Space Force- Dr. Scott Pace

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 5, 2026
23rd Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 6-7, 2022
-Dr. Scott Pace
Director, Space Policy Institute - Professor of Practice of International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs
All right.
Good afternoon.
Thank you, everyone, for coming back for this session.
We're going to be talking about Space Force, which, no, not the TV series, the real Space
Force.
So I'm sure you've all heard about that.
The U.S. Space Force is, of course, the newest armed service for the United States.
The last time we created a new armed service was the creation of the Air Force in 1947,
when we also created the Department of Defense and its sort of current structure.
And so creating a new armed service is a pretty monumental sort of change, and, of course,
has created questions about, well, why is the U.S. doing this, why did we do it, what
do we hope to accomplish with it, is it, in fact, really necessary, where did this idea
come from, and all that sort of thing.
Not the least of which these questions arise is because a lot of our friends and allies
have actually also been going in a very similar direction with us, and our adversaries have
been going in a similar direction.
In fact, prior to the creation of the Space Force, both Russia and China reorganized their
own strategic and space forces to put more of an emphasis on space warfighting, and our
allies have paid more attention to this.
So there's a space command within France, there is a space defense unit within Japan.
In fact, actually, Japan is talking about renaming them to be an aerospace force rather
than the air self-defense sort of forces.
So this is not an issue which is sort of confined to the United States alone.
But again, the question is why, and why now?
Now on one hand, the confrontations in space have a history that go back to the Cold War,
and of course the nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union.
But after the end of the Soviet Union, that idea of a major nuclear peer threat declined.
We of course went through a period, of course, of regional conflicts and subnational conflicts
that certainly occupied attention, 9-11 certainly occupied attention for a global war on terror
for many years.
But the kinds of insurgency forces we were facing in Afghanistan and Iraq were not space-capable
forces.
So space was largely a sanctuary.
We could operate from space pretty much with impunity.
We didn't have, again, a major peer competitor like the Soviet Union to worry about, and
so we could afford to really treat space as a sanctuary.
Well, what changed is probably, it can be marked in several ways, but probably most
notably was the 2007 Chinese ASAT test.
The United States had last tested a destructive ASAT in 1985.
We blew up one of our own satellites, created a lot of debris, and decided that was a bad
idea and we're not going to do that again.
The Soviets certainly had done destructive ASAT testing themselves and then had really
paused a lot of that.
China's destructive ASAT test created lots of debris, much of which we're still sort
of struggling with.
We occasionally have to maneuver the space station to get it out of the way of debris.
It was followed by tests by India and then by Russia in November of 2021, a bit before
the Ukrainian invasion.
And so ASAT testing has come back to a fore.
With the Ukrainian invasion, we've also seen increases in electronic warfare, hacking attempts,
some fairly sophisticated against our communications satellites.
My colleague J.P. Parker here will talk a little bit more in detail about those kind
of threats.
And so space as a warfighting domain has come to the fore, had been coming to the fore for
some time.
It was first really more openly acknowledged in the Trump administration, and I'm actually
pleased to say that it's survived the transition and the issues have been continued by the
Biden administration on a bipartisan basis.
But again, this question of where does this idea come from?
Is this something that President Trump just thought up, which I know people sometimes
ask me about?
And the answer is no.
Really since the end of the Cold War, if not longer, people have been looking at how to
integrate air and space capabilities more directly.
My basement is full of studies about air and space integration.
I used to work at the RAND Corporation.
Several of those studies were co-authored by my wife, but that's another story.
And in working through these issues of how to integrate space into our military forces,
the effort was made over and over and over again to do so within the existing Department
of the Air Force.
And despite individual successes here and there, I have to say overall it didn't work.
And so when it came time in the Trump administration to relook at this question about how do we
respond to space being more of a warfighting environment, and we looked at the history
of studies going back 20 years of different formations, we realized that there were really
four options ahead of us, and this was worked out with the Office of Management and Budget,
National Space Council, and National Security Council.
One was to create a separate service, a completely different department, a Department of the
Space Force.
The second option was to create a Space Corps, like the Marine Corps is within the Navy.
And this was something that the House, for example, had already had legislation on.
Mike Rogers and Jim Cooper, on a bipartisan basis, had led thoughts of a Space Corps.
Door number three was to create a civilian technical agency, kind of like the Missile
Defense Agency, that would create capabilities and then present them to military forces to
be used the way we do with missile defense.
And the last one was to take U.S. Space Command and give it more acquisition authorities,
which is unusual, but it's something we do with Special Operations Command.
So Special Ops Command, for example, has acquisition authorities.
They don't do billion-dollar satellites.
I mean, they do things like really cool weapons and different delivery vehicles, so it's a
little bit more specialized.
But you could give acquisition authorities to Space Command.
So those were kind of the four options.
The President, at the third meeting of the National Space Council, which was one where
we were discussing space traffic management and how to deal with the growth of megaconstellations
and increasing activity in space, becoming more congested and crowded,
made the announcement that he wanted to see the creation of a Space Force.
Now, this requires congressional legislation.
The President cannot unilaterally do this.
The President had already decided the creation of a Space Command, another combatant command
like CENTCOM, UCOM, INDOPACOM, and so forth.
That's within his authority as Commander-in-Chief.
But to create a service requires Congress.
And so his proposal to create a service was directing the Department of Defense to get
to work on a legislative proposal.
That meant my office, which was the Space Council, would put together a space policy
directive that outlined the policy frameworks and objectives of such legislative proposal.
And then it would go to the Hill.
So that's what we did.
And pretty much one foot in front of the other.
After the President's announcement in 2018, the Vice President, my immediate boss, went
to the Pentagon to lay it out in more detail.
And people said, hmm, they're really serious.
Okay.
And so we began that process, which culminated in December of 2019, with the President being
able to sign a National Defense Authorization Act, creating the Space Force for the first
time.
General Jay Raymond became the first Chief of Space Operations.
And essentially, it was built on door number two, which was creating a Space Corps within
the Department of the Air Force.
We decided not to create a separate department of the Space Force at this time.
Too much bureaucracy, a lot of overhead, not really a lot of add-on benefit.
Might happen in the future, can happen in the future, but not now.
And so the idea that Mike Rogers and Jim Cooper, which was then worked on and massaged and
accepted by our Senate colleagues, is really the basis of what passed.
And so I think what you saw was a coming together of a lot of different forces at once.
One, a changed geopolitical environment.
Second, a President who was determined to make sure that American forces would be able
to respond to changing new threats.
Three, a Congress that had already been thinking about this for some time and was ready to
move.
And in all of those pieces, a number of people all played a role in bringing together the
Space Force at that time.
The Space Force is incredibly small.
It is smaller than the Coast Guard.
This is not an industrial age kind of force.
We don't have, you know, computer nerds with keyboards charging up a hill somewhere.
This is not a mass human sort of activity.
This is individual specialists, highly skilled, having global effects.
The two dozen people who man the Second Space Operations Center, the 50th Space Wing that
run GPS, have a global effect that really is not matched by anybody except maybe occasionally
a Special Forces team now and then.
But they have global effects.
And space is an incredibly important environment in which a small number of people have really,
really dramatic global effects and is central.
And right now, the job of the Space Force, and we'll hear more on this again from my
colleagues, is primarily of a service provider.
It is not about fighting a war in space.
It is not about protecting a lunar colony or anything like that.
It is about providing services to combatant commanders who need space.
So INDOPACOM, UCOM, especially CENTCOM, they need all the services that space provides.
That's a dial tone.
When you pick up that phone, you expect that tone to be there.
And that's what they provide.
Now, as we've seen Chinese and Russian counterspace threats coming up, both jamming and kinetic
weapons and a variety, there are threats to our space assets in a way that didn't exist
a decade ago.
And so in that situation, we need to be able to defend those assets.
We may rely upon things in space, but probably more likely we're going to rely on forces
on the ground to make sure that we continue to protect what's off in space.
But again, the Space Force provides combatant, provides services, what's called a training,
organizing, equipping, and presents those to Space Command, which then on a joint basis
with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard, provides combatant solutions
for each particular region.
So fairly traditional in some ways and fairly new and innovative in others.
With that, let me pause and turn over to my colleague, J.P.
Parker, talking more about the threat and how we got to this point.
J.P.
