THE NEED FOR NAVAL STATECRAFT TO WIN THE NEW COLD WAR

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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28th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Philippines🇵🇭- February 3-4, 2025
-Hon. Brendt Sadler
Heritage Senior Research, Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology, Allison Center for National Security
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Ready go ahead and queue up the slides and back by popular demand you have the second dose of Brent Sadler
to for your afternoon entertainment and again
Thank you for the kind hospitality Harrison Pininger and of course everyone at the House of Representatives here in Manila
so what I'm going to talk about here we go is a
Discussion that goes back. I got to stay close to the microphone. I'm sorry
It's a discussion that goes back well over 10 years and it starts with the private project within chief of naval operations
Admiral Gary Roughead in
2010 2011 to figure out how to rebalance the Navy to address the rising China threat
That would eventually become the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
Those inside the US military and our allies and the Philippine Armed Forces would also know this as the defense strategic guidance
Lots came out of that
It was a study that also looked at the confluence or the merging of economic statecraft a much more informed and energetic
diplomacy
backed by a military presence that was connected and
Enforcing and helping enabling a lot of these other efforts
It has become extremely popular the book that came out in
2023 in May 2023 you see in the upper left hand corner up there or right hand left hand corner up there on the slide in
Influenced a lot of the folks in the last administration is influencing folks in the current administration
in
September of
2023 a few months after the book came out then Secretary of the Navy gave a very a very
Significant speech at Harvard University talking about what what he termed maritime statecraft, but it is from this book
Naval statecraft, and it is one way if you go the next up here. We go in the next slide
there's a reason that we have to change the way we think about and
execute national power
and it's driven largely because the way the Chinese have been able to manipulate work between the seams in
The American experience between our cylinders of excellence our executive branch our Congress and of course our judicial
But also between industry civil society and you can see
2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff. That's a failure the Chinese are in effective control of that today
2014 Russia annexes Crimea and supports insurrection in the Domba something that was predictable
Could have been prevented could have been you know a lot of the things that there could have been averted
2013 to 15 island building campaign there were indications to that that predated
What was obvious of what was coming yet nothing was done and the Chinese response when asked
When I was with this chief of naval operations to our face from the Chinese
Fleet commander was that you never told us you had a problem while we were building these and so you have to get inside
their decision loop
2018-19 of success the build act and the the prevention of a hostile takeover of Subic Bay is South Korean company
Hanjin was going bankrupt more on that
Maybe we can get to later the West Kapala
2020 the another indication of mixed results of naval statecraft in action
Leveraging naval pressure and presence backed with very strong and vigorous diplomacy, but underlined with an understanding of the economics at play
The next one Russia invades Ukraine failure of course China Solomon Islands secret security pact
failure and then the October 7th and the Red Sea which
Ostensibly is still going on which is why the question mark all of this points to a core problem the
Institutions that we are using to execute national power are inadequate to the new Cold War that we're in today next slide
Now in the last few years adding to that complexity of not being built for the task
We also have multiple challenges and this this this isn't a
Cartoon that was done for the next book. That'll be coming out in in August. You've got
An axis that's working against the free and open
Indo-pacific but to China at the head of it with another very vigorous partner Russia and of course Iran and North Korea are also
In the mix there along with several others
But it's this dynamic that's making it imperative that you just can't boresight or fixate just on the China threat
in order to be effective and maintain strategic focus
And more importantly to have effect in the economic diplomatic
Informational and at military arena you have to always be aware of how China's partners might respond and distract you
So that you can stay on target, which is the China threat next slide
Now the United States. It's no secret is
Does not have the military that it once had it is not really sized for the task of waging another new Cold War
Let it be a major
global war with China
And we're in the midst of rearming and building up lessons that this that Putin is reminding us in the prolonged war in Ukraine right now
Which means you have to pick your fights both in peacetime and also potentially in war and that's what these pictures are supposed to show
The red circles are the flashpoints some of them since this was originally created several years ago are actually hot right now
In the gold area I want to draw your attention to in this new Cold War
Seizing the initiative is
Going to be the determinant factor of who wins or who stays ahead, and it's really not like a finish line
It's a condition of being of competition
Which is really kind of goes against the way Americans think about this and many of us think about you know conflict or competition
We think there's an end state, but from the Chinese perspective
It is a condition of being and in order to seize that initiative you have to find the places where we have an advantage
But at the same time our competitor our foe in this case China and also Russia
Have to respond and have to devote their precious resources
Those are the eastern Mediterranean. That's the Black Sea the off the coast of Levant and the northern half of the Red Sea
Lots of reasons there I can talk on the on why that's important for the Russians
It's also the end point of the Belt and Road or the Silk the Maritime Silk Road
But then no surprise to many of the folks here and online is the South China Sea or the Western Philippine Sea
for historical reasons
Operational reasons for a potential war over Taiwan which is China's one of the China's core national interest
Which increasingly looks like it's only going to be resolved through force of arms
They are extremely sensitive to the activities in the South China Sea
It has been a vector of invasion of it a bad influence for past dynasties and the people's report
But the Chinese Communist Party is no different in the sensitivities. So seizing the initiative have to act in
these decisive theaters
With limited resources that we have and of course the interconnectedness of maritime trade and the economics is all under lies
If you don't have a vibrant economy
You don't have the money or the resources to sustain yourself in this deck what could be a generational long new Cold War
next slide
So China made a decision in 1998 at the tail end of the third Taiwan crisis
This is when the United States sent to carry strike groups
Taiwan had a presidential election the leaders in Beijing weren't too happy with it, but their military was
Incapable of responding effectively and so they they decided that they were going to build a military that was going to outclass and defeat the United
States and all of its allies in a war
They're still on that and building that in their mind, but they have spent well over what they state by multiple
Seven eight percent of GDP on their defense for decades now, and they have a very large Navy and a very modern Navy
But they also know that if they get into a conflict over Taiwan
It's not going to be resolved in a few in a few days or months
But likely years which means you have to sustain a wartime economy, which means you need to have control the terms of trade
This is ports. This is the world's largest shipbuilding the largest shipping fleet
So now China has the ability though they have some concerns questions that are still unanswered
but they effectively control the terms of trade that is an economic coercion that also must be responded to and
Makes the new Cold War peacetime competition very dangerous
next slide
So now to kind of get to what is this naval statecraft idea?
And why is it you know I've kind of laid out the conditions that are leading to
merging three key elements naval presence
economic development
Which you hear in the language with around the EDCA
Sites here in the Philippines, and then also with something called you know the diplomatic, but the economic side of it in
Base politics, and this is three three pieces of it one
You can see that's the West Kapala in the background charted by Malaysia Chinese were intimidating it
But over a series of statements diplomatic statements that came after the naval presence the Chinese backed down
But then merged that also with economic development
That's that center part. That's Djibouti
Before September 11th. There was only a small garrison of French Foreign Legion the economy was tiny
After September 11th the US military moved in with special forces to go interdict
Al-Qaeda that they might flee from Afghanistan which grew into a large presence to include with Japanese base overseas and also China
the economy the economic benefits
multiplied so provide a
secure environment security
economic connectivity to and up to the to the mother country or to other countries can start to take off and you can see that
With trade and with the GDP and Djibouti that is tied with this same presence
And then finally the base politics part of this this is the reality that when you have trade
Agreements for security and military presence in each other's country it
Builds up more connective tissue between the governments and the people and it has a synergistic effect
With trade and development and that was a study and you seen that far slide over there that in
2015-16 there was a lot of discussion about cutting in half US overseas military obligations
These are treaties and also bringing back soldiers and sailors from overseas
Cut it in half
450 billion dollar hit to the American economy
but they also found that it goes the other way that if you increase that presence as
Well as increase those treaties you can also grow the trade
And it's not really surprising when you think about it the more of a relation and interchange between two governments
the more that there's confidence in the trade and the
Commerce between the two, but that's something that is missed
It's something it's something that's also not thought about in the way the United States does
Strategy the way it does its diplomacy
next slide
We can go to the next slide
So I'm gonna go ahead and wrap up
I kind of like fire this off very quickly, and I don't know do we have time for questions?
maybe for a few questions the basically the godfathers of
maritime strategy
You've got Mahan tying how
Trade and commerce rely on and Navy's rely on it at the same time for sustaining prosperity
through commerce and trade and then Colbert about the purpose for which you have a Navy is to control not a
Specific set of ocean, but the sea lanes the communication lines, and so we're in a brave new world
We're facing a threat through the Chinese Communist Party. That is comprehensive. It is significant
And it blurs the distinction between economic diplomacy social and military
They are all conflated
And so we need to have a new framework the track record of the last 15 years bears that out in my mind that
The place where we are most likely to be able to seize the initiative and have the most advantages as allies and partners
is through the maritime and
That is a way that we can outclass and sustain a new Cold War
Keeping it cold and hopefully never getting hot into conflict and at the same time making sure our free and open
Markets continue to persist and that we continue to enjoy the prosperity that we've had for so long
With that I think I'll go ahead and pause for any questions
You got time for one question. Oh, yes in the back
Yes, sir. Oh
I think it's coming over there
Just speak loud forever. Hold your peace
First of all thank you very much for that short, but nevertheless very invigorating of a presentation
I was in a conference last year in Singapore
This is a talking about naval power, and I could still remember
Colonel bow a retired People's Liberation Army is part of that
You know notion of wolf warrior diplomacy, and he said this in a conference you have to understand
He told everyone in the room
China now has the largest Navy in the world you know the ships of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is about
325 US Navy is around 270 correct me if I'm wrong of course
Yeah, but they also the advantage of the People's Liberation Army's Navy's the fact that it push comes to shove in the Indo-pacific
They could concentrate all their assets either in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Straits
Whereas of course in the case of the United States Navy. It's a global. Maybe you have the seventh fleet the
sixth fleet in the Mediterranean
So American naval attention and resources will be scattered all around the world
While the Chinese people in the People's Liberation Army's Navy could simply focus in this part of world any comments regarding this matter
Yes, so in the so there's two sides of this equation one is Admiral Ong's discussion yesterday is also important about a maritime
counter-insurgency so in the peacetime we have to wage a
Maritime counter-insurgency and that means you have to be in the right place, but the focus shifts from
Having our military the US Navy
Focused in on just the Chinese that we can't play man
To use an American football term wherever the Chinese are we are or wherever the threat is we are we have to be more
Proactive and seize the initiative and look at where we can actually have the most effect to the people
It's a people-centered approach in the peacetime in setting the rules based order
Which I think we need to find a better term it was my point yesterday in the questions, but in conflict
They're going to be very precious little time of indication and warning to basically move our fleet from all over the world one place
So we have to rebalance
Where we operate and so if you've looked and you track where our carrier strike groups are you'll find that over the last several years
We've been able to maintain about two aircraft carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific
Now there have been a period where there were none
There have been a period stretches where there was only one, but it seems to be that we're moving towards a
posture of two carrier strike groups that are in the Western Pacific and to include the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean
We had some distraction on that since October 7th
With the Hamas attack and the Houthis in the Red Sea, but now that if that actually starts to subside we'll go back to it
That's the hard reality the only other way you get around that is you have allies that are strong
allies that we have a an interoperability we have a
Operational concepts that are very complementary to each other and that requires being there and practicing together
Thank You captain Sadler appreciate much this presentation
