The Battle For Greenland Is Splitting NATO Apart.

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I don't need international law. There is only one thing that can stop me.
My own morality. Said Donald Trump in an interview with the New York Times.
These words were spoken in a very specific context. The emergence of a new objective
for the President of the United States. That objective is Greenland.
Trump argues that taking control of the island is essential to U.S. national security.
The governments of Denmark and Greenland, for their part, are willing to expand cooperation
with Washington, but not to sell the island. For the American President, this is not enough.
As a result, tensions continue to rise. A recently leaked report from the Danish
Ministry of Defense warns that the United States is collecting sensitive data on military bases,
ports, and airports in Greenland. Combined with Trump's threats,
he has explicitly refused to rule out taking control of Greenland by force.
This sends an extremely dangerous signal. European governments are treating Trump's
rhetoric with utmost seriousness. France, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, and Finland have even decided to deploy troops to Greenland
to strengthen the island's defenses against hostile provocations.
Trump, however, did not give up. He began threatening European countries with additional
tariffs. A rattled Brussels, in turn, weighed retaliatory measures against American companies.
Relations between the United States and Europe have not been this strained in a very long time.
As if that were not enough, Trump went on to purpose a new format for a so-called
Board of Peace, to which he invited a number of world leaders,
including Vladimir Putin and Alexander Lukashenko. In the distant Arctic, what is unfolding is not
only a dispute over Greenland's future, but a struggle over the future of the entire North
Atlantic Alliance. Donald Trump is not the first American to seek control over Greenland.
The origins of U.S. interest in the island date back as far as 1867, when Secretary of State
William Seward, the same man who negotiated the purchase of Alaska from Russia,
proposed expanding America's borders by buying Greenland and Iceland from the Kingdom of Denmark.
Although the plan ultimately failed, Seward's proposal left a lasting imprint on American
strategic thinking. From that point on, Greenland began to be seen as a natural extension of the
North American continent and a key piece in completing U.S. dominance over the Western
Hemisphere. The United States came the closest to acquiring Greenland during the presidency
of Harry Truman. During World War II, the island was under American military control,
and as the confrontation with the Soviet Union loomed, Washington was determined to keep it that
way permanently. In 1946, the Truman administration formally offered Denmark $100 million in gold
for the island. Notably, the U.S. proposal also included an alternative option – an exchange of
strategically important areas of Greenland for oil-rich territories near Point Barrow in Alaska,
home today to the largest oil field in North America. Despite severe postwar economic hardship,
Denmark ultimately rejected Truman's offer. Instead, both sides settled on a compromise
that served their respective interests. In 1951, the United States and Denmark signed the Greenland
Defense Agreement, which effectively enshrined Washington's role as the island's primary
security guarantor, while reducing Denmark's role largely to that of a civilian administrator.
The agreement granted the United States extensive rights, including the authority to establish
defense areas on Greenland – zones that were in practice exempt from Danish jurisdiction.
Under this framework, the United States built more than a dozen military bases on the island.
At the height of the Cold War, roughly 10,000 American troops were stationed there. At that
point, U.S. servicemen accounted for nearly 30% of the entire population of the Green Island.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States gradually
scaled back its presence in Greenland, shutting down successive bases and withdrawing troops.
This strategic pause in the Arctic, however, proved short-lived. Since around 2010, we have
witnessed not only a steady expansion of Russia's presence in the region, but also the arrival of a
Combined with climate change and the melting of Arctic ice, competition for the region has
turned into a ruthless race for strategic resources and new trade routes. Greenland,
meanwhile, has found itself at the very center of this struggle.
It is difficult to overstate Greenland's strategic importance for Washington
and for U.S. national security planning. Let's begin with the military dimension.
Pitafix Space Base, known until 2023 as Tool Air Base, is the northernmost military installation
operated by the United States. It serves as the eyes and ears of America's defensive architecture.
Pitafix's significance stems from its unique geographic location,
which allows for radar coverage of areas inaccessible to other ground-based systems.
At the heart of the base lies the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BMEWS, a radar network capable of detecting and tracking intercontinental ballistic missiles
launched by Russia or China toward North America, over the Arctic and the North Pole.
Without data from Pitafix, Washington's response time to a nuclear attack
would be dramatically reduced, undermining the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence.
In recent years, the base has also grown in importance in the space domain. Now operated
by the U.S. Space Force, Pitafix plays a crucial role in monitoring satellites and objects in polar
orbit. Yet Greenland's strategic value extends far beyond missile defense alone. The island
also forms the western pillar of the so-called G.I.U.K. gap – Greenland, Iceland, and the United
Kingdom. This maritime chokepoint separates the Norwegian Sea from the open Atlantic Ocean.
Control of the G.I.U.K. gap is strategically vital not only for the security of the United States,
but for the entire North Atlantic Alliance. Coming back to China, the scale of China's
Arctic ambitions is best illustrated by the fact that in 2018 Beijing declared itself a
near-Arctic state. China's policy in the region follows a dual-track approach.
On the one hand, Beijing seeks to develop what it calls the Polar Silk Road. On the other,
it aims to secure permanent footholds in the Arctic by taking control of strategic
infrastructure and gaining access to local deposits of rare earth elements.
In 2018, the Chinese state-owned China's Communication Construction Company
came close to securing a contract worth approximately $550 million to modernize
Greenland's airports in Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Kuakortoq. Under pressure from the United States,
however, the Danish government intervened and blocked the Chinese bid. A similar failure
followed China's attempt to acquire the Gronedal Naval Base in southern Greenland.
Chinese efforts to gain control over Greenland's rare earth deposits have likewise fallen short.
Although China already controls around 60% of global rare earth mining and roughly 90%
of their processing, gaining access to Greenland's resources would still be of
enormous value to Beijing, as it would further strengthen China's monopoly.
Beneath Greenland's ice sheet lies one of the world's largest untapped reserves
of strategic raw materials. According to reports by the U.S. Geological Survey
and Denmark's Geological Services, the island contains deposits of 25 out of 34 raw materials
classified as critical by the European Union and 43 out of 50 minerals deemed vital to U.S.
national security. The state of the U.S.-China struggle over Greenland's resources is best
illustrated by the fate of two flagship mining projects, Fanefjeld and Tanbres.
Fanefjeld is owned by Energy Transition Minerals, a company linked to Chinese capital. Despite the
site's immense mineral wealth, mining there never even began. Why? In 2021, following the electoral
victory of the Inuit Atakatigit party in Greenland's parliamentary elections, the island
introduced a ban on uranium mining. Because uranium occurs alongside rare-earth elements
at Fanefjeld, the ban effectively sealed the project's fate. While environmental concerns
were the official justification, analysts point to Washington's quiet satisfaction at having blocked
Chinese access, especially given that the second major mining project, Tanbres,
backed by American capital, has moved ahead at full speed.
The Tanbres project contains strategically important heavy rare-earth elements,
such as dysprosium and terbium, but crucially does not contain problematic uranium. In 2025,
the U.S. government-backed Exim Bank offered a $120 million loan to support Tanbres' development.
In January this year, the creation of a joint venture was announced, envisaging the shipment
of raw material from Greenland to Saudi Arabia for processing, followed by the transport of
refined metals to the United States for use in the American defense industry. As we can see,
China's actual presence in Greenland remains minimal. Even when Beijing manages to secure
a contract, its implementation is typically blocked either by the United States or by
the environmental or climate-related constraints. Nothing, however, suggests that these repeated
setbacks have discouraged China from seeking a foothold in the region. On the contrary,
as climate change accelerates and the Arctic ice cap continues to melt, opening up new shipping
routes, the contest for the Arctic is only beginning to intensify. At the same time,
Moscow is investing heavily in the infrastructure on the Northern Sea Route, which runs along
Russia's northern coastline and forms part of the Northeast Passage, linking the Atlantic and the
Pacific. For now, some sections of the Northern Sea Route remain ice-free for only about two months
per year. But climate change is advancing rapidly enough that this situation could shift dramatically
in the coming decades. Beijing is betting on precisely this outcome, seeking to establish
a so-called Polar Silk Road that largely overlaps with Russia's Northern Sea Route.
In this context, Greenland becomes essential. Control of the island allows the United States
to project power toward the Barents Sea, severely constraining the freedom of movement of Russia's
northern fleet. Put more plainly, in the event of a conflict, Greenland would function as an
unsinkable aircraft carrier, locking down the G.I.U.K. gap and effectively blocking
Russian naval forces from breaking out into the open waters of the Atlantic.
Onto this carefully prepared geopolitical stage now steps Donald Trump. The president argues that
full U.S. control over Greenland is essential from the standpoint of American national security.
He highlights Greenland's role in the so-called Golden Dome Project, a new U.S. missile defense
system. Among his arguments, Trump also points to the island's vast natural wealth, hidden beneath
a thick layer of ice. According to the president, if the United States does not take control of
Greenland, the island will inevitably fall into Russian or Chinese hands, while Denmark or its
European allies would fail to respond in any meaningful way. And yet, these arguments are
largely flawed and disconnected from hard data. As we have already noted, every Chinese attempt
to gain a foothold in Greenland has ended in failure. Each time, Washington signaled its
opposition to a Chinese project to Denmark and Greenland. American objections were taken into
account, and China, one way or another, was removed from the equation. As for Greenland's natural
wealth, the island does indeed hold vast deposits of rare earth elements, as well as oil and natural
gas. However, the lack of infrastructure and the harsh climate make extraction extremely costly,
though this may change in the coming decades. The core issue, however, lies with Greenland's
local population. Under Greenland's Self-Government Act of 2009, the island's inhabitants hold
exclusive rights to manage and benefit from their natural resources. In recent years, Greenland's
authorities have adopted a series of decisions that sharply restrict resource exploitation. In
2021, the government introduced a ban on uranium mining, as well as on projects in which uranium
would appear as a by-product, effectively killing the Kvanefjeld project. In the same year,
Greenland's government also decided to stop issuing new licenses for oil and gas exploration.
Despite these constraints, American investors have little reason to complain.
The U.S.-linked Tanbres project, focused on extracting clean rare earth elements without
uranium, continues to expand. Greenland's government places considerable hope in this project,
viewing the resulting revenues as a potential path toward reducing dependence on Danish subsidies.
The most misguided of Donald Trump's arguments, however, is his core claim that national security
requires U.S. control over Greenland. At the height of the Cold War, the United States
maintained roughly 10,000 personnel and more than a dozen military bases on the island. Today,
it operates just one, Pitafik Space Base, staffed by approximately 150 troops. No one, neither the
Danish government nor the government of Greenland, has pressured Washington to scale back its military
presence. That decision was made entirely by the United States itself. Lars Løkke Rasmussen,
Denmark's foreign minister, who visited the White House in early January, made it clear that the
Danish government sees no obstacles to the United States increasing its military presence in
Washington so chooses. Denmark has only one condition – that any expansion take place
within the framework of existing agreements, namely the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement.
Greenland's local authorities have adopted the same position. In other words, there is nothing
preventing the United States from once again deploying 10,000 troops to the island, as it did
during the Cold War, or from building components of the Golden Dome missile defense system on
Greenland. Yet, the existing framework does not satisfy Donald Trump. Why? Because this is not,
in fact, about the security of the United States or Greenland. At least, not only. A crucial and
often overlooked dimension of the issue is that the Greenland question serves as a convenient
pretext for escalating tensions between the United States and the European Union,
and for deepening internal divisions within the EU itself – something we can observe unfolding
almost in real time. While some EU member states are determined to defend Greenland's autonomy,
others watch from sidelines, and still others quietly cheer on the United States in its Arctic
expansion. This may sound like a distinctly Machiavellian strategy, but the Donald Trump
administration has not been hiding its intentions. In its new U.S. National Security Strategy,
published last December, Washington openly confirms that it is working to undermine EU cohesion and to
build in Europe what American strategists describe as a bloc of, quote, healthy nations of Central,
Eastern, and Southern Europe, aligned around the United States. Greenland is simply another
step toward realizing this vision of a divided Europe. This approach also fits into a broader
pattern – the systematic downgrading and circumvention of existing multilateral institutions,
such as the United Nations. Its formal embodiment would be the proposed
Board of Peace. Trump envisions it as an organization tasked with building peace
and stabilizing conflict zones, such as Gaza, where the UN, in his view, has failed.
The Council would operate under its own rules of membership and voting rights. Permanent seats,
for example, would reportedly be available to states willing to pay at least $1 billion as
a membership fee. In practice, however, the Council's structure would concentrate real
decision-making power in the hands of, unsurprisingly, Donald Trump himself.
It is rumored that invitations were sent to around 50 world leaders. As shown on the map,
more than two dozen have already officially accepted, including Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and Belarusian President
Aleksandr Lukashenko. Skepticism has come from European Union countries, as well as from Russia
and China. France, Italy, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden have officially rejected
the invitation. It is also worth noting that taking control of Greenland fits neatly into
another core objective of the New American Strategy – achieving full US supremacy in
in line with the so-called Dunrow Doctrine. If Greenland were to come under US control,
Washington would effectively place Canada in a strategic vice, at the time when the Trump
administration is also seeking to subordinate Ottawa geopolitically. This is hardly surprising.
As far back as 1867, Secretary of State William Seward already viewed Greenland as a bridge for
extending American power toward Canada. Finally, we cannot ignore motivations that are purely
personal and psychological. After years of observing Donald Trump on the stage of
grand geopolitics, one thing is abundantly clear – he wants to secure his place in history,
by any significant means necessary. A Nobel Peace Prize may sound appealing,
but becoming the president who expanded US territory by 22% through Greenland alone,
or by as much as 124% – Greenland plus Canada – would guarantee him a place at the very top
of the American pantheon, at least in Trump's own imagination. This reality underscores
a sobering truth. Strictly egotistical and personal impulses can shape the fate of the world
as powerfully as enduring forces such as geography, demography, or technology.
For Greenland's 57,000 inhabitants, most of them Inuit, a sudden surge of global interest in their
island is a double-edged sword. The desire for full sovereignty from Denmark runs deep. Polls
conducted in 2025 show that as many as 84% of Greenlanders support independence, yet replacing
dependence on Denmark with a new dependence on the United States enjoys little public backing.
When asked which country they would prefer to align with politically, 85% of respondents said
they favored a loose association with Copenhagen over incorporation by Washington. Greenland's
prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, is therefore walking a tightrope. He firmly
rejects the idea of selling the island while stressing that Greenland is quote
open for business and eager to cooperate with the United States on a partnership basis,
seeing this as an opportunity for development rather than subordination. The central obstacle
on the road to independence is economic. Greenland remains dependent on an annual Danish subsidy,
which in 2025 amounted to roughly $600 million. That transfer accounts for more than 50% of
Greenland's public revenues and around 20% of the island's GDP. Without it, maintaining current
levels of public services, education or healthcare would be impossible. At the same time, surveys
consistently show that Greenlanders support independence only if it does not lead to a
decline in their standard of living. Washington has hinted it could assume the financial burden
of sustaining the island. Investments in mining and tourism, the argument goes, could replace the
Danish subsidy. Experts, however, warn that even a rapid expansion of mining would be unlikely to
fill the gap left by Danish transfers in the near future. Donald Trump's aggressive rhetoric has
placed Denmark in a state of crisis. Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen is attempting to
strike a delicate balance, defending Greenland's autonomy while trying to preserve good relations
with the United States. For Copenhagen, losing Greenland would be a geopolitical disaster,
reducing Denmark from an Arctic power to a small European state. Denmark's efforts are being backed
by the European Union, which is increasingly alarmed by rising tensions in the Arctic.
Brussels plans to double its spending on Greenland to 530 million euros between 2028 and 2034,
aiming to anchor the island more firmly within Europe. EU funds are to be directed toward
natural resource development based on a sustainable development model, presented as an
alternative to Washington's more transactional approach. It is doubtful, however, that this
European initiative will curb Donald Trump's expansionist ambitions. Inside the White House,
multiple scenarios are being sketched out for how control over Greenland might be achieved,
ranging from purchase offers through economic pressure to outright coercion. From Washington's
perspective, the most advantageous option would be a direct purchase of Greenland,
but neither Copenhagen nor Nuuk is willing to agree to such a deal. Another peaceful scenario
would involve Greenland declaring independence from Denmark and then signing a free association
agreement with the United States. Under such an agreement, Greenland would enter the American
sphere of influence on terms similar to those governing Pacific island states such as Palau
or the Marshall Islands. As the polling data may clear, however, this option lacks public support
in Greenland. But the U.S. does have other tools at its disposal. One conceivable path is what
might be called economic annexation, in which Greenland's economy is gradually absorbed by
American capital. By financing critical infrastructure and resource extraction,
Washington could marginalize Copenhagen over time, creating a situation in which Greenland,
while formerly remaining part of the Kingdom of Denmark, would in practice function as an
economic protectorate of the United States. Finally, Washington could opt for more escalatory
measures. The Trump administration has already signaled a willingness to apply economic coercion
against Denmark. The president announced that Denmark, along with other European countries
that have sent troops to Greenland, would face 10% tariffs starting on February 1, rising to 25%
on June 1. Yet it is doubtful that this will break European resistance. In response,
EU governments have begun discussing the activation of the so-called anti-coercion instrument,
an economic nuclear option, that if deployed would restrict U.S. companies' access
to the European market, inflicting multibillion-dollar losses. Once again, however, Trump,
true to form, began retreating from his tariff threats shortly after the Davos meeting. Yet
there is little indication that this marks the end of the Greenland saga. The Arctic ice,
it seems, will remain firmly on Donald Trump's radar for the rest of his term.
