55 Collapse Largest Crash In China s Modern History Japan China Tensions

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00:00 Introduction
00:15 Japan-China Tensions: Embassy Attack
05:15 It's Over, It’s Done: China’s Property Crisis
08:39 Singapore on US-China & World Order
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Happy Friday everybody, welcome to another episode of China Update where we discuss leading
political, economic and geo-strategic analysis on the world's number two economy.
My name is Tony, what a week it has been, there is still a lot to cover before we enter
the weekend, let's jump in.
And first up, earlier this week we covered a concerning incident in Tokyo, Japan, where
despite being famous for its high levels of safety, what appeared to be a soldier jumped
the wall of the Chinese embassy and threatened diplomatic staff with a knife.
No injuries have been reported.
Tokyo police have taken over the case and in the last few days, as one analyst put it,
quote, officials and propaganda channels in China are leaning into the intrusion to intensify
the campaign since November to criticize Japan for so-called resurgent militarism, end quote.
The rhetoric has been intense, the state-run People's Daily, quote, this is by no means
a random public security incident, but rather an outbreak of a deep-seated ailment of the
right would shift in Japan's political ecology, end quote.
State-run nationalist, the Global Times, quote, historically Japanese militarism once dragged
Asia into the abyss, today Japan again stands at the crossroads where a neo-militarism could
gain momentum, end quote.
The Ministry of Defence, yesterday, quote, this incident is extremely egregious in its
nature.
It highlighted the grave reality that the rampant spread of far-right impact in Japan
has deeply infiltrated into the Japanese self-defence force, end quote.
Despite Japan being one of the safest countries in the world, on Thursday a travel alert advising
Chinese citizens to avoid travelling to Japan was sent to cell phones, citing, quote, constant
deterioration of security environment for Chinese nationals in Japan, end quote, referring
to, quote, the extremely vile act of a Japanese ground self-defence force member who broke
into the Chinese embassy in Japan, end quote.
Veteran China analyst Bill Bishop was quick to point out Beijing's double standard in
discussing the case, quote, the attacker sounds mentally ill, and while it is obviously a
bad incident, no one was hurt, unlike the 2024 knife attack on a bus for a Japanese
school in Suzhou that left a Japanese child injured and a Chinese woman dead.
In that case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing said it was an isolated incident
and that such isolated incidents could happen in any country in the world, but in this case,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the incident once again highlighted the danger of the rampant
spread of far-right impact and neo-militarism in the country and went on to say it also
reveals the toxicity of the Japanese government's erroneous policies on vital issues concerning
China-Japan relations such as history and Taiwan, end quote, his point being that from
Beijing's point of view, when violent anti-Japanese attacks occur in China, they are isolated
incidents.
If an attack occurs in Japan, it's due to rising nationalism and militarism.
Over the last few months, we've seen China's forceful response to remarks by Prime Minister
Takahashi over a potential Taiwan contingency escalate into a broader diplomatic and economic
pressure campaign against Japan.
Measures ranging from inflammatory rhetoric to seafood import restrictions and tighter
rare-earth export controls were intended to deter Tokyo from framing Taiwan as a survival-threatening
situation.
Yet some Japanese analysts now argue that the strategy appears to have backfired against
China.
Domestically, the pressure has strengthened Takahashi's political standing.
A snap election victory has reinforced her mandate, while public opinion, already shifting
in recent years, has become more receptive to a tougher stance on China.
Concerns over regional security, particularly since the war in Ukraine, have increased support
for expanding Japan's defence capabilities and deterrence posture.
Institutionally, Japan's political landscape is also evolving in ways that favour a more
assertive security policy.
The ruling coalition's reconfiguration has brought in Nippon Isshin no Kai, a party that
advocates fewer constraints on Japan's military role and a broader interpretation of collective
self-defence.
Policy discussions now include loosening arms export restrictions, strengthening alliances
beyond the US-Japan framework, and even proposals for wider regional security groupings aimed
at counterbalancing China.
In the legislature, a growing so-called realist bloc, spanning both ruling and opposition
parties, is enabling faster progress on defence reforms.
Even opposition groups are moderating their stance, signalling tacit support for strengthening
Japan's security posture.
Meanwhile, public tolerance for measures such as long-range missile deployments, particularly
in southern Japan, reflects a notable shift in threat perception.
Taken together, these developments highlight the limits of coercive diplomacy rather than
forcing compliance.
China's actions risk accelerating Japan's strategic transformation.
The result is a more unified political environment in Tokyo, greater public acceptance of military
normalisation, and a sustained shift toward deterrence – outcomes that may ultimately
run counter to Beijing's intentions.
Next up, after years of brutal contraction and trillions of dollars of lost wealth, there
are growing signs that China's property collapse may finally be seeing some light
at the end of the tunnel.
According to new analysis from Bloomberg Economics, the sharp decline in construction activity
since its 2021 peak is gradually bringing supply back in line with underlying demand.
At its height, China's property boom was extraordinary.
In 2021 alone, new construction reached 1.56 billion square metres, equivalent to building
more than eight Manhattans in a single year.
The scale of overbuilding was such that economists estimate construction needed to fall by roughly
55%, over half, to rebalance the market.
Since then, property investment has dropped about 40%, suggesting, if these original estimates
were correct, the adjustment is already around 70% complete, with stabilisation potentially
arriving by 2027 or early 2028.
Now, it's worth stressing that this is stabilisation, a new normal at half the former rate, not
recovery.
It basically would mean that after six to seven years, the bleeding would have stopped.
China still has a glut of housing, estimated at 90 million empty housing units, assuming
three people per household, that's enough for the entire population of Brazil.
And this is combined with a structural decline.
Because of the country's one-child policy, as well as the regular trends one sees with
development and urbanisation, China's population is expected to fall by 204 million people
over the next 30 years, and that's the conservative estimate.
What this all essentially means is that China's former golden years of explosive housing growth
is over.
It's done.
It's the end.
It is not coming back.
Early signs of stabilisation at a new normal are emerging, price declines have begun to
moderate, and some cities are even seeing modest gains.
This matters not only for developers, but for the broader economy, as real estate accounts
for an estimated 60-90% of household wealth in China.
Before the collapse, this was closer to 80-90%.
Stabilising the sector is therefore critical to restoring some consumer confidence in spending.
Looking ahead, the structure of China's economy is shifting.
While housing is expected to remain significant, its share of GDP is declining, even as high-tech
and green industries expand rapidly.
The end of the property downturn then may mark not a rebound, but a transition toward
a new growth model.
And even if successful, a new growth rate will likely be much slower.
If policy makers cannot pull off that transition, China faces stagnation at best.
Okay, we have one more development to cover, but just quickly, if you want to continue
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Next up, Singapore is an interesting country.
A city-state at the heart of a critical region and crossroads.
Ethnically, majority Chinese, but multi-ethnic and culturally distinct from China.
Asian, but heavily westernized in language and institutions.
Its leaders have often had very different takes on global affairs.
In an interview with UK-based Reuters this week, Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan
discussed navigating a rapidly shifting global order, one increasingly defined by great power
rivalry rather than cooperation.
In the interview, he described the United States as a, quote, revisionist power of its
own system, end quote, marking a, quote, striking departure from decades in which Washington
underpinned a rules-based global system, end quote, that system built on multilateralism,
open trade, and relative stability enabled export-driven economies like Singapore to
flourish, but Balakrishnan argues that era has now ended, replaced by a more fragmented
and distrustful environment.
Crucially, Singapore is not turning to China as an alternative anchor.
Instead, the country is doubling down on strategic autonomy, refusing to align fully with either
side.
Quote, we have to be relevant, useful, and not used, end quote, he said, emphasizing
that Singapore will make decisions based solely on its own long-term interests, even if that
means saying no to both Washington and Beijing.
This balancing act reflects deeper structural realities.
The United States remains Singapore's largest source of foreign investment and a key services
trading partner, while China dominates goods trade.
Severing ties with either is not economically viable.
Instead, Singapore is seeking to hedge, strengthening links with middle powers such as Europe, India,
and Japan, while expanding trade agreements and digital economy partnerships.
At the macro level, his comments highlight a broader global shift, the erosion of trust
and the weaponization of trade, technology, and finance.
In such a world, even traditionally stabilizing forces like supply chains have become tools
of geopolitical leverage.
The risks are significant.
Escalation and flashpoints like Taiwan or the South China Sea could force difficult
choices, including whether to grant military access to partners.
While Singapore hopes conflict is not inevitable, it is preparing for a more volatile future.
Ultimately, its strategy resembles what Farah Khresnan described as, quote, riding a bicycle
on a tightrope, end quote, constant motion, careful balance, and no room for missteps
in an increasingly divided world.
Meanwhile, Singapore's Prime Minister, Lawrence Wong, said at a recent Boao Forum that China
can play a bigger role in supporting regional prosperity and stability, quote, its vast
domestic market can be a powerful engine of growth for the region, end quote.
The statement provoked a response from a commentator we often quote on China Update, Peking University
Professor of Finance Michael Pettis, quote, there is quite a bit of hypocrisy here.
Last year, Wong warned of a world in which the United States is turning inward, with
neither China nor any other country willing or able to fill the vacuum.
Filling the vacuum, of course, means running trade deficits.
Wong is saying that if the United States is no longer willing to absorb the massive trade
surpluses of countries like Singapore, China should reverse its Singapore-like policies
and boost domestic demand by enough that it becomes a trade deficit economy that trade
surplus countries need.
What Singapore apparently isn't willing to do, however, is to reverse its own policies
and boost its own domestic demand.
Singapore itself apparently should bear no responsibility for its role in the global
economy.
But the global economy would be much better off, as Keynes argued, if trade surplus countries
like Singapore took meaningful steps either to raise relative domestic demand or to channel
their surpluses into productive investment in capital-constrained developing economies.
But the first is costly and involves structural changes, and the second is risky.
So what Singapore asks is that if the US no longer wants to absorb its trade surplus,
then China should.
Someone else, in other words, must bear the cost of Singapore's relatively weak demand.
Let me know in the comments below what you think of these comments as well as the previous
comments from the Singaporean foreign minister.
And of course, as always, I am generally interested in your other thoughts on what we covered
in today's episode.
That is today's episode of China Update.
Thank you so much, everybody, for watching.
Have a good Friday.
Have a restful weekend.
And unless there is another extra episode on the weekend, I hope to see you for a new
week of updates on Monday.
