ENERGY SECURITY- Mr. Lucian Pugliaresi

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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Mar 2, 2026
25th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
London🏴🇬🇧- August 31- September 1, 2023
-Mr. Lucian Pugliaresi
President, Energy Policy Research Foundation, Inc
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I'm Lucian Polarisi, President of the Energy Policy Research Foundation.
I first want to thank some folks here in the audience, Diana Ferscott-Roth and my friends
at Heritage just down the street from us in Washington, she's been very helpful and engaging
on all these issues, Ash Shastri, our man here in London, and Elon for interrupting
her holiday and helping out here, and of course the Real Clear Foundation, I'm going to show
you some results of a forensic analysis we did, and Rupert Darwell from the Real Clear
Foundation was very helpful in getting us a grant to start the work on this project.
Now before I get started, I'm going to sort of reinforce a lot of the comments Carla made,
but to show you them in a more graphical, data-rich environment.
Now the Net Zero program promoted by the IEA calls for everybody in the world to reduce
their carbon emissions to zero by 2050, or at least net zero, you can capture some and
get it to net zero by 2050.
And this is somewhat, when you begin to dig into it, you begin to understand that the
initial work is driven by these large models.
And by the way, as Carla pointed out, the U.S. is the world's largest oil and gas producer.
It turns out that for the United States, it's an instrument of national power, it creates
wealth, and the proposal on net zero was actually initiated somewhat by the Biden administration,
but we have a constitutional republic, you can't do everything you want to do.
And on the first day of the administration, they killed something called the Keystone
Pipeline.
The Keystone Pipeline brought crude oil from the northern provinces of Canada and Alberta
all the way to the Gulf Coast, where it could be processed by refineries who had technology
that was well-matched to this crude.
Now you might think the Keystone Pipeline was just stopping these Canadians from producing
so much oil.
But in fact, North America is part of a massive complex that solves transportation, processing,
and production decisions at the least cost.
In other words, it's an instrument of wealth creation, an instrument of energy security.
And so when the administration did that, they disrupted the efficiency of this North American
platform.
It didn't kill it, we're a very flexible system, but it showed you where the administration
was going.
Now, this first chart is very important, because it shows you what the base case, in other
words, before you start to work on net zero, you want to have a handle, okay, what would
the world look like in the absence of net zero?
And what I really want you to draw from this is not that we know where we are in terms
of what the base case is.
We have enormous uncertainty.
And you can see this, right, between the estimates by our colleagues in Japan at the Institute
for Energy Economics Japan, or OPEC, ExxonMobil.
In fact, we tested this model with a very simple four or five variable model, and we
found out that if you didn't do anything, the world would continue to expand and use
a great deal of energy, not as much as some people thought, but not as little as many
other modelers thought.
And when you get into the models, you see right away that these models are highly imperfect.
They don't get the results the modelers want, and they're always tinkering with them.
So the thing you want to take away from this is there's enormous uncertainty about the
future.
And government policies, which think they know what the future looks like, are going
to give you a lot of problems, because what you want are strategies which are robust against
this uncertainty.
You do not know exactly how the future is going to play out.
In fact, I was thinking about how I could tell this story in terms of the Congress,
particularly for the parliamentarians.
You know, what happens if you're a committee staffer on Capitol Hill, somebody's put a
bill on the floor?
The committee you're working for might not even know about it.
And someone probably not quite as astute as Robert Pittenger would come up to you as a
committee staffer and say, you know, this bill is coming on the floor in an hour.
Tell me in the next 10 minutes whether I should vote for it or not.
And that's what I'm going to do right now.
First thing is if you want to think about the future, this shows you what happened at
the Energy Information Administration.
Every year they made a forecast on how much oil and gas China would use in 2015.
And you see that every year they consistently missed, so that they underestimated how much
energy China would use.
And they kept working at it.
And by the way, EIA, Energy Information Agency, it's not trying to cook the data.
It's very transparent.
It just shows you it's very difficult to know what the future is going to give you.
The other question is we've tried this before.
This shows you all the various proposals we've had over the years going back to the Carter
administration.
So we had very ambitious goals on wind and solar.
And you can see even after spending billions of dollars, enormous regulatory initiatives,
in terms of the most recent data, we're only about 5% in the U.S. of wind and solar, of
primary energy.
And if you throw in hydropower and some biofuels, a lot of things we already had, we may be
up to as much as 12.
Now, how difficult is net zero?
I think that's really, there's a lot of discussion about it.
Anybody watching some of the chaos on the London cameras and the disruption, political
disruption taking place over the rising cost of driving your car into London can sort of
relate that it might be quite difficult.
And this shows you some of the instruments.
I won't spend much time on that.
But part of the transition to net zero, and this is done from a Princeton study, and it's
embraced by many people, is that we can seamlessly alter behavior channels.
We can seamlessly change our power system, heavily reliant on reliable base load from
fossil fuels or nuclear power to asynchronous sources like wind and solar.
It's very difficult.
The list is long.
And keep in mind, in the history of the world, we are not using any less of any fuel.
That includes wood.
So the amount of wood we're burning today is no less than our ancestors in Neanderthal
times were burning.
All the fuels we're using today, we're using more of.
To the extent that we bring more wind and solar, we're adding to the fuel supply.
We have not transitioned away at all, and I'll show you that in a minute.
Now, there was a discussion about EVs.
There's a great study by Mark Mills.
And by the way, our study and these slides are available to you.
You can either get them off our website or from Lucas or just ask me.
And Mark Mills is a very interesting character.
He does a lot of work on mining.
And there's a fascinating interview, I encourage you to watch it, when he's talking to the
ESG officials at Skagen in Norway, and they become quite stunned.
He explains how much ore you must move to produce one medium-sized lithium battery.
Turns out, you need to move at least 500,000 pounds of earth in different forms.
And there's a calculator on the MIT website to help you with that.
But that particular process uses a lot of energy.
So Carla mentioned this.
What she was saying is the amount of energy it takes to produce a lithium battery, when
you deliver that car to the showroom, it's already a net deficit compared to an internal
combustion engine.
So one of the problems with the net zero initiatives is that it's technology-based.
It's not systems-based.
If you brought a bunch of engineers from Mars and said, look, we're trying to reduce our
carbons long-term, our carbon emissions, we'll put you in a room, just come back in
a few hours and let us know what you think we should do.
They wouldn't do this.
They would say, okay, flood the world with natural gas, try to drive out some coal use,
put a lot of money into R&D, and think very hard about adaptation.
That is a strategy that's robust against uncertainty.
So putting aside how real the climate crisis is, there is a strategy to deal with the uncertainty.
That is not what we're doing.
We want to commit everyone to a very hard and fast technology-driven solution.
We have plenty of experience in the U.S. that this doesn't work out too well.
This is what the world's primary energy supply looks like today, after spending somewhere
between $5 and $7 trillion on direct subsidies.
I'm not talking about renewable portfolio standards.
I'm talking about direct money from the government to produce renewable fuels.
And you can see from this chart that after spending somewhere around $5 to $7 trillion,
the amount of renewable fuels is extremely small.
This means it's a very difficult task.
It's going to take a lot of money.
Now, that's fine if you're Denmark and you've got 3 million people on the island,
somewhere that's achieved net zero.
But if you're in Indonesia, and there's 300 million people, and it's hot,
and everybody wants an air conditioner, you're going to be very cautious.
You might find the leadership signing up for certain kinds of provisions,
but we've spent six to seven years with our colleagues in Japan, all through South Asia,
and the same story we hear when we get sort of below the top leadership.
We're not doing that.
It's too dangerous.
We'll be kicked out of office or worse.
So, in the developing world, they, I'm going to show you a slide on this,
they need lots of dense energy, lots.
And they need it to progress and to improve the human development.
This shows you the use of emissions from certain sort of important pillars of modern civilization.
In fact, four pillars of modern civilization,
cement, steel, plastic, and fertilizer have no cost-effective substitute.
This is one of my favorite charts.
I know I have a colleague here from Denmark.
If you go to power systems around the world and say,
okay, what is the relationship between cost and the volume of intermittent power sources?
And in almost every case, you see that the more asynchronous power you use,
intermittent, unpredictably intermittent power, the higher the cost of your power system.
If you're a developing country, higher energy costs, higher electricity costs are not popular.
And remember, if you were to really look at this program very carefully,
and I encourage you to read our report, the pathway to net zero is full electrification.
It's not diversification.
It's full electrification of the economy.
Full electrification of the economy can be efficient, but it also can be extremely costly.
I'm going to stop probably at this slide, given I see that my time is working out.
This is something called the Human Development Index.
And where you want to be is on this red line.
You want to get up to the point where you as a country are prosperous enough to live a comfortable life.
All of the countries in the far left-hand corner have relatively small use of energy per capita.
There is no development, human development, without immense new increases in per capita energy.
And where that energy is going to come from is dense fossil fuels.
There's not much we can do about that.
So what I'm arguing here is not that reducing carbon emissions may have some beneficial effect.
This is the wrong way to proceed.
And we're going to need a major rethink of the policy of this.
We're going to have to really struggle with what we ought to do.
And one of the most important things we can do is to back away from a centrally planned strategy
and focus more on a broad-based range of technologies and policies that will move us to a more prosperous future.
And I'll stop right there.
But just before I leave, I just want to leave one last comment with you.
Between now and 2050, the world is going to need about the equivalent amount of energy the entire OECD uses today.
And in the absence of large volumes and new supply of energy, we're not going to...
These countries are not going to prosper.
And the one thing to keep in mind, even if the entire OECD were to go to net zero,
in the absence of a massive transformation in the developed world,
the total emissions would only be down slightly from where they are today,
and maybe around 20-25% in the base case scenario in 2050.
And I'll leave it there. Thank you.
