COUNTERING FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND ECONOMIC COERCION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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28th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Philippines🇵🇭- February 3-4, 2025
-Mr. Jules Gerard V. Arceo
MA Faculty, Department of International Studies, Institute of Arts and Sciences, Far Eastern University
AI Generated·May contain errors
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
I am pleased to present our study
at the Ateneo School of Government,
entitled Strengthening Democratic Governance,
Countering Malign Foreign Influence
and Interference in the Philippines.
Oh, okay.
So our team is comprised of Rear Admiral Romel Ong,
Attorney Neil Silva,
who were both presenters yesterday as well,
yours truly, and Karen Garcia.
We acknowledge the support
of the International Republican Institute
to the study's completion.
So in this project, our primary objective
is to provide insights into the Chinese Communist Party's
influence operations in the Philippines.
Our end goal is to identify potential countermeasures
ranging from policy measures
to a draft foreign interference law.
So the presentation will begin
with an overview of the background,
including the context of foreign influence operations
abroad, the study's framework, and its main argument.
The findings are organized to highlight
the various levels within the Philippine context
where CCP foreign influence operations are evident.
This presentation will end
with the study's recommendations.
Okay.
So diplomacy has been a core institution
of international relations.
Nonetheless, it does not always yield the desired results,
as outcomes can also be elusive.
In cases where diplomacy falls short of outcomes,
overseas covert actions become a promising course
for states.
While inimicality is not inherent to influence operations,
as inferred from this definition,
the potential harm arises when influence operations
are conducted covertly or manipulatively,
especially when they deceive, mislead,
or destabilize societal structures for malicious purposes.
Among the key states currently under scrutiny
for malign foreign influence operations is China.
In context, the CCP has been vocal
about the need to broaden the government's
external propaganda to enhance China's image
for the realization of the Chinese dream.
President Xi Jinping remarked in 2013
that the government must tell China's story well,
implying the significance of foreign influence
and interference.
As reported by the U.S. National Counterintelligence
and Security Center,
the CCP toolkit includes various mechanisms.
It was widely reported that these overseas operations
involve various government agencies
and non-traditional Chinese agencies,
like the United Front Work Department
and Confucius Institutes.
Additionally, covert actors,
including overseas police stations
and overseas Chinese service centers
were reported to conduct espionage activities,
curb dissent, and facilitate the return
of critics to China.
Next slide, please.
Okay.
Political influence is among the key objectives
of CCP foreign influence manifesting in three areas,
as noted by a recently published field guide
by the International Republican Institute.
First is electoral interference,
where a notable case is that of the former
Solomon Islands Prime Minister,
who was heavily supported by the PRC
and pushed for the signing of a security pact
between the two countries.
Subnational governments, the legislature,
next slide, please, the clicker seems to not be working,
and political parties are also targets
of Chinese political influence.
These operations manifest in sister city partnerships,
party-to-party exchanges,
and engagements headed by friendship associations
and front organizations.
Notable foreign cases include that in Kenya and Brazil.
Next slide, please.
More covert forms of PRC political influence
often involve creating a constellation
of ostensibly legitimate entities
that mask their connections to the CCP
and the Chinese government.
A notable example of such is in Czech Republic,
involving the operations of the China Energy Fund Committee
that raised red flags due to corruption, among others.
Next slide, please.
Against such backdrop, the study used the IRI Field Guide
as the framework to examine CCP influence operations
and interference in the Philippines,
particularly focusing on malign foreign influence
and interference.
The study operationalizes malign foreign influence
as an activity on behalf of a foreign principle,
primarily in the form of communication,
that seeks or reasonably tends to manipulate,
disrupt, infiltrate, obstruct,
or control the internal or external policies
or affairs of the target state,
such as disinformation campaigns
and promoting disobedience to the constitution and laws.
On the other hand,
the study characterizes foreign interference
as an activity beyond mere communication
of a verbal, linguistic, or symbolic character
through cyber attacks, harassments,
and surveillance, among others.
With this, the study mainly argues
that malign foreign influence and interference
threaten Philippine sovereignty and democratic values,
underscoring the urgency to adopt legal and policy measures
coupled with capacity building at the government level
and civil society empowerment.
The study used the qualitative method
focusing on key informant interviews
with representatives from two critical sectors,
the government and the academe, along with FGDs.
Next slide, please.
Moving forward to the findings now,
CCP foreign influence operations in the Philippine context
are evident in the national level.
Looking at the current landscape,
these operations manifest in politics and economics
and are even recognized
as significant national security threats.
However, these activities remain ambiguous
and difficult to pinpoint as they occur in bits and pieces
and appear on paper as harmless and non-adversarial.
These activities are often reinforced
by narrative manipulation that favors the CCP.
Additionally, instances of elite capture have been observed
such as those involving politicians,
some Chinese-Filipino organizations, and think tanks.
Next slide, please.
CCP influence operations have likewise manifested
at the sub-national level,
engaging local government units
and educational institutions.
Sister city arrangements were noted
as entry points of foreign influence
since the agreements tend to be vague and broadly worded.
As it also, it was noted that economic disparities
and class divisions are vulnerabilities
at the sub-national level with vote-reach areas
entering more sister city arrangements.
Philippine educational institutions similarly
were posited as entry points of foreign influence
given their internationalization initiatives.
The existence of weak institutional structures
has facilitated likewise the illegal issuance
of crucial documents like birth certificates and passports,
thereby increasing risks of foreign interference.
Foreign influence at the sub-national level
then has economic and political implications.
Economic in the sense that investments
and other financial incentives are the starting point
such as the case of Philippine offshore gaming operators
but can eventually spill over to the political
as with the allegation of Alice Guo,
a former municipal mayor, being a Chinese spy.
Pogos likewise can have criminal underpinnings
and with their existing infrastructure,
it's likely that they can be used as mechanisms
for foreign influence like troll farms on social media.
Fraudulent behavior also poses risks
such as the continued illegal land purchase
of foreign nationals using falsified documents
or Filipino dummies.
Next slide, please.
Coercive Chinese foreign lobbying activities
have also been increasingly prevalent
at the legislative level.
A key informant noted instances
where the House of Representatives
was pressured by Chinese embassy representatives
to avoid issuing statements concerning the West Philippine Sea
or at least focus on cooperation in issued statements.
Party-to-party diplomacy also was leveraged
with activities in the Congress involving China
ranging from sports festivals and formal gatherings
to educational sponsorships.
With this, the current legislative landscape
calls for an interagency collaboration.
Next slide, please.
With the 2025 midterm elections approaching,
concerns about foreign interference likewise arise
with disinformation and manipulation
remaining as key vulnerabilities
as well as persistent cyber attacks.
Next slide, please.
To counter malign foreign influence and interference
in the Philippines, various mechanisms are promising
ranging from legislative reforms,
investing in intellectual resources
and activating technical civil society organizations
to using social cyber forensics.
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While the findings show a clear need
to counter malign foreign influence and interference,
ideally through a foreign interference law,
key concerns must be considered
such as those involving the definitions,
the loss objectives, the safeguards needed
and its implementation.
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Furthermore, areas of vulnerability must be examined
as the legislative overreach
can have a significant implication on privacy rights,
development work, constitutional protections
and relationships with international organizations.
Next slide, please.
To conclude, the study has underscored the necessity
for a multifaceted approach.
And the study's recommendation is classified into twofold.
Next slide, please.
First, policy measures,
engaging traditional media organizations
and new media content creators
to enable literacy campaigns
and refute foreign propaganda is critical.
Second, further fostering a vigilant public
through logic and critical thinking,
particularly focusing on the youth
can help better detect
and resist foreign-sponsored narratives.
Third, mandating disclosure requirements for LGU officials
when traveling to specific countries
can improve transparency.
Next slide, please.
This is also connected to the fourth recommendation
on strengthening the implementation of asset disclosure
as well as reviewing suspicious assets
of elected officials.
And fifth, government-led information campaigns
as well as engaging Filipino-Chinese community nationwide
can build resiliency to CCP propaganda and recruitment.
And lastly, for the legislation,
the draft bill we propose is based on
for the foreign influence and interference legislation
in Australia, Canada, and Singapore.
Covered in the draft bill
are the objectives of malign foreign influence,
definitions to delineate the act,
lobbying activities and measures
to enhance Philippine resiliency
vis-a-vis malign foreign influence and interference.
The study notes nonetheless that the draft bill
aims to provide a synthesis of the inputs gathered
and more importantly,
to contribute to the ongoing legislative deliberation
and general discourse
on countering malign foreign influence and interference,
not just in the Philippines but also globally.
With this, I end the presentation.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
