Hon. Emanuele Ottolenhi

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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18th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum Panama City, Panama 🇵🇦 June 29- 30, 2021
-Hon. Emanuele Ottolenhi
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Dr. Arlingue, you're with us virtually. We'd welcome your response to that question in the
broader context of trade-based money laundering, if you could be with us at this time. Perhaps we
have a... there he is. Dr. Arlingue, please. Good afternoon, everyone. Buenas tardes, Panama.
It's a great pleasure to be here today, and I apologize for not being able to be
there in person. Don't be misguided by thinking that I
avoided you because I'm skiing, as you can see in the background. I'm actually in my home
in the Washington area. It's a great honor to participate in this panel. It's a pleasure.
I think that this initiative is extremely important. It's been going on for a number
of years thanks to the leadership of Congressman Robert Pittenger. I want to thank him in particular
for continuing tenaciously to pursue this issue. And this issue that we're discussing today on
this panel is of particular urgency and importance. Let me start with the figure.
The United Nations assesses that the global value of the annual trade of drugs globally
is in excess of $320 billion U.S. dollars. Now, that is a staggering figure for just one
of many illicit activities that organized crime is involved in. Organized crime has morphed
in the last three decades. It has become globalized as much as the illicit legal economy.
And a globalized illicit industry that generates this amount of revenues needs avenues to repatriate
the ill-gotten gains of crime through formal financial channels. When you're handling
more than $300 billion a year's worth of revenue, you simply don't have enough suitcases
and twin engine planes to move it about across the world. That is where trade-based
money laundering comes in. Trade-based money laundering is, very simply put, a system,
a mechanism to move value from point A to point B. Drug cartels sell, deliver cocaine to buyers,
let's say, in the United States. Drugs are sold on the streets. Money is handed over to drug
dealers. It goes up the chain of supply. At some point, those large quantities of cash
collected on the street and through informal mechanisms across the United States or across
Europe or elsewhere, wherever the market may be, need to be sent back to the seller. And
that kind of money cannot travel in cash across borders. That's where the trade-based money
comes in. Companies, sometimes set up with the specific purpose of laundering the money,
or sometimes legitimate businesses who offer their services occasionally to crime,
lend their hands to move the cash. How do they do that? In a variety of ways.
They make up fake, false, fraudulent invoices in order to justify the transit of money
through their bank accounts. They send merchandise that is counterfeit,
but declare the value as if it was real brand. So they engage in intellectual property fraud as well.
They overcharge the cost of the merchandise they're selling. One example that I can mention
to you from a case involving a Turkish gold trader that was laundering money for the Islamic
Republic of Iran in one specific transaction. He had his yacht-making, yacht-manufacturing company
charge $250 a pound of brown sugar to a non-existent company. That is the kind of
fraudulent paperwork that is involved in the cover-up of movement of money through
regular channels. And therefore you have hundreds of companies that can play this game,
thousands indeed, because we live in a globalized economy where the volume of
trade is staggering and the ability of authorities in entry points of each country,
whether it's customs or airport and port authorities, to monitor physically the
merchandise is extremely limited. Of course there are sophisticated ways to try and pinpoint
anomalous shipments based on a variety of factors such as the weights declared,
such as the prices declared, such as the nature of the merchandise traded.
When you have a company that deals in electronics, for example, that sells
PlayStation platforms all the time and all of a sudden they're shipping cosmetics,
that's an anomaly. When you have a company that deals with clothing and they suddenly buy 40 tons
of charcoal from Latin America, that's an anomaly. So those are things that authorities can do.
They cannot monitor all the traffic because doing that would eventually essentially disrupt
the global economy. So cartels and the hundreds, thousands of companies involved in trade-based
money laundering count on that fact. The fact that the ability of authorities to monitor each
and every transaction, to inspect and verify the nature of the merchandise declared at shipment and
origin or destination is limited. And here is the second problem, enters the terrorists, because
while cartels and organized crime or crime syndicates may have control of their territories
wherever they may be, Mexican cartels in Mexico, Colombian cartels in Colombia, PCC in Brazil,
the Andrangheta in Calabria in southern Italy and so on. But when they globalize their business
and the revenue they generate through the illicit activities has to be returned to them from distant
shores, they don't necessarily have a presence where they're doing business. If a Colombian
cartel sells cocaine to Australia, to a criminal underworld buyer in Australia, they don't
necessarily have the infrastructure to bring the money back from Australia. And building it is
expensive. It's complicated because you have to go to a terrain that you're not familiar with.
That terrain is controlled by other criminal organizations. And here's where the terrorist
groups come in, especially the Lebanese Hezbollah. Why? Because Lebanese Hezbollah
relies on a global network of expatriates. And the Lebanese diaspora is one of the most
globalized and spread out in the world. A global network of expatriates to launder money.
And the advantage that they provide to their criminal partners is that they have businesses
everywhere they can rely on. They trade in just about anything. They can rely on the loyalty of
their members. And they're not competing. So when the Colombian cartel sells to Australia,
they may do a deal with a local criminal buyer. But for the money to return,
they rely on Hezbollah. Hezbollah does not compete with them in that market. It doesn't try to steal
a chunk of the market. It acts as a mediator, as an intermediary, as a service provider.
And that is why you see, when you look at TBML, trade-based money laundering,
you see a lot of interaction between crime and terror finance. Of course,
those involved in providing this type of service are not doing it
out of any other reason, but to make money for themselves. To provide services to criminal
organized crime means that you're engaging in a high risk business. And so typically,
you can charge significant amounts of money. Cartels don't file a tax return on April 15th
every year, so they don't have to factor in the cost of taxes and accountants to comply with
legislation. Spending 10-15% of their income to launder the money back and have it available
at their own disposal is actually a quite inexpensive proposition.
And so this is what happens. They rely on a terror organization to launder money,
and this is happening on a global scale. Once again, the networks are complex, cross-border,
trans-jurisdictional, relying on a mixture of ideological commitment, family connections,
greed, and opportunities. And so, for example, one important trade-based money laundering scheme
that US authorities investigated in the past decade that should probably resonate,
especially to a Central American audience, involved a Colombian-based Lebanese national
named Ayman Juma, who was working closely with Mexican and Colombian cartels.
The network, at the height of its activity, was laundering as much as 200 million US dollars
a month. And when you consider that they were taking anything between 8% and 15%
of $200 million a month, you realize that this network alone was generating
more than $200 million of revenue for Hezbollah every year.
The network was relying on a mixture of informal and formal channels. The informal channels
involved Hawala and the black market, the black person market exchange system,
to move money informally between money exchangers through networks of
confidence and mutual trust. But it was also relying on a giant, on a large-scale
scheme that involved companies in the United States, in West Africa, in Lebanon, and in Asia.
The companies in the United States were selling used cars to West Africa, who were using the cash
from cocaine proceeds. The money, then, the cars were being resold locally at a profit,
and the revenues from that operation would then be channeled to Lebanon
to accounts that would be used by companies in Asia to buy merchandise and then sell it back
to front companies in Venezuela and Colombia. So that was the way that the money was moving,
from the cocaine being shipped to being sold, the money being funneled through multiple stages,
and returned back to the Colombian and Mexican. At each stage, there would be transactions between
buyers and sellers, and the money would move in one direction and merchandise in the other.
All of that was not real commerce, but it was designed to move the money back to the cartels.
And so this is why it is so important to focus on trade-based money laundering. There are many
ways to launder money, and there are many new avenues and opportunities, from cryptocurrencies
to the traditional schemes of moving money in suitcases or relying on
precious metals and so on. But in the global economy where we live in, with the volume of
trade annually growing and merchandise moving across the globe at staggering quantities and
speed, trade-based money laundering remains one of the most important ways criminal syndicates
launder money. And it is increasingly one of the ways that terror organizations such as the
raise funds independently to support their own ideological struggles.
So it is extremely important that this forum looks at this topic and draws some important
practical lessons that can be applied through legislation and through enforcement.
One important thing that I would like all of you in the audience to take away
is this. As I said, oftentimes in trade-based money laundering schemes we see the convergence
of terror finance and organized crime. This convergence is toxic for a number of reasons.
Now, for many countries in Latin America especially, the issue of terrorism is remote,
especially when you mention Hezbollah. Hezbollah is in Lebanon. The conflicts that Hezbollah
participates in are a world away. But what Hezbollah does to fund those conflicts is not
a world away, it is at your doorstep. Because as I said, when you look at these transactions there
are a number of violations. There is contraband, there is tax evasion, there is intellectual
property fraud, there is corruption of public officials, sometimes there are environmental
impacts. One of the things we've seen in recent times from Latin America involving
drug cartels and potentially Hezbollah is the extensive use of charcoal as an export cover
for drugs. Charcoal is one of the drivers of deforestation in Latin America. We are seeing
a significant uptick in illegal gold mining, which is destroying the environment in Latin America,
whether it's Brazil or Venezuela, Colombia or Peru. A lot of these activities are linked to
organized crime and they also feed additional criminal endeavors, such as human trafficking,
because the illegal mining villages need prostitution for the workers, among other
things. So it is a chain, a cascade of crimes that are related to these types of activities.
That is why it's important for governments to pay attention to them, because while terrorism
may not directly impact governments in the region, the consequences of terror finance
being complicit with organized crime are significant and impact you locally and directly.
Second of all, very important to mention, some of these organizations such as the Lebanese
Hezbollah, in order to maintain loyalty and influence within the communities that help them
invest considerable resources in indoctrinating and radicalizing the youth. So they're actually
exporting a problem of radicalization and intolerance in those societies where they operate.
Third of all, of course, by facilitating crime, taking resources away from the state,
whether it is again tax evasion or contraband or intellectual fraud or a variety of other
such crimes, they are reducing the amount of resources that governments have to invest in
the things that governments should invest in, infrastructure, good governance, education,
public health, and so on. So the damage that these schemes cause to governments are staggering
and they require being addressed. And one of the ways they can be better addressed
is to increase transparency at all levels. First, transparency in public commercial records.
It is extremely of value and of importance that governments enforce the principle of
corporate transparency. People need to know who their clients are. We need to know who's
behind the business. Here in the United States, in my own county, I can access the real estate
records of my county and find out where you own a house and whether you have a mortgage and at
what bank you have a mortgage. But if you own a company, I do not know who is the real owner.
That's a problem. And again, the United States is not at the forefront of fixing it,
but it is extremely important that transparency be increased. That is the first step.
The second step, of course, is that given that you're dealing oftentimes with
crime and terror finance combined, you need intelligence agencies and law enforcement
to work together. Third, what you need to also encourage and enhance is cooperation
among governments and their public agencies and public officials. For example,
when you have a trade-based money laundering scheme, almost invariably you will have companies
that are involved, which are based in two, three or four different countries. You cannot
tackle effectively and prosecute and bring people to justice effectively these challenges unless
the justice system, the police, the law enforcement agencies of these countries
have a tradition and a procedure and a mutual confidence to share the information.
The other thing is, of course, that sharing information needs to happen between
law enforcement, which is focused on bringing people to justice, and intelligence, which is
more focused on the preventative side. Sometimes the information that the intelligence has
cannot be leveraged in court, but it can help the law enforcement better understand
what they're confronting. More communication between the two is therefore of the essence.
This type of transparency and communication across borders should also happen in those specific
spheres that are most involved on a day-to-day basis in trade, namely customs authorities and
port authorities and also the financial institutions that are processing the payments for trade.
Oftentimes that information is there, but it's not being shared between the stakeholders in a
timely way to ensure that bad transactions are caught. So, at all levels, transparency.
Last but not least, and it seems important in this forum, oftentimes,
especially in the world of a global economy of the 21st century with the digitalized world,
the corporate world, private corporate companies have their own intelligence gathering
and due diligence mechanisms, which sometimes have better information and are faster in gathering and
processing than government agencies. So, there also needs to be a lot more communication between
law enforcement, government stakeholders on the one hand, and the private sector. And again,
there is a lot to gain. Who is going to be hurt when intellectual property fraud happens?
The state, for sure, because there's revenue lost from taxes, but it is also the global brand that
is harmed. So, once again, transparency at all levels, cooperation between law enforcement
intelligence, cooperation across borders, cooperation between trade, customs agencies,
and dialogue between government and the private sector can go a long way to mitigate this
challenge. I'm going to stop here, and I thank you for the opportunity.
Do we have further...
