SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE- Hon. John Strand

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 25, 2026
26th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 7-8, 2023
-Hon. John Strand
CEO of Strand Consult
I'm very happy to be here today.
And I know yesterday I had a short presentation
because someone was stepping out,
so I stepped in before Marco Rubio came on.
But I want to show you some of our latest research
we have done.
So I've been speaking at this event before
about how we've done the mapping of all the Chinese
equipment in 31 countries across Europe,
which operators, which countries are dependent
of Chinese telecommunication infrastructure.
And that mapping have had a huge impact
on the regulations in Europe.
And while we're looking at these things,
this morning I've just been to a presentation
in the State Department here in the US
and showed also some of the things I'm showing you now.
We just did lately, there's 10 countries
which have an ambition of being a part
of the European Union.
We call them enlargement countries.
That's one you can see here.
And we have just done a mapping of Chinese equipment
in those countries.
But actually, when you do these kind of mapping
and you try to find other things,
you sometimes find something you didn't expect to find.
And you start digging into it.
And I will also present you for that today.
What's very important is that EU have this,
what's called the 5G toolbox,
which ensure that European countries
are basically not using untrusted vendors
in the 5G networks.
It's a member state decision.
All 27 countries have committed themselves
to do these things.
A lot of countries have implemented with success.
And some countries are a little bit slow.
One of the worst countries is actually Germany,
which basically, first of all,
they're dependent on Russian gas.
And now they're dependent
on Chinese telecommunication infrastructure.
It's absurd, but it's just like history repeating itself.
What's interesting also is that when we did the mapping
of the 27 countries in Europe,
we basically have seen a lot of stories
coming into the media.
A lot of them have been planted by public affair,
PR companies working for Huawei,
the Chinese government trying to change the perception
of what's going on.
And the misinformation,
which a lot of people talked about here, is huge.
And on this subject, and when it comes to chips,
it's even huger.
But what you see actually is there is some countries
which is afraid of putting sanction
on Chinese telecommunication equipment
because they say this will have a negative impact
on our business with China.
The reality is that all those countries
which have put sanctions on China,
Chinese telecommunication infrastructure,
none of them have been hit anyhow at all.
That's including UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway,
the Baltic countries, the list is long.
So the reality is China threatened to do regress
on the different countries,
but in the end of the day, they don't do it
because they like to do business.
And then they said,
now we just lost one kind of business
and let's continue it with the other businesses.
So China is very good at threatening,
but in reality, they're not delivering on the threats.
And the interesting thing is the conditions in China
for Western companies, much worse than it is.
In China, Huawei and ZTE have a market share
of 98% of 5G equipment.
Chinese vendors have better conditions in Europe
despite the sanctions than European vendors
or American vendors have in China.
So we just talk about, people very often forget
to talk about what is the conditions in China.
In some countries, they distinguish between core and RAN.
That's how you build the networks up,
the antennas, you have the one side
and then the networks was transported
and they've put in different restrictions.
Huawei have invented a story
that you can distinguish between core and RAN
so if you get Chinese out of the core network,
the one, the network was connected,
towers, the masts, then it will be safe.
And that's totally bullshit, to be honest.
But different, some countries actually
is believing that story, but that's not the reality.
So basically, when you do these kind of policies,
you can do it in three ways.
You can do it voluntarily, that the operators say,
it's probably not smart to build
a fundamental, legitimate society
on Chinese telecommunication infrastructure.
We've seen that in a numbers of countries
where operators said, yes, we bought Chinese equipment
in the past, but we can see the China we have today
is not the same China as we had 10 years ago.
So maybe it's a good idea to replace it.
So that's smart, they do it.
Some operators, they need to have a little bit help
by the government.
So then you make a transition process
where the government says to them,
we think you should do these things.
And that's basically what we have seen in UK.
Then the operators get a window
to rip and replace the equipment
and they do it in that period.
And then in other countries,
you need to take the baseball bat
and tell the operators, this is how we do it.
Unfortunately, there's some operators
which basically have a great love to China.
Huawei is one, Deutsche Telekom is one of them
and Vodafone is another one.
And unfortunately, that's a reality.
When we did this mapping of these countries,
which we have here, it's in numbers,
eight small countries and two big countries.
The two big countries is Turkey and Ukraine.
And that's the countries
which are on the European Union's list of countries
which have an ambition on the process
of maybe getting members.
With deep respect for the Turkeys,
I don't believe they ever will be
a member of the European Union.
That's my personal opinion.
They have different values and it's a different country.
And we have seen the challenge
they have been giving Sweden to become a part of NATO,
which is my eyes totally absurd.
And in that way, yeah, long story short.
Ukraine is important because I think we all,
hopefully all of us support Ukraine
and what's the fight against Russia and what they're doing.
And there's no doubt about Ukraine have a lot of challenges.
In this process, when we work with these things,
we also see that these countries
which you want to be a part of European Union,
you have to be compliance to a lot of rules
before you can become a member.
So a lot of these countries is already now,
and some of you is coming from these countries,
working on being compliance to according to EU rules.
It's a little bit like,
if you want to be a member of the club,
you have to live up to these criterias.
And we see that numbers of these countries
have actually understand this
regarding using Chinese equipment
and are in the process of implementing rules.
They have operators who have basically made a decision
not to use Chinese equipment and doing those things.
And basically, we see that.
On the top of that,
we also see that EU have a lot of financial help
to not only these enlargement countries,
but also to Africa and Latin America
where we give aid and help.
And basically, interesting part is that
if you get subsidies for European Union
to build telecommunication infrastructure,
then your infrastructure have to be compliance
with the EU's 5G toolbox,
basically meaning that you should not use
non-trusted vendors in your networks.
And there's already some cases.
That means that if I'm an operator in Africa
who's getting grants from the European Union
or Latin America,
the European Union basically wants to do these things.
And the whole idea is also that
if you get loans from the European Investment Bank,
you basically also have to be compliance to these rules.
So that's quite interesting
that aid is linked to national security rules.
Here's a case, Slovenia is an example
where basically, yes, there's 541 million euros
in subsidies for building
some telecommunication infrastructure
and that infrastructure have to be compliant
with the EU's 5G toolbox of what's going on.
I think there's also a project in Moldova
right now in the pipeline
where basically it will be the same.
When we did this mapping and did these things,
we saw that the main part of these small
East European countries basically are in the process of,
either they don't have any Chinese equipment
or they're in the process of getting rid of it
and so on.
There's some few exceptions.
I want to put focus on two countries.
One country is Turkey,
which is very much Chinese equipment.
And I don't think there's a big chance
in short term to change that.
But there's an issue on Ukraine.
Why I'm bringing up the Ukraine part
is that a lot of Western companies,
we have a lot of sanctions on doing business with Russia,
but there's actually a lot of Western companies
which have take the responsibilities to their own hands
and decided to stop doing business with Russia,
despite the fact that it's not under sanctions,
pulled out of Russia and so on.
And we can see a lot of this,
that vacancy which is created
when Western companies pull out of Russia
is being taken over by Chinese companies.
Chinese don't care.
They just want to do business.
And I think there's not enough focus
on what China actually is doing in Russia
because there's no doubt about they help them a lot.
But I would like to ask for your help today
because there's certain things,
I can find out a lot of things,
but there's certain things I can't find out.
When we look at it and look at these things,
of these 10 countries,
they represent less than 1% of the mobile subscribers
in the European Union,
if we take at least 10 countries.
So we take the small out
and then we are sitting back with Turkey and Ukraine.
But what's interesting is that
in the occupied parts of Ukraine,
which is roughly 20% of Ukrainian land, including Crimea,
there's actually been established five new mobile operators.
So what's happening is that the Russians
basically occupied the territories
and the old mobile towers, mobile mass,
get disconnected from Ukrainian networks
and get created new networks
running on together with the Russians.
So there's actually five operators,
Russian operators on Ukrainian land operating today,
serving all the people which is there.
But it's even worse.
The mapping we find out here
is basically when it starts back in Crimea,
there was created this called Crim Telecom.
So basically they created a Crimea.
They basically took all the Ukrainian towers, mass,
disconnected from Ukrainian networks,
created new local Ukrainian, Crimean Russian network,
if you could say like that.
It have its own operator codes,
just like what any operators in AT&T or Verizon
or T-Mobile or whatever.
So then they came there.
And this is described in Kiev Post and a lot of other places.
This is an article from 2015, basically.
When you have a mobile network,
you also have some security issues.
It's a part of the standard.
You have what's called a lawful interception gateway,
which basically means that if the police,
security authorities want to do surveillance of a person,
they have an interface to the network,
which basically they put in information,
this phone number we want to track,
we want to know everything about this person.
And this gateway basically puts like an,
an octopus putting his arm into the networks
and take all the information that is about that person.
Let's say it was you.
Basically, where are you now?
Who are you sending text messages to?
Who are you receiving text messages to from?
Who are you calling?
Which website do you visit?
All those information goes
into the lawful interception gateway
and back to the police and the authorities.
These new Russian networks
built in the occupied parts of Ukraine have,
Cisco is a big supplier of these security solutions,
for instance.
But in this, these networks,
they have a solution called SORM from a Russian company.
And that SORM solution is fully integrated
with the Russian security towards the FSB.
So that's basically means that they can sit in Moscow
and decide saying, now we want to do surveillance
because the people living in the occupied areas,
their mobile phones goes on these networks.
And basically they can sit in Moscow and track them.
But what's also happening if it's,
let's say some Ukrainians gets into the occupied territories
and they have not turned their phone off,
then their phone will go and say, is the network here?
Just like when you come to the U.S. and you're roaming,
it will try to get the network.
When you get to the U.S.,
your operator will tell the U.S. operator
about you can roam on their network.
But these networks is open.
So what's happening if a Ukrainian phone
comes under the network,
they can see, oh, here's a phone.
It's a Ukrainian phone which is in our network.
And let's imagine there was sitting,
suddenly you see 10 Ukrainian phones in a forest
in the occupied territories.
It's probably not 10 Ukrainian going on a field trip
to study the nature, you know?
It's probably some guys doing a dirty job
which have to be done, okay?
Then the Russians have this.
So they use this not only to do surveillance
of the Ukrainians which moves into these areas.
They also use it to do surveillance of the citizens.
And the Russian military use these networks
for communication.
So this is actually a defense solution.
It's an army solution
because the Russian communication solutions,
the radio systems is shitty and old and whatever.
And basically these mobile networks is used.
That's happening in all countries
that the military and the police enforcement
and so on use the normal networks.
So what's interesting here is,
this is the name of the operators.
We have a lot of information about them.
And we've been trying to dig into this
because when you create a network like that,
when you take a mobile tower
where there's some equipment and disconnect it
and want to connect it to a new network,
you need some help from a vendor.
It's not something two school guys can do.
And you need also some new equipments
because some of the equipment was used to serve
the networks when it was on Ukrainian land,
if you could say like that, is in Kiev.
But they cannot use that to serve it.
So you need to connect it to something else
and you need help.
We know that Ericsson and Nokia
is not doing business there, that for sure.
But we're trying to find out which role the Chinese have,
which role do Huawei have, which role do ZTE have.
And basically we have not been able to get any information.
They probably have some other people
do the dirty job for them, some subcontractors.
But the reality is if the Chinese involved
in building these five networks
or all those who was involved
in building these five networks,
they are delivering communication solutions
for the Russian military.
This is reality.
This is happening every day.
Thousands of people are using these networks.
As in my presentation, you can see the numbers
how many people there actually is.
So when we look at these things is,
in these areas of the old Ukraine,
the problem is in Ukraine,
all the operators using Chinese equipment big time.
So the Ukrainians are afraid of talking.
I've tried to reach out to numbers of people in Ukraine
and trust me, I have good relations in Ukraine.
But because the Ukrainian operators
are so dependent on Huawei and ZTE equipment,
they don't wanna talk about it.
They don't wanna step on the Chinese toes.
So talk about supply chain's risk.
Right now, the Chinese is probably helping the Russians
to build and run five networks in occupied territories.
And Ukrainians cannot interfere in these things
because they get supplies,
the networks are supplied by the Chinese.
And by the way, the Chinese is working
very close to the Russians, okay?
Just ask Putin about that.
Yes, and open.
So basically what I say is,
and if you want to know what Huawei is,
here's a fantastic article,
how they have delivered surveillance camera for Taliban.
And this article is less than a year old in Afghanistan.
So Taliban can use surveillance cameras
to find their enemies.
Listen, show me your friends, I will tell who you are, okay?
This is guys who's doing business with Taliban,
helping Taliban to do surveillance in Afghanistan
and suppress people in Afghanistan.
I just want to tell you one thing,
in Afghanistan, that's the country where they have shut down
the beauty bars where women went to get their manicure
and pedicure done, okay?
That's the country where girls cannot go to school, okay?
This is, sorry to say, it's a way of looking at people
which is so far away from where I was born
and raised and the values I have.
So let me say it very simple.
We need to have focus on these things.
And we are right now putting a lot of focus
of who is building and running these networks
in the occupied parts of Ukraine.
Because we need to find out who's behind this.
And we need to get their names on the front of the newspaper
and we need to basically tell the world
who's actually helping doing these things.
Thank you.
