LIVE: NASA Releases Findings of Boeing Starliner Crewed Test Flight Investigation

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NASA announces findings of its 2024 investigation into the crewed test flight of Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft at 2 p.m. ET on Feb. 19.
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Discuss the findings of investigations into the 2024 crew test flight of Boeing Starliner
to the International Space Station.
Administrator Jared Isaacman will provide some opening remarks and answer questions
alongside Associate Administrator Amit Shatria, who will give closing remarks.
If you have a question, please join the queue by pressing star 1.
We will attempt to get through as many questions as possible.
Shortly, NASA will send a news release that links to the report, redacted to the least
extent possible for your reference.
With that, the Administrator.
Thank you, Bethany.
For those that are joining us today, I would like to read a letter that I sent to the NASA
workforce in just the last few minutes.
So within the next week, Congress will be briefed by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
and NASA's independent investigative report on the Starliner crewed flight test will be
released publicly.
Many of you know this program intimately and some of you lived every development in real
time.
We returned the crew safely, but the path we took did not reflect NASA at our best.
There is no expectation of perfection in missions as challenging as those that we are entrusted
to undertake.
Even with our best efforts and programs like CCP that have seen great success, mistakes
will occur.
What defines us is whether we learn from them, improve because of them, and strengthen confidence
across this workforce and the nation that we serve.
This requires transparency and accountability, neither of which can be selectively applied.
In this letter, I will summarize the timeline, the organizational root cause, and the actions
we are taking to restore trust and move forward.
Let me begin with the most important point.
Starliner has design and engineering deficiencies that must be corrected, but the most troubling
failure revealed by this investigation is not hardware.
It's decision making and leadership that if left unchecked could create a culture incompatible
with human spaceflight.
To give you a little program history, Starliner was conceived under the Commercial Crew Program
in 2010 with the intent to establish dissimilar crew access to low Earth orbit.
After the retirement of the space shuttle, it became a national imperative to never again
accept a gap in American human spaceflight capability.
Now the first test, Orbital Flight Test 1 of Starliner, was in December of 2019.
A mission elapsed timing error prevented the guidance software from calculating orbital
insertion burn timing, which triggered excessive thruster firings, incorrect orbital insertion,
major propellant use, and 10 thrusters that were declared failed off.
This mission was declared a high visibility close call.
Orbital Flight Test 2, or OFT2, was launched in August of 2021.
During the OFT2 launch countdown cycle test of the service prop module system, so this
actually didn't launch to be declared, but during OFT launch countdown cycle test of
the service module prop system manifold isolation valves, 13 of the 24 oxidizer valves failed
the cycle open, so they were stuck in the closed position, and that resulted actually
in a launch scrub.
So the spacecraft and the booster itself were rolled back and the service module was removed
and it was replaced for launch many months later, which actually led to the Orbital Flight
Test 2, OFT2, which did launch in May of 2022.
Now this mission proceeded mostly nominally compared to certainly the other mission, however
three aft service module RCS thrusters were declared failed off during the flight.
Now this led up to the actual crewed flight.
So preparation for the crewed flight, OFT, and OFT2 investigations did not drive to or
take sufficient action on the actual root cause of the anomalies that we observed.
The investigations often stopped short of the proximate or the direct cause, treated
it with a fix, or accepted the issue as an unexplained anomaly.
In some cases, the proximate cause diagnosis itself was incorrect due to insufficient rigor
and following the data to its logical conclusion.
Now we still stepped into crewed flight tests, so CFT, which was launched in June of 2024.
Now after a lot of delays and an unexpected helium leak, NASA and Boeing launched astronauts
Butch Wilmore and Sonny Williams aboard Starliner.
During the rendezvous and proximity operations, propulsion anomalies cascaded into multiple
thruster failures and a temporary loss of six degree of freedom control.
Now the controllers and the crew performed with extraordinary professionalism.
Flight rules were appropriately challenged, control was recovered, and docking was achieved.
It is worth restating what should be obvious.
At that moment, had different decisions been made, had thrusters not been recovered, or
had docking been unsuccessful, the outcome of this mission could have been very, very
different.
The astronauts did remain safely aboard the International Space Station while they were
advocating for data, for more testing, and for leadership engagement necessary to complete
their mission safely.
On the ground, joint Boeing and NASA teams conducted tests, reviewed data, and evaluated
next steps.
In September 2024, Starliner undocked autonomously, it did experience an unexpected crew module
propulsion failure, and landed successfully, though, zero fault tolerant in the crew module
thrusters throughout reentry.
Butch and Sonny subsequently returned safely to Earth aboard SpaceX Crew-9 in March of
2025.
Now talking about the investigation, mistakes incurred from program's inception and continued
throughout execution, including contractual management, oversight posture, technical
rigor, and leadership decision making.
Boeing built the spacecraft, and from the onset, NASA approved variances, and we agreed
to fly it.
As development progressed, design compromises and inadequate hardware qualification extended
beyond NASA's complete understanding.
Now variances exist across all major aerospace programs, and by themselves, are not unusual.
The engineering reality, however, is that Starliner, with its qualification deficiencies,
is less reliable for crew survival than other crewed vehicles, and that was as noted by
the report.
But at NASA, we managed the contract, we accepted the vehicle, we launched the crew to space,
we made decisions from docking through post-mission actions.
A considerable portion of the responsibility and accountability rests here.
Now talking about root causes, we have identified organizational root causes, the technical
investigations to identify the proximate or direct causes for the service module and crew
module thruster anomalies remain ongoing.
So I think acknowledging that present day reality is essential to mission success.
So to the root causes first, NASA's limited touch acquisition and management posture left
the agency without the systems knowledge and development insight required to confidently
certify a human rated spacecraft, and insight versus oversight was not applied consistently.
Second, Boeing's propulsion system design and certification approach allowed hardware
to operate outside qualification limits, which is incompatible with crew safety margins.
Third, NASA's programmatic desire to maintain two dissimilar crew transportation systems
influenced technical and operational risk discussions.
Now it is through that lens that we examine leadership decision making through the various
phases of the mission.
Pre-launch, more than 30 scheduled CFT launch attempts created cumulative schedule pressure
and decision fatigue.
Prior OFT thruster risk was never fully understood, corrective actions from OFT1 were incomplete,
and flight rationale was therefore inadequate.
Witness statements routinely reflected a belief that management within the commercial crew
program could only succeed if Starliner launched.
Now on orbit, disagreements over crew return options deteriorated into unprofessional conduct
while the crew remained on orbit.
Witness statements describe an environment where advocacy tied to the Starliner program
viability persisted alongside insufficient senior NASA leadership engagement to refocus
teams on safety and mission outcomes.
Now post-mission, despite the loss of six degree of freedom control and cost thresholds
exceeding a type A mishap by a factor of over 100, a mishap was not declared.
Concern for the Starliner program's reputation influenced that decision.
Initially, our commercial crew program investigated itself.
Ultimately, these decisions were inconsistent with NASA's safety culture and a subsequent
independent investigation was commissioned and the record is now being corrected.
Today we formally designate this event a type A mishap to ensure lessons are fully captured
for future missions.
Programmatic advocacy exceeded reasonable bounds and placed the mission, the crew, and
America's space program at risk in ways that were not fully understood at the time decisions
were being contemplated.
This created a culture of mistrust that can never happen again and there will be leadership
accountability.
Now our path forward, NASA will continue to work with Boeing as we do all of our partners
that are undertaking test flights.
Sustained crew and cargo access to low Earth orbit will remain essential and America benefits
from competition and redundancy.
But to be clear, NASA will not fly another crew on Starliner until technical causes are
understood and corrected, the propulsion system is fully qualified, and appropriate investigation
recommendations are implemented.
A little bit to transparency.
Transparency is not a weakness, it is a strength.
We will release the investigation in full, redacted only where legally required or as
directed by our commercial partner.
Pretending unpleasant situations did not occur teaches the wrong lessons.
Failure to learn invites failure again and suggests that in human space flight, failure
is an option.
It is not.
American trust NASA with the hardest endeavors ever attempted.
The world looks to us for the discoveries, achievements, and leadership only this agency
can deliver and that requires putting the mission and the crew first.
We will achieve success through extreme ownership, immense competence, and decisive action.
Thank you.
We'll open the floor to questions for reporters on the phone and we'll start with Marsha Dunn
from the AP.
Yes, hello, Mr. Eisenman.
Given that the space station only has four more years as of right now before it's decommissioned,
why continue with Starliner at this point?
You know, surely this investigation is going to be continuing on for a while longer.
Why bother to keep Boeing on board at this point?
Thanks.
So at NASA, we see near endless demand for crew and cargo access to low Earth orbit,
well beyond the life of the International Space Station.
You know, one of our top priorities here in line with President Trump's national space
policy is to ignite the orbital economy, which hopefully necessitates numerous commercial
space stations in low Earth orbit, in which case, as I mentioned before, America benefits
by having multiple pathways to take our crew and cargo to orbit.
We certainly hope and we intend to fully work with Boeing in the months ahead to get to
the technical cause of the thruster issues to implement the recommendations from the
independent investigation and return to crewed flight.
And next, we will go over to Jeff Faust with Space News.
Good afternoon.
Before this announcement, NASA had said that they were working towards a Starliner 1 cargo
only mission as soon as April.
If that was successful, that could be followed up by a crewed mission perhaps towards the
end of the year.
Does that schedule still hold based on what we have heard today about the various steps
you believe need to be taken before Starliner is ready to fly crew?
Or will that schedule be altered in some way?
Well, I think a no earlier than date is just a no earlier than date.
I mean, what we don't want to do is perpetuate past problems by establishing, you know, endless
target launch dates that we were unable to meet.
I think right now, you know, our focus here at NASA is working alongside Boeing, again,
to understand the technical challenges that have caused these service module and crew
module thruster issues to remediate them, make sure we have a full understanding of
the risk associated with this vehicle, implement the report, the recommendations from the report
and get back to flight.
Now, if that happens to line up in April, then so be it.
And if we can follow that on with crewed missions, that's fantastic as well.
As I mentioned, I think there's going to be endless demand for crew and cargo access
to low Earth orbit, well beyond the design life of the International Space Station.
But we are not going to fly again, crewed or uncrewed, until it's ready.
And next we will go to Eric Berger with Ars Technica.
Hi, thanks very much for doing this.
A couple questions.
First of all, Jared, how widespread were the leadership failures in this case on NASA's
part?
And what does there will be leadership accountability actually mean?
Are we talking about program changes, a commercial crew, elsewhere here, or sort of what could
happen?
In terms of what were the leadership failures, I mean, to provide more specificity, leading
up to launch, while the astronauts were on space station and we were evaluating what
actually transpired and what are our options to bring these astronauts home.
And then after they came home, there was a continuous, the overarching programmatic
objective of dissimilar crewed access was continued to be introduced into the conversation
when mission and crew safety should have come first.
Now, that resulted, for the various NASA workforce and contractors that were involved in this
process, a breakdown in culture created trust issues.
And where a leadership failed was to recognize that this was taking place and to intervene
and course correct.
There was always an option.
Everybody, even if you don't follow spaceflight closely, knew that there was always an option
that could have been sent up, was inevitably going to be sent up, that could bring these
astronauts home.
And pretending that that did not exist, you know, and focusing exclusively on a single
pathway that was a, well, now, quite clearly, a mishap, you know, created, again, a cultural
issue that leadership should have been able to step in and course correct.
What levels of the organization inside NASA did that exist at?
Multiple levels, including, I would say, right up to the administrator of NASA.
I can't imagine a situation like that if you, why there would not have been some direct
involvement to bring people back to the mission and the crew and figure out the correct pathway
forward, which we ultimately did arrive at.
But as I mentioned in my letter and my remarks, how we got there was not the correct way.
And next, we will go to Will Robinson-Smith with Spaceflight Now.
Yes.
Hi.
Thank you for taking the time to speak with us this afternoon.
Given, obviously, that these are two very different programs, but that Boeing is the
contractor behind both Starliner and the Space Launch System rocket, if we're watching the
Are there any possible overlap between leadership concerns from how Starliner was handled to
how the leadership were at the last concern has been running and is moving forward at
this point in time?
Thank you.
Thanks for the question.
It's a good one.
But what I think what the administrator said is important is the alignment between the
development methodology and the test and qualification methodology.
So, you know, in the environment we're in a commercial crew, you know, within the fixed
price environment where you're providing services, you have limited insight and oversight, that
works depending on the hardware richness of the program and the test approach.
It doesn't work if you classically develop, you know, quality built in.
So, that's the real difference is that those things have to be aligned.
It's not about one versus the other.
It's about making sure that you're testing and qualifying according to your development
approach.
And so, with on the core stage, even on space station, the development approach is similar
in terms of how it works with the company.
But at the same time, the test and qualification, the fault tolerance, how that's levied and
how the certification is done does match up.
And so, in that particular case, you know, we have less concerns because, you know, we're
basically testing like we should according to the way we're building the hardware.
And we will move to Bill Harwood with CBS News.
Thank you very much.
I think this is for the administrator.
You know, given the amount of work you're talking about will be needed to hammer all
of this out and get these changes made, obviously, that's going to take some time.
I know you guys aren't talking dates about when a crew might fly on this vehicle, but
it seems like with the deadline coming for station retirement, there has to be some point
where you either have to get this going or it's not worth continuing.
Is there such a point or is the plan that you're going to press ahead with Starliner
regardless of how long this takes and get it flying with a crew at some point?
Thanks.
Thank you for the question.
I think it's important to point out we are not starting from zero here.
We are sharing the results of multiple actual investigations.
We'll essentially be coming to light in the, you know, literally the hours and days ahead.
But work has been taking place continuously on this program.
Obviously, you know, at the time the astronauts were on orbit, we knew we had a problem that
required significant attention, so much so that, again, we have declared it a type A mishap.
Boeing and NASA has been working to try and understand these technical challenges throughout
that entire time period.
Now, I did want to make sure I drew attention.
We have not arrived at true technical root cause as it relates to the SM and the CM thruster
related issues in this, but it doesn't mean we may not be close to it.
We are committed to helping Boeing work through this problem to remediate the technical challenges.
Again, fully understand the risk associated with this vehicle.
Try and minimize it to the greatest extent possible.
And if we can implement a lot of the report recommendations, then we will fly again.
And I think that's important even outside the context of the International Space Station.
America is not giving up its presence in low Earth orbit.
We have an unbelievable internationally assembled orbiting laboratory right now that's enabled
continuous heartbeat in space for more than a quarter of a century that will not end with the
International Space Station.
There will be other space stations, I guarantee it, and they are going to require crew and
cargo access to and from low Earth orbit.
And I think the nation and the world benefits when you have multiple providers that are capable
of doing that.
Thank you.
And we will now move to Joey Roulette with Reuters.
Thanks.
Question for Joe.
As a result of this report and the findings in your letter, are there any penalties or punitive
measures being taken on Boeing or against any NASA employees?
And have you discussed these findings with Kelly Ortberg or any other Boeing executives?
And what do they say?
Joey, I think kind of part of your transmission there was a little bit garbled.
But I think I've got it.
If I don't, please correct me.
At least throughout my evaluation of this investigation, which I began to get briefed on and
started to dive into the reports and the witness statements almost immediately after I was
confirmed in this role, I followed that up with a number of interviews that I wanted to have
directly with those that were involved in either the incident itself or the post-mission
investigation to kind of hear it firsthand, especially since time had gone by.
And I wanted to make sure what I was reading actually was still as the parties that were
involved believed it to be the case today.
So in that respect, I tried to have as many conversations, get as educated as I could on the
situation as possible while the multiple investigations were underway, including speaking
multiple times with the ASAP committee.
I would also say that I did have conversations with Boeing on this.
I think they put out a public statement.
I completely concur with it.
Just as we are taking ownership of our shortcomings, which I think is absolutely imperative
for NASA to be able to undertake our world-changing mission in air and space, they are
doing the same.
And I believe, and I've spoken to a number of our team members here at NASA that work
closely with Boeing on Starliner, that there has been some recognizable changes in their
approach to the vehicle and a very concerted effort to adjust the culture inside that
organization.
So clearly, both NASA and Boeing had work to do, and we are doing it right now.
And now we will go to Kenneth Chang with the New York Times.
Hi.
Thank you.
This is for the innovator.
So you were saying that this was all over imbalance between insight versus oversight
and what we're doing.
I was wondering if there's also this imbalance with SpaceX.
SpaceX is having to do a better job.
And also, how are you going to apply to HLF?
Thank you.
Yeah, again, the point here is that we have to have a kind of risk-based approach to how
we're doing insight and oversight.
You can't apply the same method to two different development processes.
And so the one approach allows for kind of total openness into the systems, and one relies
a little bit on kind of fixed deliverables and how that works.
And you can't just kind of spread that out.
It has to be tailored according to the risks in the systems, the propulsion systems, life
support systems, et cetera, need to have more than kind of a spot level of insight.
And that's what we're trying to right-size.
I think we've learned through every iteration of the commercial services approach and a
lot of our contracting approaches to make sure that we are tailoring those things going
forward in the existing developments we have that use the same approach.
But again, the most important point here is that it requires that intensive application
of that per system, per company, per what they do for their development.
And it can't just be assumed that they're symmetrical.
And I think that's really the key here in terms of how we manage these programs going forward.
And now we'll head to Jackie Wattles with CNN.
Hi, folks.
Thanks for doing this.
Apologies.
I didn't quite hear that last question.
I hope I'm not repeating anyone.
But I wanted to kind of piggyback off of Eric's and Will's question.
If this is more of a systemic issue within commercial crew, does this raise any concerns
that oversight is also inadequate for SpaceX?
And then just as Artemis 2 is on the launch pad, question for Administrator Isaacson,
does it raise any concerns for you that the safety measures in place are insufficient,
not just for commercial crew, but maybe more broadly within the space agency?
And if your answer is no, could you detail why you're confident that these issues don't
carry over?
Thanks.
Yeah, well, let me take the second part of the question, which is just how do I view
Artemis 2 on the pad right now relative to this situation?
And if I'm not concerned, why?
And then if you wouldn't mind just repeating the first part of your question when it's
done.
As Amit mentioned, these are two very different contracting approaches.
SLS is very much conceived through a traditional procurement process.
We have lots of prime contractors, lots of subcontractors.
NASA owns a lot of the design and the assembly of the vehicle.
I would also say versus what was a Starliner, which was designed to be procured essentially
as a service in that.
You can certainly see in the report that a lack of inadequately applied insight and oversight
into the original Starliner program is because we had very high confidence from the get-go
in the manufacturer based on their past performance on other programs.
And even after the OFT 1 and OFT 2, we still gave a lot of benefit of the doubt there when
we probably rightfully should have unpacked it a lot deeper.
Maybe we would not have flown CFT 1 in hindsight on that.
I think that's very different again from SLS, leverages a lot of components that go back
to the space shuttle program, procured and assembled in a more traditional way.
And also with the mindset that this is now the most important human space flight mission
in more than a half century, there cannot be enough eyes on this program.
I've dispatched second and third and fourth sets of eyes during the Artemis 2 campaign.
AMET has dispatched multiple sets of eyes on this.
We have pre-FRRs down to the component level, the integrated level FRR.
We are putting a lot of attention on this because this is a mission we do not want to get wrong.
I will say, though, that part of the reason that we are having this discussion right now,
leaning into transparency, and this is irrespective of the date that we're communicating,
it just so happened to be during wet dress, is to make sure we are sending the right message
within the workforce of NASA, that we have to make the right decisions in this circumstance.
Leadership has to be appropriately applied because the situation we found ourselves in
with Starliner, with CFT, could happen anywhere across the organization.
And as I mentioned before, the approach we took is not compatible with human space flight,
and we cannot allow it, not permit it to continue.
And if you wouldn't mind just asking the first part of your question again, and AMET can answer.
Sure. Sorry about that.
Yeah, it was kind of based in a little bit to the answer there,
but I was curious since it seemed to be an indication that there was more of a systemic problem
within the commercial crew program specifically, I was wondering if there was like,
if the scope of the investigation included looking into whether oversight of the SpaceX is adequate,
if there was concerns that there's carryover concerns between oversight of Starliner
and oversight of Crew Dragon.
Let me, just to jump in, without picking on any one contract or the other,
I spent the first two months on the job trying to visit every one of the centers
and gather input from the workforce and almost every one of our partners,
beyond just human space flight, our robotic missions, aeronautics.
I would tell you that almost every one of them included in their formal responses back to NASA
that they would prefer less oversight, more insight, less requirements, right?
So I don't think that that ask is specific to any one contractor,
but there are lessons to be learned here, which is, again, back to why you're transparent about this program.
Certainly, taking that advice as it relates to Starliner did not lead to a good outcome, right?
I mean, this is part of why I put out my workforce directive to restore core competencies inside NASA,
why we're bringing a lot of contractors back as civil servants,
regaining some lost muscle memory on our engineering skills so that we can look at situations,
again, regardless of contractor, and say, you know what, this is an area that is not necessarily critical to human life,
and we can take more of an insight-based approach to this, or, in fact, we can let the contractors tell us
what is the best way to potentially achieve this outcome or solve this particular problem.
And then there are other areas, regardless of the contractor and regardless of their past success,
where we are going to want to have oversight, where our requirements are going to be very specific,
because if we get it wrong, the outcome goes beyond that particular contractor
but has implications across America's space agency, and that's something that we can't ever allow to happen.
And this is just a reminder that if you have a question, to press star 1 to enter the queue.
Next, we will head to Richard Trebo with the Orlando Sentinel.
Hi, and thanks for taking my question.
Now that you've reclassified Starliner on the same level as Challenger and Columbia,
can you speak to the gravity of that and how you'll be discussing Starliner going forward?
Would Challenger and Columbia be in the conversation as you discuss these things for either administrator or omni?
Thank you.
I think just to maybe give a little background on what a Type A mishap actually means,
and then if we want to go a little bit deeper than that, I can pass it over to Amit.
First of all, we had a WB-57 aircraft that had a gear-up landing not that long ago.
Right now, that is initially classified as a Type A mishap.
It's defined as certainly it can have a human health consequence to it,
but also simply over $2 million in damages.
So this is just about doing the right thing.
It's categorizing the mission appropriately.
If a gear-up landing of an aircraft is a Type A mishap and no one was hurt and we could declare that,
then we sure as heck should do that.
When we had a very severe situation in space where we did lose, for a period of time,
six-doff control over the vehicle, our astronauts spent an extensive amount of time on orbit,
well in excess of the original mission design.
And when we did ultimately bring them back home,
we had to forego two astronaut spots that would otherwise have been conducting good science and research on the space station.
That's a Type A mishap.
So sure, you can point to some moments in our history where we made some terrible mistakes
and there were really bad outcomes as a result of it.
Those are Type A mishaps.
We have had situations where a ground-based antenna was over-rotated
and caused damage that approached a Type B mishap, for example.
So it's not necessarily a question, again, of human life.
Anything to add on that?
Yeah, I think it's just to be clear, and this is maybe a little pedantic,
but the Challenger in Columbia vastly exceeded the threshold because of the loss of life.
Those were actually presidential commissions that were established to investigate those things at that level.
That's not what we're suggesting here.
The administrator is right that we do have procedural requirements,
which, by the way, are informed by the lessons learned from those catastrophic events
that lead to this mishap classification.
Strictly speaking, with respect to correcting the record, that's exactly what this means in terms of this classification.
It also means that it would have invoked independent review,
and we, because of the program in ISS as well as CCP, agreed to let that independent review occur.
The process by which the review is conducted meets the standards
according to what would have been invoked if it was a Type A mishap.
And so we believe that the work has been done to identify that,
the independent review, the witness statements, et cetera, the data collection that would have been done.
This is simply about recognizing that we need to correct the mistake,
and that according to what the administrator said is exactly what this is.
And now we'll go to Andrea Leinfelder with the Houston Chronicle.
Hi, my question is a follow-up to that one.
Is a Type A mishap literally then just something that's more than 2 million in damages?
Can you clarify that?
And also, you know, when you start talking about management and cultural concerns,
I do think people start thinking of the shuttle,
and so I'm curious if you saw any parallel to the shuttle disasters,
and are there any cultural changes you're looking to make on NASA now?
Thank you.
So as I described before, Type A, Type B, Type C mishaps is relatively standardized across the government.
That's why you hear it often referenced in Air Force
or Navy-related matters when there's damages to aircraft and ships.
So, yes, there is a dollar threshold that's associated with it.
Depending on the service or the agency, it triggers various events,
one of which in NASA would have been an independent review,
which has already been conducted and the findings of which being released today,
but as Amit mentioned, this is about getting the record straight.
And I do think that failure to acknowledge this as it was, which is a Type A mishap,
and ensure that we are transparent and correct management and leadership missteps
that could lead to an unhealthy culture is absolutely warranted.
Failing to do so invites repeats of previous catastrophic events,
which, again, is never an acceptable outcome here at NASA.
Irene Klotz with Aviation Week.
One clarification, with the declaration of this now as a Type A mishap,
does that mean that the formal investigation board, if you don't need to do one at this point,
you're saying that that's already been completed
and the reclassification of the Starliner incident is a little retroactive in that sense?
And, Garrett, has Boeing committed to you that they will stay in the Starliner program?
Do you have any indication that they are finished with investing in the program?
Thanks.
Yes, so to answer the first part of the question, we are not conducting a new investigation.
We did conduct an independent investigation as would have been required
had this been declared a Type A mishap from the start.
So in that respect, the work is done.
The redacted reports are being made public.
We're speaking to you all today.
There is still ongoing work.
As I mentioned before, we have not arrived at the technical root cause of the SM and RCS thruster failures,
and we are working alongside Boeing in order to solve that problem
and implement the report recommendations I mentioned before so we can get back to flight.
I'm not going to put words in Boeing's mouth.
They released a statement that I think expressed the desire to continue to work with us,
as they have done since CFT-1 returned from space to solve the problem.
And I think they acknowledge what I mentioned before,
which is there is going to be extraordinary and continuous demand for crew
and cargo access to low Earth orbit well after the design life of the International Space Station.
And I think it serves the American people and certainly our international partners in the world
to have multiple providers capable of undertaking that important work.
I fully anticipate Boeing will be there.
Now I'll head to Ryan Caton of nasaspacelight.com.
Thank you very much for doing this, Ryan Caton, NSF.
A couple questions.
First of all, I was just wondering if there was a Boeing representative who was invited to attend today's conference.
And second, I was wondering, considering both the recent WB-57 gear-up landing
and the Challenger and Columbia disasters that are currently coming,
what type of mishap, if NASA's mishap definitions are sufficient for the modern day?
Thank you.
So as I mentioned, the mishap categorization is relatively, as I understand it,
and I have some experience with it outside of NASA, standardized across agencies
and part of our Department of War Services.
So this is, again, this would be the same if you were to reference ships that are damaged,
aircraft-related incidents, the same type of standard is applied.
Now what it triggers can be very different here.
Type A mishap, for sure, is going to get the attention of the administrator of NASA,
and it's going to require an independent investigation.
And that's how this should have always been done, and it's how we are characterizing it today.
I don't think there is anything that is flawed about that process.
Now we will head to Ken Kramer.
Space up close.
Thank you for doing this.
Very informative.
My question, yeah, for the administrator and Amit.
You know, I've been following this program from the beginning,
and my impression has been that they, Boeing, have just not taken a very aggressive approach,
especially related to these service module and RCS thrusters.
And that goes to the top of Boeing management.
You know, they're always hesitant to provide funding to move forward.
So I wonder if you could talk about why they are so hesitant.
And the fact that they still have to do tests, it seems to me that should have been done already,
and they should have been given top priority a long time ago.
So I'd like to know why is there no sense of urgency from Boeing?
Thank you.
I appreciate the question.
Again, you know, we have, as the administrator said, we discussed this report with Boeing.
We have partnership from Boeing management to discuss, you know, the way forward.
We're collaborating with their engineering team to do this work.
In terms of we're not going to speak for Boeing management.
That's on them to speak for themselves.
I think what the administrator is trying to communicate and what I'm trying to communicate is that we have to own our part of this.
What we did, how we led through it, how we acquired the vehicle, how we decided it was qualified,
how we behaved when we were operating it and what we're going to do going forward.
And that's the most important thing.
It's difficult sometimes to look inward and do that work,
but that's mandatory in this business when you're dealing with the rigors of human spaceflight.
And just a reminder, if you have any questions, press star 1 to get in the queue.
We will now head to space.com's Mike Wall.
Thanks for doing this.
Yeah, just a quick question.
Based on what we've heard, you know, there's interdefinitions of what these different mishap categories represent.
So I'm just curious, how did the original team kind of get away with not declaring this as a Type A mishap?
If it was clear it cost more than $2 million with the damages or with the delays and all that.
What was the rationale at the time to actually not declare it in that category?
I am certainly not going to try and explain it because we are here to acknowledge that that was a mistake
and it should have been declared right from the get-go.
I don't think this is ambiguous at all.
There's a clear dollar threshold here.
And the situation itself was, I mean, extraordinarily high visibility, right?
This was a story that I think captured a lot of people's interest more than a year ago.
So that was a mistake.
And I think that is why the independent report investigation, along with the ASAP committee,
have arrived at a position that this should have been declared a mishap.
And we fully, obviously, concur with it.
So that's why we're righting the wrong here and trying to course correct.
If you're asking, you know, what were some of the, you know, possibilities of why it was considered,
I think we referenced it before that throughout the development of this program,
certainly leading up to flight on orbit as we evaluated options of how to bring the crew home
and then post-mission when we decided what to do about it,
the overarching programmatic objective of dissimilar crew access to orbit was present in those discussions
where it probably, especially in certain cases,
had no place being there when it directly tied to the mission and crew safety.
Now Anthony Leone with Spectrum News.
Hello, and thank you for taking our questions today.
Mr. Eisenman, you explained what the type A mishap is, but how much danger were Butch and Tony in,
particularly when they were having the thruster issues?
And how much of what happened with Starliner impacted Butch and Tony's decision to retire from NASA?
Thank you.
I'm certainly not going to speculate on their decision to retire from NASA.
They both had extraordinary careers, I mean outright unbelievable careers here at NASA
and grateful for all their years of service to science and discovery at NASA.
How much danger were they were in?
Losing sixth off control is a huge deal.
I actually want to give a lot of credit, and I mentioned it in my remarks earlier,
to the flight controllers that made the decision to kind of challenge some of our flight rules
and bring that crew to a safe haven, which is the International Space Station.
Had that not taken place, had thrusters not been recovered,
it could have very well been a different outcome.
As I mentioned before, after we did undock Starliner and it autonomously reentered,
it came home zero fault tolerant for another.
That was a CM thruster failure that we were not anticipating at the time.
So the spaceship was not healthy, and I think everybody absolutely, as I mentioned before,
we got to the right place.
How we got there was not correct, and that's why we are trying to set the record straight
and classify the situation accordingly so lessons are learned and not repeated.
But, you know, we are grateful we have two astronauts here
and that we did properly investigate this and that lessons will be appropriately learned across the agency.
And there will be accountability.
Marcia Smith with Space Policy Online.
Thanks so much for taking my question.
I think that's the question I still have in my mind, what you just said about
there's going to be accountability.
What exactly and succinctly are you trying to change now?
You're going to change some of the leadership?
Are you going to try and change training or change the culture?
In just a couple of sentences, what precisely are you trying to change now?
I think first and foremost we are trying to send a message about what is the right and wrong way
to handle situations like this so that they do not reoccur.
I think setting the record straight, classifying as a type A mishap,
ensures what happened here with this mission is appropriately recorded
and can be referenced for future learning.
This is how you course correct a culture.
I do think that what we will have learned from this will inform how we handle future,
you know, contractual procurements with our vendors.
Space is extraordinarily hard right now.
For sure, not taking anything away from SpaceX's success story with Crew Dragon,
that was an evolution from Cargo Dragon to Crew Dragon,
lots of demand was able to be forecasted,
and they delivered a service that has enabled us to send American astronauts
to and from space now for more than five years.
Our counterparts in Russia are still using Soyuz,
which is essentially derived from more than a half century old spacecraft.
What we're talking about is extremely hard.
So I think by properly characterizing this, ensuring that the information is made public,
we can look at it when we do subsequent procurements.
Are there areas where we should stand back a little bit more
and let industry and all their knowledge and experience inform the process?
If it's not absolutely critical to safety of flight, for sure.
We should welcome their ideas on how to arrive at the right outcome.
And then there's areas where it is absolutely imperative,
based on all of our years learning and leading in this challenging field of human exploration,
that we should be establishing the appropriate requirements and go beyond insight,
but proper oversight in that matter.
And, yes, I do think that as we work through this process,
we will look at where there were leadership shortcomings,
where people should have stepped in and tried to course correct when it was clear
the conversation that was being had was not appropriate for the mission and the crew at hand,
and we'll make adjustments.
I do want to point out that I think that that goes right up the chain of command.
I don't know what, even at the most senior levels of the agency,
you'd be waiting for to step into than when you had such a high visibility situation on orbit
where astronauts no longer, at least at that moment, had a good, safe, certified way to come home.
There were a lot of leadership failures in that regard.
Brandon Viglierolo from The Register was unable to get on the call but sent in his question.
He asks, does the blame placed on the CCP for prioritizing contractor results over technical rigor
suggest CCP isn't a sustainable or reliable path forward for American spaceflight?
Is letting private companies lead space development creating unnecessary risk for astronauts
and the future of spaceflight?
And I will just note that this is the last question.
Yeah.
I mean, first of all, I want to pull this way up from the CCP level.
CCP is a very successful program, extremely successful program,
and helped return American spaceflight capability to the United States
after more than a decade when the space shuttle was retired.
I mean, a very, what I would consider dark day or dark decade at NASA
is when our dependency went overseas to send our astronauts to and from space,
and our CCP program was able to bring that back.
And in terms of leveraging private industry and expertise to enable America's space program,
we've been doing that since the get-go.
I mean, I can't emphasize that enough.
People seem to think that's somewhat of a new development.
It's not.
We didn't get to the moon without the contributions of America's greatest aerospace industries.
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were just some examples of it.
And many of those names still exist today, and we also have new ones.
And we have new approaches to contracting.
Some things we procure, some we develop ourselves, and some we purchase as a service.
I think properly categorizing this situation, ensuring the information is made available,
that lessons are learned, we can use that to make sure our culture is correct,
our internal expertise is correct, that we restore core competency in the areas
that are essential for our mission success, for achieving our national space policy,
to make sure that when we design these procurements,
we are taking the right approach from a requirements and an insight and oversight perspective.
So, again, relying on industry to get us there is one of our strengths at NASA.
It is not a liability, but there are certainly things we can do better here in order to achieve our objectives.
And, you know, step one in that is the conversation we have today
and the materials we're releasing to you all today.
And with that, I think we will turn over the floor to the Associate Administrator to close us out.
Thanks, Bethany.
And, again, thanks to everyone for their interest and, of course,
the Administrator for his incredible leadership here.
I think it's really important that we recognize that this is not about –
it really is – this is hard to hear for the workforce at NASA.
And, you know, I've been here in the agency almost 20 years now,
and it is hard to hear sometimes when we're talking about our culture
and we're talking about how we do things.
I think it's important to recognize that this form of leadership allows our culture to get better.
And, you know, in the past, we've only really had honest conversations about our culture
and our leadership and our sense of accountability
and how we need to get better after the worst has happened.
This was a really challenging event.
And in our recent history, as the Administrator said, you know,
we almost did have a really terrible day,
thanks to the work that the team did in real time as well as the wisdom that was showed, you know,
by the program ultimately afterwards when we were investigating that that worked out.
But, you know, that transparency is the key.
We need to be able to talk freely about – inside the agency, outside the agency –
about what we're doing and when we're doing the wrong things.
And we always talk about being able to speak up, but we don't all the time.
And all of you that are hearing this probably feel that a little bit too.
And I want to say that we know that.
But we need to get better, and every day we need to get better.
And so this transparency, it starts from the top.
It starts with the Administrator.
It goes through me.
It goes to everybody.
Everybody owns that.
And as we progress towards crewed lunar flight, as we continue to fly ISS,
as we continue to develop these vehicles,
as we continue to develop the incredible science machines that we're building,
we need to be able to speak to each other.
You know, NASA is a family, and the extended NASA family outside.
A lot of us on the outside, on the inside, have known each other for a very long time.
And some of that is – it makes it hard sometimes to make sure
that we're holding each other accountable.
And we understand that.
It's really important for you to hear that.
We understand that.
And this is what we're trying to communicate through this announcement,
through the release of the products,
and through what we're going to do going forward,
recognizes just how close we all are,
but also recognizes that despite that closeness, technical truth and rigor
and focus in the right areas is really what we need from everybody.
And I would say that it's also a little bit about – like I said, we are a family.
And Butch and Sonny are honestly like family to me.
I will just tell you personally that I've known them both for almost my entire career.
On STS-129, I was the robotics lead for that mission,
and Butch and I sat side-by-side together for hundreds of hours
as we were preparing to install pallets on this amazing machine
that now has been flying for as long as it has.
He's really just a brilliant guy.
He's got a great sense of humor.
I'll tell you, one time, when I put my first shift on console as a flight director,
they make a big to-do about it,
and then basically the flight director is supposed to tell everybody to leave,
which I did summarily.
But the next thing that happened after that was I got a phone call at the console,
and it was Butch, and he was on board, Expedition 40.
And he called me, and the first thing he told me was,
man, it looks like they'll let anybody run this place.
That's the kind of guy he is.
When he came back from space, even from the Starliner on Crew-9
and during this whole incident,
he stood amongst the entire world and said that he was also to blame.
And that's an incredible thing.
Sunny, same way.
I mean, she's, again, just an incredible American,
just a brilliant astronaut.
I first started working with her in STS-116.
We were installing five trusses,
and she's done incredible work in space all throughout the agency.
It's interesting.
A lot of you probably know, my parents are immigrants.
I was born here, but they're from India,
and they're naturalized American citizens now.
But they still follow.
My mom is still with us, and she still follows.
She follows Sunny Williams because even in India, she's a rock star.
And every time I see Sunny out at lunch or at a happy hour, she will find me,
and she will make sure that we take a selfie and send it to my mom
because she knows just how they have so much grace,
and they're so competent, the two of them.
And we failed them.
The agency failed them.
And even though they won't say that, we have to say that.
We have to recognize that our responsibility is to them
and to all the crews that are coming
and to the crews that are about to go fly,
and our responsibility is to each other too.
We're a family.
So I want you guys, I want everybody to hear that.
I want the agency to hear that also, that we are, this is what this is about.
This is not about pointing fingers.
It's not about assigning blame.
It's about making sure that we are holding each other accountable
and the incredible tasks that we have to do,
and that starts with these sorts of discussions.
And, again, I think it's worth saying before I close
that the reason why Sunny and Butch are on the ground
and having incredible adventures, the reason why we have this data that we have,
the reason why we have all of the ability to really interrogate
and learn from this is because of the amazing people at NASA,
because of their ability to react in real time,
because of their fealty to technical rigor,
because of their adherence to the lessons learned in the past,
and making sure that we did conduct this investigation
and that we are doing the right discussions,
we are doing the right tests,
and we are going to hold each other accountable
so we can do the amazing missions that we have.
And so with that, Bethany, I'd like to say thanks to everyone for being here
and thanks to the administrator for your incredible leadership.
And we'll wrap this up. Thank you.
