When Did The Zulu Realise Their War With The British Was Lost Zulu Wars Timeline

On January the 11th, 1879, British troops invaded the independent kingdom of Zululand in southern Africa. Just 11 days later, a British column had defeated a Zulu army on the banks of the Inyazani River in eastern Zululand. British military self-confidence seemed to be justified. Later that same day, however, elsewhere in the country, the result would be Lord Chelmsford, of course, was quite experienced in this sort of warfare. He'd recently concluded a successful campaign on the eastern Cape frontier, and he thought he knew the sort of war that he was about to fight in Zululand. Right from the word go, he decided that the centre column would be very much his central thrust. He expected that a lot of the fighting to fall to the centre column, and that was the reason why he attached himself personally to that column. The centre column had assembled in early January at a border crossing known as Rorke's Drift. James Rorke had been a hunter and trader. He'd lived in Zululand from the late 1840s. Rorke himself had died in the early 1870s, and the Swedish Mission Society had taken over the site at Rorke's Drift. But from Lord Chelmsford's point of view, the post offered a number of military advantages, not least of which was that there were some permanent buildings, which he could use as a supply depot, and a very definite road into Zululand, which would take his army in the direction that he wanted to go. The weather remained fine until after Rivali sounded at 2am. Then a thick fog came on, accompanied by a drizzling rain, which made operations rather more uncertain and difficult. The river came up to the men's necks in places and ran at the rate of over six knots an hour. The two line regiments crossed all right at the two pontoons, and with the third, NNC, took up a position on the opposite side, ascending the hill in skirmishing order. After the party had passed some distance onward, the mist lifted, and the advanced guard were able to capture an armed Zulu and a small herd of cattle. On that high note, the center column's war began. On the 20th of January, the center column advanced to a distinctive rocky outcrop, known as Isandlwana. The war was now a week old, but the British still had no very clear idea of the Zulu response. When Lord Chelms had arrived at Isandlwana, he was thinking very much in terms of a war of movement at this stage. He wasn't intending this to be a permanent camp, and at that stage he was expecting the Zulus to come and attack him. He was very worried about country off to his right flank. There's a range of hills called Malagata and Chazakaz, and he was worried that the Zulus would get into that. And he really didn't expect to stay long at Isandlwana, and he was anticipating an advance into those hills to confront the Zulus as quickly as possible. The reconnaissance of the 21st of January was planned to ensure that there was no hidden body of Zulu lying in the broken ground to the south of Lord Chelmsford's line of advance. Command of the reconnaissance was handed to Major John Dartnell of the Natal Mounted Police. Dartnell's plan was to split the force into two and sweep through the Malagata and Chazakaz hills, meeting up again at the eastern end of the range before returning to Isandlwana. However, late in the day, at the far end of the hills near Mangaini Gorge, Dartnell ran into a force of Zulus. Then appeared as if by magic, from one end of the ridge to another, a long line of black men in skirmishing order advancing at a run. It was a grand sight, and they never uttered a sound. I defy the men of any British regiment to keep their intervals so well at the double. On reaching the brow of the hill, the center halted, and then the horns appeared. The points of the horns were halfway down, and all thought we were to be attacked. Nevertheless, we held our positions when the Zulus, of whom there were some seven or eight hundred, turned, for what reason I cannot say, unless it was to entice us up the mountain and into a trap, and slowly retired. Dartnell now faced a dilemma. He was due to be back at Isandlwana before dark, but now, late in the afternoon, he had discovered a body of Zulus of unknown strength to his front. To attack in the gathering gloom would be foolhardy, yet to retire to Isandlwana could risk an attack against his rear in the dark. And what's more, all his strenuous efforts of the day in locating the Zulus would be lost if he broke contact overnight. Therefore, Dartnell decided to take up a position on the high ground overlooking Mangani Gorge, and he sent information back to Lord Chelmsford, advising him of his discovery. The message reached Lord Chelmsford about 2 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd. His staff woke him to deliver it. When Lord Chelmsford received the information from Major Dartnell that there were Zulus out near the Mangani River, he of course faced a dilemma. It's the middle of the night. He's come into this war thinking that the Zulus are going to fight a very fluid, perhaps a guerrilla hit-and-run sort of war. And now, here, his reconnaissance has found them, in the very hills, the very terrain that he's been worried about. And he decided, on the strength of this, actually to take a large fighting element away from the column. Took most of the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment and four of his guns, for example. And the idea was that he would march out and confront the Zulus, preferably arrive about dawn, give the Zulus the surprise of their life, and fight them in the hills before they had the chance to get close to the camp. On looking back to that Wednesday morning, how every detail seems to stand out in relief. The hurried and careless farewell to the comrade in my tent. My servant, who was to leave for Natal that very morning, saying when he brought my horse, I shall be here, sir, when you come back. The wagons are not to start today. Now this force is going out. The half-laughing condolences to the 1st 24th, as they watched the troops move out of camp. The men, not for duty, turning out for the routine work of the camp. The position of the tents and wagons. Many trifles fixed in the mind serve to make stronger the contrast between the departure and the return to that ill-fated camp. Now, of course, Lord Chelmsford and most of the officers under his command were under the opinion that he would be the one doing any fighting that day. So the force that was left behind really was to look after the camp. And indeed, the officer who was selected to command it, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pullein, had a reputation as being an extremely good administrator. That was the reason why Chelmsford appointed him for this particular task. And Pullein's directions really were simply to look after the camp, should anything befall it. Nobody expected that it would. But should an attack develop, Pullein was ordered merely defend the camp. At the last minute, Chelmsford decided to reinforce the camp. A few days earlier, he had moved one of his reserve columns to the border to support his advance. Now, he ordered it forward to his Anduana. In fact, Chelmsford had misread the signs. The main Zulu army had never been where he was looking for it. Now, the Zulu army which had marched out to confront the centre column was very much the striking arm of King Quechuaio's army. It was, if you like, an army of concerted national resistance to this British invasion. It consisted of at least 12 of the great Amabuto of the kingdom, detachments from other Zulu military institutions, as well as men from various chieftains who joined it on the march from Ondini to the front. Altogether, it consisted of something like 25,000 men. It was a very significant force. This was very much a strong military response and it was directed entirely against Lord Chelmsford's centre column. Back at his Anduana, the men in the camp had awoken to a day of routine duty. Soon after dawn, however, large parties of Zulus had appeared on the ridge above the camp, watching the British movement. We none of us had the least idea that the Zulus contemplated attacking the camp and having in the last war often seen equally large bodies of the enemy, never dreamed they would come on. Besides, we had about 600 troops, two guns, about 100 other white men and at least 1,000 armed natives. By the time the reserve column arrived from Roke's Drift at about 10.30, however, the Zulus had retired beyond the skyline. Colonel Durnford had received written orders to proceed to the camp at his Anduana with his men and presumably expected to find fresh orders on arrival, but there were none. Once in camp, Durnford was the senior officer present and in theory should have taken over Purleen's orders to defend the camp. However, all information started coming in that there was Zulu activity on the Anduana ridge to the north of camp and this altered the situation that had existed when Chelmsford had marched out earlier that morning. The information that was coming in was confusing but it occurred to Durnford that perhaps this Zulu movement indicated that they were attempting to cut off Lord Chelmsford from the camp at his Anduana. Durnford therefore decided to ride out with his mounted men. He split his force into two, part of the force going up onto the top of the Yinyoni ridge and driving eastwards, while Durnford with the other section followed in the same direction along the foot of the ridge. He hoped by this forward movement he would prevent any Zulu attack from surprising Lord Chelmsford. A small herd of keke came past our line from our right, being driven by some of our scouts and just when they were opposite the Nkwijo regiment, a body of mounted men on the hill to the west were seen galloping evidently to cut them off. When several hundred yards off, they perceived the Nkwijo and his mountain fired one volley at them and then retired. The Nkwijo at once jumped up and charged, an example which was taken up by the Inupiaq and Nunduan on the right and the Ingwamakos and Mbomand on the left. the dramatic stories of this remarkable era by signing up via the link in the description. When the auxiliaries crossed over the Mabaso hill and looked down into the Ngwabeni valley straight into the face of this great Zulu army, they had of course stumbled across really the great Zulu masterstroke of the Asantewana campaign. Simply getting this great army to within five miles of the British camp without being detected was an extraordinary achievement. The Zulus were not planning to attack on the day of the 22nd. The coming night was a the night of a new moon which is an ill omen for major events such as launching a battle but in fact of course as soon as they were discovered and without any time to make any of the last minute ritual preparations, the nearest warriors rose up out of the valley and charged straight at the British incursion and the battle was on. Below the escarpment, Durnford himself had ridden several miles from the camp when a long column of warriors at the left wall swung into view ahead of him. Durnford formed his men into a line and retired slowly on the camp. By now the Zulu chest had begun to crest the ridge above the camp driving Pulein's companies off the hills. As the Zulu attack approached the British line however, it ran into a wall of rifle fire. On the right, Durnford's men had secured themselves in a deep donga more than a mile from the camp. The English force kept turning and firing but we kept on. They could not stop us but they got into a donga and stopped our honoured move there. We could not advance against their fire any longer. They had thrown their horses into this donga and all we could see were the helmets. They fired so heavily we had to retire. We kept laying down and rising again. As the Zulu attack became fully developed it became painfully obvious to the British commanders just how extended their position was. There was a large gap on the right of the line for example between the nearest of Pulein's red coat companies and Colonel Durnford who took up a very good defensive position in a water course way off on the right flank. Elements of the Zulu chest actually began to press between this line and Durnford found it was impossible to sustain his position. In fact he had to withdraw to fall back on the camp to take up a much better defensive position. This of course then compromised the integrity of the rest of Pulein's line. And just as the British were trying to reform trying to fall back and take up a much better tighter defensive position the Zulus spontaneously launched a fresh assault along the whole of the length of their line. From their commanding position on the bridge the Zulu commanders saw their opportunity. The great Ndunas were on the hill to the north of the camp and just below them a number of soldiers were engaging the Nkiljo regiment which was being driven back. But one of the chiefs of the Nkiljo ran down from the hill and rallied them calling out that they would get the whole imp beaten and must come on. They all shouted Usutu and waving their shields charged the soldiers with great fury. In a moment all was disorder and few of the men of the 1st battalion 24th regiment had time to fix bayonets before the enemy was among them and using their asser guys with fearful effect. I heard officers calling to their men to be steady but the retreat became in a few seconds general and in a direction towards the road to Rooksdrift. Before however we gained the neck near the Isandlwana hill the enemy had arrived on that portion of the field also and the large circle he had now formed closed in on us. A group of the volunteers formed together in an attempt to prevent the Zulus entering from the right of the camp and they were joined by a few of the regulars and then Durnford himself. Zulu accounts tell us how this body of men stood back to back firing their guns until their ammunition ran out and then they fought on desperately with knives, bayonets, rocks and even their fists. It was only at this point that the Zulus finally could overwhelm them. On the ground below Isandlwana hill the redcoats of the 24th regiment fought and died. A mob of panic-stricken men tried to break through the Zulu cordon. Only those on horseback stood any chance of escape. Our flight I shall never forget. No path, no track, boulders everywhere. Our way was strewn with shields, asser guides, blankets, hats, clothing of all descriptions, guns, ammunition belts and saddles which horses had managed to kick off, revolvers and belts and I know not what else. Our stampede was composed of mules with and without pack saddles, oxen and horses in all stages of equipment and flying men all strangely intermingled, man and beast all apparently impressed with the danger that surrounded us. The survivors fled across country striking the flooded Mzenyati river downstream from Broxtrup. Here the Zulus caught them again killing many in the last rocky descent of the river. Of the 1700 men who had been in the camp when the battle began 1300 were killed. Scarcely 60 whites survived. Both Poulain and Durnford. The Zulu victory at Isandlwana had been extraordinarily comprehensive. In many ways the headquarters detachment of the entire column had been wiped out. The Zulus then pursued the survivors as far as the Mzenyati river. There was an opinion that they should then cross over and raid into the British colony of Natal but King Quechuayo actually had ordered them not to do that. He wanted to claim in any subsequent peace negotiations that he was the aggrieved party that the British he said brought the war to him. He didn't take it into their territory and when some of the warriors were reminded of this by the Isandunas they were quite happy on the whole to give up the pursuit at the border. And on top of that of course there was the marvellous prize of the British camp at Isandlwana to loot. It was a huge amount of military stores and all sorts of exciting exotic goods had fallen into Zulu hands and in some respects it was much more interesting to go back and loot those than to carry on fighting for the rest of the day. Yet the Zulu victory had been bought at a terrible price. Over a thousand warriors were killed outright in the fighting and hundreds more badly injured. The survivors were utterly exhausted. The Zulus say that the English killed very large numbers. The dead are not to be counted. There are so many. The whole Zulu nation is weeping and mourning. This Zulu force did not return to the king to report as was the custom. Only a portion went down with the weapons and tents. The rest has scattered. Orders have been issued for this force to assemble at once at Ongine. But they are very unwilling to do so saying so many of them will kill. Out at Mangaini, 12 miles away, Lord Chelmsford had little idea of the extent of the catastrophe that was unfolding behind him. Throughout the day various odd reports had reached him that something strange was happening at Isandlwana and indeed a number of his officers were sent up onto high points with field glasses and telescopes to look back at the camp. But the camp was shimmering in a distant heat haze. The tents hadn't been struck, which they really should have been done if the camp was under threat. And of course Chelmsford's officers really were looking for reassurance in signs of normality and it was only quite late in the day that Chelmsford began to think that something had occurred at Isandlwana. He then had to collect his troops together and he then marched back to find out exactly what had gone wrong. By the time Chelmsford got back to Isandlwana it was dark and the battle was long over. In their mad rush to get into the camp, the Zulus had killed everything. Horses had been stabbed at their picket lines, splendid spans of oxen were lying dead in their yokes, mules lay dead in their harness and even dogs were lying stabbed among the tents. Ripped open sacks of rice, flour, meal and sugar lay everywhere. Among all this debris, singly and in heaps, or rather in groups of two or three, lay the ripped and mutilated bodies of the gallant 24th. That they had fought to their last gasp could be seen by the number of dead Zulus who lay everywhere among them. Chelmsford was stunned. I can't understand it, someone heard him say. I left a thousand men to defend the camp, but the day's toll was not yet over. The Zulu regiments who actually crossed the Mzinyati River to attack at Rorke's Drift had formed the reserve at the Battle of Isantlwana. They'd actually been the regiments camped furthest from the British incursion that morning and only they had been held back by the senior commanders and ritually prepared for war. They were actually commanded by Prince Dabula Manzi Kampanda who was one of King Trechwayo's younger brothers and actually missed out on most of the action during the big battle itself. One of the regiments had been used to mop up survivors and Prince Dabula Manzi felt that his men had missed out on the fun of the great battle of the great victory and as a response to that he decided to take them across into Natal not really to launch a major attack but merely to raid the exposed border as far upstream as Rorke's Drift. During the morning the garrison at Rorke's Drift had heard the sound of distant firing from Isantlwana but had thought little of it. The arrival of the first survivors soon disabused them. The garrison which had been left in charge at Rorke's Drift was a typical cross-section of any of these kind of depot guards on the line of communications. There was one company of British infantry B Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 24th Regiment a small medical detachment looking after sick men a small commissariat department looking after a stockpile of supplies and a detachment of auxiliaries who were largely there to bring up the numbers to make it a more defensible post. The news of the impending Zulu attack gave the garrison a very clear choice. They could either try and fall back on their nearest supports a garrison at a little hamlet called Help Makar a few miles down the track or they could try and make a defence. There were a number of sick in the improvised hospital at Rorke's Drift and of course to evacuate them would have slowed down any withdrawal that they'd made. On the other hand they had a huge stockpile of supplies at Rorke's Drift and the suggestion was made that they could use these to form an improvised fort and that that would offer a much better chance of survival than any attempt to withdraw actually did. Rorke's Drift and the buildings around it were in awful defensive position but they weren't intended to be defended. They were after all a mission station and hospital a mission station and hospital which had been taken over by the British as a depot and they're overlooked by the Oscarsburg or Shiani as the Zulu call it so it was a hopeless position in fact. So what the British did was the best they could in trying to link up the buildings the hospital, the storehouse etc with wagons and biscuit boxes and all the rest of it so it was very much an ad hoc desperate attempt to make something defensible that wasn't really defensible. Over 30 wagon loads of supplies had been due to go forward to the column that morning and they provided the raw material for the defence. There was very little time to evacuate the patients out of the hospital instead it was decided to put a number of able-bodied soldiers in the building to try and defend them. As a result of that it was necessary to make an initial perimeter which included both the buildings at Rorke's Drift the hospital and the storehouse but this was rather overextended certainly after the members of the native contingent had abandoned the post and as a result of that Chard decided to make an improvised barricade of biscuit boxes across the middle of the yard between the two buildings the idea being basically that if one building or the other was overrun there would be a second line of defence to fall back on. The barricades were hardly complete when... About 4.30pm 500 or 600 of the enemy came in sight around the hill to our south and advanced at a run against our south wall. They were met with a well-sustained fire but notwithstanding their heavy loss continued the advance to within 50 yards of the wall when they were met with such a heavy fire from the wall and crossfire from the store that they were checked but taking advantage of the cover afforded by the cookhouse and ovens and so on kept up a heavy fire the greater number however without stopping moved to the left around the hospital and made a rush at our northwest wall of melee. It's very clear from the way the Zulu attack developed that this wasn't a premeditated attack the Zulu assaults actually were made piecemeal initially there was a rush against the rear barricade which was halted by very heavy rifle fire at 40 or 50 yards and the main bulk of the warriors then veered off round the end of the hospital and occupied the bush lying in front of the mission station from there they launched a series of attacks against the weak spot in the British defences the most vulnerable point in the British line which was the partially built largely unfinished barricade in front of the hospital building. Several times the Zulus overran the incomplete barricade in front of the hospital only to be driven out at bayonet point. Most of the Zulus armed with firearms at Rourke's Drift carried outdated muzzle-loading flintlock or percussion muskets. A number of these men were able to get up onto the terraces and amongst the caves on the Sian hill which was behind the mission station and overlooked the British position but the distance of three to four hundred yards was beyond the effective range of these weapons although a number of bullets did strike down randomly into the defended area and they caused a number of British casualties. These were mainly against the defenders of the front wall who had their backs to this fire. With little to counter this dangerous fire from behind at about 6pm Chard gave the order to retire behind the inner wall of biscuit boxes. When Chard gave the order to retire behind the biscuit box barricade he actually was able to draw his men into a much more secure defensive position. He has the same number of men now defending a much smaller perimeter and indeed the storehouse building itself actually cut off much of the danger of fire from the Siani terraces behind. The downside was of course that there hadn't been time to evacuate the hospital building before the withdrawal and that left the patients and the able-bodied men who'd been placed in there to defend them stranded within this isolated building under heavy Zulu attack. From the very first the enemy tried to rush the hospital and at last they managed to set fire to the thick grass which formed the roof. This put us in a terrible plight because it meant that we were either to be massacred or burned alive or get out of the building. What were we to do? We were pinned like rats in a hole. Already the Zulus were fiercely trying to burst in through the doorway. The only way of escape was the wall itself by making a hole big enough for a man to crawl through into an adjoining room and so on until we got to our inmost entrenchment. The Zulu during the day had only attacked those parts of the fortification where quite thick cover had come up quite close. In other words, the minute they deployed beyond that they got into the open and got shot down. So only about half the fortification was attacked in the daylight. Once night began to fall that's when the Zulu began to extend right around the fortification because there was a darkness. But there was an irony here because when the Zulu captured the abandoned hospital when the British withdrew their fortifications to half its original size they set it alight. And the light of course the burning hospital silhouetted them which made the job much easier for the defenders. And in fact there were no real concerted Zulu attacks after about nine o'clock at night. After that there were the occasional sort of attack here and there but nothing concerted thereafter. Come the morning the British garrison was down to box or so of ammunition. If the Zulu had attacked again they might well have broken in. But don't forget this Zulu force that was attacking. It had started the previous morning from the Ngwabeni Valley miles beyond the St Luana where it was first discovered. It had marched the whole way. It had fought all night. It had suffered six, seven hundred casualties. It hadn't broken through the fortifications. It was demoralized and exhausted and it was ready to go. Shortly after 7am on the 23rd the Zulu rear guard came into view. But there was to be no fresh attack. And they withdrew silently out of sight. For Chard's men relief was at hand. When Chelmsford got back to Rorke's Drift he was of course delighted to find that the post had held. But he rode up and whilst he was congratulating the men on their stout defense he asked them but tell me are there any men from St Luana there? And of course they had to say to him that no there were none. And this is a very bittersweet moment for Lord Chelmsford. Delight on the one hand that the border has held but the awful realization of the full extent of the disaster in St Luana that actually nobody had been able to fall back in any kind of defensive order to Rorke's Drift. The defense of Rorke's Drift had been extraordinary. Just 17 of Chard's men had been killed. Though many more were wounded. By contrast the Zulu losses were extraordinary. The British counted around 400 casualties in and around Rorke's Drift itself. But we must remember that Zulu wounded by the soft lead Martini-Henry slug took tremendous tissue damage. Bones were crushed. So many of those had been hit by bullets would have died on the way back. Another few hundred possibly. So I would think something like 600 Zulu probably were killed in the attack. The Utulon regiment was finished up at Jim Frog's place. Shocking cowards there were too. Our people laughed at them. Some said you, you're no man. You're just women. Seeing you ran away for no reason at all like the wind. Others cheered and said you must off. You went to dig little pits with your other guys out of the house of Jim. That had never done you any harm. The battle of Asantewana, the debacle came as an awful shock. Here is a British army actually defeated in the field of great losses. So therefore the news of Rorke's Drift coming very soon thereafter was a tremendous Philip and booster to the Victorian public's confidence. And not least of course to the public in the colony of Natal had been rushing into their lagers and expecting a Zulu invasion in a moment. And the British authorities milked Rorke's Drift of course for every propaganda drop it could. Now there's no denying of course the courage of the defenders of Rorke's Drift. But certainly as far as the British establishment and to some extent the British public was concerned this was a piece of very good news at the end of a very bad day. And a large number of the defenders of the garrison quite deservedly were singled out for honours. And honours were generally heaped on the garrison all over the place. There were 11 Victoria Crosses awarded, a number of distinguished conduct medals. But really this merely served to obscure the fact that actually the British army was defeated on the 22nd of January. When you look at the two battles in relation to one another by far the most strategic significance is the great defeat at Asantewana. And really the battle of Rorke's Drift is merely a holding operation on a day when the British generally on that front are driven out of Zululand. It took more than a fortnight for the news to reach London. Frere's war, which the British government had never sanctioned, had returned home with a vengeance. Yet if the Victorian establishment had not wanted war imperial pride could not allow them to end it on a note of defeat. The Zulu people, unknown in England a week before, were demonised in the press and the public clamoured for revenge. It would be a further month, however, before the first reinforcements could reach Durban. In the meantime the initiative lay with King Ketuea. Victory was within the Zulu grasp yet ironically they were unable to follow up their advantage. Asantewana was a Zulu victory and Rorke's Drift was a really bad reverse. And I think what horrified the Zulu was that they had lost so many men at Rorke's Drift but even at Asantewana, which they had won, they had lost so many, well over a thousand, that they realised that another victory like Asantewana, let alone another defeat like Rorke's Drift, was really pretty unsustainable. And we do know that there was widespread mourning throughout the land. There was heavy shock, in fact, after this victory and defeat combined. And I think it really gave the Zulu real pause in terms of how to continue the war and what the war would mean for them. In the weeks after Isandlwana, only the flanking columns allowed the British to retain any vestige of initiative. The most vulnerable point on the Transvaal border was the mission village at Lunenburg, in the heart of the old disputed territory. Early in the war, raiders led by Prince Mbelini had attacked outlying farms and a British garrison had been established at Lunenburg to protect the settlers. The British garrison at Lunenburg drew its supplies from Leidenburg in the Transvaal. At the beginning of March, a convoy of about 18 wagons set out, escorted by a company of the 80th Regiment, on the last leg of this journey from Derby into Lunenburg. It was an appalling journey. The constant rain turned the tracks into liquid mud and every river they had to cross into a raging torrent. And all the time, at a safe distance, they were being observed by Zulu scouts. At one point, due to misleading orders, the escort abandoned the wagons, leaving them stretched out on the road and marched into Lunenburg without them. A company-sized detachment of the 80th under Captain Moriarty was then ordered out to bring these wagons safely in. It took Moriarty two days to gather all the wagons together at the Ntombi River due to the appalling weather. But by then, the river was in flood and it was impossible to actually get any of the wagons across. For three more days, Moriarty and his men sought what shelter they could from the constant rain, waiting for the swollen Ntombi River to subside. Moriarty's command was immobilised on the banks of the Ntombi Stream, almost within sight of Lunenburg. The appalling weather had made Moriarty careless. The wagons were not properly loaded and his men were wet through and demoralised. This is the spot where Captain Moriarty pitched his tent when the convoy was stranded here at the Ntombi River. The river's down here behind me. Now, on the night of the 11th of March, there were just two sentries posted outside the lager, only about 50 yards either side of Moriarty's tent. That would have been a position which gave them a bit of a view of the surrounding countryside. Again, a very dank, miserable, misty night. And shortly before dawn, on the morning of the 12th, suddenly one of these sentries looked out in this direction here, into the mist, and saw several hundred Zulus, only about 50 or 60 yards away. The Zulus had actually got right up close to Moriarty's position without being discovered. And there was then a great shout of Usutu and the Zulus rushed into the lager, overwhelming the sentry, killing him, and rushing in amongst the tents. Of course, the men were up in a moment, some men sleeping under the wagons and some in the tents. But before the men were in their positions, the Zulus had fired a volley, thrown down their guns, and were around the wagons and on top of them, and even inside with the cattle, almost instantly. So quickly did they come, there was really no defence on the part of our men. It was simply each man fighting for his life. And in a very few minutes, it was all over. Our men being simply slaughtered. The Battle of Ntombi was the first significant engagement in the war since the battles of late January. And it was a British disaster. But if the Zulus remained masters of the field, the tide of war was already turning against them. By the beginning of March, British reinforcements were flooding into Durban. And by the end of the month, Chelmsford was prepared to go on the offensive. Once sufficient reinforcements had arrived in South Africa, Lord Chelmsford's first need was to relieve the garrison besieged at Eshawi. In order to draw off some of the Zulu attention from this, he gave orders for his commanders along the length of the border to try and make diversionary attacks in the hope of fooling the Zulus as to where the next British move would come from. It was very much in the context of this that Colonel Wood decided to attack the Floban Mountain complex. Floban was the central dominant feature in a chain of three flat-top mountains. And the Floban Mountain has also served as a rallying point for local Zulus since the war had begun. Colonel Wood was further encouraged in his decision by the news that Mbalini had taken refuge on the mountain following his successful attack on the British wagon convoy of Ntombi earlier that month. There was a perception inside Zululand that Wood's column was the most dangerous, the most aggressive, it was destroying and raiding the most Zulu homes. And as a result of that, the Great Army, the same regiments which had triumphed at Isandlwana a few months before, were sent northwards to attack Colonel Wood at his base at Kambula Hill. Wood knew that the Zulu army was reassembling, but he did not worry him. Bula has started for Chlobane. Russell goes at 1pm. I'm going to go at 3pm to try to get up to Chlobane at daylight tomorrow. I'm not very sanguine of success. We do not know how steep the eastern end may be, but I think we ought to make a stir here to divert attention from you. Although, as you'll see by our last reports, it is asserted you have the coast tribes only against you and all Chechueo's people are coming here. Colonel Wood's plan had been to assault the Chlobane mountain with two detachments of mounted troops, very much a pincer operation, attacking the mountain at either end. Now the problem with this was that British scouting had not really managed to map the mountain properly. There was only a vague sense of where it was possible to get up onto the top. And indeed, the party which advanced to the western end under Colonel Russell never did successfully get fully up onto the top of Chlobane and it was left to the party going up the eastern end under Colonel Buller to actually carry out the bulk of the assault. The British assault began just before dawn. One of Buller's officers recalled that in the morning before daylight, we started for the mountain which we reached just as the day began to break. As soon as we got to the foot of the mountain, one shot was fired by the enemy. We then got the order to go up in skirmishing order as fast as we could, which we did to the best of our ability. The Zulus poured bullets into us from two spots as we went up and we did the same to them. The last one of our officers, Williams, and two or three others. Although encountering some opposition as they climbed the mountain, Buller pushed through and arrived safely at the summit dispersing the Zulus he had encountered and he rounded up a large herd of cattle. Buller's party had ascended at the far end of the mountain off in this direction and had driven the Zulu cattle right across the top of the mountain here. However, as the day progressed, the situation began to deteriorate badly. Firstly, elements of the Abakbulusi, the local Zulus who lived around the mountain, ascended at the far end and began to drive in Buller's pickets. Buller gradually retreated across the top of the mountain and once he got towards this end, they looked out over this big valley here behind me and they saw a large Zulu army on its way from Ulundi coming to attack Woods Camp at Kambula. The Zulus, of course, becoming aware that there were British on the mountain, immediately deployed to join in the battle here. The problem then was that the British had to get off this mountain as quickly as possible and for Buller and his men, this was the only way down off the mountain. Pushing through to the edge of the pass of this mountain, I saw one man standing at my side. I also looked down and my blood turned cold. The pass was steep and narrow and choked with boulders. Zulus crawling over the huge rocks on either side were jabbing at the men and horses. Some of the men were shooting and some were using clubbed rifles and fighting their way down. Owing to the rocks on either side, the Zulus could not charge. The intervening space was almost filled with dead horses, dead men, white and black. Do you think there's any chance of pushing through? I asked the man next to me. Not a hope, he replied. Placing the muzzle of his carbine in his mouth, he pulled the trigger. One of his brains and other soft stuff splashed on my neck. It was the last straw. I gave one ear, let go of the bridle of my pony and bounded down into the pass. That night, while the scattered British survivors made their way back to Kambula, the Zulu army rested below Flobani Mountain. It was quite obvious to both sides that the Battle of Kambula would be a decisive one, even before it had begun. The British were certainly looking to reassert themselves in the aftermath of the disaster at Isandroana. The Zulus, on the other hand, realised that should they win another victory of similar magnitude, the political advantages that might fall from that would be enormous. Both sides therefore went into this battle realising that victory was quite essential for the subsequent management of the war. And indeed, from the Zulu point of view, there's a certain amount of evidence that this realisation actually unsettled them before the attack and actually made them over-eager to get to grips with the enemy and eroded some of the discipline that would be necessary to win the victory itself. Wood's position was carefully chosen and well defended. A complex of wagon lagers and an entrenched redoubt built along the crest of a narrow ridge, which allowed for an open field of fire. About 3,000 men held the lager. And coming on to attack, it was some 20,000 to 25,000 Zulus, broad-chested, powerful fellows marching in their regiments, fresh from the great victory over the British troops at Isandroana and from sweepings like chaff from the Khlo Bar mountain the previous day. Wood spotted a fatal flaw in the Zulu approach. The right horn was in position before the rest of the army and he provoked it into launching an unsupported attack. The white people came towards us on horseback. They commenced the firing test. They retired and we followed them. The horsemen galloped back as fast as they could to the camp. We followed and discovered ourselves almost close to the camp into which we made the greatest possible effort to enter. The English fired their cannons and rockets and we were fighting and attacking them for about an hour. Before the main body of the Zulu army came, we, the Ngwabamakos, were lying prostrate. We were beaten. Some men were killed but the few who were not killed were lying between dead bodies The early repulse of the right horn effectively gave Wood the battle. For the rest of the afternoon, the Zulus made courageous but uncoordinated attacks on the camp. It was on this ridge behind me here that Colonel Wood built his camp in the aftermath of Chelmsford's defeat at Isandroana. In the weeks preceding the Battle of Kambula in late March 1879, the fatigued parties clearing up the camp collected together all of the dung and the rubbish produced by the camp animals and they actually cleared it away from the camp and piled it up. There was a great dung heap on the spot where I'm sitting here now and with the heavy rain that preceded the Battle of Kambula, there was a big growth of grass and melees on the top of this dung heap and during the course of the battle when the Zulu left horn attacked actually up the slope directly behind me here, numbers of Zulu snipers occupied this position and they got down in amongst the long grass and the melees and they fired then across at the British positions. So this was really quite a dangerous spot as far as the British were concerned. Eventually, later in the battle, the British actually directed their volleys from the main cattle lager over there not into the long grass at the top where the snipers of course were hiding but actually into the dung itself. Of course it was very soft being only an accumulation of animal rubbish and debris and the volleys from the camp then actually smashed through all of this dung, scattered it, killed a lot of the Zulus here and generally flattened the position. The Ondine Regiment managed to get into the cattle lager but were driven out again. We could not stand against the fire and had to retreat. The two regiments formed the horns were quite exhausted and useless and we could not properly surround their position. We lost far more men at Kambula than Isambia. At about 5.15, the Zulus began to retreat and the British gave chase. For fully seven miles, I chased two columns of the enemy. They fairly ran like bucks but I was after them like a whirlwind and shooting incessantly into the thick column which could not have been less than 5,000 strong. They became exhausted and shooting them down would have taken too much time. So we took the Asagais from the dead men and rushed among the living ones stabbing them right and left with fearful revenge for the misfortunes of yesterday. No quarter was given. The British in the Anglo-Zulu War have often been called very barbaric in the way they treated the Zulu especially in pursuit, especially after they defeated them and indeed that was quite true but this was a feature of the war. In many of the battles of the war the Natal native contingent the African auxiliaries of the British that had been their main function to go out and finish off the Zulu. The Zulu on the other hand didn't take prisoners either so this is not a prisoner taking war and neither side expected it actually. Once the battle was over the price paid by the Zulus for their extraordinary courage became apparent. The casualties that the Zulus had suffered in this battle were extraordinary. Over 785 Zulu bodies were collected around the British camp at the end of the fighting and indeed hundreds more lay out on the line of retreat where they had been killed in this fairly ruthless pursuit. It's estimated that at least a thousand possibly as many as 2,000 Zulus were killed and at the end of the day the Zulu army was demoralized, exhausted and really it collapsed. It broke up into its component parts and the warriors simply went home rather than go and report to the king as was traditional under such circumstances. For King Kechweo the battle of Kambula confirmed a terrible truth which he had suspected from the beginning. The king was very angry when we went back. He said we were born warriors and yet allowed ourselves to be defeated in every battle and soon the English would come and take him. For the Zulu people the tragedy had scarcely begun.