LIVE: Fed Chair Powell Holds News Conference on Policy Decision

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Fed Chair Jerome Powell holds a news conference following the release of the U.S. Federal Reserve policy decision at 2:30 p.m. ET on March 18.
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Good afternoon.
My colleagues and I remain squarely focused
on achieving our dual mandate goals of maximum employment
and stable prices for the benefit of the American people.
The U.S. economy has been expanding at a solid pace.
While job gains have remained low,
the unemployment rate has been little changed in recent months
and inflation remains somewhat elevated.
Today, the FOMC decided to leave our policy rate unchanged.
We see the current stance of monetary policy as appropriate
to promote progress toward our maximum employment
and 2 percent inflation goals.
The implications of developments in the Middle East
for the U.S. economy are uncertain.
We will remain attentive to risks
to both sides of our dual mandate.
And I'll have more to say about monetary policy
after briefly reviewing economic developments.
Available indicators suggest
that economic activity has been expanding at a solid pace.
Consumer spending has been resilient
and business fixed investment has continued to expand.
In contrast, activity in the housing sector has remained weak.
In our summary of economic projections,
the median participant projects
that real GDP will rise 2.4 percent this year
and 2.3 percent next year, somewhat stronger
than projected in December.
In the labor market, the unemployment rate was 4.4 percent
in February and has changed little since late last summer.
Job gains have remained low.
A good part of the slowing in the pace of job growth
over the past year reflects a decline in the growth
of the labor force due to lower immigration
and labor force participation,
though labor demand has clearly softened as well.
Other indicators, including job openings, layoffs, hiring,
and nominal wage growth, generally show little change
in recent months.
In our SEP, the median projection
of the unemployment rate is 4.4 percent at the end
of this year and edges down thereafter.
Inflation has eased significantly from its highs
in mid-2022, but remains somewhat elevated relative
to our 2 percent longer run goal.
Estimates based on the Consumer Price Index and other data
indicate that total PCE prices rose 2.8 percent
over the 12 months ending in February
and that excluding the volatile food
and energy categories, core PCE prices rose 3.0 percent.
These elevated readings largely reflect inflation
in the goods sector, which has been boosted
by the effects of tariffs.
Near-term measures of inflation expectations have risen
in recent weeks, likely reflecting the substantial rise
in oil prices caused by the supply disruptions
in the Middle East.
Most measures of longer-term expectations remain consistent
with our 2 percent inflation goal.
The median projection in the SEP
for total PCE inflation this year is 2.7 percent
and 2.2 percent next year,
a bit higher than projected in December.
Our monetary policy actions are guided by our dual mandate
to promote maximum employment and stable prices
for the American people.
At today's meeting, the Committee decided
to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 3.5
to 3.75 percent.
From last September through December,
we lowered our policy rate three-quarters
of a percentage point, bringing it within a range
of plausible estimates of neutral.
This normalization of our policy stance should continue
to help stabilize the labor market while allowing inflation
to resume its downward trend toward 2 percent.
But the implications of events in the Middle East
for the U.S. economy are uncertain.
In the near term, higher energy prices will push
up overall inflation, but it is too soon to know the scope
and duration of the potential effects on the economy.
We will continue to monitor the risks
to both sides of our mandate.
We are well-positioned to determine the extent and timing
of additional adjustments to our policy rate based
on the incoming data, the evolving outlook,
and the balance of risks.
In our SEP, FOMC participants wrote
down their individual assessments
of an appropriate path of the federal funds rate
under what each participant judges
to be the most likely scenario for the economy.
The median participant projects that the appropriate level
of the federal funds rate will be 3.4 percent at the end
of this year and 3.1 percent at the end of next year,
unchanged from December.
As is always the case,
these individual forecasts are subject to uncertainty,
and they are not a committee plan or decision.
Monetary policy is not on a preset course
and will make our decisions on a meeting-by-meeting basis.
To conclude, the Fed has been assigned two goals
for monetary policy-maximum employment and stable prices.
We remain committed to supporting maximum employment,
bringing inflation sustainably to our 2 percent goal,
and keeping longer-term inflation expectations
well anchored.
Our success in delivering
on these goals matters to all Americans.
We at the Fed will continue to do our jobs with objectivity,
integrity, and a deep commitment to serve the American people.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
COLBY.
Thank you.
Colby Smith of the New York Times.
There's been some debate
about whether the Fed should look through the inflation
that will come from higher oil prices stemming
from the Middle East conflict.
Is that the right approach at this juncture?
And to what extent does the fact
that inflation has been above target
for roughly five years now influence
the committee's thinking around this?
So, first, let me say we're well aware
of the performance of inflation over the last few years
and how a series of shocks have interrupted progress
that we've made over time.
And that happened most recently with tariffs,
and now there will be some effects
on inflation coming forward.
The thing that's really important
that we see this year is progress on inflation
through a reduction in goods inflation
as the one-time effects on prices of tariffs go
through the system, go through the economy.
That's the main thing we're looking
for going into this exercise.
And we need to be seeing that to, you know, to sort
of understand that we actually are making progress
because on net we didn't make progress.
And if you look at total inflation,
sorry, total core inflation, it's about 3%,
and some big chunk of that between a half
and three-quarters is actually tariffs.
So we're looking for progress on that.
The question of whether we look
through the energy inflation doesn't really arise
until we have kind of checked that box.
It, of course, is kind of standard learning
that you look through energy shocks,
but that's always been dependent
on inflation expectations remaining well anchored.
And I think now it's also dependent
on what you mentioned, which is that broader context
of five years now of inflation above target.
We have to keep all of those things in mind.
And the question of looking
through when it does arise will be one to approach not lightly,
but, you know, in the context that you mentioned.
And just on the S&P, can you help us make sense
of why there is still a bias to cut
for most officials this year, despite the upward revision
to headline and core inflation
and the essentially unchanged forecast
for growth and unemployment?
Just curious kind of what's the genesis behind the need,
what's the need for the cut?
Yeah. So, you know, there are 19 people, and so 19 reasons,
19 individual submissions.
You know, but, and if you notice, the median didn't change,
but there was actually some movement toward,
a meaningful amount of movement toward fewer cuts by people.
So four or five people went from two to one, let's say,
two cuts to one cut.
And each person has individual, you know,
stories behind what they want to do.
But essentially it is that, you know, the forecast is
that we will be making progress on inflation,
not as much as we had hoped, but some progress on inflation.
It should come, as we start to see in the middle of the year,
progress on tariffs, you know, going through once
and then tariff inflation coming down.
That's, we should be seeing that.
And, you know, the rate forecast is conditional
on the performance of the economy.
So if we don't see that progress,
then you won't see the rate cut.
Thank you, Howard Schneider with Reuters.
Just to follow up a little bit and to be clear,
is the higher inflation penciled in here for 2026 solely the
result of the oil shock or something else?
So that's going to be part of it.
But, you know, that wouldn't be most of core, right?
So the oil shock for sure shows up here.
Some of that will be in core as well, but yes.
But no, there's also just the feeling that we haven't seen,
you know, the progress that we had hoped for on core goods
and on tariffs and on the rest of it.
You know, we've, so for whatever reason people did write
up their inflation forecast, that will certainly be tied
to events in the Middle East and the price of oil.
But it's also, I think, a reflection
of the slow progress we've seen on tariffs,
which we believe we will see.
It's just a question of how long it takes for them to get all the
way through the economy, and it just takes some time.
Right. And is the lack of change in the CEPs, again,
just to explicate this a little bit, more due to the expectation
that the oil portion of this will pass through or more
out of concern that there is a potential blow to consumption
and growth coming in the form of wealth effects
with the stock market down, in the form of gas prices,
you know, diverting spending from other parts of the economy?
So I didn't get the second part of your question.
Well, the consumer is going
to be potentially diverting money to gasoline
from other parts of the economy.
There could be a growth shock or a redistribution
of spending there that can make consumption wealth effects
as well.
I guess I'm wondering, are you not,
is the rate forecast not changing
because you think the oil shock is going to be temporary
or because you want to be sure your position
in case growth starts to slow?
So the thing I really want to emphasize is that nobody knows.
You know, the economics effect could be bigger,
they could be smaller, they could be much smaller
or much bigger.
We just don't know.
So people are writing down something that seems
to make sense to them but have no conviction that, you know,
to your point, if we have high, you know,
if we have a long period of much higher gas prices,
that's going to weigh on consumption.
That'll weigh on disposable personal income and it'll weigh
on consumption.
But we don't know if that's going to happen.
It's something quite different than that.
We might have much lower than expected pass through.
So people write down, you know, this is one of those SEPs
where a number of people mentioned
if we were ever going to skip an SEP, this would be a good one
because we just don't know.
So I wouldn't say there's a conviction that this is going
to go through quickly or not quickly.
It's just you got to write something down
and this is something that is, that people wrote down.
And so, and, you know, we don't debate how long,
how do you do that?
We wouldn't be able to debate what the length or size
of these effects would be.
We just have to kind of make an individual statement.
And also, you know, what you've written
down before will be, you'll be reluctant to move too far away
from that just because you don't know.
It's so unclear what the direction
from this particular end will be.
Meanwhile, the economy has, the growth has been solid
and inflation, the overshoot is mainly
from the goods and tariffs.
And, you know, the labor market is, the unemployment rate
of course has little change since September.
You have a very, very low break even rate apparently
for new jobs with little growth in either demand or supply.
But the U.S. economy is doing, you know, pretty well.
It's just we don't know what the effects of this will be
and really no one does.
Steve?
Mr. Chair, in the past the staff has suggested
that higher oil prices, they have a hit to consumption
which Howard was talking about, but that's somewhat upset
by increase to domestic production.
I wonder if you could talk about that dynamic especially
to the extent that how much U.S. production is happening
right now?
So, the first thing is, there is, you know,
the original thinking, the long-standing thinking,
put it that way, is that you do look through energy shocks.
But as I mentioned, that's conditioned
on inflation expectations and that kind of thing.
So, sorry, your question was?
What the staff is saying about and has said in the past.
Yeah. So, there'll be an offset.
Offsets, yeah.
So, that's true.
You know, we have, we're a net exporter of energy, right?
So, any effects on employment and economic activity
and spending would be offset to some extent by the fact
that our oil companies will be more profitable
and they may even do more drilling.
If you ask oil companies about doing more drilling though,
they're going to want to see, you know, a consistent rise
in oil prices from where they were before the build-up
for the war, and they're going to want to believe
that that's going to be persistent
for a fairly long time.
So, they're not sitting there waiting for oil to go
over $70 a, you know, a barrel, and then they're going
to start drilling or whatever.
They're going to make a reasoned, careful judgment
that we're going to have higher oil prices
for an extended period, meaningfully higher.
So, you don't, I wouldn't say there's much of that happening,
not much will be happening now, but some of that could happen
over time if you see that, but.
So, you know, the net of it would,
the net of the oil shock will still be some downward pressure
on spending and employment
and upward pressure on inflation, of course.
And if I could just follow up on Colby's question,
how much do you worry that having looked
through tariff inflation and inflation running above target
and looking through the oil price shock would undermine the
credibility of your commitment to the 2% target?
You know, we have to do our analysis and, you know,
think these things through carefully, but of course,
that's on everyone's mind.
You know, we're well aware of the history and,
but you don't want to overreact to that.
You know, you want to make the best judgment you can based
on the facts.
I don't think we're going to let it color our decision making
more than is appropriate.
It's more the thought that it's been five years
and we've actually had, you know, we had the tariff shock,
we had the pandemic, and now we have an energy shock
of some size and duration.
We don't know what that's going to be, actually.
And, you know, it's one of those things
where it's a repeated set of things, and you worry
that that's the kind of thing that can, you know,
can cause trouble for inflation expectations.
And so we worry a lot about that, and we're, you know,
we are very strongly committed to doing what it takes
to keep inflation expectations anchored at 2%.
And, you know, I think it's important
that we do that, very important.
Nick.
Nick Timoros, The Wall Street Journal.
Chair Powell, you've described monetary policy
as modestly restrictive.
If the unemployment rate is roughly stable,
inflation moving sideways in the high twos
with an ongoing overshoot in services
and non-housing services, not just goods,
and the economy doing fairly well, as you just outlined,
what gives you confidence that inflation returns to target
over the next couple of years?
Okay. So I would say the rate is, you can characterize it
as in the high end of neutral, or you can characterize it
as perhaps mildly restrictive, even modestly restrictive.
No one knows for sure, but it's in that range
where it's somewhere around the borderline
between restrictive and not.
Remember that a big part
of the disinflation we're looking for is just the runoff
of when tariffs are put into place, of course,
what they do is they raise prices to some extent,
to the extent those prices are, the tariffs are paid
by consumers, on a one-time basis.
And we're waiting for that process.
It takes 8, 9, 10, 11 months a year to go
through the system, and we're waiting for the tariffs,
which were put in place over the course of the middle part
and later last year, we're waiting for that to go
through the system so that goods inflation will return closer
to what it's always been.
I mean, it used to be, for many, many years, it was negative.
And then, you know, the year before tariffs came in,
it was zero, and it's running at like 2% now.
So that's kind of, goods inflation is running at 2%.
So that's not coming from standard Phillips curve,
restrictive, you know, restrictive policy.
It's coming from the runoff of a one-time thing.
We also think it's important, though,
to keep policy either mildly restrictive or, you know,
close to that, but not too restrictive
because of the weakness in the downside risk
in the labor market.
We are balancing these two goals in a situation
where the risks to the labor market are to the downside,
which would call for lower rates, and the risks
to inflation are to the upside, which would call
for higher rates, or not cutting anyway.
So we're in a difficult situation, and we feel
like we're, our framework calls on us to balance the risks,
and we feel like where we are now, which is kind of on
that borderline, the higher borderline
of restrictive versus not restrictive,
we feel like that's the right place to be.
Can I ask about corn on housing services, though?
Because there are some people who think that it hasn't come
down very much, if at all, over the past year.
If wage growth has come down, if the labor market has loosened,
why has non-housing services inflation maybe been slower
to follow?
That's a good question.
It's, you know, it's frustrating.
Labor, non-housing services have,
they basically move sideways for a year.
They're at the same level, and we do expect
that they will come down, but, you know, it's a bunch
of idiosyncratic things, but at the same time, that is one
of the things we should be seeing because, to your point,
you know, the labor market is clearly not a source
of inflationary pressures, and that should really matter
for non-housing services, but we're not seeing progress there.
So we do, you know, what we expect
for next year is continued, what we want to see
for this year, rather, is continued progress
on housing services, finally seeing that, you know,
the goods inflation come back down because the one-time effects
of tariffs are through, and then also get some help
from non-housing services.
That's what we'd like to see, but it's, you know,
it's a good question why we didn't see much
of that last year.
Edward.
Thanks, Chair Powell.
Edward Lawrence with Fox Business.
So in December, we saw employment numbers revised
down to negative 17,000.
January revised down.
February posted a loss of 92,000.
Is that, is the employment side a far greater risk
than the inflation side?
Because we are seeing inflation, CPI is close to 2%.
PCE has ticked down overall.
You know, it's really, I wouldn't say that.
I wouldn't say that that's clear at all,
that one is more at risk than the other.
So you can point to the unemployment rate being stable.
And, you know, in a world where both supply and demand
for workers have come down very, very sharply over the course
of the past year due to immigration policy, largely,
you know, a ratio is going to be a better thing to look
at than job creation, for example.
So, and the ratio is the unemployment rate,
and it's been stable since September.
So that tells you that.
Inflation, you know, you can, we're at 3.0% core,
inflation 2.8% headline.
So we've been well above the 2%, that amount, whatever it is,
0.7, 0.8, we're a full percentage point
above 2% for some time.
And that's a concern.
You know, we need to get back down to 2%.
And we need to keep focused on that,
even though we do now face some new inflation from energy.
So I'd be hard-pressed to say that one
of them is obviously more at risk than the other.
And if I may, what happens
if there's no Federal Reserve chairman confirmed
on May 15th, would you stay on?
So if my successor is not confirmed by the end
of my term as chair, I would serve
as chair pro tem until he is confirmed.
That is what the law calls for.
That's what we've done on several occasions,
including involving me, and it's what we're going
to do in this situation.
And while I'm at it, on the question whether I will leave
while the investigation is ongoing, I have no intention
of leaving the board until the investigation is well
and truly over with transparency and finality.
And I would refer you to the statement that was
in the Fed's brief that you all have seen.
And I won't have anything more for you on that.
On the question of whether I will then continue to serve
as a governor after my term ends
and after the investigation is over,
I have not made that decision yet.
And I will make that decision based
on what I think is best for the institution
and for the people we serve.
Figuring you probably were going
to set the dominoes off there, Edward.
And I'm not going to have any more to say
on those issues, by the way.
Thank you very much.
Claire Jones from the Financial Times.
People have drawn quite a few historical parallels
with the current situation.
We've seen oil price shocks in the past.
Some people have said the first Gulf War and the Fed's response
to that where there was a focus
on the growth risks is the right parallel.
To what extent would you agree with that?
And to what extent do you think we're
in a different place today?
Thank you.
You know, it's really hard to say
until we see the situation, the actual situation.
In some circumstances, that might be the right case.
In fact, for example, if we do see the kinds
of disinflationary progress that we expect to see with due
to tariffs that I mentioned, I think it's hard to say.
And it will depend to some extent on the size and duration
of the effects we're seeing on prices.
And it will depend a lot on what we can see
in inflation expectations.
And just one follow-up, if I may, just on the BLS report
that was mentioned briefly there.
It doesn't seem from the projections
or from the comments you've made today
about the unemployment rate and focusing on that,
that your view on the labor market story,
to a large part being a supply-side story,
has changed despite the quite negative number in February.
Would that be the right take?
And was there anyone else in the room who thought differently
in that the February jobs report was cause for concern?
So I think you have to take the two together.
You know, in a way, the January report was a positive surprise.
And the February report was a negative surprise.
If you put them together, you get something in the middle.
And I think you have to realize, as you do, I'm sure,
realize there was a strike and there was weather.
And that's about 80,000 of the negative effect total
on the February report.
Notwithstanding that, so what do you see
if you take a step back overall?
There are a number of indicators
that suggest a degree of stability.
But the thing that I think a good number of people
on the committee are concerned about is just the very,
very low level of job creation.
If you adjust what has been the trend job creation
over the past, let's say, six months, if you adjust
that for what we think, our staff thinks,
is the overstatement due to overcounting,
effectively there's zero net job creation in the private sector.
But actually, that looks like that's
about what the economy needs in terms of dealing with very,
very low non-existent, really, growth in the labor force,
which of course we've never had in our history.
So you've got a sort of a zero employment growth equilibrium.
Now, that's balance, okay?
But, you know, I would say it does have a feel
of downside risk and it's not kind
of a really comfortable balance.
So, you know, we look at that, we see it, we get it,
and I mean, everybody understands the arithmetic
and that's, you can say the break even is zero.
But nonetheless, it's something we're watching carefully
and so, and, you know, are concerned about.
But ultimately, though, you can argue that it's a consequence
of deliberate policy, which is really the changes
to immigration, because that's the biggest factor there.
And, but nonetheless, something we watch carefully.
Andrew.
Thanks, Chair Powell.
The economy has experienced a series of supply shocks
in the last few years, COVID, tariffs, to oil price shocks.
Do you think that is bad luck or is something changed
in the world that makes supply shocks more common
and does the central bank need to take, start taking account
of the risk of supply shocks as a more common problem?
You know, we did go through a long period
where the shocks were all demand shocks and, you know,
so we've had a lot of practice thinking about supply shocks
in the last four or five years, for sure.
And it's just a very different thing
and a much more difficult thing
because it does immediately raise the question of tension
between the two parts of our mandate.
But, you know, has the world changed?
I mean, COVID, COVID is a one-time thing, right?
This energy supply shock is a one-time thing.
It's not, it's not because of some broad tendency
or anything, I don't think.
And, you know, the oil shock under,
with Ukraine was also a consequence of military action.
So I don't know that, I don't know that the world
has changed in a way that there'll be more supply shocks,
but, you know, there's, people have written that paper
and that speech a number of times,
a number of people have tried to make the case
that that is the case.
And in fact, we have seen more supply shocks
in the last five years than we've seen
in many years before that.
It's a fact.
Okay.
You said last year that the Fed was reviewing
its communication strategies, including the SEP
as part of its framework review.
Whatever happened to that?
And I have like five follow-ups to that,
but I guess, you know, what would you change
about Fed communications if you had the time?
Thanks.
What happened about that was not much.
And I'll tell you why.
So, you know, we looked carefully at many aspects
of the SEP and of our communications,
and there just weren't, there weren't any ideas
that had very broad support on the committee.
And you don't want to make a change to your communications
unless you have, you know, have the committee behind that.
So we didn't really make any changes on that.
You know, I had hoped that they had some things
that I wanted to do, but they just,
they didn't attract broad support.
And we'd already made all the changes we made
to the framework.
That was a critical thing.
So we didn't, you know, I wish we had been able
to do some things, but, you know, we didn't.
So maybe the next chair will take a look.
I'm sure he will.
Michael McKee from Bluebird Television and Radio.
The minutes show in January some members
of the committee wanted to include
a two-sided guidance on policy.
Was that discussed today?
And given the rise in the inflation expectations,
how much support for a two-sided policy warning
would there be?
So it did come up today.
The policy that our, the possibility, rather,
that our next move might be an increase
did come up at the meeting, as it did at the last meeting.
The vast majority of participants don't see
that as their base case.
And, of course, we don't take things off the table.
But you correctly characterized, you know,
what was in the minutes that several participants
indicated and something very much
like that conversation did happen.
What was your second question?
Oh, it was just one question there.
But a follow-up would be, there are a lot of goods,
besides oil, that are trapped in the strait right now,
and a lot of supply chains getting snarled.
How much concern do you have about whether,
if this becomes an inflation problem beyond just oil,
whether there's anything you can do about it
or would do about it, given the efficacies
of monetary policy?
You know, you can worry about other commodities.
You can worry about all of the ways
that oil-related commodities go into manufacturing
and that kind of thing.
The truth is, it's completely out of our hands,
and we just, like everybody else,
we have to just wait and see what happens.
And it'll come down to how long, you know,
the current situation lasts,
and then what are the effects on prices
and then how do consumers react and that kind of thing.
I wouldn't speculate in any way,
and there's really not a lot we can do
other than kind of watch and see.
Maria Luisa.
Afternoon, Chair Powell.
Maria Luisa Capurro with Bloomberg News.
I wanted to ask you, you've said longer-term measures
of inflation expectations reflect confidence
that the Fed will get back to its 2 percent goal,
but there are some colleagues of yours
who have pointed to higher dispersion in household service
and business services as well.
And that they take as a signal
that inflation expectations may be less sticky than in the past.
I'm wondering if there was a discussion around that
at this meeting across the committee,
and what were the views of what is the state
of inflation expectations
and the risks from higher oil and gas prices?
So, at this meeting, I mean, a number of people mentioned
and staff briefed on short-term expectations
having moved up quite a lot for reasons we understand well.
But long-term expectations, you know,
you can always find one that's troubling
or some aspect of one that's troubling.
But ultimately, right through this whole period,
the overwhelming majority of the things we look to,
including markets, including surveys of,
you know, of the public and also of forecasters,
they've all been pretty solid
on longer-term inflation expectations
being right where they need to be,
consistent with 2%.
So, that continues to be the case.
We didn't have a lot of conversation about that.
I think everyone does agree that, you know,
we'll be watching those extremely carefully
as we see the effects of the price increases
come through from the conflict.
And still on how the discussion went across the committee,
before coming to this meeting,
there were some members who were, like,
discussing the risks of a slowdown in growth
at a time of where inflation remains high.
It really doesn't seem that most members
are penciling in a slowdown in growth.
But has there been any discussion
of the risks of stagflation at this point?
So, people actually wrote up their growth forecast
by a tenth, and I think that's probably to do
with just growing confidence in productivity.
But so, sorry, and your second question was
if there have been any discussions
about the risk of stagflation scenario.
Yeah, so, as I mentioned,
there is tension between the two goals, right?
The upward risk for inflation
and the downward risk for employment.
So, and that puts us in a different situation.
You know, when we use the term stagflation,
I always have to point out that that was a 1970s term
at a time when unemployment was in double figures
and inflation was really high
and the misery index was super high.
And when you add them together,
you get the misery index.
And that's not the case right now.
We actually have unemployment
really close to longer run normal.
And we have inflation that's, you know,
one percentage point above that.
So, calling that stagflation, it's not,
you know, I would reserve the term stagflation
for, you know, a much more serious set of circumstances.
That is not the situation we're in.
What we have is some tension between the goals
and we're trying to manage our way through it.
It's a very difficult situation,
but it's nothing like what they faced in the 1970s.
And that's, I reserve stagflation for that,
the word for that period.
Maybe that's just me.
Elizabeth.
Thanks so much.
Elizabeth Schulze with ABC News.
President Trump says that oil prices
and overall inflation will go down very rapidly
as soon as the war ends.
Do you agree with that?
I don't have a forecast on that.
When we're thinking about the impact
on American households, as you know,
they've been facing these higher prices for years.
They've seen an almost $1 increase in gas.
How worried are you about households,
especially lower income families,
being able to afford those price hikes?
And should people be bracing for higher costs,
including for food now?
We just, we don't know how big these effects are going to be.
And I don't want to characterize them in any way.
Of course, people are already seeing gas prices.
Gas prices are up almost a dollar a gallon.
We hope that isn't for a long period of time.
And of course, people will feel that.
But I don't want to speculate about what that might mean,
because honestly, that would sound like I have some idea
of what's actually going to happen.
And I don't think anybody really does.
We're going to see how this works out.
And I just would leave it at that.
Victoria.
Hi, Victoria Guido with Politico.
I just wanted to ask, for purposes of the next meeting,
how the Middle East war develops between now and then,
how are you thinking about
what might guide action at your next meeting?
I mean, if we have oil prices, you know,
above $100 a barrel the entire time until the next meeting,
is that going to change your wait-and-see stance?
Like, what would lead you all to move?
Or is it — or do you want to hold pretty indefinitely?
We'll have to wait and see.
I mean, you know, we always say
we're going to learn more by the next meeting.
And usually we do.
But in this case, we're going to learn a lot
because we're going to learn six weeks to the day
until the next meeting.
And, you know, we're going to see whether the —
what happens is — it's going to be very important
for the way the economy looks and the way the outlook —
the way the outlook evolves with what happens in the Middle East.
That's going to be a big factor. And we'll know that then.
I don't know how it's going to affect our thinking.
I really don't.
We did talk about alternative scenarios a little bit,
but it's just — I wouldn't bring that in here.
It's very uncertain.
And I just want to just remember that we don't know.
And we shouldn't assume it's going to be one thing or another.
We're going to see.
So is it a matter of you don't know
how the situation itself is going to evolve?
Or even if things remain as they are,
the economy could still remain relatively durable
in face of them?
Yeah, that's true, too.
No, I mean, the U.S. economy has just, you know, made its —
been strong through a whole bunch of challenges.
I mean, if you go back — go back to 2023,
when we raised rates a lot in 22 and 23,
and close to 100 percent of economists
called for a recession, which didn't happen.
In fact, 2023 was a really strong year.
So I — the U.S. economy has really been just —
just doing pretty well
through a lot of significant challenges
over the past few years.
It's been amazing to see.
And I — again, I don't —
I don't know what's going to happen
in the next intermediate cycle,
and I don't know what's going to happen in the Middle East.
I wouldn't want to speculate.
Hi, Chair Powell. Thanks for taking our questions.
What makes you so certain that tariff-related price increases
will be a one-time effect?
I don't think we've seen you since the Supreme Court
tariff decision.
And it's pretty clear that none of us
know what the extent of the tariff shock
will be as the administration moves
to replace some of the tariffs that were overturned.
So I suppose I'm curious,
what would make you question this certainty
that tariffs are going to be a one-time price effect?
Well, I would not at all use the word
certain about my views on that.
I'm not certain. I'm uncertain.
But just if you think about what it is,
it's a one-time increase in the price of a good, right?
And what inflation is, is ongoing increases in prices
this year, next year, the year after.
That's what inflation is. It's not a one-time price increase.
There's a very, very big difference.
The public doesn't really focus on that,
but that's the difference.
And tariffs should be, in theory,
unless they cause people to start expecting
still more tariffs the next year
and still more tariffs the next year,
they should be a classic one-time thing.
People say the same thing traditionally
about an energy price spike,
because traditionally prices go up and they come back down.
And by the time monetary policy would react,
you know, it would be over.
So I don't have tons of confidence on that.
I mean, I think the theory is probably right.
But as usual, the time it takes
to get all the way through the economy is just very uncertain.
And we found that coming out of COVID,
that the inflation did go away,
and largely for the reasons we thought it would,
but it took two years longer than we thought, you know?
And so I think we have to be humble
about knowing how long it will take for tariffs
to go all the way through the economy.
And so what we've been doing, as our staff's been doing,
it's very interesting.
They started off with just an estimate
because there wasn't a real history.
And then they've built, based on the history
that they're seeing of tariffs coming through into prices,
they can now have an arc.
And for all the tariffs, they can say,
well, you know, so we have, I think,
a slightly more confidence
that we will see tariff inflation coming down,
not prices, but you won't see further increases.
And we should start seeing that more and more
in the middle parts of the year.
We do expect that.
Now, you're also right, though, that the level of tariffs
came down fairly meaningfully
in the wake of the court decision.
But the administration said they're going to get that rate
right back up to where it was.
So, you know, we assume that they'll do that over time.
So that's how we think about it.
Thank you.
Chris Rugebert.
Hi. Thank you.
Chris Rugebert, Associated Press.
I wondered, you talked about the shortcomings
of the SCP in this environment.
I wanted to ask about or throw in an additional thing,
which is the fact that it's happening before transition.
Is there still some value, perhaps,
in the public knowing what other Fed officials are thinking,
the ones who will stay on for the rest of the year and beyond?
And does that even handicap your successor in any way?
Well, just in terms of having a whole committee
expressing its views,
is that something that locks them
in for the rest of the year?
No, no, no. We never — the SCP is never —
people are more than happy to change their SCP dots.
There are no way bound by them.
You know, it's your opinion at a moment in time,
which can change based on events,
you know, sometimes very quickly.
So it doesn't — it never locks people in.
You know, people are more than happy to be proven wrong
in either direction. And so I just think we do it.
And, you know, we — this was —
you mentioned this was a time when it's very hard to do it.
During the pandemic, we actually took one meeting off,
I think. And — but, you know, we don't —
we don't like to do that just because it's hard to do.
We should just keep doing it.
But I just would say, for this one, though,
I think it's — it's more than —
even more than usual good to take it —
take the forecast with a grain of salt
because subject to just very high levels of uncertainty.
Hi, Chair Powell. Brian Chung with NBC News.
So you mentioned at the beginning of this conversation
that you're well aware of the history of inflation
running above target.
It seems like that might be what's underpinning
the affordability problem that we're hearing
a lot about on Main Street.
Are there any signs to you
that that's impacting the psychology of the consumer,
especially given that they're a big driver
of overall economic activity?
Hey, you know, I'm not sure what's — what that's all about.
But what — I'll tell you what I think
and what we see in surveys, and that is, you know, people —
there were big price increases all around the world,
by the way, everywhere in countries
like the United States had basically the same kind of thing.
It was a global inflation coming out of the pandemic.
And everywhere, people are feeling like they —
you know, real wages have been going up in the United States
now for three years, roughly.
But people are not feeling like —
they're not feeling good about it yet.
And it will take some years of positive real earning gains
for people to feel good again, we think.
But you're right, we — when you talk to people,
they do feel squeezed.
And, you know, there are areas where prices are still going up,
like insurance, various different kinds of insurance
are getting more and more expensive.
And that's just catching up, really,
from inflationary pressures
that take a while to get to the price — into the price.
So we take it very seriously. We don't dismiss it at all.
It's a very real thing from the standpoint
of what people are experiencing.
And, you know, what it does for us is, you know,
makes us even more committed, if that's possible,
to getting inflation back to 2 percent on a sustained basis.
How does the Fed's independence play into the ability
to address affordability?
Well, independence is what allows us to do our jobs.
And, you know, stable prices is half of our mandate.
It's one of our two mandates,
maximum employment being the other.
I mean, every — look at every advanced economy
that looks anything like the United States
anywhere in the world, in a market economy,
in a democracy, and you'll see, you know,
pretty much central bank independence
that looks a lot like — in some cases,
stronger than what we have.
But it's critical that we have that
so that we can do the things when we need to do them
to preserve price stability.
And it just — it's an accepted, standard practice
and I think has a lot of support,
certainly in Congress,
which is where our oversight is, is in Congress.
And you see that among Democrats and Republicans
in the House and the Senate.
Hi, Chair Powell. Richard Escobedo at CBS News.
Thanks for doing this.
Two questions. One, how high would oil prices
and broader inflation have to go,
and for how long for the committee
to consider hiking rates?
And then, secondly, diesel prices
are rising faster than gas prices.
How concerned are you that the increase in diesel
might drive up food and goods prices
and lead to broader inflation?
Yeah, I'm not going to give you an example
or a specific answer on the first question.
You know, we're prepared to do what needs to be done,
but I wouldn't want to hypothesize
about what that might be.
You know, in terms of diesel prices,
so your question there is, are we concerned about it?
I mean —
How concerned, and whether or not it will drive up,
you know, the cost of food and other goods
that really rely on it to —
I think it's a more general concern than that.
It's diesel prices because that's transportation of food
and things like that.
There are just lots of ways that oil
and derivatives of oil get into the production
and transportation of many, many things.
So — and those — you know, there are big effects
in headline inflation,
but things like that leak into core as well.
And the effects may not be as big,
but they're quite real in their material.
So we are aware of that, and we're watching it.
But, you know, we're right at the beginning of this,
and we don't know how big it —
we just don't know how big this will be
and how long it lasts.
You know, it may or may not be something
that really makes a big imprint on the U.S. economy.
We're just going to have to wait and see.
Thank you.
Thanks very much.
Just to sort of stare into the future for a little bit,
I was looking at the longer-run bits of the SEP
and noticed that the growth estimate
had been revised up a good chunk from 1.8 to 2,
and the kind of long-term Fed funds rate as well.
It would be great just to hear, is that AI productivity
or what's going on there exactly?
Yeah, well, I think it's just productivity.
You know, we actually started seeing
meaningfully higher productivity some years ago —
four years ago, five years ago.
And that's not because of, you know, generative AI.
It may — we won't know for years what it's really due to,
but it could be due to the kind of things
that people did during the pandemic to economize
and somehow become more productive
because there was, you know, an incredible labor shortage.
But — and, you know, I think economic forecasters
are very skeptical of periods of high productivity
because they're so rare, and they're often revised away.
And for many of us to —
I never thought I'd see this many years
of really high productivity and, by the way,
expect it to continue.
And we haven't really started to see the effects of generative AI,
and that should certainly contribute to that.
So it's quite unusual, and it's — you know, this is the —
higher productivity is the thing
that allows incomes to rise over time,
and so it's a great thing. Was that your question?
Yeah, no, I was just curious what lay behind that.
And just briefly to — on that as well, to finish up,
you hear the argument a lot,
this is a sort of disinflationary story.
If you believe that productivity thing,
that should also weigh down inflation over time,
maybe then kind of pull down where rates end up.
Do you kind of agree with that line of thinking,
or do you think that's not how you should think
about weather rates?
I think you have to be cautious about that,
in particular if you're talking about AI, about generative AI.
So remember, in the short term, what's happening
is we're building data centers everywhere,
and that's actually putting pressure on all kinds of goods
and services that go into building these things.
So that's actually probably pushing inflation
up at the margin.
In addition, it probably raises the neutral rate.
So in the near term, you're looking at —
you're not looking at something that would immediately call
for lower rates or that would be lowering inflation.
Over time, though, sure, it's a — it can be a —
it's expanding potential output,
which is what productivity — higher productivity does.
Then it actually can be.
But I think it's an empirical question
because it's really what is the demand growing faster
or slower than the supply side.
And I think we just don't know that answer ex ante going in.
We'll just have to wait and see.
Thank you very much.
