Abusive Practices in Global (Panel)

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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20th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum | Washington, D.C 🇺🇸 | December 6, 2021
-Hon. Matt Pottinger
Former Deputy National Security Advisor
-Mr. Milos Ivkovic
MA, LLM, LLM, International Arbitrator / Advisor to Governments
Dr. Roslyn Layton
Founder of ChinaTech Threat
As we all know, our countries are in dire need of investment.
The world functions on the premise of foreign investment,
which is certainly increasing the ability of each and every country to grow.
That said, one of the major tools that abusive governments use
is investments which are targeting essential structural elements of our societies
in order to take over or remove control from the host countries
and effectively become matters of national security
that is advancing our opponents and enemies.
Now, while the host countries may have the intention to grow,
and this is why they seek to receive investments,
on the other hand, the opponents have only one objective,
and that is to control the markets they're going to invest in.
That said, what is very important is to define and recognize
which type of investments are illicit, abusive,
and should be regulated carefully or addressed subsequently by legal processes.
As a matter of international law, there are two types of illicit investments.
Those investments which are benicio, so as of the very beginning, are illicit,
meaning they come into the country through corruption, as an example.
And the second type are those investments which are used for illicit purposes.
So, subsequent to an investment which may go through all processes and be illegal,
that investment is used to further illicit purposes.
Now, if we carefully observe the types of investments
that are coming from the Far East, first and foremost,
especially from Beijing, what we will establish is that
those investments cover infrastructural projects, energy projects,
and in return take over or try to control the sources of energy
or supply chain, such as cobalt, copper, lithium, and so on.
So, worldwide there is a careful pattern of these abuses.
In addition, with every loan that is coming into the country,
there are requirements imposed on the host country,
which the host country most likely cannot fulfill.
And those are intentionally placed in order to enslave the host country into new loans,
which will not be granted likely by the Western allies,
since they had previously been based on corrupt dealings.
So, that all said, that scheme has only one outcome.
And that outcome for sovereign states is simply removing sovereignty away.
Now, that all said, when we diagnose the problem,
we also need to try to see what the states can do,
because they can do a lot.
Firstly, the states can address the problem from the very outset,
before it appears.
Two issues need to be recognized.
Firstly, the power of every parliamentarian is to introduce laws,
the laws which can control these abusive investments,
which can define these abusive investments,
and which can stop them prior to them entering into the country.
In this respect, it is important to notice that sometimes these abusive investments
have a purpose of simply stealing intellectual property.
The United States went through a long process to recognize it,
that Chinese companies are buying U.S. companies
not in order to further or profit from these U.S. companies,
but simply to buy the know-how, to buy the patents,
and to use their patents against the United States.
What happened in numerous cases is actually that U.S. companies died out,
immediately subsequent to being bought by the Chinese companies.
So, this is one type of investment.
The second type of investments are investments in supply chain.
Whenever there is an unlimited power of an investor in a supply chain,
let's say any type of mineral that potentially a Chinese or any other government wants to abuse,
the states may limit their own exposure towards the foreign investors.
This is perfectly aligned with international law.
But let's now assume that a foreign investment is already there,
that the government wants to address a foreign investment which has already entered the country.
Does this mean that, having in mind that foreign investors,
and especially the Chinese government, have very firm rights under international treaties,
they have strong political power, and they have also strong power of diplomacy,
which they abuse from time to time.
And does this mean that states remain hostages?
Actually, the answer is no.
Firstly, as a matter of law, there is no such a thing as permanent investment.
Every investment, at any point in time, can be revisited as a matter of law.
So, if states, state legislators, or courts, establish that an investor abuses its own position,
those states may prosecute that investor,
and those states may even remove the investor from property.
That is point one.
Point two.
It is necessary to establish alliances,
because only alliances can protect each individual country.
We had a very, I think in the first panel we had a question,
what can countries without assets and power, as the United States holds,
what can they do to confront the dangers, to confront the issues?
Well, they can be truthful parts of alliances,
and work together as one front towards this abusive practice.
And last but not the least, what is very important is that at any point in time,
we shouldn't forget that the holders of sovereignty are the state's host states, not investors.
That said, with respect to the supply chain issue,
naturally every host state may favor its own interest over any foreign interest,
may favor the interests of its allies over any other interests of its adversaries,
and may impose laws in place in order to address the opponent's strategy to abuse its power.
So, in summary, while this threat is evident, it is present,
and it is affecting every country on the face of this planet,
this threat can be remedied, even if it has been occurring already,
and certainly can be prevented through careful legislation.
Thank you.
Well, so we have about 40 minutes left.
I'm going to make some remarks to follow on with our two speakers,
and then we're going to go to some questions and discussion.
I think as Mr. Pottinger first laid out this sort of concise brief history in China,
what does it mean for democratic countries and their allies, and what can we do about it?
Also, I think you've made a very helpful discussion around the kinds of investments that are made,
and perhaps what we've forgotten is that the states also have rights and responsibilities with regard to that.
I mean, naturally, business and enterprise, they want to make a return.
States set up regimes so that they can do that,
but you're also bringing the important point that the states also have a right in the investment.
They are providing the environment for the enterprise to happen.
Absolutely.
So I founded an organization called China Tech Threat here in the U.S.,
and we are studying the information technology that is produced by firms owned or affiliated by the Chinese government,
and we are concerned about what that technology will do to the security, privacy, and prosperity of Americans.
However, many of those concerns are for people around the world.
I'm also a European citizen, so I'm quite concerned about European laws,
which are being violated every day by a Chinese government technology.
But also in your vein of wanting to make things practical,
what I had hoped to do in this short time with you is to share three policies or three pieces of legislation in the U.S.
for your inspiration for parliamentarians around the world,
tell you about the challenges of doing those policies, the pitfalls, and then perhaps some of the benefits,
and I hope that you can think about those in your own situation and see what will be the right course forward for you.
And certainly, I want to begin by a thank you and a tribute to Congressman Pittenger,
because he led in the House side one of the most important reforms for foreign direct investment,
perhaps maybe the most important reform.
It was FIRMA in 2018.
It's the Foreign Investment Review and Risk Modernization Act.
And the most difficult part about that, and as a challenge to the parliamentarian,
Americans, Republican, Democrat, all agree that China is a threat.
And Europeans similarly.
We are all on board that we are concerned about the military of China.
We're concerned about its destruction of human rights, the destruction of the environment.
There's no doubt about that.
Where the challenge comes is industry and business.
American, European business want to make money in China.
So as much as the parliamentarians push forward to try to make the laws that we, the voters, want,
they get pushback from industry, which wants to make money in China.
So that is really the central conflict here.
It's not about, you know, the people versus the government.
It is how does business get what it wants out of the deal.
So, but to just discuss, nevertheless, Mr. Pittenger, he continued the FIRMA came into place in 2018.
And very quickly, the United States Treasury Department.
There's a committee there, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.
It implemented this reform in a series of months.
It's really record-breaking.
Very quickly, overnight, they began to review the investments that the Chinese government wanted to make in the U.S.
And they also proceeded to unwind previous investments that had been made,
which were deemed to be harmful or dangerous to security.
And one of the most important aspects of that legislation was that it takes into account personal data.
So if, in fact, so for example, there was an acquisition of a hotel reservation system,
well, you get a lot of personal data around your guests checking into the hotel.
And that is, that could be U.S. government officials.
It could be, you know, personal addresses, things like that.
Also, another acquisition was of a health analytics company, which had to do with health information.
Again, it could also be compromised in the hands of the Chinese government.
So that is a really significant improvement to the foreign direct investment laws.
And I would say significantly, look at some of the major acquisitions prior to this reform that happened.
IBM's laptop division sold to Lenovo.
GE's hardware division sold to hire.
Motorola phones also sold to Lenovo.
Chinese were very clever around taking trusted American brands, buying them,
and then putting their data analytics and whatever into the product,
and then making a global, making their own brand on the premise of being American, high quality, and what have you.
So had that CFIUS reform been in place at the time of those acquisitions,
they would not have happened because that data now goes and sits in Chinese servers
where it can be, you know, the same as any Chinese person.
A profile will be developed.
So today we still have the question about what do we do with TikTok?
And people say, oh, well, that's just children.
Well, a child can grow up and become a president or a senator or a representative like yourself.
Every person's lifetime history is inside that record,
and you can be compromised at such time you want to run for office because that record's held now in China.
So we have on the China Tech Threat website a paper Mr. Pittenger and I,
we wrote about this former reform, how it happened, the changes before and after,
how it was implemented, what it means going forward.
So I invite you please have a look at that.
Also here at the PISF we have had many discussions about foreign direct investment.
If you go through the website, there's excellent presentations.
Tom Fetto from U.S. Department of Treasury,
who's been a leader in bringing forth this reform for foreign direct investment.
He's a great resource, and you can watch his presentation.
So that we covered the FIRMA, which is about money coming into the U.S.
The other important piece of legislation in 2018 as well was called ECRA,
the Export Control and Reform Act.
That's about U.S. assets going abroad,
and the licenses that foreign companies will attempt to get to access U.S. technology.
During the Trump administration,
over 330 entities in the People's Republic of China were placed on the entity list.
Now that in itself has a very specific meaning
about whether or not that entity can get a license and what they need to do.
So a lot of the, if you know about Huawei being restricted,
it was placed onto the entity list there at the Department of Commerce
for certain kinds of technologies.
Now in the meanwhile, just until recently,
Huawei was continuing to operate in the U.S.
It had over 3,000 products of its were licensed at the Federal Communications Commission.
So I would say perhaps the upside and downside of American policy instruments
is they're very confined to rule of law.
There's not an ability to just ban a company.
You have to be able to define the parameters.
It is very strict.
And all of the entities who will be restricted,
they will fight you in the court of law.
Huawei will go to the courts and challenge the determination made by the U.S. government.
And that is to be expected.
And also you can be removed from the entity list, for example.
The situation can change or maybe the technology becomes ubiquitous.
So in any case, that is one of the tools used now by the U.S. government.
It is also still quite debated
because the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security,
similarly to CFIUS,
it did not make its reforms as quickly as the Treasury Department.
So we're still waiting now for almost four years later
for BIS to produce these lists of foundational technology
which are supposed to inform what restrictions need to be made.
So if it's strategic technology,
it's not supposed to be sold to military end users
or for military uses.
There are certain rules around that.
And many of your countries are part of the Wassenaar Arrangement
where with the U.S. we share that regime
and decide which kinds of technologies that are dual use
cannot be accessed by rogue militaries.
So just as Mr. Pottinger alluded,
we have a major issue with semiconductors.
And particularly, even though the U.S. retains prowess in designing semiconductors,
much of the manufacturing capability is gone.
And part of that acceleration is that U.S. semiconductor manufacturers
who make the equipment,
they're selling this equipment in China.
It's a huge profit for them.
They've doubled, tripled, quadrupled their profits in recent years.
But if you accept that there's civil-military fusion in China,
and I'm sure Mr. Pottinger would agree to that,
essentially all the factories or fabs for semiconductors in China
have some alignment with the military,
if not being direct military fabs.
So we have companies today that are supplying
their high-end, very thin, top-of-the-line,
cutting-edge chip-making machines to China.
And the Department of Commerce has not acted on this.
So this is one of the challenges that we have outstanding.
Finally, let me go to one last act,
which just passed last month, signed by President Biden,
called the Secure Equipment Act.
This was almost unanimously passed in both the Senate and House, both parties.
It came together relatively quickly.
This is a bill which powers the Federal Communications Commission,
which is our telecom regulator,
to restrict vendors, any equipment that uses a radio frequency.
So if you notice, any piece of electronics you buy in the U.S.
will have a little sticker on the back that says FCC.
That means it complies with the radio transmission
and environmental and frequency transmission rules in the U.S.
Now that will include a security screen.
And so the FCC will maintain a covered list,
similar to an entity list, but it only has five companies on it,
but a covered list, which once the National Security Authority
deems that a certain entity is not secure or poses an unacceptable risk,
the FCC can put that company on the covered list,
and then it can deny future authorizations for them to sell their equipment.
And I think it's an important recognition
because obviously we assume the U.S. is a free enterprise country,
but in fact, the ability to use the radio waves,
it's a privilege, not a right.
So this goes back to over 100 years of U.S. policy
that the radio frequencies are very important themselves
as a strategic resource, and the FCC has in its founding,
in its statutes, that it needs to manage them for defense
and the security of the person and of property.
So it is quite a significant evolution for the FCC to take that on.
And as I said, there's just five Chinese companies there today.
Perhaps DJI will be added.
But if you look at civil-military fusion in China,
there might be 2,000 to 3,000 companies which would need to be added.
To say nothing of the companies may attempt to circumvent the rules
or change their name or change the label or what have you.
But nevertheless, it's a start.
It is significant because today you can go to Amazon,
Best Buy, any one of these retailers,
and you can find Huawei products still.
You can find Hikvision cameras, Hightera radios, and so on.
And in the future, the future products they have,
at least according to this law, will not be there.
So from a consumer protection standpoint,
that's a very important development.
So I think the final frontier here is,
and then to say one other element about this,
that there's a competition angle.
During this proceeding, a lot of small businesses wrote to the FCC
and said, oh my goodness, we are providing security systems.
And if you will restrict this product, we can't do our business.
Well, as a matter of fact,
there are over 40 non-China-based providers of security cameras.
That are price competitive.
And the interesting thing that we found in many cases
is that the Chinese players have been so flooding the market
that non-Chinese players cannot get a foothold.
Interesting thing we found with the Huawei situation with 5G networks,
when Huawei started to be restricted,
companies like Samsung entered the space.
Samsung had a very hard time to get a foothold
because of the various predatory practices.
So by removing the Chinese player,
which was violating the laws of the country,
you actually cleared the playing field
for the legitimate lawful actors to compete fairly in the market.
And that is what I predict should happen with cameras now,
and security cameras.
We should see that.
And we're also seeing many players who want to enter the 5G space,
working in the different segments of the infrastructure market.
So that's an important benefit.
The benefit is competition.
That's what we want.
And when you have an anti-competitive actor,
you need to restrict that actor.
You need to punish that actor.
You might need to remove that actor.
So we've seen that benefit.
The other layer here, some are looking at,
is are there now risks if you are an American company,
European, Latin American, what have you,
you're producing in China.
What are your risks if your products,
your supply chain is compromised there,
even if you own your own factory,
or to what extent, under what arrangement?
And so that, I think, is the next level where we have to go.
It's not just about restricting Chinese firms in name,
because we also know they have bought U.S. and European firms
and used those brand names.
But now we have to really look at the supply chain.
Where is the hardware made?
In addition to all of the data, we've talked about that as well.
So that's kind of an overview.
I would love to give Mr. Pottinger, for you,
you have heard our remarks.
You served in the national security capacity.
What would you say that if you wanted to,
anything that you would add, or you might clarify,
or you might, what sparks for you in what we've discussed?
Maybe turn on your sound.
One more time.
Let's see if we can get, do we have the sound on our side?
A little bit louder.
Okay.
I think one more time.
Okay.
Let's see if that works.
You've got it.
Thank you so much.
Appreciate it.
Good.
No, I was just saying, Rosalyn, how excellent your remarks were,
and Milos, yours as well.
This is really about sovereignty.
Rosalyn, to your point, we have several tools now,
legislative as well as tools that were created through executive order by
President Trump, by President Biden, that are not being applied yet.
We're well past time.
Those were all created with intent.
Our lawmakers had intent when they created great bills,
for example, like FIRMA,
which Congressman Bittinger played such a key role in and has played such a
great role in just showing leadership on this whole issue for years now.
But there are a couple of others that I would mention that aren't
technology-specific, but more about capital flows.
Well, in fact, there are a couple that I'd like to mention.
One is that back in 1999,
the U.S. Congress passed a law that basically required the Department of
Defense to maintain a blacklist of Chinese companies that are affiliated
with the Chinese military.
And that law was ignored by three successive administrations
until the Trump administration,
when we finally told the Department of Defense,
you need to follow the 1999 National Defense Authorization Act to create this
blacklist.
Well, they finally began doing that over the course of 2020.
And there was then a couple of executive orders by President Trump,
which were repackaged and reissued in an executive order by President Biden
that requires that Americans can no longer invest in companies that appear on
that blacklist.
In fact,
the Biden administration actually expanded the definition to say not only
Chinese military companies,
but companies that are associated with human rights atrocities are no longer
eligible for receiving investment into their stocks and bonds by U.S.
persons.
Despite this law going all the way back to 1999,
and despite executive orders from two presidents now,
that list of companies is tiny.
It's only 59 companies, which is preposterous.
To your point,
if we were really to look at companies in the nexus of China's military and
civil fusion strategy,
we're really talking about a galaxy of thousands of Chinese companies.
Yet the Department of Treasury,
which is now the steward of that list,
it was taken by the Biden administration away from defense and given to
Treasury, has done nothing with that list.
So we should see several orders of magnitude,
greater numbers of companies listed on that investment ban list.
A second one,
which is related to what you were talking about,
about BIS and the Department of Commerce,
is the internet communications and technology and services panel that was
envisioned in an executive order to the Trump administration and has been
enacted through actions by the,
has been actually formed now under the Biden administration.
And yet we're waiting for that body to do its job and its job,
its mission is to block Chinese technologies,
whether they are software apps or server farms here in the United States or
5G, 6G telecommunications gear.
This body will screen those inbound technologies and software and services
to make sure that they are not a threat to U.S. national security.
That's a very sharp tool that has bipartisan support.
It's been signed by two presidents and yet it hasn't yet to deliver any
discernible impact to protect our national security.
So those are a couple of others that I would add.
If I may just address several topics that you raised, Matt.
Firstly,
I think it's important for the audience to understand how complicated it is
to regulate thousands of companies.
The approach that China is implementing here,
enforcing here,
is not to buy one company that,
for example,
produces military equipment.
They use thousands of small companies to buy all the parts necessary and
then they will just put these parts together and have a stealth airplane.
I still recall when,
years ago,
I spoke with Congressman Pittenger about how did the legislation come about.
And he said,
well,
I saw that China is building military equipment by actually buying small
companies and then combining these elements into a stealth grade aircraft.
So that all said,
it is not simple and straightforward to regulate just a couple of companies.
We need to regulate them all if they are used for a particular purpose,
which brings me to another element,
and I think that we are in full agreement.
Nobody here speaks against China per se.
We speak against policies,
abusive policies.
So the general fear or spreading fear that any company which has anything to do
with China,
whether it's completely legitimate or legal or not,
is incorrect.
We are addressing abusive investments,
abusive steps which benefit the military power of the People's Republic of
China,
and which destroy the competition in the Western world.
This is what is addressed here.
And the last point is that the tools that the U.S. has at its disposal are
still in development.
We have to be honest that we are recognizing,
day by day,
new ways that the Chinese government is using or employing in order to abuse
its position,
in order to take over more and more companies in the West and their
knowledge.
So it is not as if the legislation now is sufficient for the upcoming future
to resolve all of our fears.
It is a continuous uphill battle.
We've got about three minutes left,
so I'm going to see if there's one question or two.
Let's take the questions first,
and then we'll go ahead, sir.
Thank you very much.
My name is Nils.
I'm a sports defense from Denmark.
You addressed a lot of issues.
One of the ones that I didn't hear,
and I'm concerned that I didn't hear,
is a little bit about the future on this.
Arctic is a very, very big issue.
The Chinese people are sailing around out there doing research,
which also means now they know the waters and know how to operate in them.
But they want the minerals in the Arctic region just as well as anybody
else does.
How do you see that compared to what we just talked about,
the fear of Chinese lack of democracy and,
how do you say it,
the way they do business on that note?
Thank you.
So short answer, time machine back to the U.S. buying Denmark,
but can't do that now.
Anyway, one more question.
What does he think about creating a common plan,
Asian like-minded democracy?
You're a good example of FDI regulation.
It passed two years already from that time,
and it's not implemented in all the countries.
Who should take the leadership on that?
Because it seems that China has a plan,
and we do not have a plan.
It seems that we know pretty well which are the themes,
and now we see Russia playing with China on technology in the last months.
And my question would be who should take the leadership in creating this
strategic plan that we do not have today in China?
One minute.
You go ahead with the first question.
Well, with respect to the first question,
there are two elements to the first question.
Firstly, what the bureaucrats tell us.
The bureaucrats will immediately tell us it's a matter of public international law
which is so complicated that we can't resolve it, period.
So let's leave it as is.
Well, this is really not correct,
because we do know what the Chinese government does,
we do know the purpose that the Chinese government wants to advance here,
and we do know that they do not respect the rules and regulation of the world
which is surrounding this Arctic Circle.
So that all said, public international law is very clear,
as I use Kagan's norm, that states may impose restrictions on China.
The problem that we have is then, if we remove the bureaucratic element,
is the power.
So who can stand in the way?
Who can actually say, no, this is the red line, you're not crossing it?
And in order to achieve that power, which has nothing to do with law,
which is an effective power, we need to have an alliance.
So we need to align states of the same mind and tell China, no, this is the end.
So to your question, just because we have just several seconds,
it is legal to do what we are discussing,
and secondly, we can do it, but only if we are aligned.
We can spend the rest of the afternoon on this subject,
and thank each of you for joining us today.
Matt Pottinger, thank you so much, my friend, for joining us.
I credit him truly for writing our China policy.
