Cyber Threat Landscape: Criminal Organizations & Motivations, Current Threat Vectors and (...)

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 10, 2026
21st Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Guatemala🇬🇹- March 7-8, 2022
Topic: Cyber Threat Landscape: Criminal Organizations & Motivations, Current Threat Vectors and Government Regulations
-Mr. Joshua Jaffe
Vice President, Business Unit Security Officer, Dell Technologies
AI Generated·May contain errors
Of course I am I'm delighted to be so
And from my side from Bell Technologies I also want to extend our gratitude for
having been invited here and for the hospitality shown by the people of Guatemala
and from this congress to participate in this dialogue
A couple of points that caught my attention regarding Merrill
and I think there's something that isn't quite understood properly
Not only in cybersecurity but also in the organizations we
represent—many of us through the extended network that has chosen us
Many of us thought companies
operated vertically writing software
I worked with Bell
We built computers and also developed software
Today all companies are technology companies
There are no technology companies whose critical
systems aren't so tightly integrated that technology
becomes a vital part of how they
operate If they'representing any department
There isn't a single one that isn't dependent on technology
All of this is critically important for us to be able to operate
We received information
a crime that is more aggressive and organized
targeting organizational systems precisely where different organizations hold their
greatest value
because that is where the greatest value lies
Gathering data and keeping it secure is difficult
So you have to break into that system and find something valuable
and make someone willing to pay for this information
This is quite complex We've had
very interesting discussions about
how to track these
funds For example the operatio
where the ransomware is or where the data is held hostage
Because somewhere in an organization you're already using it
You don't need to find a buyer
but rather the buyer is the company that was attacked
Since we're already targeting critical operational functions
And how have we come to this point
The thing is many of these information systems
weren't originally connected to the internet
That's why we've implemented numerous safeguards in our IT systems
But we didn't consider it important in the operational side
because it wasn't connected to the internet
Now as we connect to the internet to achieve greater
efficiencies we're also creating risks—within a remarkably
short span of just months or years
What once took us several decades to build
internal networks now takes just 20 years
We understood what our technology requirements were Now they are
vulnerable Therefore in many cases
from a legislative perspective
There is a degree of agility on the attacker's side
We don't always have the foresight to implement security
They adapt quickly
to technology and technological systems
at we believe are intrinsic
But from the very first person who places their hands on the keyboard
to automate and accomplish tasks more quickly
They may be vulnerable to these attacks Thank you
I can't hear
I'm going to repeat the question
Could you keep up with Josh
I like the onion metaphor in defense Because it'
s something we spend a lot of time thinking about
We need to demystify other things like security
leaders which are hard to explain to those involved
We need to explain him to shareholders and customers for instance
It's crucial to establish a defensive perimeter around your system
They need to understand their network and systems
It may seem straightforward but if you think about it as an IT director
They often don’t understand everything connected to their network
They need to know which data is critical and which must be protected
This is critically important
There are simple metaphors like an onion regarding defense
One of the simplest methods is to focus on the essentials
There are many opportunities to create security issues It can
be extremely difficult But the
incidents we see are nothing new
It's not a new exploit
It's almost always a vulnerability that has existed for months or even years
So focus on the basics
Remediate all vulnerabilities you
discover While considering your critical
data do the opposite of what we discussed in the operational section
We have systems that are separate
There was a gap between the system and the network
because the system wasn't connected to the network
We've closed that gap
And now we've made the system vulnerable
But it could go the other way
Perhaps we know our critical data
They have a gap between the two
If we experience a ransomware attack
We must have backups
We must have encryption
That way they won't be able to carry out these attacks
At Dell
we're thrilled to be building intellectual property registration
development and we're constantly backing
up our work taking photos of our backups
For all that critical information
This is important for their institutions and organizations
But it's also relevant to what we're discussing here
I'd like to spend a little time
discussing incentive structures
There's a reason why cybercriminals
operate as they do
There are values that can be captured there
From a regulatory standpoint
To make it less easy
for them to gain access to your network
This type of approach not only
safeguards their critical data
but also helps address the moral
issue we are discussing here
I know tomorrow we'll continue
discussing a major topic Jeremy
has covered it very well I
believe the same principles apply
That's what we've discussed We
need to assess how well data and
systems withstand stress We must
plan for our systems to be resilient
So that if our systems fail we have a plan
to recover the data and
get it running again
In our supply chain we must identify our
critical suppliers We
must restore production
with or without access to a supplier at some point
There are incentives in all this
This applies not only to bad actors
but also incentivizes
positive behavior among good actors
Above all we aim to achieve
as much as possible at the
lowest cost It's important
to ensure that part of this
Verify and validate the security of your
suppliers If you lack strong controls
over your suppliers you might still receive
quality products that are inexpensive
and are willing to take on these risks
But if we have an interconnected system
like the ones we currently operate
risks may arise
other parts of his system
