Silence as Misrepresentation Contract Law

History of Law
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7 Video Views·Mar 7, 2026
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Citations and Sources
A. Naidoo, Complete Contract Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2021).
M. Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (Oxford University Press, 2022).
Disclaimer:
At no point are these video lessons intended to provide any sort of legal advice. These are for educational purposes only!
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In this lesson we're going to talk about the question of misrepresentation again,
and ask the question specifically about whether or not silence could ever be misrepresentation.
And this is a quite interesting point because we've noted in previous lessons
what misrepresentation requires. It requires a statement of material fact,
that particular statement must be false or misleading, but it must also have allowed
the inducement of contract from the other individual.
So the question here is, could silence ever be misrepresentation?
Let's think about this in relation to the idea of what has been determined to be a statement
of fact for the purposes of misrepresentation and what hasn't.
We noted, for example, that there was an instance where an opinion
was not considered to be actionable misrepresentation.
And we use the case of the individual who sold land and said that
you could farm, I believe, 2,000 sheep on this land, and then when you couldn't,
the individual refused to pay for that land, and then they got sued,
and then they argued it was misrepresentation.
And then the courts concluded, the public council concluded,
that it was in fact not misrepresentation, given that it wasn't a statement of material fact,
it was a statement of opinion, an educated guess as to how many sheep could be farmed on that land.
We also noted that statements of future intent generally do not constitute actionable misrepresentation.
But in some circumstances they may.
If it is clear that there is a material future intent and that it is false,
then, or at least it has been presented as false to the defendants or the claimants,
then this could represent an exception to the rule that
actionable misrepresentation cannot be done through future intent.
But that's what two of these things we've looked at so far.
Opinions and statements of future intent.
What about silence?
Could silence ever amount to actionable misrepresentation?
Could saying nothing at all ever suggest that there is misrepresentation?
Well, just like with the previous instances, the general rule for silence
is that it cannot amount to actionable misrepresentation.
The general rule is that silence does not amount to actionable misrepresentation.
And you can understand why this is the case, given the fact that actionable misrepresentation
requires firstly a statement of material fact that is false or misleading,
that then induces the other party to enter into a contract.
You will be failing at the first hurdle if you suggest that silence is misrepresentation,
because silence isn't a material fact statement.
It's not a statement, a quiet statement, a silent statement.
It doesn't make much sense.
So, as a result of this, the general rule is that silence does not represent actionable
misrepresentation.
So, given that silence cannot represent a statement of fact, this is obviously the case.
Now, we can look at some examples where this has happened or where this may happen.
And this is the case from 1951 of Keats and Kagogan.
In this case, the claimants had made attempts to suggest that the failure to disclose certain
information amounted to actionable misrepresentation.
And this is, in a roundabout way, saying essentially that silence is misrepresentation in
this regard, given the fact that failure to disclose information could amount to silence
in that regard.
The failed disclosure was pertaining to the conditions of a property.
And the defendant in this case was a landlord who had failed to disclose that the property
he was letting out was in very, very poor condition.
So, he didn't say that it was in very good condition, which would actually be actionable
misrepresentation prima facie, given the fact that it would be a statement of material
fact that was false or misleading that would have induced a contractual obligation.
And so, as a result of that, that would have represented actionable misrepresentation if
he had said, no, no, no, this is actually very well kept, very good condition piece
of property that you can buy.
Instead, he just didn't say anything.
He didn't say he failed to disclose anything about the information about the condition
of the property.
And when the individuals who entered into a contract then tried to sue on the basis
of actionable misrepresentation, it was held that this failure to disclose did not amount
to an actionable misrepresentation.
But that's an example of the application of the general rule when we think about actionable
misrepresentation and silence being part of it.
Now, let's look at exceptions to the general rule.
There are always exceptions to the general rule, as it seems to be the case.
And exceptions look a little bit like this.
The courts have considered and developed a number of circumstances where something which
essentially amounts to silence could still nevertheless be considered actionable misrepresentation.
One such example of this is in the sense of there being a change in circumstance.
Change in circumstances is a general exception which is outlined in the case of Wythe versus
O'Flanagan from 1936.
In this case, the defendant had been the seller of his personal medical practice.
He had told the claimant that the practice had made an annual turnover of £2,000 per
annum, which in 1936 was quite good.
This was something which changed over the period before the sale of the practice, reduced
by the illness of the defendant.
So he had said, look, I'm selling my practice.
It made £2,000 per annum.
I want this much for it.
And then in the basis of making that sale, it actually had reduced in price in terms
of annual turnover because he was ill.
But he still wanted the asking price on the basis that it was still making £2,000 per
annum.
It was held that the change in circumstance here, the reduction from £2,000 per annum
to a lower number, represented an actionable misrepresentation.
And it essentially gives us the principle that if a statement was made which was originally
true, but then in the course of negotiations becomes untrue, then it implies that there
is therefore an obligation on the part of the parties to make the other side aware of
this change in circumstance.
If they do not, this could be an actionable misrepresentation.
Finally, then, I just want to talk a little bit about the concept of contracts of utmost
good faith.
Contracts of utmost good faith may also suggest actionable misrepresentation through silence.
A contract of utmost good faith will often arise in circumstances where one party is
in a strong position to have factual information, a position that the other party is not in.
So where there is a negotiation and you have two parties, one of which maybe has access
to a lot more information about the circumstances of this contract than the other, then there
is seemingly an obligation to actually give certain amounts of factual information to
that other party.
The most practical example is that of an insurance contract, since the individual seeking to
gain insurance is going to disclose all the relevant information for the insurance provider
to assess the claim.
In these circumstances, there is generally an obligation on the part of the person who
is seeking to gain insurance to disclose all the information in good faith.
And silence may amount to actionable misrepresentation because, of course, the insurance company
does not have as much or anywhere near as much information about your particular insurance
claim than you.
So, of course, you should give all the information in good faith in order to actually allow for
there to be a successful and accurate insurance claim that can be made on the basis of this
insurance provider.
