LIVE: Senate Committee Hearings Examine Department of Defense Network Security and IT Operations

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The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Cybersecurity holds hearings to examine enterprise security and information technology operations of the Department of Defense networks and systems at 2:30 p.m. ET on March 24.
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Good afternoon and welcome to this afternoon's Cybersecurity Subcommittee hearing on Enterprise
Security and Information Technology Operations of Department of Defense Networks and Systems.
I want to begin by thanking our witnesses for appearing today before this subcommittee.
Your testimony arrives at an inflection point for how the Department of Defense fights,
decides, and wins. This hearing is fundamentally about warfighting,
the digital backbone of the Department of Defense is no longer a support function,
it is a weapon system. Our tanks, ships, aircraft, and ground forces depend on connected,
resilient, and secure networks to operate at the speed and precision across vast distances.
Sensors all over the world will connect to shooters across the theater in a vast
kill web that must operate faster and more efficiently than our enemy's systems. This
is especially true for future conflicts as we continue fielding software-intensive systems
designed for decision advantage and speed of action. While quantity may have a quality all
of its own, the ability to optimize our targeting and orient, decide, and act more quickly than the
enemy will likely decide the outcome of the next major war. The Department's cultural shifts
towards recognizing networks and information technology infrastructure as a warfighting
platform is one I agree with, yet I realize there is still a long way to go. Software can be
developed and deployed in minutes, hours, or days. The bureaucratic processes governing how we acquire,
certify, and field it does not match that timeline, at least not yet. This reality is
no longer merely an inconvenience, it is a strategic liability. We have talked long enough
about solving these problems. This subcommittee wants to see them resolved. Compounding the urgency
is the condition of the infrastructure itself. Defense-to-information technology budgets have
long served as the bill payer, absorbing cuts to fund near-term priorities. The result is a technical
debt problem of historic proportions in both hardware and software. Our adversaries are not
blind to this. Not surprisingly, they are taking advantage of this blunder. Every day we delay
modernizing is a day we strengthen their hand in the cyber domain. As we modernize, speed without
security is not an improvement. We must be disciplined about not punting today's problems
to the future. That means patching what we have while building with foundational security baked
in. This cannot be a government-only endeavor. The private sector can move with speed and provide
capabilities the department cannot match, but partnership only works when our processes and
requirements are transparent and consistent. We owe our industry partners clarity and we owe
our warfighters results. We must ask what kind of compute capacity, network resiliency, and data
infrastructure our warfighters require, not just today, but as artificial intelligence is deployed
at a scale across the force. If we cannot answer that question with specificity, we cannot build
toward it. Today, this subcommittee looks forward to hearing from both of you on where the department
stands in addressing these efforts. We want to understand how bureaucratic barriers are being
dismantled and how our processes are being made more welcoming to industry partners. It is
especially important for us to hear whether our networks have the capacity, resilience,
and performance our military requires for modern warfare against a capable adversary.
Thank you again, and now I would like to recognize the ranking member for her remarks. Senator Rosen.
Well, thank you, Chairman Browns. Ms. Davies, General Stanton, appreciate you being here. I want
to welcome you. And Ms. Davies, congratulations on your recent confirmation and assumption
of duties. And so, Ms. Davies, as you get settled into this position, we'd like to hear more about
your priorities, get some of the ideas of where you're going to be placing emphasis on funding
from FY26 appropriations on any reconciliation funding you may have received as well. And so,
without discussing specifics, it would also be helpful to know where we might see significant
budget swings for programs, so we're not surprised when the FY27 President's Budget
Request is released. That request is already nearly two months late. It's not expected for
a few more weeks, and that leaves little time in our NDA process to delve into the details,
and it's critical for us to be able to do that. General Stanton, I want to welcome you back.
Thank you for your years of service. I hope you will also share your thoughts on all of these
topics as they relate to your role as Director for the Defense Information Systems Agency and
Commander for the Department of Defense Cyber Defense Command. As the organization charged
with running DOD networks, you have a unique operational perspective on how policy decisions
from the Department's CIO are translated, well, into action. That also means that you have a
slightly different view as to the resourcing and workforce needs. The implementation of technology
for the warfighters is different, maybe, than the development, right? The impact of technical
debt on the ability of our department to modernize, you can speak to that in a practical sense.
We also have a long list of long-term issues we want to make sure the department is addressing
so they don't get lost in the immediate priorities of the day or the specific priorities of this
administration. For example, implementation of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification
process, improving the authority to operate process for software to be placed on the DOD networks,
and addressing the backlog of technical debt in our IT programs to make sure our networks are
more modern, more resilient, and of course, more secure. These are just a few of the areas where
I think we have common cause and desire to work together to improve the department for the long
term. We want to work collaboratively with you on these issues. However, the department has not
been particularly timely or forthcoming on information. So for us to conduct our statutory
obligation to oversee the Department of Defense requires us to have open and honest conversations.
There's definitely a trust deficit right now, but I think it's fixable if the department can be more
responsive to the requests of this committee and to our members. So I hope we can use this hearing,
both open and closed, to help us get started on the right foot. And with that, I'm going to turn it
back over to Chairman Browns. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Today we're pleased to have
our two panelists with us, Kirsten Davies, who is the Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Defense, and Lieutenant General Paul Stanton, United States Army Director of
Defense Information Systems Agency, Commander of the Department of Defense Cyber Defense Command.
We welcome both of you here, and we look forward to your opening statements. Your written statements
will be a part of the record, but we would welcome your opening statements. And with this,
Ms. Davies, would you like to begin? Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman,
Ranking Member, Senator Reed. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today
about the department's strategy to transform technology and cybersecurity into a decisive
warfighting advantage. Our focus is to enable data supremacy and decision dominance on the
contested battlefields of today and tomorrow at the speed and scale our warfighters deserve.
In the latest initiative in Secretary Hegseth's drive for efficiency and effectiveness,
we are undertaking a bold transformation of enterprise IT and the cybersecurity program,
unifying these capabilities under the department's Chief Information Officer.
Through this effort, we will eliminate inefficient spending, reduce technical debt,
accelerate modernization, drive consistent and upleveled cybersecurity,
and unleash data and innovation from the core to the edge across our joint forces.
Leveraging my oversight of DISA, the NSA Cybersecurity Directorate, and the department's
Cybercrime Center, we are working with the military services, joint staff, combatant
commands, and defense agencies across four transformation pillars. I'll provide a few
highlights here. Under Pillar 1, the Enduring Digital Foundation, we're transforming our network
infrastructure and communications transport, which extend from undersea cables to terrestrial fiber
to advanced satellite capabilities, connecting everything from the home front to the tactical
edge. This foundation supports every warfighting system and our global installations. We're driving
continual modernization, expansion, and hardening, as well as broad 5G usage and data center
modernization. We're evolving our cloud strategy in JWCC Next, and we're also leading a proactive
approach to spectrum management and advancing PNT efforts, ensuring ready and resilient
capabilities that enable American warfighting dominance. Under Pillar 2, Agile Digital
Capabilities, reflecting some of your comments, Senator Round, we are expanding and maturing
digital offerings. We're accelerating delivery of software and SaaS services and standardizing
data architectures, streamlining our data flows. We're shifting from slow legacy software development
to modern agile delivery, driving interoperability by design, and delivering applications and
analytics at the speed of relevance. We're driving extensive defense business systems work,
whether modernizing or sunsetting those systems, to enable clean audits and reduce wasteful spend.
We're also deploying mission partner environment as persistent secure environments, where trusted
partners can be rapidly integrated. Under Pillar 3, Cybersecurity for the Warfighting Ecosystem,
in alignment with President Trump's national security strategy and the national defense
strategy, we're moving from checklist-driven compliance towards unified holistic risk-based
approach. We will emphasize automation and dynamic and continuous monitoring. We will
drive risk reduction rather than burdensome paperwork, focusing on anti-fragility and
resilience through a holistic blend of streamlined processes, advanced technologies, and skilled
people. We're refining the authority to operate process and accelerating our deployment of zero
trust principles. We're also refining our risk management process and reigniting the DIB to align
with the Secretary's arsenal of freedom initiatives. Finally, through Pillar 4, Skills and Partnerships,
we recognize that people are our decisive edge. As part of our transformation, we're reviewing
IT and cybersecurity roles to ensure clear responsibilities, accountability for outcomes,
and a bias for action. We're leveraging your provisions in the fiscal year 2026 NDAA to
enhance recruitment and retention of cyber professionals and expand competitive compensation.
We will be launching an expanded top-tier certification program in partnership with
industry and academia, which will offer upskilling and cross-skilling to our warfighters, from new
recruits to seasoned service members. And because we do not fight alone, we're doubling down to
influence the digital transformation efforts of our allies and partners, which will better enable
all of coalition force readiness. As we advance this bold strategy, thank you for your continued
interest in and support of IT and cybersecurity and for the resources you provide to protect
national security. The race for data superiority and decision dominance is won or lost every day,
and this strategy is a key part of how we together ensure the technology race is won
by the United States. Together, we will ensure the resilience, readiness, and lethality of America's
warfighters across every domain. I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Ms. Davies. Lieutenant General Stanton.
Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Rosen, Senator Reid, thank you for the privilege of appearing
before you today to explain the fundamental shift we are making to ensure that our weapons system,
the Department of War Information Network, provides our warfighters with decision advantage.
I'm honored to represent the highly skilled and dedicated professionals of the Department
of War Cyber Defense Command and the Defense Information Systems Agency that design,
build, secure, operate, and defend our environment. We must deliver a secure,
standardized, resilient, and efficient architecture that supports combatant commands.
Nested within the Department of War CIO's vision, the Defense Information Systems Agency has a
responsibility to provide functionally relevant capability that aligns with the time and tempo
of the warfighter's mission. As the Department of War Cyber Defense Command, we have an added
responsibility to ensure that our systems and data are properly defended against continuous
and sophisticated attacks. Combining these two responsibilities and said simply,
we must get the right data to the right place at the right time such that our commanders make
better and faster decisions than our enemies. We are a subunified command and a Department
of War Combat Support Agency. Our mission, and therefore our culture, is to support warfighting.
We are fully engaged to move and maneuver the network and our data according to the changing
conditions of the operating environment. We design, build, secure, operate, and defend in
lockstep with commanders at echelon. We campaign to execute our missions and defeat our adversaries.
We present and defend the architecture so that commanders can fight.
We are doing so right now in Operation Epic Fury. But we cannot rest. We must transform ourselves
and the means by which we support to leverage the most modern and effective technology.
We are in a perpetual state of continuous modernization. New solutions, artificial
intelligence, commercial SATCOM, mobile data centers, they emerge at industry's pace,
and we must integrate them into our architecture in missions at speed.
Further, we must be prepared to fight alongside our partners, sharing data across warfighting
functions within decision cycles. The coalition information environment, as recently prototyped
during an exercise in the Indo-Pacific theater, is a cornerstone of our approach.
We know that our adversaries, our enemies, are watching us and will certainly attempt to delay
or degrade our decisions, and we will defeat them. We are developing solutions that are secure by
design, incorporating perimeter defenses that defeat known attack vectors, and employing zero
trust to detect, bound, and defeat new and novel tradecraft. Our internet access point
and our cloud-based internet isolation warfighting systems continuously adapt to new threats at our
boundary. Our Thunderdome implementation of zero trust is proven, expanding rapidly as we transition
defense agencies and field activities into DoD net. We will use these tools and the associated
data in an informed, productive, efficient, and speedy manner, automating our defenses
and employing human tradecraft for advanced analysis. We prioritize our defenses on what
matters. In order to preserve decision space for commanders, we must defend the critical systems
upon which they are dependent. Our approach employs a mission-thread defense that we nest
and plan amongst commanders and their staffs for synchronization. We align our cyber defenses to
how their systems employ and move data, ensuring that they have confidence in the data upon which
they make their decisions. Our defenses and our strategic goals require optimization. We have to
see ourselves holistically. We have made and continue to make significant progress in sensing,
logging, aggregating, and analyzing our data accordingly. Our data analytics support cell
is employing our common data analytics platform to continuously run queries in analytics that
optimize performance and support defensive operations. CDAP feeds into U.S. Cybercom's
joint cyber warfighting architecture for enrichment with classified intelligence
in coordination with offensive cyber forces for speed and lethality. Key to our success
is the innovation, talent, and motivation of our workforce. Readiness is a requirement.
A trained and ready force has confidence to act with disciplined initiative. Demonstrated
confidence leads to trust to make decisions at speed. When we combine our transformational
architecture with a talented and trained workforce, we are postured to meet our requirements.
This is an imperative. The effectiveness of the DOIN is inextricably linked to our missions and
our nation's defense. With the continued support of the committee, we will preserve the decisive
advantage. We look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thank you, General Stanton. Normally,
we would begin with five-minute rounds, and I would start. Senator Rosen, the ranking member,
would be second, and then we'd move back and forth, but we also have the ranking member here,
and if you would like to, no? Okay, regular order it is. Very good. Well, then I will begin.
Ms. Davies and General Stanton, the ability of our warfighters to operate in a contested
degraded environment is directly tied to how resilient and modern those networks are.
Where does the department stand on network modernization, and are our warfighters
confident they can operate if those networks are attacked or denied?
Thank you, Senator Rand, for that great question. I'll allow General Stanton to get into a few of
details, but as I reflected on pillar one of our transformation strategy, this is active work that
we are doing right now that DISA has been conducting for quite some time under General
Stanton's leadership and previous leadership as well. This is a key area of focus for us.
Our forces are globally located. Our joint forces are globally located. We are currently,
obviously, in a mission right now with partner forces as well, and the resiliency
and the efficacy of the traffic of our network is quite critical to that. It's a key focus area
for us, Senator. General Stanton.
Senator, thank you for the question. With great support from Congress, we have an initiative that
we reference as DISA and security and resiliency, so the Defense Information System Network, where
we focus on undersea cables, increased bandwidth for terrestrial fiber, multimodal satellite
communications capabilities, what we refer to as an agnostic peering gateway that allows us to
communicate over military SATCOM waveforms, but also via commercial SATCOM capabilities.
As our forces move into theater, as they currently reside in theater, we have a primary
alternate contingency and emergency plans put into place. We're never single-threaded on any
capability as we enter into the fight, such that if we suffer degradation, we have fallback
capabilities. We're seeing that in spades currently, operating across terrestrial,
space-based, and undersea capabilities.
So, recognizing that we're in an unclassed environment, we'll go into a classified
environment when this meeting is done. Specifically, I think what you're indicating is there's a couple
of different areas where we may have some challenging communications problems. You
mentioned undersea cables, you mentioned space-based assets, and so forth. Are those perhaps
the most challenging that we're going to face that we can talk about in this environment today?
Well, Senator, I think that it's the combination and the fact that as our warfighting formations
are outfitted with capability, we never isolate down to a single mode of transport. We ensure
that we have the ability to route terrestrially. We hit to peering points, such that we can
leverage undersea cables. We're never bounded by a single undersea cable. We always have a plan
to route around or have an alternate path. And then the proliferation of space-based assets,
specifically in the commercial world, is really game-changing technology to give us
leap over capability if and when we do suffer a degradation.
It's an interesting lead-in on it then for us to talk a little bit about the reason why we no
longer talk about a kill chain. We talk about a kill web, and that is because we have multiple
avenues to move from a spotting system back into where you actually have the ability to trigger a
weapon. So multiple ways to get the communications from point A to point B, not simply one line.
Ms. Davies, many smaller defense industrial base companies lack the internal security
capability to defend themselves against a sophisticated state actor.
What is the department doing to reach that tier of the industrial base?
And is voluntary participation in government support programs getting us there?
Senator Allen, this is a key focus area for me as well. I think we have focused
largely on confidentiality of data in the past. I know that there has been some burdensome
requirements that have been placed on large and small businesses alike. In the new transformation,
one of our key pillars is going to be working directly with the defense industrial base. Their
resiliency is our resiliency. Their security is our security. But it needs to make sense.
We've heard Secretary Higgs talk about reducing the burdens to entrance,
allowing entrance, new entrance for smaller companies as well. This is a key focus area
for us, whether it's providing guidance, providing principles for them to follow,
it's coming alongside them and partnering them. But it's also tailoring these requirements
so that they are effective for the arsenal of freedom that we are driving.
Thank you. My time has expired. Ranking member Rosen.
Thank you. Chairman Rounds, I'm going to just say something and I'll ask for
more details in the classified briefing. Just building on what Senator Rounds said,
I want to hear a little bit about the lessons you learned from the recent military operations
in Venezuela and Iran that relate to the DOD networks in terms of showing us a little bit
of stress testing in the real world. We're in conflicts in both places and what we've learned
about what we might be changing for future protracted conflicts. We'll save that one,
just put that out there. General Stanton, I want to
talk a little bit about IT support during a war. The Defense Information Systems Agency,
your combat support agency for the Department of Defense. I'm hoping that you can explain for all
of us what that means practically, given our current posture in the Middle East. What does
your agency do during wartime that could be different than what it does during peacetime?
Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. Thank you for the question. We are at war and we're executing
Operation Epic Period currently, which means that every day inside of our operations center,
the Defense Information Systems Agency and Cyber Defense Command get together to ascertain what has
transpired in the context of the network. What assets are still up and running? What
assets need to be resolved? How do we route around problems? How do we dynamically solve
problems with emergent technology and do so rapidly? From a DISA perspective, a lot has to
do with network transport. Where are the terminals located? How do we get them to the right spot? Do
we need to lease a new circuit on the fly in order to ensure that critical data gets from point A to
point B? These problems present themselves in real time. Inside of our ops center, we are
dynamically solving and developing resolution. Thank you. I'm going to move on to you, Ms. Davies,
because we want to talk a little bit about the Joint Warfighting Cloud Contract.
It's a mouthful. The Joint Warfighting Cloud Contract, do not try to say that quickly. We'll
just say the JWCC is a little bit easier. It's reaching a point soon where it's going to need
to be re-competed and there'll be a need to be a replacement contract. What lessons has DOD learned
from the JWCC that we might see next in an updated JWCC? How do you see AI impacting your decisions?
Thank you for the question. It is a mouthful, isn't it? It is. We are expanding JWCC into a
unified cloud marketplace, integrating additional providers, embedding financial operations,
automation, and multi-cloud management to enable enterprise-wide cost control and interoperability.
I can speak from being new in the role and seeing that there are contracts everywhere and different
points of authorization with different cloud that's happening. One of the key areas that we
need to be looking at from a multi-pronged approach is, is this the most efficient way
to be driving cloud compute? It's not. We need to be continuing on in the JWCC next. Is it the
best way to see the spend? It is not. JWCC next is going to provide us that financial transparency
that's there. It's also going to provide General Stanton and his team the ability to do better
defense across all this because we're going to know where all of the cloud compute is,
and that's key for us in asset identification and asset security. Thank you. I'm going to continue
with you, Ms. Davies, because I want to talk about the Enterprise Chief Information Officer
collaboration, right? So DoD, like you're saying, you're just a vast conglomeration of networks,
clouds, operating cultures, systems, you name it. It's difficult to craft a one-size-fits-all policy,
although you can set standards and you can at least lay out the templates for it. You can map
out where everything is, essentially. But in my view, there are benefits to having each of the
military departments and defense agencies having their own CIOs so that they can tailor technology
and policies to the needs of the various organizations. So could you describe for us
your relationship with your CIO counterparts in the military services and defense agencies,
and are there any lessons helpful or otherwise you might have picked up in your time so far?
Some great lessons, indeed. I'm holding regular meetings with my military department counterparts,
as well as the DAFA counterparts. I'm learning where the operational efficiencies are,
where the centers of excellence and expertise are, also where the gaps are. So I think there's
varying levels of competencies, varying levels of operational cadence that are there. And one of
the things that we will be getting after with this new strategy is to take a hold of that rising
tides, raise all ships, to make sure that we're all pointing in the same direction and focused
on operational excellence in cyber defense. I yield. Senator Reed.
Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Ranking Member. I thank the witnesses not only for
being here today, but for your dedication to all warfighters. Thank you.
Ms. Davis, I'm sure you're aware of the recent decision by the Secretary to designate
Anthropic as a supply chain risk. Indeed, you yourself signed out a memo on March 6,
directing the removal of Anthropic from DOD systems within 180 days. However,
the committee still has not heard the rationale from the department about why the designation
was made, nor received the full notification, which is required under law by Section 3252
of Title 10. And this notification requires a summary of the risk assessment and a summary
of the basis for the determination, including what less intrusive measures were considered
and why they were not reasonably available to reduce supply chain risk. We have not received
that information yet. It is required under law. So first, are you aware of the actual reason in
designating Anthropic as a supply chain risk? Senator, thank you for the question. I was
involved, as many of my counterparts were, in this collaborative decision-making process
that followed the regulatory requirements. Well, why was it done?
Sir, we're in active litigation right now, so I won't go into the deep details of it. We have
reached out and offered a briefing for your offices into the depths of it. I will say that
the filing in the California court is available. We have made that available, but it was only
available to us this morning. So we did provide that over with the risk analysis that was a part
of it. It's just interesting that you would file required documentation for the California court
before complying with the law and filing it and sending it to us. I don't believe it's been sent
to us officially or unofficially. Why haven't you, the department, complied with the law?
Senator, I'm aware that our colleagues in legislative affairs have followed the regulation
what they were supposed to provide. I do know that we followed all of the steps of the regulatory
requirement of the Title 10-3252. Well, I don't think we received it. We have not received it.
Just in checking with staff, I do not believe that we have received it at this time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. But as you pointed out, the California court has received it
because of the litigation. One additional question is, are you aware of any estimates
that were made as to the potential cost impact on DOD users for removing and replacing Anthropic
from DOD systems or the cost to replace Anthropic with another large language model?
Senator, I'm aware of the risk analysis that was conducted as a part of that,
and I'm aware that we have also constructed our data architectures to be able to be
interoperable with a variety of different AI capabilities. The deep assessment of replacement
of that, I'm unfamiliar with right here. I can take that away as an action for you.
It would be appreciated because the idea of the scale and the magnitude of the disruption
would be helpful. Further, it's my understanding that Anthropic's Claude system is being used today
in Iran in our military operations. Is that true? Without going into the details in this forum,
Senator, the use of the system is active right now. This is also why we provided for a measure
of time we felt was reasonable, as well as an exception process for removal of the Anthropic
systems. It just seems odd that you would continue to use a system which you determined to be a
supply chain risk. Does that strike you as odd? Senator, at no time in any way will we interfere
with the success, the lethality, and the resilience of our warfighters. For that reason,
we've provided what we feel is a reasonable amount of time for those systems to be replaced.
I can also say that with President Trump's great leadership, we have a number of technology
companies that have come to the table wanting to do business with us as the Department of War and
across the U.S. government. We know that we've architected this appropriately in order to use
competitive advantage as well. Thank you very much, Mr. General. Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Reid. Let me just follow up on that just briefly here.
My understanding is that there has been a 180-day notification with regard to Anthropic.
I presume, and you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I presume that there is an additional time
frame here in which there is the possibility of additional negotiations that can occur during
that time period, recognizing just what a significant change this would be to the Department
with the reliance right now on the Anthropic product at this time. Fair enough to say?
I'm not sure what part of the question to answer first, Senator Rounds. Let me try to unpack that
for you. We have architected our data in so much as we can deploy multiple types of AI across our
data. That's something that General Stanton and the DISA colleagues have been very careful about,
number one. Number two, we have provided what we feel is an appropriate amount of time
to remove the Anthropic systems in accordance with the designation by the Secretary of the
Supply Chain Risk designation in and of itself. Does that answer your question?
Yeah. I think the other entities that we are looking at, many of them have also indicated
that they have Anthropic within their systems as well. What I'm looking for is the possibility that
as this discussion goes on in a business-like manner, I'm assuming it will be done in a
business-like manner, that there are opportunities for additional negotiations to continue to occur.
Senator, I will defer that to my colleagues in the legal department who are undergoing that
active litigation right now. We will certainly bring a report back to you.
That's fair. I do think it'd be fair to say that the committee as a whole, and I can't speak for
the chairman, but at least with regard to the subcommittee, this is something that we have a real
interest in. We will want to get in a classified setting, probably deeper into the details at some
point when you're prepared to share that with us, with the appropriate personnel.
Senator, we'll take that for action. Absolutely. Thank you.
Thank you. Let me go on a little bit here. I'm just curious. General Stanton,
one item that we've talked about is deterrence. As we use our offensive capabilities,
one of the reasons why you use offensive capabilities is to deter future attacks and
to let people know that we know who they are, we know where they are, and we do have access
to some very exquisite capabilities to stop them from actually using kinetic
activities or kinetic systems. Can you talk a little bit in this open session, just so that
the American public will understand some of the things that we have the ability to do now that
we've actually utilized some of them and the bad guys know what we can do? Can you talk just
briefly about that, just to share with the American public what their taxpayer dollars are buying?
Yes, Senator. I look forward to having a more robust conversation in a classified
session. I understand, but the public can't see that. Like I said, I don't want to do any damage
to our ability to do it in the future, but I think it's fair for deterrence sake to maybe
talk a little bit about what our capabilities are, if that is acceptable. Yes, Senator. I think I
would address it in two principal ways. The first is there's a deterrent effect associated with cost
imposition. If you make it really hard for the enemy to attempt to achieve the effects that the
intends, then it is a cost imposition. The enemy has to spend more money, more time,
develop more resources, and apply it in ways that the enemy may not have been prepared.
That's a cost imposition. In addition, we have offensive cyber capabilities. We have
offensive cyber capabilities that can respond at speed to evidence of adversarial activity
beyond the bounds of our US networks. When we see operations in foreign space
as actioned by our cyberspace foreign adversaries, we have the capabilities to
deny them those resources. It's fair to say we can deny them the ability to communicate
in some cases. Yes, Senator. It's fair to say that we can sometimes make it so they can't see
what they want to see on their systems. Yes, Senator. To know what's going on in their
part of the world. It's fair to say that we can make them see things that maybe aren't even there
today. The ability to deny access to systems, the ability to manipulate data to get inside the
decision cycle of the adversary are all the art of the possible and techniques developed in support
of offensive cyber operations. All of which means that our young men and women are then safer when
they go in harm's way because we limit the adversary's ability to respond to our young men
and women who are on the battlefront. Unequivocally. Yes, Senator. Thank you. Thank you, Member Rosen.
Thank you. In the classified, I'm going to ask a little bit more about
how you've architected, it's a new verb, architected your data to feed into many different,
I would assume, large language models or the like. I think that it's very interesting to me. But
for this open session, I want to talk about the authority to operate process because I'm
encouraged by the department's continued support for improving security, cybersecurity, and supply
chain risk management, of course, and you've made progress towards reforming and accelerating
acquisition, testing, authorization of commercial software. But more, of course, can always be done
to streamline the authority to operate, ATO, our single process into a single department-wide
accreditation for secure software providers, streamlining the process. So can you talk about
the status of your efforts to streamline that process of what actions you're taking and what
plans your office may have to establish and encourage reciprocities for ATOs between
individual service branches and department components? So pulling all that back up to the
center. Ranking Member, a great question. The ATO process is part of the broader risk
management framework, as you are very familiar with. Right now, we have a very static snapshot
in time with regards to risk management, and that needs to be moved to a much more dynamic
framework and process, which includes inheritance of assessments that are conducted somewhere else
across the department on a piece of software. That inheritance can then travel to a new department
that wants to leverage that piece of software, that inheritance of all the testing and the
scalability and all of those types of things. The ATO process as a piece of that also needs a reform.
We're finding that it's very difficult for people to actually grab that inheritance over. It's very
difficult to understand the work of that risk management framework because it's broken,
it's fragmented, and it's static. So what we're doing is we're looking to do a lot more automation
across this, having dynamic repositories of this information and the testing in and of itself.
This work of the RMF framework, as well as the ATO processes, will be sitting
underneath the department's chief information security officer, who was presidentially
appointed just a few weeks ago, but he's right on top of it and going to be working very actively
with me to make sure that we're reforming that appropriate to the risk of the actual work that
needs to be done. I understand what you're saying, how important it is to be more dynamic and
sometimes less static, but I'm also well aware of the vulnerabilities it places when you are
quickly dynamic without the proper audits and controls over that as well because you never
want to sacrifice speed. I'm not saying static is always the way to go, but you have to be very
careful about that dynamic architecture as well because it can create vulnerabilities
because moving at the speed of light or sound or nanosecond, whatever you want,
has risk in there as well. So I hope that you're building in a good audit process, review
how that's working so in that speed we don't get...
Yes, Senator, and it's a great point. We're going to be bringing in a lot of
industry good practices across this as well where we've learned to do a lot of the automation of
processes, less paperwork, more dynamic checking across the software design life cycle. We can do
a lot of code scanning, code reviews. Those are the types of automation that will help us speed
these things up while we're compiling appropriate data repositories for that constant risk checking.
Right, because if you do it too fast, once a piece of bad code gets in,
it's already replicated quickly across your system before you may have caught the bug.
That's right. You understand the risk process very much.
I think I do, but thank you. I'm going to talk a little bit in my... Just ask you a question
about artificial intelligence, the validity. We talked about anthropic. I know we're going to go
talk some more about this. The validity of their output, critical to the effectiveness of what we
do as we acquire and deploy more systems, artificial intelligence systems, more fighting.
You said we're in a war, but it's going to help our situational awareness,
our decision making, and we must secure these systems and the data that powers them.
That's why I want to talk about how you architect your data. Data is power. If you're smart enough
to analyze it and use it, it's all about how you use it. The data is key. It's important and
critical to maintain the trustworthiness, the integrity of all of that, avoid any corruption,
malicious manipulation. As much as you can say here, what are you doing to ensure that
you're leveraging existing commercial solutions without making us vulnerable?
Thank you, Ranking Member. In July of 2025, my office published the DOWAI Cybersecurity Risk
Management Tailoring Handbook. We provided some great guidance across that. This is an ever
evolving framework or competency, I would say. We've been tackling this in the industry
across the last, I'd say, five to seven years, providing appropriate garter rails, ethics,
security across this, looking at the weights of models as well as hallucinations to try to reduce
all of these factors that are there. We're going to be continually evaluating this as we go through.
We have provided strong garter rails. We're doing risk management assessing on a regular basis
across this. We will continue to have conversations around this because it is an evolving category of
software, if we want to call it. Thank you. I think at this time, we will conclude the open
portion of today's Cybersecurity Subcommittee hearing. As all of you know, we'll be reconvening
here in a few minutes. We've got a vote at 3.15 that's scheduled, as a matter of fact, three of
them, but it'll give us an opportunity to go make our first vote. We'd like to reconvene at 3.30
down in 2.17 in the SCIF for a classified portion of this. Then for the information of members who
will not be joining us for the closed briefing, questions for the record will be due to the
committee within two business days of the conclusion of the hearing. With that, I want to
thank you for this open session. We look forward to visiting with you again very shortly, beginning
at 3.30 in the closed session in the SCIF. With that, this subcommittee meeting is adjourned.
