LIVE: IMF Holds Press Briefing on Regional Economic Outlook in the Asia Pacific Department

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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) holds a press briefing on the regional economic outlook in the Asia and Pacific Department at 8:00 a.m. ET on April 16.
Good morning and welcome to our attendees here in the room,
and good evening to those joining us virtually and online from Asia.
This is the press briefing on the regional outlook for Asia and the Pacific.
I am Randa Nagar from the IMF's Communications Department.
Joining me today is Krishna Finivasan, Director of the Asia and Pacific Department,
and Thomas Helbling, Deputy Director of the IMF's Asia and Pacific Department.
To kick-start our briefing, Krishna will give some opening remarks,
and then we're going to take your questions. Krishna.
Thank you, Randa. Good morning to participants here in Washington,
and a very good evening to those joining online from Asia.
Welcome to our press briefing on Asia and the Pacific.
Allow me to make a few opening remarks before I take your questions.
Asia entered 2026 on a solid footing, with growth remaining resilient despite the region bearing
the brunt of U.S. tariffs and heightened uncertainty. However, given the region's
high fossil fuel intensity and reliance on the conflict areas for key commodities,
the new energy shock will have a negative impact on the region.
The shock is raising inflation, weakening external balances,
tightening financial conditions, and narrowing policy space.
Let me elaborate on these. First, let's take a look at Asia's resilience.
If you look at the chart here, growth across most Asian economies
turned out stronger than expected in late 2025. This is in large part thanks to exports and
consumption, which held up better than anticipated, supported by accommodative
policies and financial conditions. With regard to exports, much of the recent strength has been
driven by robust demand for tech goods, if you can see on the chart on the left.
This has benefited many Asian economies that are deeply integrated into tech supply chains.
In addition, trade diversification toward the rest of the world also helped cushion
softer import demand from the U.S., especially for non-tech exports, and you can see that on
the right-hand side chart. So, Asia's exports to the U.S. declined, but that to the rest of
the world increased. As for other growth drivers, which are shown here, consumption recovered at
different speeds across countries, while investment, not surprisingly given the
uncertainty, remained soft in many economies amid uncertainty and country-specific shocks.
Let me now turn to the immediate challenge. In the context of the war in the Middle East,
oil and gas prices have risen sharply, and there's considerable uncertainty about how
persistent the shock will be. Asia is significantly exposed to the energy shock.
This is because of three key reasons. First, the region is highly energy intensive,
and you can see that in the chart on the left-hand side. The use of oil and gas amounts to about 4%
of GDP for the region as a whole, although there is variation across countries. Now, this 4% which
I talked about is nearly double Europe's share, and there's a lot of heterogeneity. For example,
oil and gas use exceeds 10% in Malaysia and Thailand, but it's only 2% in Australia and
New Zealand. Second, limited domestic production means that this high energy intensity translates
into import dependence. Altogether, net oil and gas imports amount to about 2.5% of GDP
for the region, rising to about 8% for some economies such as Singapore and Thailand.
And third, we don't show that here, the region is also exposed through non-energy inputs.
Disruptions of fertilizers and petrochemical inputs such as helium and sulfur can create
broader supply chain pressures if the conflict persists. Now, turning to the forecast,
the negative impact of the energy shock has been offset to a considerable extent by the tailwinds
that already put the region on a solid footing. Hence, under our reference scenario,
which assumes a conflict of limited scope and duration, growth forecasts for Asia are broadly
unchanged relative to our forecast in January. And Asia remains the main driver of global growth.
Regional growth is projected to moderate from 5% in 2025 to 4.4% in 2026 and 4.2% in 2027.
Advanced Asia is expected to slow as domestic demand stays soft. Emerging Asia remains the
main growth engine, but the momentum is set to moderate with broad-based decelerations in China,
India and the ASEAN, as higher energy prices weigh on consumption and external positions.
The composition of the outlook is also less favorable. Inflation is projected to rise from
1.4% in 2025 to 2.6% in 2026 and to ease to 2.4% in 2027. External balances are weaker,
policy space is narrower, and more importantly, risks are now firmly to the downside.
First, what are these risks? First, a larger or more persistent energy shock
would hit Asia-Pacific countries unevenly. Second, economies that depend heavily on
imported energy use are especially vulnerable. Third, risks are greater still where energy
buffers and fiscal space are limited or where remittances, tourism or fertilizer imports add
to the exposure. This matters in parts of South Asia, Southeast Asia and key among the Pacific
countries. To better quantify risks, the WIO includes two adverse scenarios.
Under the adverse scenario, the increase in energy prices is larger and more persistent,
with oil prices rising to about 60% above the January forecast in 2026 and remaining 20% higher
in 2027. This leads to a cumulative output loss of about 0.8% by 2027 for the major Asian economies
and to higher inflation. In the more severe scenario, the shock becomes more persistent
and damaging. The economic drag worsens due to second round effects with cumulative output losses
almost 2% by 2027. Energy exposed economies, especially in some South and Southeast Asian
economies, will be hit the hardest. Turning to policies, the near-term priority is to
absorb the shock while preserving space and price signals. Starting with monetary policy,
so far inflation expectations remain broadly anchored in 2027, which gives central banks
some room to look through the first round rise in headline inflation. But monetary policy should
remain agile. A prolonged energy shock could weaken currencies and generate more persistent
inflation through exchange rate pass-through and broader second round effects. Let me provide a
few country examples. In Japan, where inflation is expected to rise above the target from below,
the central bank can look through the first round of energy shock and continue withdrawing
accommodation. By contrast, the scope to look through the shock is more limited in economies
where inflation is already above target and pressures remain firm, such as in Australia.
In economies where inflation remains below target, such as Thailand and the Philippines,
further rate cuts can be paused to preserve room for easing later. Finally, it's important in this
context to allow flexible exchange rates to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and be
guided by the IMF's integrated policy framework, should movements become excessive or disorderly.
What about fiscal policy? Fiscal policy requires a careful balancing act. Prudence matters more
than in the past, as shocks and interest costs are rising, debt levels are higher, and fiscal
space is narrower, as seen in the chart on the left-hand side. This means that where needed,
fiscal support should be temporary, with sunset clauses targeted to vulnerable households and
viable firms, while designed to preserve fiscal price signals. In places where the fiscal space
is limited and inflation risks are elevated, support should be budget-neutral, meaning
policymakers should find offsetting savings elsewhere in the budget or implement new revenue
measures. In that respect, it is vital to ensure coherence between monetary and fiscal policies.
Let me note that broad fuel subsidies, tax cuts, and general price caps may smooth inflation in
the short run, but they are costly, distortionary, often regressive, and very hard to unwind.
In fact, as shown in the right chart, higher energy prices can quickly trigger new support
measures and make existing subsidies more expensive, as in 2022. I'll close with a broader
message. This shock strengthens the case for structural reform, it does not weaken it. Let me
first lay out the issues. In many economies, despite high growth and strong investment in education,
youth unemployment remains extremely elevated, as the chart on the left-hand side shows.
Highly educated young workers are struggling to find positions that match their qualifications.
This points to persistent skill mismatches and a weak connection between education systems and
labor market needs. Then there's AI that has the potential to deliver sizable gains in growth and
productivity across Asia. But if adoption moves faster than skills adjust, as shown in the right
chart, it could worsen these mismatches and make labor market pressures that much more acute,
especially for young workers. This strengthens the case for rethinking education and re-skilling
more broadly, making universities and technical programs more responsive to employer demand,
and equipping graduates with skills that firms actually need. What other reforms are needed to
We have been calling across Asia for stronger social safety nets that would make it easier
to protect vulnerable households without relying on generalized subsidies. Stronger domestic final
demand and deeper regional integration that would reduce dependence on external demand and improve
resilience to external shocks. And last but not least, investment in alternative energy sources,
energy efficiency, power grids, and that would reduce vulnerability to future fuel import shocks.
So the near-term task is to absorb the shocks while preserving price signals and policy credibility.
The medium-term task is to build a more resilient and more balanced and more inclusive growth model.
With that, let me thank you. I look forward to your questions. Thomas and me will be answering
your questions. Thank you very much, Krishna. We're going to take your questions. So please,
before you start, identify yourself and your news organization.
We're going to be grouping your questions. So please, we're going to start with regional
questions. So give me your questions. The lady in the front row.
Thank you. My name is Rui Zhou. I'm with 21st Century Business Herald Guangdong, China.
So my question focuses on China. So how does the IMF assess the current growth momentum in China,
especially between the domestic demand recovery and external headwinds,
and also what role can China play in supporting economic developments globally? Thank you.
Thank you for the question. So you can see from our growth forecast for China, we have lowered
our growth forecast from, you know, it was 5% in 2025. It's now 4.4%, modestly reduced from our
January forecast, and it slows on further in 2027. Now, momentum in China has been helped by
a number of factors, including because tariffs have come down compared to what we had earlier.
And there is strong momentum coming starting from 2025 onwards. That's been offset by the
energy shock, which we've taken into account. But as you can see today, the numbers came out
for the first quarter, and they were stronger than we had internalized in our projections and
also stronger than consensus. So there is some upside potential to growth in China going forward,
and we look at the numbers again in the context of our forecast in July. That said, if you look
at the numbers, China still relies a lot on exports. Production is stronger, exports are
domestic demand remains weak. So our fundamental policy advice with China of rebalancing the
economy towards greater consumption, that stays. Notwithstanding the momentum, the fact is that
China cannot rely on export-led growth going forward. It's quite a big economy, and so it
needs to rebalance, and that remains. That policy advice, which will be articulated in our substantive
staff report, remains. I'll go to the lady next to me.
And if we can focus on regional, please. Okay, go back to China.
Thank you, Randa. I have a first question about energy shock. You mentioned that a lot of the
Asian economies are exposed to energy shocks, and they rely heavily on imports. So what's the
suggestions for those countries specifically when they have to import a lot of energy and they're
more vulnerable? Secondly, about trade, because right now the war is going on, and it's likely
to disrupt trade as well, and Asia is very integrated in the global supply chain. Do you
think this kind of disruptions would facilitate regional integration within the Asian region?
Thank you. Thank you for the question. As I showed in my chart, this is a region which relies a lot
on – it's very energy intensive, and so if you look at the energy intensity for the region as a
whole, it's 4% of GDP. The numbers do matter. For some countries, it's even higher, 8% to 10%,
and because domestic production of energy is much on the lower side, they import a lot. So
they are much more vulnerable to the energy shock than many other regions. So that's clearly an
issue that they're grappling with. And what does it mean for policies? We've talked about that.
In the case of monetary policy, most countries should wait to tighten further. They have the
room to look through the shock. In our reference scenario, we assume that the shock is of limited
duration, so they have the room right now to look through the shock. But if, suppose, the shock
intensifies or the duration increases, then they'll have to adjust monetary policy accordingly.
On fiscal policy, we are very clear. Let price signals work, because if you don't let price
signals work, you're not going to let demand and supply match in the context of supply shortages,
and that's going to be inimical for prospects around the world. So we're talking about
targeted fiscal support, targeted to vulnerable people and viable firms, and that's important to
preserve the buffers. All countries have been hit by repeated shocks, so buffers have gone down.
So you want to preserve your buffer. So that's why we emphasize on the need to provide
targeted support, support which is temporary, so have sunset clauses. So that's the thing.
In terms of your second question, we've talked about this in the past, right? Integration within
Asia is limited because many countries in Asia use non-tariff barriers. Now, this could be a
wake-up call. This could be a way for countries in Asia to trade more with each other,
reduce non-tariff barriers, and increase trade integration. So this is something which we've
been calling for in the past, and this shock in some sense also underscores the need to diversify
your trading partners and so on, and so greater integration is something which we would call for.
Thank you. Any further regional questions?
Thank you, Randa. Hi, Krishna. Hi, Thomas. Karishma from Business Today, India Today Group.
You've given, from a broader perspective, the regional outlook seems a bit weakening,
is what you've said, on the growth aspect. I want to specifically ask, what is the road ahead for
small states in the region, and what kind of policy support do you think they'll need?
I also have a quick follow-up question, which is on India, certainly. You've given a slightly
optimistic estimate for India's growth when it comes to 2026 and 2027, both. A couple of changes
in the country with calculating the GDP, the base year has been changed, and now, if the situation
gets worse, then they will have to take further brunt of the fuel prices and pass it on to
consumers. Do you think they'll have the appetite to bear this? So when you talked about small
states, Karishma, I wasn't sure you're talking about small states in South Asia, are you talking
about the Pacific Islands? Yeah. So we are very concerned about the small state in the Pacific
Islands, because these countries' cost of living has been an issue even before the shock.
They're highly dependent on imports of oil, gas, and so on and so forth. There is diesel, kerosene,
and so on. So we are very concerned. And also, what's important to note is that even if
things become more novel in terms of disruptions come down, by the time the ships go from
the Middle East to the Pacific Island, it's a long time. So we are very concerned about these
countries, and they have more limited buffers. So that's something which we need to take into
account, and we are here to provide any kind of support that they need, whether it's policy
support or financial assistance and so on. In terms of India, we have modestly increased our
forecast from 6% to by 0.1% point, and that partly reflects the fact that momentum coming into
2026 was strong, and also tariffs were lowered from 50% to 10%. So that gives Philip to the
economy activity, in addition to the tax reforms which they had done last year. So of course,
the question is if this shock intensifies, both in terms of duration and expanse beyond just oil
and gas, that could be disruptive for India. So far, they've been very prudent on the fiscal,
they have built buffers over the years, and they've been able to provide support. But if this
intensifies, it'll get worse for all countries, including for India. So that's something which
you have to watch out for. We'll go to this side of the room, the gentleman in the second row.
Thank you, Krishna. This is Vishnu from South Asian Herald. Given that nearly half of India's
remittances come from the Gulf region, how significant could a potential 5 to 10 billion
decline for India's external accounts due to the conflict? How might similar remittance
dependencies affect other South Asian countries like Bangladesh and Nepal? The second question
is, what policy measures can India adopt to cushion the effects of prolonged volatility
in global commodity markets? How vulnerable are South Asian economies to extended disruptions
in global trade and supply chains? Thank you. Thank you. On your question on remittances,
so far what we've seen is remittances have held pretty strong, pretty robust.
And you can see that that's reflected in the fact that people from India and other Asian
countries have not left the Middle East, so they're still there. So remittances have held
up quite strongly. And one part of me tells me that, given infrastructure needs to be built
back again in these countries, I think remittances are likely to stay strong. That's my gut feeling.
In terms of what they can do, what can countries do, I think they have to use their buffers very
wisely. Countries like India have been very prudent on fiscal. They have accumulated buffers.
And so even – but here, too, they have to allow price signals to work and use their buffers in a
efficient way. Because if this shock intensifies, they will need the buffers. So again, we have been
emphasizing the principles in terms of providing targeted support, targeted to people who need it
the most, targeted to firms which are viable, and so on and so forth. So hold your – keep
your buffers in such a – or expand your buffers in such a way that you give it to those who really
need it. The gentleman here – I'm going to stay on this side of the room.
Good morning. I'm Krishna Acharya, Canterbury Media Group from Nepal. Given the war in Middle
East, how does the IMF plan to help countries like Nepal? Thank you. I think Thomas will take
that question. In general, the IMF stands ready to help all our member countries. In particular,
of course, at this moment, we focus on more vulnerable, lower-income countries. That's
as usual. The IMF stands ready. We also stand ready to support countries through policy advice
and consult as needed. We can quickly react. And in the case of Nepal, we – as you know,
there was recently a staff-level agreement on the seventh review. I believe that was concluded.
The program will go to the board, and then that will be the end of the program. And the IMF will
continue to close collaboration with Nepal and support policymaking, both in terms of surveillance
but also through capacity development, help any policy adjustment needed. Thank you.
Thank you, Thomas. We're going to go on Webex. I know that there's another Nepal question now,
so if we can take it.
Namaste. Good evening from Nepal. I am Janardhan Baral. I work for Online Power.
There is a debate in Nepal about reviewing the pegging of its currency to the Indian rupees.
Many economies in the world exercise the pegged exchange rate system. My question is whether
maintaining pegged exchange rate regime benefits small and vulnerable countries like Nepal,
especially when tackling the major geopolitical and economic shocks such as ongoing conflict in
the Middle East. Should countries like Nepal consider alternatives to pegged exchange rate?
And may I ask another question as well? We can stay to one question,
please, because we have a lot of questions and little time. Thank you.
So on your question, as Krishna mentioned, the general advice is to let the exchange rate be a
shock absorber. But that's the general advice. It's for countries that typically have inflation
targeting regimes and some exchange rate flexibility. So for Nepal, Nepal has a pegged
exchange rate. The pegged exchange rate system is the nominal anchor, and our general advice is
for such systems, if they're well established, to keep them and reconsider the exchange rate
in good times, not in times of vulnerabilities or stresses or uncertainty as in current times.
I would also note that thanks to the IMF arrangement that Nepal has had, Nepal with
the reforms has built some fiscal buffers. So the government has some scope along the lines
that Krishna mentioned with targeted and limited measures to help the population and the country
to absorb the shock. Thank you. Go back to the room, please. The lady on the right.
Hi, Rekha Kihar from Reuters. Given Asian countries are under severe strain from the
Middle East conflict, has any countries in the region asked for IMF help already? And if so,
can you identify? Thank you. So as mentioned, we are here to provide support. And we have
programs in four countries. We're talking to those in terms of their needs. In terms of new programs,
as of now, we have not heard anything from countries. But as I said, we are here to help.
And it's not just about financial assistance, it's also about policy advice. So for a lot of
countries, we're engaging very intensively in terms of providing advice of what they should
be doing on policies. We go to the left. Hello, good morning. I'm Catherine Chen from Business
World in the Philippines. So I have questions for the Philippines. So you got your projection
for a country to 4.1% from 5.6% in January, but you kept it at 5.8% for 2027. I'm wondering if
this tells us that the economic drags from this crisis would be just for the short term for a
country? And what are the growth drivers behind the rebound that you're expecting for next year?
And maybe just another quick point, as a country that's already grappling with a budget deficit,
and where domestic headwinds have already slowed our fiscal consolidation, even before this war
erupted, how can the government ensure that their fiscal response to this crisis will not further
erode the economy? And can they afford sustaining their fuel subsidies and possibly suspending
their excise tax on fuel until this conflict ends? Thank you.
So there were lots of questions in one question. So I might not remember all the questions,
but let me try. So this was in the Philippines, right? On the Philippines, we have a lower
forecast. The momentum coming into 2026 was weaker. And this reflects the fact that the
country's sentiment is still weak, given the governance issues with these flood control
projects, the public flood control projects. So that was already weighing on sentiment
across investors. And then comes a shock. And as you can see from the chart I showed,
Philippines is a very energy-intensive economy. It relies a lot on imports. So
the shock has a lot of significant bearing on prospects in Philippines.
The question about policy advice, see, many countries, we've seen over the last two decades,
we've seen multiple shocks. So over the years, countries have lost buffers. And so they have to
be that much more cognizant of the fact that buffers are lower. And so when you talk about
providing support, we keep harping on the point about providing targeted support. Why do we say
that? Because buffers have come down, and we don't know how long this shock will last. So providing
targeted support is very important, and that applies in the case of Philippines.
Debt levels aren't very low. It's still at about 60%. So there's not much by way of fiscal buffers.
So use your buffers in a very efficient way. And that's what is important for Philippines and for
other countries in the region, especially those which rely a lot on imports, don't have much by
way of fiscal buffers of oil and gas. Krishna, I will read a couple of questions on ASEAN.
So we received questions from The Nation, Taipublica, and TV3 about what would a smart,
sustainable, and effective means to manage fiscal policy by authorities look like while
monetary policy is managed by BOT? There's another question on ASEAN. Looking at ASEAN's public debt,
does Thailand's position, the most fragile, has the region's public debt position deteriorated?
And what advice do you have to Thailand and ASEAN to handle rising debts while maintaining growth?
Thank you for the question. On the issue of Thailand, the question was about debt,
whether Thailand stands out. I think debt levels in Thailand are slightly below 70, at about 65-66%,
and that's not very different to what we see in Malaysia and the Philippines. So Thailand, yes,
the debt is on the higher side, but it's not among the weakest in terms of the levels of debt.
But this also puts the onus on making sure that you use your fiscal resources wisely,
and so the principles we talked about applies for Thailand as much as they apply for other
countries we talked about. In the broader case of ASEAN, there is a lot of heterogeneity
in terms of how we see energy intensity, in terms of buffers, and so on. But the broad principles
of monetary policy looking through this shock, waiting to move on monetary policy is important.
At the same time, if the risk of inflation expectations getting an unanchored rise,
then you have to be agile and tighten monetary policy. So at this point in time, they can wait
to move on monetary policy. On fiscal policy, provide a targeted support which is aimed at
the poor and the vulnerable and viable firms, and that's important to make sure that you stay
within your – this is not the time to actually play around with fiscal frameworks and so on. So
I would say that's an important point to make. Thank you. We'll go back to the room.
I'll go to the lady in the back. Hi, my name is Sang-Eun Lee from the
Korea Economic Daily newspaper from South Korea. And South Korea is one of the countries
most severely affected by the blockade of Strait of Hormuz. And how do you assess the scale of
economic scar this shock may leave on Korean economy going forward? And do you view this
as a one-time shock, or do you believe this will have sustained increase in cost for business
over the longer term due to the supply chain realignment needed?
Thank you. On Korea, as for the vulnerability, I think it's – we see Korea in line with us
Asia as a whole. It's energy importing region. Korea, we would point out, is in the fortunate
situation that it starts from a strong macro condition. Growth has picked up. It has benefited
from a tech cycle, and those benefits will carry into 26 and 27 in our current forecast. And we
expect these benefits to remain in place. The government has been very proactive trying to
mitigate the impact of the shock. It benefits that it has substantial energy buffers. It has
been proactive in encouraging other sources of energy. And then in terms of the shock itself,
I think that's what Krishna mentioned earlier. There's considerable forecast uncertainty.
In our reference scenario, it's a relatively moderate short-lived shock, mainly in the first
half of the year, and then it will subside in the second half. But then we have adverse scenarios.
As Krishna mentioned, the adverse scenario is just the oil price mostly higher throughout
2026. And in the severe scenario, the oil price will stay high into 27. That clearly would change
the picture in Korea and elsewhere in Asia, but our view is it's too early to tell how this oil
shock will play out. In the severe case, it will be a bigger concern for the global economy and for
the region, of course, but we will see. Thank you. We'll stay in the room. The gentleman in the
middle. Thank you, Randa. I had a good question about the situation for countries such as Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh, which was already in a quite difficult situation a few years back,
and I am among those that are most impacted by the energy crisis right now. I wanted to have
your opinion about that and how concerned you are about this country. And that's it. Thank you.
Thank you. So again, all these countries have IMO-supported programs, and in the case of Sri
Lanka, over the last three years, they have made significant improvement in boosting their tax
revenues and revenue as a share of GDP. So they have gradually built up fiscal buffers. So in
some sense, I would say they're better placed to provide support to people who are hurting from
this energy shock. But again, the principles applied to them even more than to other countries
make it very targeted and temporary in such a way that you use whatever buffers you have in a very
efficient way. In the case of Bangladesh, their revenue base is on the lower side, their revenue
intake is on the lower side, and so they are that much more hard-pressed to provide support. But
again, people are hurting in Bangladesh, so it's even more important to use whatever resources you
have to make it as targeted as possible. I think at the same time, they need to really work towards
improving their revenue intake, which is among the lowest in the world, and they also need to
take into account other impediments in the financial sector and so on, so that they can get
growth going over the near term and over the longer term. Thank you. We have other questions
on Sri Lanka online, and then we go back to the room. So we're going to go on Webex now.
Go ahead. Zulfiq?
Hi, this is Zulfiq from MTV News for Sri Lanka. My question on Sri Lanka is although Sri Lanka's
sovereign debt restructuring is nearing completion, the country remains one of the
most highly indebted economies in the region. Now earlier, the IMF also warned that any fiscal
could trigger a repeat in the crisis, despite good bond spreads and accumulating reserves.
Given what is happening in the Middle East, what is the position of the IMF when it comes
to Sri Lanka's recovery in terms of protecting the poor and vulnerable and adding further support?
Thank you. Thanks for the question. Like many other countries in Asia, Sri Lanka also relies
a lot on import of energy when it includes oil and gas. So they are as vulnerable as other
countries in the region. The point I was making in response to the previous question was that
over the last three years, they have slowly built up buffers on the fiscal side. Their revenue as
a share of GDP has doubled from the bottom of the crisis to where we are today. So they are in a
better position than they were before to provide targeted fiscal support. At the same time,
it's important that they continue on the reforms which have embarked upon,
so that they can secure inclusive and balanced and strong growth going forward.
Thank you. We're going to take one from the room and then go back online. The gentleman on the
left. Thank you. A question from Bloomberg. Last year, the IMF called on China to allow its currency
to strengthen and rely more on domestic consumer spending. So in the meantime, since then,
what's the IMF's assessment of China's foreign exchange management? Do you see any shift
in the works? Relatedly, just another point, the renminbi is among the strongest performing
currencies amongst the major currencies since the Iran war began. Do you see a future where
more oil, for example, is priced in the UN? Thank you. I think fundamentally our advice still
stands. Let me though point out, our advice is for China to allow for more exchange rate
flexibility, for the exchange rate to, on the one hand, act as a shock absorber. On the other hand,
also allow for better and more monetary policy transmission. So we advise for more exchange rate
flexibility in the context of a policy to rebalancing the economy and strengthen domestic
demand. And as you know, we still see room for more forceful and comprehensive policies
to strengthen domestic demand, as pointed out in the last article four. As for the renminbi,
you know, the authorities have allowed the renminbi to strengthen in line with market forces,
and I think that reflects fundamentals. China has had an increasing trade surplus. I think some of
the capital outflow pressures with the strong trade performance have eased. So the fact that
the renminbi has strengthened is in line with expectations. As for the pricing of contracts,
and that's up to the market and we have no comment on that. Thank you. Thank you very much. We're
going to go back online with Webex now. Please, I know that Bloomberg Japan is online.
Hello, my name is Takashi. Can I? Yes, go ahead. My name is Takashi Umekawa from Bloomberg News,
and I have a question about the Bank of Japan. Now crude oil prices make inflation higher,
but at the same time, there is a risk of slowing economic growth. When the BOJ conducts
monetary policy, what factors should they keep in mind? Thank you. Thanks for that question.
So in terms of the BOJ's action, what we're seeing, what we're forecasting is that growth
has held up quite well in Japan. We have growth in Japan at, you know, 1.2% in 2025.
It's still at what we project at 0.7% in 2027. That's around the potential growth rate in Japan.
In terms of BOJ's action, you know, we expect inflation to rise, to increase temporarily,
and come back to target by 2027. So our advice to BOJ is to, you know, along the lines of
what we've been talking about, which is to be data dependent, and gradually start increasing
rates going forward. Activity is holding up quite well. Domestic demand is quite strong.
We see real wage growth being positive. The Shinto negotiations have been pretty robust.
So we expect domestic demand to be strong, and that is reflected in our growth forecast. You
know, we're at 0.7% in 2026, and around the same amount in 2027. Growth is holding up quite well,
and so that's where we are in terms of our advice on monetary policy.
Thank you. We'll stay on Japan. I have a question from Yuriyuki Nobu Sakamato,
is asking to elaborate on Japan's growth projections from the WIO,
and balance between fiscal prudence and expansionary policies in Japan.
So, you know, I'm just going to repeat myself in terms of answering that question. Growth was
pretty strong in 2025 at 1.2%. We expect at 0.7% this year and 0.6% next year. You know,
domestic demand remains pretty strong. You know, like I said, real wage growth is positive. The
Shinto negotiations are providing further fillip to domestic demand. So that's coming along well.
In terms of fiscal, our advice is similar to what we've been telling other countries in Asia,
which is to provide targeted support and use your buffers wisely. I mean, compared to other
countries in the region, I would say Japan, China, and Korea have physical buffers of energy,
which others don't. So Japan is better placed. That said, you have to use your buffers wisely,
and that's our fiscal policy advice for countries in the region.
Thank you. We have three minutes left, so we're going to go back to our colleagues online.
Okay, we go online and then we come back to them. Okay, please go online. Jamuna, hello?
Okay, while they're connecting, we're going to go to the room.
Hi, this is Jamuna. This is Thomas from Jamuna Television in Bangladesh.
I was actually asking two questions. One is how do you assess the current economic
situation of Bangladesh, especially the reform of the IMF program, especially within the banking
system and the revenue generation, as you were talking about the revenue generation earlier?
And the second question will be, considering the energy crisis right now going on in Bangladesh,
do you have any additional financing packages that you can offer to Bangladesh to deal with
this kind of situation, especially as a budget support? Thank you.
So like other countries in Asia, Bangladesh is also affected by the energy shock. They import
a lot of energy, so they're affected by the shock. We're working with the authorities in terms of
policy support and on the programs. Negotiations are ongoing, discussions are ongoing, so we'll
have to just wait and see how those things pan out. Thank you. We have one more question to go,
please. We're going to go to the last question in the room. Identify yourself, please.
Good morning. I'm from Bangladesh. So thank you very much for the chance, Krishna. You visited
three weeks back Bangladesh and met our prime minister and finance minister, all the ministers
down the line. So what is your impression regarding the new government and their fiscal
management, fiscal space, because you know our revenue is very poor. So what is your assessment
regarding that? And another issue of some installment is due. So what is your position
when you are going to release the installment? And another question, IMF MD last day here in the
briefing, Kristalina, she said that a country like Bangladesh and the developing countries,
they should not waste time and start negotiation if they need additional finance. Thank you so much.
Thank you. So you're right, I did go to Bangladesh. I met with the prime minister,
I met with the finance minister and so on. And we had a good discussion in terms of the challenges
the country faces and made the point that a new government with a significant majority,
this is the right time to undertake ambitious reforms. And so they heard us and now we wait
to see how they react to that. I would say that in terms of revenue intake, Bangladesh has not
done well. It's on the lower side and it has actually, revenue intake has slipped over the
last three years. So a lot of reforms are needed in Bangladesh, both on the fiscal side, on the
financial sector and on the exchange rate reform. So the three pillars on which the program was
based, all of those, there's work to be done. In terms of your last question, the team is
negotiating, is having continued discussions with the authorities and we'll have an update for you
down the road. I know I promised the last question, but my colleagues online are asking me
because of the time difference in New Zealand, our Reuters colleagues and PAC News are asking about
the effect of the oil imports, specifically energy imports on Pacific Islands and how could they
navigate the crisis. So you're supposed to take that? I'll take it. I think on the Pacific Island
countries, the concerns are broadly similar to that of the region. There's a specific element,
of course, they're smaller, they're further away. So besides our general recommendation of using
buffers wisely, we would also encourage the countries to be proactive and think of supply
chains, procuring oils and other essential supplies on a more forward-looking basis,
working with partner countries and also then, depending on the situation in individual countries,
use the policy buffers they have within their overall framework. Thank you very much. Thanks
to our speakers Krishna and Thomas and thanks to you for attending in person and following
online with the time difference. We have reached the end of our press briefing today. We look
forward to seeing you in our other regional briefings. The Africa Regional Outlook will
follow us after this and then you're going to find the transcript data online. Have a good day.
Thank you so much. Thank you.
