LIVE: House Subcommittee Examines US Special Operations Priorities for FY27

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The House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations holds a hearing at 3:30 p.m. ET on March 18 titled “U.S. Special Operations Forces and Command—Challenges and Resource Priorities for Fiscal Year 2027.”
Witnesses:
Adm. Frank M. Bradley, commander, United States Special Operations Command
Derrick Anderson, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, Office of the Secretary of Defense
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Today we will hear from our witnesses on U.S. Special Operations Forces
and Command on Challenges and Resource Priorities for Fiscal Year 2027.
The OPTEMPO for Special Operations continues to put demands on the force,
even with the major force drawdowns from Iraq and Afghanistan almost five years ago.
Recent consolidation and downsizing of forces in Syria and Iraq bring only minor relief as
our Special Operations Forces continue counterterrorism efforts against violent
extremist organizations, military proxies, and non-state actors in both of those countries,
as well as an increase of OPTEMPO on the continent of Africa, ongoing operations in
the Western Hemisphere, and now requirements related to the ongoing operations supporting
the fight in Iran. Special Operators have adapted to meet the challenges of an evolving landscape
of great power competition in every corner of the globe, while continuing to aggressively
attack violent extremist organizations and transnational criminal networks,
all in an effort to protect the homeland. Our adversaries are using cutting-edge technology,
economic incentives, and illicit activities to attempt to gain footholds in every geographic
combatant command's area of responsibility, and the battlefield has become increasingly
contested and denied by the proliferation of peer adversary capabilities and malign influence.
All while our Crisis Response Force has been called upon repeatedly over the past few years
to execute exquisite challenging missions that only they can conduct. Special Operations continue
to be one of our most valuable tools in our toolbox, used to showcase our dominance,
to impose cost on our adversaries, to reestablish deterrence, and to provide the nation with a
position of advantage should deterrence fail. We ask a lot of our Special Operations Forces,
and the demands both on and for them will only continue to grow. It is critical we provide these
elite operators and all that support them with the resources that they need. I was disappointed
in the fiscal year 26 budget submission for SOCOM from the Department of War. This committee worked
diligently with SOCOM to provide critically needed resources to fill the gaps from over a decade of
stagnant flat budgets through the reconciliation process, only to have the department submit a
budget with a reduction to SOCOM, making the budget a wash and still flat. SOCOM's purchasing
power has been reduced by 14% since 2019, despite increasing demand for support worldwide. I am
however optimistic about President Trump's direction to include a significant increase
in the fiscal year 27 defense budget and what this will mean for SOCOM in the future. I look
forward to reviewing the budget and putting SOCOM on a path that increases to get them to a steady
state of at least 20 billion dollars annually in the budget. We look forward to hearing how
Congress can best support SOCOM, such that you can continue to provide the high return on investment
the nation requires, while simultaneously modernizing for the challenges of the future.
Our witnesses today are the leaders in the special operations community. I want to welcome
the Honorable Derek Anderson, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, Office of Secretary of War, and Admiral Frank Bradley, Commander of the United States
Special Operations Command. In the interest of time, I am going to ask you to keep the witnesses
to keep their opening remarks to five minutes or less, so we have sufficient time for questions
and answers. I think you may have a combined opening statement. If so, then make it 10 or 15
minutes. With that, let me thank our witnesses again for appearing here before us today and for
your time, and I now recognize Ranking Member Crow for any opening remarks he might have.
Thank you, Chairman Jackson, and to all the witnesses today, and for the record, we're not
short. These chairs are just very big. I want to get that out there. In previous years, we've opened
this hearing by acknowledging how dynamic the global security environment is, and I just want
to say, the state that is dynamic right now would be a massive understatement. The U.S.
is facing an increasingly turbulent global world order, trained by accelerating strategic competition
among major powers, more intense and unpredictable transnational challenges, and multiple
regional conflicts with far-reaching implications. The bar to access advanced technology like AI,
drones, and complex cyber tools has never been lower, allowing non-state actors and violent
extremist organizations to punch above their weight, enabling them to destabilize countries
and negatively influence our partners and our allies. And those are just the things we know to
be true today. Who knows what challenges tomorrow will bring. The challenges and threats of today
and tomorrow demand the full attention of this administration and the Department of Defense.
I urge them to especially consider how we support the unique capabilities of the Special Forces
community, who are called upon to assist combatant and functional commands and their campaigns
at a rapidly increasing tempo. For more than 20 years, the Special Forces community has served
as the primary tool in the fight against terrorism, encountering violent extremist organizations.
That was the mission required of us in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, a mission that I
carried out as an Army Ranger. And while we still need to maintain that capability and not lose
sight of those hard-won gains, we must also prepare to face future challenges. One, how is
the Special Operations community postured to support this effort? Two, do they have the right
training, manning, equipping, institutional support, funding, and professional military
education system? Another crucial question for this committee to address is SOCOM's budget,
which has been relatively flat over the past decade. I share the Chairman's concerns in this
regard, given the tremendous amount of strain and resourcing that's been placed on your command.
It simply has not kept pace with inflation, resulting in a 14% reduction in buying power
since 2019. Though SOCOM's requirements have certainly not diminished, as we've pointed out.
Despite this stagnation, there has been a 35% increase in combatant command demand
for Special Operations capabilities. So in a rapidly changing threat environment, a Special
Operator is one of the country's greatest advantages, and remains so today. It is our
job to ensure we continue to hone and support this highly capable and agile force, including
resourcing critical gaps in SOCOM funding. So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about
how they have prepared to do this, what is needed for deterrence, and how we're going to meet this
increasing challenge of skyrocketing demand while diminishing resourcing for our capabilities. So
Assistant Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley, I want to thank both of you and your teams,
not just for this hearing, but the engagements that have led up to this, the briefings that
you've given to both the Chairman and I. It is actually very refreshing in this environment,
the amount of engagement and collaboration and information that you provided through your
command. You're setting the standard, in my opinion, with the Department of Defense. So we
look forward to that continuing. And with that, I yield back. Thank you. We will now hear from
our witnesses. Once this is done, we're going to move into the question and answer session.
And immediately following one round of questions, which won't take long since many of our members
were not able to make it today, we will reconvene for the classified session, which will take place
in Rayburn 2337. Please be advised that we may have to break in the middle for votes on the
floor. We will wait and see. And I understand you both have statements to give. So I will start with
Secretary Anderson. We will begin with you. You're recognized for five minutes.
Chairman Jackson, Ranking Member Crow, and other distinguished members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on the global posture of our nation's Special
Operations Forces. I'm honored to testify alongside Admiral Mitch Bradley, Commander of
United States Special Operations Command. I'd also like to take a moment to recognize the dedicated
professionals from the SOLIC team who are here with us today. Mr. Randy Harvey, who leads the
Secretariat's Strategy, Forces, and Integration Portfolio, and Ms. Kara Teeter, who leads the
Secretariat's Capability, Resources, and Analysis Portfolio. The SOLIC team, together with their U.S.
SOCOM counterparts, bring invaluable expertise, leadership, and insight as we advocate on behalf
of the SOF Enterprise, our service members, and their families. People are the foundation of SOF
and of the Joint Force. They are our competitive advantage against our adversaries. We are
thankful for those who have volunteered to serve, those currently in harm's way, and those who have
made the ultimate sacrifice, including the 13 service members we've lost during ongoing operations.
We honor their lives and legacy. We'll never forget their sacrifice in defense of our country.
Today's security environment is defined by simultaneity, convergence, and speed.
State adversaries, terrorist organizations, and transnational criminal networks are increasingly
aligned, technologically enabled, and active across domains and regions. To answer these challenges,
the National Defense Strategy marks a fundamental shift, directing the Department of War to implement
a flexible, realistic approach to protect America's interests. Purpose built for this era,
SOF provides capability and optionality. Comprising only 3 percent of the Joint Force
and less than 2 percent of the Department's budget, roughly equivalent to the procurement
cost of a single aircraft carrier, SOF delivers outsized strategic value. SOF provides senior
leaders with scalable, tailorable, and asymmetric options across the full spectrum of competition
and conflict. Leveraging persistent global presence, generational relationships, and unique
authorities, SOF shapes the operating environment, strengthens partners, and imposes costs on our
adversaries. Every major operation has a SOF component to it. Operations like Southern Spear,
Rough Rider, Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, and Epic Fury have demonstrated our nation's prowess
and commitment to confront our adversaries wherever they may be. From the Western Hemisphere
across the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and beyond, SOF has been
decisive in defending the homeland, deterring China, and enabling our partners and allies.
Should deterrence fail, SOF is postured with the Joint Force to prevail in high-end conflict.
SOF also creates opportunities across all domains, buy down risk, and serve as pathfinders
for the department. With our culture of rapid adaptation and agile problem-solving,
SOF accelerates the adoption of disruptive technologies, seeding investments in unmanned
and autonomous systems, counter-UXS, cyber and electronic warfare, and rapidly delivering tools
to warfighters at the point of need. In accordance with the law and congressional guidance, of which
we are immensely grateful, the department has taken decisive and concrete steps to institutionalize
SOLIC's oversight and advocacy role and strengthen the governance of the SOF enterprise.
Over the last year and a half, we have transformed the Secretariat for Special Operations to provide
direct civilian oversight across organize, train, and equip responsibilities, not to duplicate or
disrupt the operational execution of U.S. SOCOM, but to support, sustain, and strengthen it.
This transformation moves us beyond the old advisory construct to a true exercise of authority,
direction, and control through an analytical, disciplined, data-driven, and strategically sound
approach. While the maturation of these initiatives is ongoing, these foundational changes fulfill
congressional intent and provide the oversight mechanisms needed to shape force structure,
guide budgetary and planning processes, and forge the future of SOF. The optionality that SOF
delivers requires resourcing and investments. To maintain our competitive edge, SOF needs
sustained partnership, predictable resourcing, and continued modernization.
We greatly appreciate the support from this committee. I commit to continued collaboration
with Congress and to make full use of my position in the department and alongside the services
to ensure SOF remains resourced, ready, relevant, and accountable, and to ensure they can meet
today's mission while transforming for tomorrow's challenges. I'm honored to lead the SOF enterprise.
I invite you to visit our special operators and their families across the globe to see
firsthand the great work they do and the challenges they face. Our service members
and their families represent the finest that America has to offer and are something we,
as a nation, should be proud of. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Chairman Jackson, Regular Member Crow, thank you very much. Distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to represent the men and women of the United States
Special Operations Command. I'm honored to testify here today with Assistant Secretary
Warr for Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict, Honorable Derek Anderson. In SOCOM,
we rely upon the SOLIC oversight, support, and advocacy to succeed in all of our global missions.
I'm also joined today by the SOCOM Command Sergeant Major, A.J. Krogman, who exemplifies
the professionalism, the leadership, and the backbone of our non-commissioned officer corps,
the greatest in the world. On behalf of our entire community, I want to thank you for your
enduring support. And to any of our nation's finest who are listening to us today and
considering a life of service in uniform, I want you to know that we are looking for
critical thinkers who can fight and creative makers who can solve the hardest problems.
And if you are one of those people, then it's you that we are looking for.
Distinguished members of this committee, we meet at a crucial moment. As you've said,
today's security environment is defined by state adversaries, terrorist organizations,
and criminal networks that are increasingly aligned, technologically enabled,
and active across every domain. Our national defense strategy highlights the potential
of simultaneity as a central problem, and your SOF is the key component of its prescription.
Today's environment rewards forces that can operate persistently and decisively,
often below the threshold of armed conflict, generating irregular effects by, through,
and with our allies and partners in order to produce a whole effect that is much greater
than the sum of its parts. Your special operations forces provide that capability.
Comprising just 3% of the joint force and 2% of the budget, as has been stated,
your SOF enables and delivers an outsized strategic return by providing our nation's
leaders with scalable, tailorable, and those asymmetric options that come across
the spectrum of competition to conflict. Our purpose is our mission. This means we are laser
focused on maintaining the readiness required to protect the homeland, to deter aggression from our
pacing challenge, China, and to enable true burden sharing by enabling and empowering the growing
capacity of our allies and partners. But that mission is not accomplished by technology and
equipment alone. It is executed by the most decisive advantage that we have, our people,
empowered by a culture of meritocracy, supported by critical programs that you have helped manifest,
like the preservation of the force and family. The health of your SOF formation is strong,
and it is getting stronger. To ensure that these exceptional men and women can succeed in the
complex of environments of tomorrow increasingly encroaching upon today, we are making transformation
our imperative. We must adapt faster than our adversaries. We must be able to project force
through the most dangerous environments, and we must evolve to leverage the ubiquitous information
environment that presents both a challenge and an opportunity. We must evolve our force design,
accelerate capability development, and strengthen our partnerships with the services and allies
to stay ahead of emerging threats. As a department's lead for experimentation and
autonomy, we are not just adapting, we are driving change. We are working with the services
to incorporate next-generation capabilities, systems that are precise, autonomous, affordable,
consistent with the law of war. The goal is to deliver these tools with the element of surprise
from unwarned access and placement at scale, ensuring our forces maintain a decisive advantage
against any adversary. You see, SOF defends the homeland by dismantling threats far from our
shores, disaggregating terrorist networks. We deter aggression by strengthening the resilience
of our alliance, illuminating and exposing adversary malign behavior that preys upon
our partners and allies. However, our ability to accomplish this is not guaranteed. It requires
accelerated modernization in your continued partnership. Predictable resourcing for our
program's modernization is a strategic necessity. SOF was purpose-built for this era of competition,
and we can provide an indispensable asymmetric advantage for the joint force and the nation.
And with your continued support, we will meet today's missions while transforming to ensure
that we are ready for the challenges of tomorrow. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, Admiral. And with that, we will start with the questioning, and I will begin
with my question. Admiral Bradley, I know you've only been in command for a little over five
months now, and I suspect you're most likely still assessing various aspects of the command,
but what would you say the top three challenges are this fiscal year to sustain your three SOF
lines of effort, which are win, people, and transform? And what do we need to do here in
Congress to help you succeed in that? Chairman, thank you. Our first priority is always to
maintain readiness for the current threats that are out there. Crisis response is that top priority
for us, being able to respond agilely to wherever it might present. And of course, the demands on
that, as had been mentioned, have been 300% increase over these last five years. That pace
continues. You'll remember a year ago when General Fenton was testifying, and I was here supporting
him as we were telling the story. That pace of growing usage but diminishing resources was
causing us to have to eat into our modernization budget to be able to cash flow those current
operations. That's still the case. And so today, the modernization priorities that I would tell you
are very similar to those from a year ago. Number one, to be able to project force into increasingly
contested environments where our adversaries are posing threats against us. Number two, really,
is to take advantage of the fact that there is this ubiquitous information environment, ubiquitous
technical surveillance that is out there. Many people see it as a threat, and it certainly is,
but it's also an advantage, an opportunity that we could leverage. The cyber and the virtual
domain are critical maneuver spaces that we must take advantage of. Of course, another aspect of
the rapidly evolving changing character of warfare is the emergence of abundant lethal autonomy.
And yes, that is a threat that we have to contend with, but it's also one that we can leverage.
And so that's also an area that we will be looking to prioritize modernization. And finally,
though this is the foundation, and as Secretary Anderson alluded to directly, our people must
continue to be our foundation, ensuring they are trained, ready, supported, and educated for the
future. Thank you, Admiral. And I will work to get you additional resources because, you know,
one thing I've learned on being on this committee in the short period of time that I've been the
chair, and a little bit prior to that, is that we absolutely, in this particular community,
cannot eat into research and development, testing, evaluation, modernization efforts,
because that will quickly affect your ability to fight in the months and years to come. So
we will take that seriously. Secretary Anderson, you've been in the seat a few months less than
Admiral Bradley, and I'm sure you're still assessing your priorities as well. SOCOM's
budget, as we mentioned, has been relatively flat for the past decade. In the combined written
statement that was submitted, you state that SOCOM comprises only 3% of the joint force and less than
2% of the department's budget, delivering, I quote, an outsized strategic value. I personally
believe SOCOM's budget needs to increase to a steady state of at least $20 billion a year.
How are you using your secretary-like position to advocate for a higher budget for SOCOM?
What do you think the future budget looks like for SOCOM? And how do you quantify this outsized
strategic value in your budget submission? Mr. Chairman, I first want to start off by
thanking the committee for those 907 authorities in the NDA a few years ago that gave us that
service-like ability. What I can tell you is, within the department, having that service-like
ability allows us to work with the other military departments hand-in-hand, specifically when we
talk about the resources, not only that we are being provided, but the other services are being
provided. It gives us an opportunity to go service to service, from chief to chief, and have those
conversations about modernizations and where we might be overlapping or where we can combine
forces. So I think that 907 capability and authorities that you gave us gets us in the
room with the other services. As far as echoing what Admiral Bradley spoke about in our modernization,
as we continue to modernize, we see that technology typically, and I've heard various
different ranges, but technology ends up being obsolete within six months. So our operators that
are operating on the ground, not only utilizing the technology that they have internal to the
department, but also training by, with, and through our partners and the technology they have. That is
an absolutely other critical part of this, and ensuring that we are staying up to speed
with technology. So that investment, as Admiral Bradley said, is absolutely crucial. And then
one of the other priorities I'd just like to highlight, Mr. Chairman, is the POTIF program,
the preservation of the force and family. That investment that you made in the SOF community
absolutely increases our readiness and allows us to take care of our soldiers and sailors and
airmen. And I'm happy to get into more detail on that. Thank you, I appreciate that. I have one
last question here, Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Section 863 of the FY26 NDAA required
the establishment of the SOCOM Urgent Innovative Technologies and Capabilities Initiative,
with funding that was allocated in the 2025 Budget Reconciliation Act. When do you expect
to begin implementing this requirement, and how does it nest with SOCOM's transformation imperative?
Chairman, I'll start and just say that the appreciation for that investment and for the
recognition of the agility with which SOCOM already operates. So in many ways, those capabilities
inside the SOCOM unique acquisition process give us unity of command to be able to both see a
requirement, to identify it, articulate it, move resources to be able to execute against it, field
it, and get it out in a very rapid manner to be able to test, evaluate whether it's credible for
the combat situations it might have to face. The authority given in 863 and the resources to be
able to allow that to happen makes us able to execute that more quickly. As we look to the
other initiatives that have come, both from this chamber, from the Senate, and from the President,
all in acquisition reform, Speed Act, the Forged Act, all of those are really looking to take
advantage of some of the pathways that SOCOM and SOLIC have been able to chart over the years,
and then extrapolate them out across the broader joint force. And so the leadership that Secretary
Anderson's talking about inside the Pentagon at the secretariat level is a critical part to be
able to harness some of that new authority that you've given us and be able to help the other
services to be able to use it in the same way. Mr. Chairman, echoing what Admiral Bradley said,
the one thing I would make a point of is when we talk about the military department to department
relationships, Admiral Bradley and I are 100% working with the other departments, not only
to give our lessons learned to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, so that their acquisitions
processes get better, but also learn where we can get better. There's certainly some lessons
learned that we can get from the services, but we'll continue to work with you and this committee
to ensure we keep you up to date on how we're exercising that authority. Thank you, I appreciate
that. And as you know, the focus of the NDA this last year was to reform acquisition and
procurement, that process altogether. This money was intended, knowing that SOCOM is already very
good at that, better than most in the military, you already have some area of expertise in there,
to refine that process so that it could then be used as an example for other, you know,
other areas in the military so that they could kind of mimic what was going on in a lessons
learned way. So I hope we get that done, and I hope it turns out to be really successful,
and everybody learns a lot from it. But thank you, I appreciate it. With that, Mr. Crow, I recognize
you. Thank you, Chairman. I wanted to begin on something that I think that Special Operations
Forces are uniquely equipped and trained to do, and that is working with civilian populations,
building trust. You know, you're known as force multipliers, and the genesis of that, as you know
better than anybody, is that you work with those local populations, you build public sentiment,
public trust, and you build foreign forces. And a part of that is this understanding, you know,
and I worked in the community, this understanding that you're going to do everything possible to
protect local forces, that built in the mission planning process is protecting civilians,
reducing civilian casualties. Because nothing sets back years sometimes of trust building
and relationship building than an errant strike, than killing civilians, right? It's not just
inefficient and immoral and unlawful in certain circumstances, but it actually makes it harder
for us to do our mission, which is why, you know, this committee in Congress, in the FY19 NDAA,
required DOD to develop a comprehensive policy for preventing civilian harm, which it did.
And in fiscal year 23 NDAA, I helped create a civilian protection center of excellence,
because I learned that, that you can actually accomplish the tactical element of a mission,
but then lose the end game. If the people that you're fighting with and working with
actually don't trust you and support you. Those efforts have been slashed in the last year. 80%
of the CPCOE and the resources have been cut. The personnel that have been embedded in the
combatant commands have been largely taken away. And it seems like a terrible missed opportunity,
but also a strategic error to not equip our operators and our forces with the tools they need
to comprehensively address our adversaries and build the trust in our alliances.
In that vein, Secretary Anderson, on February 28th, there was a girls elementary school in Iran
that was struck. Public reports say that 175 civilians, many of them children, were reportedly
killed or wounded in that strike. It's my understanding that there's been a preliminary
investigation and that you might be aware of that. Is that investigation, preliminary
investigation complete? And was there a 15-6 that came out of that?
Congressman, first to answer your second question first. Currently,
the incident is being investigated by CENTCOM. I wouldn't want to get ahead of the investigation.
And in the closed setting, I'm happy to give you some of the dates and details as
how that's progressed. But it is currently being investigated. And what I can say is that
the investigating officer is a general officer outside of the CENTCOM chain of command. So
there will be an unbiased, impartial investigation that's conducted.
And Congressman, to your point, to be very clear, you're absolutely right. There is
no strategic benefit for the United States or for the department in civilian harm. And that's
what makes us different and separate from our adversaries. We continue to have a center of
excellence, a civilian harm center of excellence, and continue with those reports. But I think you
bring up a good point is what we've done within the command structure, if you look at from when a
SOF operator is training at the ground level all the way through a general officer,
they're taking civilian harm and ensuring that it is mitigated throughout the entire process.
I think that has shown a world of compliance to culture. And I think that is where we've
been heading. And again, I'm happy to have more conversations and discuss some of those
things in the closed setting. I appreciate that. And I appreciate
you saying that the strategic importance of this, and I don't doubt in any way that you're
committed to that, because I know you live this and you understand it, and obviously it's a part
of what you do at Downrage. Can you clarify, and this isn't a gotcha, I'm just honestly asking the
question, so there has not been a preliminary investigation that's been completed? The
initial investigation by CENTCOM is still underway? No, Congressman, as you're well aware with the
harm mitigation, there'll be an initial investigation to determine whether or not a
15-6 should be opened. And that's been complete? Correct. And now there's a 15-6? And there's a
15-6 open, and it's going to be a full investigation, Congressman. And you have my
commitment, as we have in the past, that once that investigation is complete and finalized,
that we'll make sure that we're available. The 15-6 is the one that's underway?
Correct. And in the preliminary investigation, did it determine that U.S. Armed Forces carried
out the strikes on the elementary school? I have not seen it, Congressman. Again,
I'm happy to have a conversation enclosed. Right now, I have the fact that a 15-6,
a full-on 15-6 has been investigated. Okay, but you haven't seen the results
of the preliminary investigation? I have not, Congressman.
Have you, Admiral Bradley? No, sir, I haven't.
You haven't, okay. All right. I wanted to go to one of your comments about lethal autonomous drones,
right? It's happening, right? Our adversaries are doing it. There's been a lot of debate about the
morality, the legality of taking a human outside of the kill chain and making that decision
ourselves. You had mentioned, Admiral Bradley, you said lethal autonomous authority is happening,
we need to leverage that ourselves. What did you mean by that? Are you saying that there's
been a decision within the administration that we will allow lethal autonomous authority with
drones? Congressman, I believe we employ lethal capability that has an amount of autonomy in it
every day. Any of our IR guiding missiles has an amount of that baked into it.
Can I drill down on that? Just sitting here today, is there a human in the kill chain?
There is always a human in the kill chain. Okay. And is there a debate about taking a human out
of the kill chain? I do not believe there is. What do you personally believe?
That the law of armed conflict and the law of war requires a human to be the decider
about where and how lethal, any lethal force should be delivered. No matter the vessel of
that lethal force, it should be a human that's making that decision. I'm very relieved to hear
you say that. Thank you. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Scott, you're recognized for five
minutes. Thank you, Chairman. And I too have the concerns about the budget constraints and what
it's doing to modernization. I want to get to the proposed $3,000 billet reduction and forces,
and Secretary Anderson, I understand it's predominantly intelligence analysts, logistical
staff, and psychological operations that you intend to make, that the reductions will come
from. Is that correct? Congressman, that's correct. I want to ask, in the psychological
operations, does that include what we would refer to as information warfare?
Well, Congressman, I would say that there's information operations, there's psychological
operations. And I'm happy to, again, talk a little bit more in detail on the closed session, but
we are doing a revamp within the Special Operations Command, specifically in USASOC,
to ensure we have those capabilities readily available. I think it would be a good use of time
for our military to study how effective the Russians have been on the continent of Africa
with information warfare, and how effective they've been at getting the French kicked off
of the continent. And it has created significant challenges for us in that continent. And I just
I want to make sure that that part of today's warfare is not ignored, because we have to
embrace it. We can see what they're doing, and know what they're doing, and yet we have not been
countering it at an effective rate, and speed matters with that. So sticking with Africa,
Russia, Africa Corps now, Wagner Group, used to be Wagner Group in China,
they're both expanding their security roles in Africa. What specific risk does this create for
the US national security, for our need for critical minerals, and our ability to operate in Africa?
Congressman, I can take that as a start point and sort of follow back on the previous
question as well. I think one of the critical things in the information space that we have to
do, and it gets specifically to your point about critical minerals and other threats on the African
continent, is lever the high ground in information operations, that is the truth. And in almost every
case, our adversaries are leveraging their positions for malign influence against the
population's interests. And merely what we can do to be most effective is tell the truth and
highlight that. I agree with you. So in Africa, that is clearly the case. And again, I don't want
to get ahead of General Dag Anderson, the AFRICOM commander, who of course owns the strategy and
understands this far better than any of us, but we provide support to him through these forces to
help him to do just that. I think it would be a good use of tax dollars for us to get some actual
footage, as you said, telling the truth of what China is doing with the harvesting of fish and
exclusive economic zones off of the continent of Africa and show the citizens of that continent
just how their their natural resources, their food supply is being pillaged by the Chinese.
And I think that the Chinese would be much less welcome by the people of the continent if they
knew just how much of the food supply was being stolen by China. So sticking to Africa,
we lost the key access point in Niger. Admiral, what has that done to the operational impact,
your ability to conduct counterterrorism missions in Africa? How has this impacted
soft stability with regard to speed in a crisis response? Congressman, West Africa has been a
particularly volatile region over the last several years and a number of countries that have changed
leadership in particularly in the case of Niger as several of the others. I would tell you that
our soft generational long-standing relationships with the professional military to military
forces there have helped us to maintain some contact in these troubling times.
And in fact, we hope that as things evolve and those governments stabilize and new diplomatic
connections can be made, they can be levered to be able to help us maintain indications and warning,
awareness of threats that might be there, and ultimately to help them to police their own
problems. Those relationships matter. I agree with you. They're still strong at the mil-to-mil level
and I hope we're able to leverage them to get back into Niger in 101 and 201. I also want to
advocate for the ECHO programs on the continent of Africa. And I know, Secretary, if I'm not
mistaken, you're a Green Beret. That's correct, sir. But I very much believe in the ODA mission
and the ECHO programs and hope that we will find the funds to continue to expand them on that
continent. With that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Mr. Tran, you're recognized for five minutes.
Thank you so much, Chairman. Welcome Admiral Bradley and Secretary Anderson. Thanks for being here.
Admiral Bradley, the department has emphasized that adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran
are increasingly operating through proxies, criminal networks, and influence campaigns
below the threshold of armed conflict. How central are special operations forces to countering
those activities and do you believe SOCOM currently has the authorities and resources required to
compete effectively in that space? Congressman, thank you. In fact, I'd refer back to those
generational partnerships and relationships that we build around the planet. Today, there are more
than 6,500 soft operators and enablers deployed around and in 80 different countries. And every
one of those building and sustaining those relationships. To your point about the influence
operations that our adversaries are conducting, in most cases, those are designed to prey upon
our allies and our partners to be able to use that malign behavior to be able to gain unwarned
access and leverage. Our ability to be able to illuminate that malign behavior and then to
pass it and make our partners aware of it, many times through diplomatic channels, but sometimes
directly, mill to mill, security service to security service, is a critical way to be able
to help undermine our adversaries actions there. I appreciate that. And to your question about
authorities, I would just reckon back to the 127 programs, a critical capability to us to be able
to do that. And we do believe those authorities are robust and appreciated. Thanks, Admiral. Let
me ask you this. SOCOM represents only about 3% of the joint force, yet combatant commanders
continue to request support from special operation forces across nearly every theater. Does the demand
for special operation forces currently exceed sustainable levels? And also, what risk does
that create for readiness and retention within the forces? Congressman, thank you. I would say
well, to affirm, they are asking for more than we have to offer every year since I've been paying
attention to that. This last year was about 70 different asks that we could not satisfy.
We are able to sustain because we only do the things that we were able to sustain.
That said, because of the work that both of these chambers have done,
really since 2006 QDR, we have the ability to sustain the level of force and commitment that
we are at today. That budget reduction or that budget, the buying power reduction over the last
five to six years has limited our ability to be able to modernize. And that's really the critical
determiner for the future. With the few resources we have that are in higher and higher demand,
to be able to make them more useful, we need to modernize them for the future.
Thanks, Admiral. To either of the witnesses, and you both may answer, looking five to 10 years
ahead, what do you believe is the greatest strategic risk facing the special operation
enterprise? And what is the one area where congressional support would have the greatest
impact on SOCOM's ability to succeed? Congressman, I'll take a first stab at it. If you'd asked me
that question 10 years ago, I would have defined the most dangerous crisis of the future,
probably being an Iran or an Iranian surrogate or proxy force threatening freedom of navigation
in and around the Middle East. And so that most dangerous crisis of 10 years ago
is the most likely crisis that we face today. I would anticipate that along those same lines,
the ability to project force into increasingly contested environments where U.S. national
interests are threatened is the characterization of the next most dangerous crisis. And that is
why that we have made our ability to do that our top modernization priority. If you look at the
operation conducted under absolute resolve into Venezuela, I would argue the most sophisticated,
integrated interagency joint force raid ever conducted, you get a peek at the modernization
pathway that the joint force is on. And it is that ability. Thanks, Admiral. Mr. Starkey,
can I get your take? Yes, Congressman. But what I would say, Admiral Battley alluded to this
earlier, when we talk about the different threats that are across the world, those relationships
that we've maintained, not just for years, but for decades, are how we
build that value proposition that soft brings to the table, specifically highlighting and you asked
Congressman, what are one of the things Congress continued support for those 127 programs are
absolutely essential to ensuring that we maintain that value proposition. What one ODA or one what
one SEAL team is able to accomplish is absolutely astronomical for the joint force. So and then
lastly, again, Admiral Bradley hit it on the head was our modernization efforts, ensuring that we
utilize autonomy and AI to efficiently conduct staffing, all of those things that allow us to
focus on operational needs. Thanks, Secretary. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. And Mr. Cho,
you recognize for five minutes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Bradley,
thank you for coming today. Thank everyone in the room for your service and continued service.
Admiral Bradley, MilCon funding for construction projects is about 509 million, one of which
soft human performance training center. What is that? Congressman, that is one of our integrated
facilities where we're able to bring together the preservation of the force and family program
to be able to provide synchronized and integrated care for our operators who are either returning
from service from an injury or who are enhancing their performance to be able to go out on the
next missions to be able to provide that continuity of care. Is it a NICO like institute? No,
Congressman, it's a there are a number of those in each one of our major force concentration centers
that give us the ability to really permeate the care from the program down to the lowest level
possible. There's more than one. I only see one in Delaware. I don't know how they ended up winning
it. I think Texas would have been a better spot to hang it, but we can talk about that later.
Yes, Congressman. Actually, I'm not aware of the one in Delaware, but those centers,
we increment through the budget to be able to give each of our force concentrations and components
that capability. I hate to put you on the spot on this one, Admiral, but what does that look like?
I've spent my entire post-military career trying to find the best, I don't say pipeline,
but training mechanism for the brain and the body combined. Our special operations forces, we demand
the boat teams. You have to go faster. It has to be there quicker. It's a rugged ride. I don't
know a boat operator that retires that can stand up straight. Most of them don't have their kidneys
anymore and everything is wrong with them, but we push them harder and we push them faster.
SDVs, how deep can you dive? How long can you go? How cold can you sustain? How cold can it be? And
you can sustain yourself to be mission capable. We keep going and we keep going and we keep going.
Our operators are carrying heavier rucksacks because we keep throwing technology on top of
them, just weighs more than anything. Push harder, push faster. And we don't ever, I'm
not wire brushing you, sorry, this is the time that I get to vent, thank you, but we do not,
we do not take the time, in my personal opinion, to take care of you from start to finish. Baseline
assessment to the time that you quit, retire, excuse me, I should never say quit, okay?
And when we have these performance facilities that we're popping up, I want to know what's in it
because I don't need a six pack and a bag of Cheetos. I mean, the special operators in the
United States of America is the most amazing asset. And I think we've not done our best
to take care of them because, and everyone in this room that's wearing a uniform right now
needs to listen to what I'm saying to you, because when you do leave and you fall into that deep,
dark black hole, because you're not here anymore and you're alone, I think there's something we
can do to catch the trajectory to change that because it's lonely out there. And I'm trying
to deal with that in the VA, but if we can help inside the DOD, inside the community,
inside of our house, that is a win. Congressman, I absolutely agree with you. And I suspect
you probably dropped a half an inch of height in your time in the teams.
That's why I'm shorter than my brother, because I kept my head under the boat.
Just like most of us. And it is exactly that aim of community that these centers and the
POTUS program is allowing us to develop. So I'll just give you a, I'll take you on a small tour
of what one of them looks like. Thank you.
Where a team of either SEALs or ODA or Raiders or our Air Force special tactics folks would come
in in the morning to begin to work their PT regimen for that day, in that same facility
would be those who are injured, but can't work out with their teammates anymore that are going
through rehab or going through a care to be able to get back up on speed, but they're in the same
facility. So there is still that strong sense of community. If they can't go through rehab,
or maybe at the backside of their physical rehab, they check into the performance enhancement
section where cognitive and performance psychologists help them to train their
cognitive abilities to be smarter and to have better reaction time. All still inside that same
facility. So there's still the jabbing and going back and forth with their teammates. They're still
part of the team. If some of those individuals in that performance enhancement, cognitive
enhancement with the performance psychs, find that they have care that needs to be attended
to by a clinical psych, there's no shame there. There's no stigma. They are now in a warm handoff
through door to a clinical psych to be able to get the care that they need. We've seen that in
many cases, this holistic care, and it is very much modeled after the lessons from the various
NICO facilities and many others that are templated around the world, has been able to reduce the
stigma to a point where some 50% of our formations in some cases are making use of our behavioral
health specialists now. I think that is one of the most important and the most telling statistics
that we've got of the success of the program that PODF has been able to fund for us. But it's not
just that. The reduction in the return time for our operators who are injured back to full duty,
75% reduction in that time. 70% reduction in the amount of time that it takes for somebody to get
access to first care. In most cases, it's less than two days. In many cases, it is same day.
And then the thing that really makes all of this home, I think, best is the permeating nature of
what we've been able to do. We've been able to put our psychs, our behavioral health specialists,
our chaplains, and our corpsmen down at the O5 level in almost every formation to be able to give
a name to face recognition of the caregivers to the operators so that there's immediate access
and you know the case history of the operators and the enablers that are being helped.
Thank you, Mr. Trill. Mr. Almoday, you're recognized for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, Secretary Anderson and Admiral Bradley,
I think you guys make an incredible team. So I'll just encourage you to continue building
that relationship. Admiral Bradley, I know you've talked about irregular triad before
of cyber special operations in space. Could you, for this committee and for the public,
just describe what that is? Congressman, thank you. I talk about it
generally when we're talking about the ubiquitous technical surveillance or ubiquitous information
environment. It might be useful to just start there and say, what in the world is that?
Well, we probably all know that more and more of the world spends more and more of its time
in the virtual domain. You only have to look at your screen time indicator on your cell phones to
be able to recognize that that is in fact the case. And it is true that that time that you spend
making more of your information available to the world is a vulnerability to you. It's a boon for
our adversaries. But it's also an advantage for us looking at our adversaries who adhere and fall
into that same trap. And so that reality, that is the ubiquitous information environment. In order
to take advantage of that, and we do, through publicly available information, commercially
acquirable information, and when appropriate, authorized, and within legal bounds, clandestinely
accessible information, we can know incredibly more about both our adversaries and the societies
within which those adversaries are operating. That will allow us to be far more precise and far more
lethal in our operations when they're required, or far more effective in those operations.
But in order to do that, we need to merge those three disciplines that you just described in
that new triad. The cyber capability, of course, the maneuver in the virtual domain to be able to
access and gain access to all that information. In almost every case, that information transits
through a space segment between one part of the globe and the other. Being able to intersect that
or to be able to lever that, to control it, to have freedom maneuver there is critical. And then
finally, I mentioned your soft placement and access around the globe. In over 80 countries, some 6,500
operators who have relationships that force multiply out to thousands, even more, give us
the ability to both lever our physical placement and access with the virtual placement and access
that our cyber comm and NSA teammates have through the space segment to be able to lever all of that
to our national interests. That's really what we're talking about when we discuss the
space soft cyber triad. Right. And given the Army is cutting 3,000 special operation
positions, would this impede in trying to implement this irregular triad?
Congressman, any reduction, of course, has to be adjusted. And most of those billets that are
being adjusted and moved out are in the intelligence, communications, and logistics
disciplines. And we completely understand why and how they're doing that because,
frankly, the services recognize that they need to build the same kind of capability that soft
has leveraged to be able to manifest this. But it does come at a cost. We're adjusting and working
with the services on how we might lever their augmentation from other fielded formations to
make up for it. But it is an adjustment. Okay. And Mr. Secretary, you know, with social media
and AI rising right now, and we know that this is a 24-7 information warfare, we can just look at
the most recent example of Iran right now. A lot of Americans don't know what's real. They don't
know what's fake. What changes from Congress would help improve how we run overseas influence
campaigns with the speed of this modern warfare that we're in? Thank you, Congressman. I'm probably
going to sound like a broken record, but when we and Admiral Bradley talk about modernization,
that is truly what it comes from. And when Congressman Scott was mentioning the information
operations world, we're trying to build information operation warriors, individuals that are
specifically honed in on the information environment. And we've done some internal
looking at ourselves to see if we're structured the right way, specifically, not just within our
ODAs and our SEAL teams and our Raiders, but specifically within our information operations
spectrum. So we've been working, and as you're well aware, Congressman, a majority of those
service members preside in the Army, but we've worked with the United States Army Special
Operations Command in looking at what that future looks like. Because as we talk about
modernization, autonomy, AI, all those other things, our information warriors, our cyber warriors
are at a different type of level than, say, I or Admiral Bradley. So we need to make sure we're
structured properly, and we're absolutely moving forward with that, Congressman.
Yeah. And especially with Iran cutting off 90% of the internet access, I think it's important
that we don't also lose sight in the most basics. Leaflet drops, what we used to always do back in
the day. And with that, I yield back. Thank you. And I would just like to say here as we close,
I want to just say, Mr. Secretary, thank you. Admiral, thank you. Thank you for what you do.
Thank you for your leadership. Thank you for your time today. Thanks to all of the members here in
the audience today that are in uniform. Thank you for your service to our country. We really
appreciate it. I think the general consensus here, and I've talked to all the members here on both
sides of the aisle frequently about this, I think we all agree that you're not resourced properly
for what you're asked to do. And so I think that that's going to be a continuing effort on our part
to make sure that we get things done, that we get you the resources and we get you the authorities
and the 127 Echoes and things of that nature. We are going to work hard to make sure that we are
supporting what you do and what you're asked to do. And with that, Mr. Kerr, do you have any
closing remarks? I'll skip so we can get down to the skiff.
Okay. With that, we're going to adjourn the open portion of the hearing here. We're going to move
to Rayburn 2337 for the classified session and we are adjourned.
