415 Billion in Repo Fails The Global Banking Crisis Nobody s Talking About

Wealth Wizards
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Repo fails spiked to more than 415 billion. Treasury bill prices are jumping. Prices.
U.S. bank dealers are using their record holdings of U.S. Treasury securities. At the same time,
foreign reserve managers are doing the same thing with the same instruments. Treasury bonds are all
over the euro-dollar shadows right now, and it has nothing to do with interest rates or the Federal
Reserve, except that the Federal Reserve gives us the data that we're using here. And the answer
to where all of this is coming from and what it actually means, a big part of it, a critical part
of it, comes from Nigeria. And whenever we talk about repo, T-bills, primary dealers,
foreign reserve assets, that's going to be collateral. Since the euro-dollar system is
effectively binary, that means if collateral isn't flowing the way it needs to, then cash can't
either. That's the binary. It takes both to keep everything flowing. We're instead getting a lot
of evidence on the collateral side for the dollar shock part of the energy shock. And as we'll see,
even though the weakened question for the fails data was a quarter end,
this is beyond any typical calendar matter. And in the aftermath of that repo spike,
suddenly Treasury bills are being bought like they're going out of style, which, I mean,
kind of they are, but only to a degree. But this goes over and above supply factors,
which is why we'll be looking to Nigeria for some big clues about what's going on here.
We've already talked this past week about Taiwan, Indonesia. Well, Nigeria is the same thing,
but with a new wrinkle that just might be the key to the whole situation. And that raises a few other
questions beside how much of the current dollar shock that we're now seeing on the collateral side
might be related to other factors beyond specifically petroleum and the fallout from
that. I'm talking about, of course, private credit as well as general macroeconomic weakness,
starting with China. How much of what we're seeing across the dollar system is one or the
other, or does it actually matter? So we need to start figuring some things out, starting with
what's actually going on right now. Let's get into the numbers here because they're
pretty eye opening. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's weekly primary
dealer survey, the total of repo fails for the week of April 1st jumped to a whopping 415.5
billion. That's the highest since the middle of December when repo was all over the financial news
and anything over 400 billion. You're getting into rare company, even if the week in question was a
quarter and like the one that we're talking about. But compare this latest one to the same week in
2025 when fails were less than 190 billion. And clearly something is different. And also remember
what was going on during the end of last March. And this isn't a one week aberration either,
which can happen from time to time. Fails had soared to just shy of 380 billion a couple of
weeks before all this, the week of March 18, which just so happened to be when central banks
were meeting all around the world, including the Federal Reserve. So that that immediately
raises some questions about why fails had suddenly increased the first time. Given how
hawkish many central bank officials have become with higher oil prices, that is their nature.
The jump in fails could have been related to a large buildup of treasury shorts. In fact,
whenever fails rise, that's usually the first and only excuse which anyone in the mainstream will
offer. But in order to short a security, just like a stock, you've got to borrow the instrument.
If a lot of people have the same idea that you do, that'll lead to a rush to borrow U.S. treasuries
in order to short them, which could lead to an imbalance where repo transactions end up failing
because demand for specific treasury surges and then causes a cascade of failed repo trades further
down the line. And that was certainly plausible in mid-March. I mean, Australia's central bank
had just raised its policy rate for the second time in a row. The Bank of England was already
talking about rate hikes. So was the ECB. And both of those had held their policy meetings
during that same week. And while the Fed and Bank of Canada were more reasonable and measured in
their responses to the oil shock, the more crazy the Europeans and Japanese, don't forget the
Japanese, let's not forget Wadahawk, the more crazy that the overseas central bankers got,
the more the Casey Jeffs and the Cleveland Bess at the FOMC are going to want to join in with them.
And the treasury market knows this. Plus, treasuries at the time were already falling
in price, meaning rising rates, especially around the short middle part of the curve,
that critical two and three year spot as the market repriced central bank inflation panic.
So you can make the case. Repo fails for the week of March 18, where some part due
to treasury shorting. I don't think it was all that much, but you can you can easily make that
case. But for the latest week, not so much. By the end of March, the start of April, the entire
dynamic in the bond market had shifted, as I've covered a couple of times here on YouTube.
Treasury yields that were rising across the curve suddenly stopped and were turning around heading
lower bonds. Remember, they made that big reversal on March 27th, which is the end of the week
before the one in question. So the second recent repo spike was much less likely due to shorting
compared to the first. And the recurrence of it makes me think the one was more likely to be
related to the second one anyway. So that points toward collateral shortage. I almost never do ads
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to it. And Bill agrees. So you get the big spike in repo fails. And then as that's taking place,
and then the week after it, which was this past week, bill prices start to go up and up and up
more than you would expect for investment considerations alone. And as we know,
when bills are in high demand like this, that points to collateral, same as repo fails do.
So whenever you see demand for bills, especially in the wake of fails over and above what they
normally would be for purely investment or money-like purposes, you already know what's
going on here. The four-week bill yield roughly was 374 up until April 1st, according to the
Treasury Department itself. And it'd been right around that rates, no more than a basis point
higher or lower for weeks, weeks before that. But then starting to the same week that repo fails
surged to 415 billion, the one that we're talking about here, four-week bill prices began to move
up and therefore the yield down. By April 8th, a week later, the rate had fallen to 3.67%. And as
of Friday, it had slid all the way to 364. Now 10 basis points in a little over a week may not
sound like much, but in the world of bills, that's a lot. It isn't just a four-weeker either. Similar
move in the eight-week though to a little bit less, a few basis points less. Even a three-month
instrument saw its rate drop about six basis points. You can clearly see something changed here.
These are unusual movements and they point to additional demand for these things. And that
always means, or almost always means, shortfall of collateral because it isn't flowing like it was
before whatever happened happened. And whatever that may have been, which I'll get to in just a
minute, notice that it didn't go away with a ceasefire announcement. The bill buying instead
picked up a little bit more over the last couple of days after the news came out. So keep that in
mind as we go forward. So these bids for bills further back our interpretation of repo fails
as pointing to collateral problems rather than just strictly treasury shorts. And the collateral
problems that started to become an issue in mid-March then must have escalated through the
end of the quarter into the start of April, even beyond the ceasefire. Now I've been telling you
about an energy shock becoming a dollar shock pretty much since this thing started. Whenever
oil abruptly rises, all of a sudden oil importers in particular, they need a lot more dollars in
order to be able to buy it. And then they have to go into the market to get those dollars. And
if the market isn't ready to give them, you lead to greater and greater dollar problems.
So suddenly oil importers needed a lot more money than they were expecting to be able to buy the
higher costing crude. Plus with the lack of petroleum moving through the Strait of Hormuz,
there was also an added layer of dollar demand because everyone was scrambling to buy additional
supplies on top of their normal more expensive purchases. It really was an unexpected acute
burst of dollar demand. At the same time, as we always talk about here, the willingness and maybe
the ability of your dollar providers to provide that dollar funding gets diminished by risk
aversion. And this is where Nigeria comes into the story, further proving and establishing this
particular point. Now I already brought up Taiwan and Indonesia, both of those specifically this
past week. Both countries have been forced to heavily use their dollar reserves, which are
largely U.S. Treasury securities. They sell those things to raise liquid dollar balances, which are
nothing more than just deposits on some global bank's balance sheet, you know, ledger money.
Then they take those ledger euro dollars and then lend them to the local firms having trouble
securing dollar funding on their own. These are largely financial firms, but maybe governments
are acting directly with oil import companies who are in need of a lot more euro dollar money to buy
that expensive, difficult to find petroleum. And you can see the national interest in doing this.
These countries need the fuel. They're desperate for energy. So, of course, they're going to do
whatever it takes to avoid fuel shortage as much as possible, even if it means dipping heavily into
their dollar stockpile. But it isn't just Asian oil import countries. Nigeria, they're a member
of OPEC and also one of the biggest oil exporters in the entire world, troubled as the country might
be. Not only is Nigeria a big net seller of petroleum, they've also become an exporter of
gasoline, too. So you'd think the energy shock would be great for them, both in terms of business
as well as dollar availability. They have what the rest of the world really badly wants. Yet,
Nigerian authorities ended up having to do exactly what their counterparts in Taiwan
and Indonesia did. Quote, Nigeria's NARA has stayed largely stable through the market volatility
sparked by the Iran war, but that came at a cost to the nation's foreign exchange reserves. Reserves
fell for 16 straight days through April 8th. Again, there's these weeks. The longest declining run
since July 2025, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The central bank's foreign exchange
holdings declined by 1.1 billion in the period to just less than 49 billion, which is the lowest
level since February 19th. Dollars should have been flowing into Nigeria, and they probably were,
but instead the central bank had to use quite a bit of its available dollar stash to keep the
currency steady. Why? Because currency weakness is as much a broader dollar problem than strictly
for Asian import countries and petroleum. Nigeria shows the other side of the dollar shock equation
that I just went over. Demand for dollars went up among the oil importers, but remember, supply of
dollars declined everywhere. While Nigeria didn't need the dollars to buy oil it already has plenty
of, suddenly it finds dollar financing for stuff it does need increasingly expensive and difficult,
therefore pressuring its currency and forcing the government through the central bank to supply
reserves to keep the naira from falling like everyone else's currency. So Nigeria exposes this
broader euro dollar supply problem. Euro dollars are harder to obtain when euro dollar providers
are looking at greater risks around the world, starting with the fallout from the oil shock itself,
but also not limited to that one possible factor. So you might be wondering what does this have to
do with collateral? The answer is, as I said in the introduction, euro dollar money flow is effectively
binary. Cash needs collateral and they really need each other, otherwise nothing moves. What that
means is, if you're on one side of the world trying to borrow dollars from the other side,
the dollars aren't going to come to you without some kind of collateral in between.
This was the only truly way to overcome both geographic and time constraints to make the euro
dollar into a full-blown reserve currency with widespread coverage and acceptance, the likes of
the world had never seen before. And by the way, I've got videos in the euro dollar university
members section specifically explaining both reserve currencies as well as the collateral
system basics. Why collateral has to flow and why there aren't enough treasuries to make it happen.
Yes, you heard me right, there are not enough treasuries to make this happen. So they got to
be reused over and over, which leads to these fragile chains in repo that can then turn into
cascades of repo fails under the right stressful conditions. So you got to become a member to get
those videos. But think about the dollar shock this way. You're in Indonesia and you're trying
to buy oil and you need dollars, but you don't want to wait for the government there to give
you some kind of short-run bridge financing after it sells its reserve assets. So you're talking
with JP Morgan or some other global bank trying to arrange a loan, but they need collateral from
you. But all you really have is some physical supply of oil that you're going to buy, or maybe
some local currency asset or bond or something like that. Those aren't going to open the dollar
taps for you. But if you work with a securities lender, you can exchange some of your liquid
collateral for US treasuries, and they will allow you to borrow liquid dollars in order to buy the
oil. Those dollars don't move to you unless the collateral moves to the lender at the same time.
So collateral has to flow so that cash can, and only then does the commerce happen. It is binary.
The world needs to cash in collateral and without both, it isn't impossible, but it's far more
difficult and inefficient to make stuff happen. In other words, this is exactly what a reserve
currency is supposed to unlock when everything is flowing. So you get a burst of demand for
dollars due to the oil shock, and it creates the same burst in demand for collateral when collateral
dealers might be just as shy as cash dealers to lend and deal in collateral. That's probably
because the securities dealers and the cash lenders are usually the same thing. And we've
got even more data that ties all of these things together, from Nigeria and other foreign governments
using the reserve assets in response to dollar shortage issues, which would be both cash and
collateral. The New York Fed also holds treasury bond reserve assets on behalf of foreign governments,
and I've covered this data many times before, but just briefly, these things tend to get used
whenever there are dollar problems like those I just described for the same reasons. You get a
dollar shortfall among local banks or import firms, so the authorities call up John Williams at FRBNY
and ask his people to sell the reserve assets and transfer those liquid deposits to some other
global commercial bank. It's the same thing that's been happening from the very beginning of the
euro-dollar system. Like the example I've shown many times, the Japanese from back in the early
1960s, euro-dollar illiquidity leads to the mobilization of reserve assets because that's
the whole point of having reserve assets to begin with. They're not being sold because of inflation
fears or foreigners are worried about the independence of the Fed or that they hate Trump
and are ditching the dollar. This is purely mechanical. Dollar shortage, reserve assets get used,
period, and boy have they been used. Look at the statistics here. According to FRBNY's numbers,
going back to the middle of February, foreign governments have sold or somehow used 107.7
billion of U.S. treasury reserve assets. That's one of the largest withdrawals of them in such
a short period of time that we've seen in the entire series. Therefore, suggesting the dollar
shock and then the global strains that they represent must be substantial. And just to give
you a comparison, during the 2023 banking crisis, the total number of treasuries that foreign
officials dipped into was about 87 billion, so less than what we're seeing here, substantially
less. And in March and April of 2020, it was 161 billion. So right now, a lot more than 2023 in
the banking crisis and a lot closer to March 2020 than we'd like to think was possible. So yes,
significant dollar strains, significant usage of foreign reserve assets by all these countries
that we're now seeing confirmed in their own reports. So what does this all mean? Like I just
said, starting with the fact that there is more significant strain, a more widespread strain,
than most people are likely aware of or appreciate. And that means the longer this goes on,
the more stress piles up, causing greater difficulties which can potentially spill over
into a far broader context, to financial assets as well as more real economy activities. If you
can't get dollars because you can't find collateral, and you can't buy oil or buy stocks or
some other leveraged assets, or something else that you might need, and that means lost business,
lost economic activity, coming at a highly unfortunate moment when the entire global system
is increasingly fragile, right China? So even as the ceasefire with Iran has taken some of that
extreme out of the near term, it doesn't completely erase these problems. As a start, petroleum is
still hanging around $100 per barrel and everything that comes along with it. Plus one final note in
all this, what you'll see is that the energy shock can't be the only factor behind the dollar
tightening. A lot of these same indications were pointing to systemic difficulties that existed
long before oil in Iran. The economy was already bad and getting worse, plus potential downside in
the monetary system due to risk aversion from the private credit bus, which is also global, not just
blue owl and American cockroaches. So how much of the current euro-dollar shortage that we're getting
in repo fails and the unusual demand for treasury bills might be due to the energy shock? How much
is more the private credit bus becoming a crisis? We don't know. It's impossible to separate one from
the other. So we have to consider both, which means even as the one might eventually fade, since oil
starts moving again and petroleum prices drop, the other that's not going anywhere. Let's be honest
here. If anything, the energy shock will almost certainly make the private credit situation that
much worse, regardless of everything else. More reasons why euro-dollar cash lenders and dealer
collateral providers will continue to be on the defensive more than they already have. So what we
know right now, what's been confirmed in the data, a lot of data, and thanks to Nigeria too, is that
the euro-dollar problem is a lot bigger than most people realize. I mean, after all, the Fed is doing
something with bank reserves and stocks are back to being stocks. Well, the euro-dollar is back to
being pressured by collateral. And how does collateral difficulties become target the big
retailer cutting prices before the energy shock? Well, they all come from the same thing, as I went
over in the video link below. As always, thank you very much for joining me. Huge thank you
euro-dollar university members and subscribers. And until next time, take care.
