CHINA COMPETITION- Mr. Piero Tozzi

Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
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27th Parliamentary Intelligence-Security Forum
Washington, D.C🇺🇸- December 4-5, 2024
Mr. Piero Tozzi
Staff Director, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Well, thank you, JC.
And we're going to begin this panel on China competition.
And since it is China competition,
I thought we'd start off by citing Confucius.
Now, Confucius has this idea of zhenming,
the rectification of names.
And that essentially means that you should call things
by their proper name.
Because if the names are not correct,
then language will not accord with reality.
In other words, if you buy the premise,
then you buy the conclusion.
And if the premise is incorrect, the conclusion
will be incorrect.
So I think the first question we have to ask ourselves
is, what do we mean by China competition?
What are the underlying premises here?
Now, one approach was voiced by Secretary Blinken in May
or March of 2022 at a speech at George Washington University,
where he said the Biden's administration strategy
can be summed up in three words, invest, align, compete.
And he summed up and said, the People's Republic of China
will compete with confidence, will cooperate wherever we can,
and will contest where we must.
We do not see conflict.
Now, unpacking that, that statement really, I think,
emphasizes cooperation on issues such as climate, OK?
And it views competition mostly in economic terms,
if you read the context of the speech.
And that closing, however, we do not see conflict,
speaks volumes.
And I'll leave it to you to unpack, I guess,
what is being spoken.
Others identify China as a strategic competitor.
There was a Rand publication from June of 2021
that spoke of the PRC as a near-peer great power.
And the United States is the upper hand
in a comprehensive national power,
but China is narrowing the gap.
Well, that's, I think, a little bit better.
It kind of corresponds a little bit more closely
with the reality.
But it also recapped a number of Rand studies
that I think are a little bit off the mark.
One of them says, whether a growing competition
for influence and leadership with the United States
in shaping the terms of the international order
escalates into dynamics that become destructive
of that order remains to be determined.
Further, Rand also saw strategic competition
in economic terms, primarily.
It's geoeconomics rather than geopolitics
in which the contest for world leadership will play out.
The principal Chinese challenge
is not that it'll impose authoritarian governments
on its trading partners,
but that over time, it will skew global standards
for trade and investment in its favor
to the disadvantage of competitors.
This too, I think, misses the true nature of the competition.
I think a better approach was last year,
the German government, which identified the PRC
as a systemic competitor that was intent
on displacing the entire post-war rules-based
international order with one of its own devising.
I think that was very clear-eyed.
However, what the German position paper gave
with one hand, it took away with the other
because the other part of it is,
well, we have to trade more with China
because our economic circumstances warrant it.
And I think that really is schizophrenic.
It really is the idea then,
and you see companies like BASF, Volkswagen,
that have invested heavily in China
and also are complicit in some of the forced labor,
human rights abuses there.
If you look at what has happened
to companies, most famously, Nortel.
Nortel entered the China market back in the 1990s
with great visions of reaping tremendous profits
in the China market, but they entered into,
I think, a joint venture agreement
with what became Huawei.
They were devoured.
They were eaten.
There is no more Nortel.
And I think the same thing as you could say
with American companies, too.
Apple's heavily invested, Tesla, Microsoft,
which has outsourced its research and development.
I mean, this idea that you can engage
in a trade with a predatory mercantilist
command economy that's able to devote resources,
not just to particular sectors of the economy,
but to particular companies,
and it would steal intellectual property
from its joint venture partners
only to devour them later,
and also uses forced labor, slave labor,
to undercut prices.
Well, that makes no sense.
Miles Yu, Yu Maochun, has made that point.
How do you include such a regime
within a world trade organization, for example?
So where does that leave us?
First of all, I think when we talk about China competition,
it's important to get the premise right.
It is not competition with China, really,
but rather the Chinese Communist Party,
and that's an important distinction to make.
We have to separate the party from the people of China,
and we need to understand the nature of that regime,
and an important point,
because we missed this before.
1989, after the Tiananmen Square massacre,
George H.W. Bush sent Brent Scowcroft to Beijing,
all in the interest of stability.
So which conception, then, is correct?
I think the Germans, when they refer to,
I wouldn't say China, but the CCP,
as a systemic rival, the Germans are right.
They are a systemic rival here.
They do seek to upend
the whole rules-based international order.
Now, history here, I think, is useful to understanding it.
We have certain themes that weave in and out over time.
The desire, really, is one of hegemony,
to rule all under heaven, tiansha,
and if you look back in Chinese history
during the Warring States period,
the state of Qin, which would become dominant
among these states,
it was governed by a philosophy known as legalism,
which essentially is a proto-totalitarian theory,
and if you want to look at continuity
through Chinese history, start with legalism.
Is the current regime truly a communist regime,
or is it a Chinese legalist regime
onto which Marxism, Leninism, Maoism,
Shiism have been grafted onto?
And if you want to look at a very important theoretician
there within the Communist Party hierarchy,
I would point you to Wang Huning.
Wang Huning, who studied in the United States,
wrote a book called America Against America,
and he advised, starting with Jiang Zemin,
Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping.
He's had tremendous survivability.
You read about all these purges that are taking place.
He's a survivor, and in some ways,
he's also powerful enough to be a critic
of Marxism-Leninism, almost from a legalist perspective,
so keep in mind these patterns of thought there
that continue.
Now, the Qin Dynasty, the first regime to unify China,
and get the name China from that,
it began with the conquest of a sort of a rump kingdom
that had a hereditary sense of privilege, the state of Zhou.
They had these nine cauldrons, and if you
get the nine cauldrons, you get legitimacy.
In many ways, the state of Zhou is like Taiwan.
Taiwan, as long as it exists as the Republic of China,
it challenges that claim to legitimacy.
William Lai, Lai Ching-de, the Taiwan president,
spoke about that during the Double Ten National
Day for the Republic of China, Taiwan,
where he spoke about the fact that the republic is
antecedent to the People's Republic.
So it maintains this challenge of legitimacy,
which is because why Taiwan is so much of a target right now.
But then you had these six remaining warring states.
What did the Qin Dynasty do?
They used wolf warrior aggression.
They co-opted elites.
They had 1,000 talent programs.
Interestingly, one of their main talents that they couldn't get
was a theoretician named Han Feizi.
He was a great legalist thinker.
He was probably the preeminent theoretician
that was the basis of their legalist philosophy,
that he remained loyal to the state of Han.
He was suicided in prison, in Qin prison.
But most importantly, what the Qin Dynasty did
is that they set standards.
And this, I think, is something that is missed
and is absolutely key.
So that's where the Chinese language, the written language,
became unified.
Weights and measures became unified, standardized,
on Qin terms.
The ruts and the roads, you can drive carts through it.
You know the Chinese character for cart or for car.
It's a cart.
The ruts and the roads were standardized
so that everyone could travel all over the place.
So this standardization is critical.
Today, we see the same tactics.
The wolf warrior aggressive approach,
whether it's what I like to call the West Philippine Sea,
unless I'm talking of the Vietnam Sea.
Why do we call it the South China Sea?
We're just really affirming that.
In Chinese, they don't even call it the South China Sea.
So maybe we can rectify our own language
and get those terms correct.
They also have their 1,000 talents program.
But we also see the setting of standards.
And this is really important.
Because who sets the standards for the global world order
really calls the shots.
And that's why it could be something
like technology with 5G, where China
is seeking to set the standard.
You can see it as the attack on the dollar
as the reserve currency.
We see it now emerging with the BRICS,
the idea of the petro-yen, this trade with Saudi Arabia
that challenges the petrodollar.
You're seeing counter-trade.
You're also seeing an appeal to, for example, African nations.
You can avoid sanctions in the Western sanction regime
if you just don't trade in dollars.
You also see it with regards to, I think,
And if you saw the Universal Periodic Review last January,
where China really challenged and pushed back on its allies,
the countries that lined up with China and against China
was basically 50-50.
They want to reframe human rights
not so much as individual rights or what
we call negative rights, rights that
are held against the state, but rather collective rights
or right to development.
They speak about a shared common destiny of mankind.
So this is a reordering of that international order.
A very important document to understand
where China is going was referred
to as document number nine, and more formally
as the communique on the current state
of the ideological sphere.
The 2013 document, it basically parallels
Xi Jinping's accession.
And one of the things that they attacked
was the notion of universal values
that they equated with Western values.
In other words, values that transcend nation and class,
that appeal to all humanity.
They call those Western values, and they
said they were antithetical to Chinese values,
a little bit like Lee Kuan Yew's, if you remember,
of the Asian values debate from the 1980s and 1990s.
This is, though, absolutely false.
I don't really have time to go into it here.
I've spoken and written about it elsewhere.
But there is a counter-tradition to that.
A Confucian tradition that's proto-democratic,
that's compatible with human rights.
The language that's used is not our modern human rights
language.
And if you look at the founding of the,
or the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Xi Jinping was one of the draftsmen of it.
And that was the contribution.
So that notion is false.
So just to leave you, then, with a question,
what is to be done?
You're reciting Vladimir Lenin.
I don't know if that's ever been said.
He wasn't the only person to ask the question.
What can we do?
Well, we're not here about regime change.
Any change within China has to come from the Chinese people
themselves.
And right now, it's a very unstable situation.
Xi Jinping, these purges, it's unclear
if it's Xi who's purging or enemies
of Xi Jinping who are purging.
We should stop making a fetish of stability.
Like I said, that mistake that George H.W. Bush
made in sending Brent Scowcroft after Tiananmen,
that great thing.
There, right now, you're seeing a lot
of centripetal and centripetal forces.
Xi Jinping consolidating his control of the last party
Congress for an unprecedented third term in the modern era.
Yet, at the same time, you see these centripetal forces,
the white paper movement, and the like.
It's important that the West stops subsidizing tyranny,
whether it's the US government with our, for example,
our fish purchases, our US Department of Defense
and Department of Agriculture for our military bases
and our school lunch programs and our prisons,
federal prisons, purchases fish that's
tainted with forced labor, both in the fishing,
the deep sea fishing, and also in the fish processing.
We're violating at least three US laws,
I can name off the bat, in the process.
And US companies have to stop subsidizing tyranny,
relying on forced labor.
One thing I hope that the incoming administration
would do, we just saw a SEC nominee,
use the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Rule 10b-5 that governs not just material misstatements,
but material omissions.
If you fail to disclose that you have forced labor
in your supply chain, that should be a violation.
So we need a more active SEC than policing
our own corporate behavior.
And look, there is, I just want to close
the Romance of the Three Kingdoms,
one of the famous works of Chinese literature,
the historical work of historical fiction.
It begins with this saying, the realm long divided
must unite, long united must divide.
I think what we're seeing in China now, again,
the centripetal and centripetal forces,
if the centripetal forces are ascending,
if the Chinese people are ascending
against their government, we'll let it fall apart.
Thank you very much.
