LIVE: House Foreign Affairs Committee Reviews US Policy in South Asia

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on South and Central Asia will come to order, and the purpose of this hearing is to examine
Americans' foreign policy across Central Asia.
I'm very pleased to have our Undersecretary for South and Central Asia with us.
Today, I have the pleasure of convening the first Regional Posture Hearing of the year,
and I want to thank Assistant Secretary Moore for his presence here today.
We are gathered to discuss one of the most important regions in the world, South and Central Asia.
Our strategy there is key to the United States' national security and economic strength and our global presence.
South and Central Asia is home to nearly 2 billion people with dynamic economies and strategic waterways
that shape the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
Throughout the region, the President has successfully negotiated deals that open markets and advance U.S. economic interests.
How we engage will define America's role in Asia for decades to come.
China has come to the same conclusion, no surprise.
Through its Belt and Road Initiative, China engages in predatory lending to further its security interests
and force smaller nations into debt traps.
Furthermore, China has hardened its border with India, Nepal, and Bhutan,
building infrastructure to support its military aspirations.
Despite its distance from our shores, maintaining a free and open Indian Ocean is a priority for our national and our economic security.
The Indian Ocean is one of the busiest maritime corridors on the Earth,
carrying the lifeblood of global commerce and energy, including more than 80% of global seaborne oil trade.
Safeguarding these sea lanes through enhanced naval cooperation with partners and allies
will only serve to counter China's growing influence and limit its malign behavior in the region.
Alongside President Trump, I too see the importance of our naval base on Diego Garcia in the middle of the Indian Ocean.
I echo this sentiment that preserving America's military fortitude in the region will deter Chinese coercion,
prevent piracy, and ensure the free flow of American and world trade.
Directly north of Diego Garcia, India, the largest democracy in the world and one of the fastest-growing economies,
remains a vital strategic partner.
Just last week, President Trump brokered a historic trade deal with India,
completely revamping U.S. engagement with the country.
The U.S.-India trade deal sets India's tariff rate at 18%, one of the lowest regionally.
Moreover, Delhi has agreed to buy more American energy.
This deal will strengthen U.S.-India relations, support American workers through manufacturing and joint technology ventures,
and boost our exports.
Strengthening ties with New Delhi through defense cooperation, trade, and technology partnerships advances our shared interests.
I look forward to increasing cooperation, co-production, and investment, especially under the new framework negotiated by the President.
Bordering India, Nepal and Bangladesh are undergoing political transformations.
Bangladesh will hold free elections tomorrow following its 2024 July revolution, which ousted an authoritarian government.
In September of 2025, Nepalese youth overthrew the government, and Nepal will hold democratic elections next month.
Both of these instances offer new chapters for engagement in South Asia, defining U.S. relations with these new governments.
South and Central Asia is a dynamic region.
Young, growing populations are more often drawn to Western cultures and values than to China's authoritarian alternative.
Strategic U.S.-led diplomacy will make a difference in building alliances and achieving our mutual beneficial goals throughout the region.
Our strategy in South Asia must be comprehensive, anchored in strong partnerships, economic engagement, and a commitment to democratic values.
Our engagement in the region must advance American interests, but also contribute to a more secure, prosperous, and free Indian Ocean.
I look forward to hearing from Assistant Secretary Ford regarding the Administration's South and Central Asia strategy.
And with that, I yield back.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member from California, Representative Kamala Dove, for an opening statement.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for your tireless efforts to bring an Administration official to testify at a regional subcommittee hearing.
And thank you, Assistant Secretary Ford, for being here today and for talking with me yesterday as well.
While we have waited for more than a year for an Administration official to publicly testify about the region,
Trump has sabotaged U.S. regional interests and decimated our diplomatic toolbox,
putting us on the back foot as major changes swept across South and Central Asia.
In April, Trump announced tariffs on partners across South and Central Asia,
an unexpected economic shock on countries already facing debt vulnerability to the PRC.
Fifty percent tariffs on India, one of the highest rates in the world,
tore a needless rupture in bilateral ties that sacrificed decades of painstaking trust-building between our two countries.
Dragging on negotiations for over a year cost us the timely convening of the annual Quad Leaders Summit and weakened our posture in the Indo-Pacific.
In May, India and Pakistan fought their most serious military conflict in decades,
risking nuclear escalation in a region of two billion people.
But a reminder of the indispensable role of U.S. diplomacy was overshadowed by Trump's insistence on claiming credit for the ceasefire
and offering to mediate the Kashmir dispute.
In September, Nepal experienced widespread anti-corruption protests that led to the Prime Minister's resignation and new elections next month.
Tomorrow, Bangladesh will go to the polls to decide on a new constitution and choose its leadership for the first time since Sheikh Hasina's ouster.
These major political transitions present a rare opportunity for the U.S. to strategically leverage our democracy assistance
to support growing regional demand for accountable governance.
Yet the State Department's rejection of democracy programming and the decimation of USAID has stripped us the very tools that are needed to advance our interests.
Further hamstringing our engagement in the region, in December, Trump took the unprecedented step of recalling career ambassadors from Nepal and Sri Lanka,
weakening our diplomatic leadership in two key states.
While self-sabotage defines much of the administration's regional policy so far, cruelty most accurately describes its approach to Afghanistan and our Afghan allies.
Nowhere in the region have Trump's aid cut skin more devastating than in Afghanistan, where child malnutrition has reached its highest level in a quarter century.
The State Department did not even provide life-saving assistance after two deadly earthquakes killed thousands of people.
Most shameful of all, the State Department is leading the betrayal of our Afghan allies who have been shut off from resettlement to the United States.
Secretary Rubio dismantled the Office of the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts and did not appoint a permanent coordinator,
violating the law passed under a Republican majority in 24.
When my bipartisan provision to re-establish the CARE Office made it into the final version of NDAA, Republican leadership yanked it out just days before it was set to pass.
On top of that, the administration has created a living nightmare for over 1,000 Afghans stuck in limbo at the Relocation Processing Center at Camp Asila.
In fact, when I asked Deputy Secretary Regas about the fate of the Afghans at CAF, he'd never heard of it.
Now the State Department is closing CAF and offering payment to Afghan allies who self-support back-to-Taliban terror,
breaking our promise to provide them a chance at a future in the United States.
I'm concerned it's only a matter of time before the administration leans into the unconscionable
and recognizes the Taliban without improving the rights of Afghan women and girls.
Assistant Secretary Kapur, you take the helm of the South and Central Bureau at a time when we are in sharp need of transparency,
strategic coherence, and a return to humanity.
And I look forward to gaining some clarity about the administration's policies today.
Thank you, and I yield back.
The gentlelady yields back.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record as well.
And we're pleased to have you, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs at the Department of State,
the Honorable Dr. S. Paul Kapur before us today.
This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us today.
Your full statements will be made part of the record,
and I'll ask you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for a number of questions.
One item of clarification, I believe.
Can you just confirm to me that it was in October of 2025 is when you were finally confirmed?
Is that correct?
That's correct.
Okay, so you've been on the job for three and a half months for the most part.
Yes, since late October.
Okay.
Since late October.
All right.
I appreciate that.
And, Mr. Assistant Secretary, I recognize you now for your five-minute opening statement.
Thank you, Chairman Mazinga and Ranking Member Tom Lagerdell.
It was great to meet you yesterday.
Thank you for taking the time.
Also distinguished members of the committee,
thank you for inviting me today to appear to discuss the Trump administration's approach to South Asia.
President Trump's national security strategy made it clear that we must put America first
and do so through active engagement with vital parts of the world.
Under President Trump's leadership,
this has advanced our economic and security interests while helping our partners.
I see the benefits every day in my Bureau of Work on the South Asian region.
Consisting of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, and Bhutan,
South Asia is vitally important.
India alone has well over one billion people and occupies a subcontinental landmass.
A hostile power dominating South Asia could exert coercive leverage over the world economy.
The United States must prevent this from happening and keep the region free and open.
As Secretary Rubio has said, America first does not mean America alone.
To achieve our goals, we must cooperate with like-minded partners who can share the burden.
Often, this will require us to help our partners build strategic capacity,
enabling them better to integrate into the world economy, preserve their autonomy,
and contribute to a free and open region.
We have many tools to do this.
We, of course, want to expand our trade relationships with the South Asian countries
because robust trade will make all of us stronger and more populous.
And just last week, President Trump and Prime Minister Modi reached an agreement
on an historic trade framework.
And two days ago, the Trump administration signed a trade deal with Bangladesh,
providing American exporters with access to Bangladesh's market of about $175 million.
But beyond trade, I would point to three broad categories of approach
to strategic capacity building that the Trump administration is deploying.
Defense cooperation, targeted investment, and diplomacy.
Defense cooperation includes military sales and transfers, co-development of systems and platforms,
and bilateral and multilateral exchanges.
Targeted investments combine U.S. seed funding, American technology and expertise, and private industry.
And diplomacy involves institutionalized touchpoints between senior leaders
as well as more ad hoc engagements to address an emerging opportunity or challenge
and strategic messaging to support our industry.
We employ these tools in South Asia as we help our partners build capacity,
strategic capacity, that is, increase their prosperity and protect their sovereignty,
outcomes that make America safer and more prosperous as well.
India, with its size, location, and commitment to a free and open region,
anchors South Asia and more broadly the western half of the Indo-Pacific.
The United States and India maintain high-level diplomatic touchpoints,
such as the 2 plus 2 ministerial, and cooperate closely in the defense, technology,
and energy sectors, bilaterally and also through the Quad.
Cooperation in these areas has remained robust,
even as we re-resolve longstanding issues in our trade relationship,
as evidenced by the renewed 10-year U.S.-India defense framework agreement,
the trust initiative, and Indian purchases of U.S. products ranging from drones to liquefied natural gas.
Following the trade framework that President Trump reached last week with Prime Minister Modi,
we can now focus on other shared priorities,
lowering barriers to trade with one of the largest economies in the world
and opening the way to even more bolstering cooperation.
This will enhance our mutual prosperity and help India to defend its sovereignty,
both on land and in its maritime network.
Pakistan is another important partner in the region.
By working together with Pakistan to realize the potential of its critical mineral resources,
combining U.S. government-feed financing with private sector know-how can benefit both of our countries.
Our trade in energy and agriculture is expanding as well,
and our ongoing counterterrorism cooperation helps Pakistan combat international security threats
while addressing transnational dangers that can harm the U.S. for our partners.
Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan's strategic locations afford them outsized support,
but they also can become target targets for coercion.
Defense cooperation with the United States helps them to protect their borders and waterways against incursions,
and carefully targeted investments can provide some states with high-quality, transparent,
and non-coercive support for critical infrastructure like ports, telecom networks, and energy portals,
helping them to avoid the dangers of debt-trap performance.
I've been discussing cooperation between the U.S. and South Asia,
but in closing, I'll point to one other important form of cooperation,
cooperation between the administration and Congress on immigration.
We both recognize South Asia's vital importance.
Let's work together in the region, helping our partners to help themselves
and making the United States safer, stronger, and more prosperous.
Thank you, and I look forward to hearing from you.
We appreciate your testimony, and I will recognize myself for five minutes at this point.
You've talked quite a bit about South Asia.
You are the Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
and are the lead on Afghanistan policy and a crucial part of the ongoing comprehensive review of strategy
and policies towards Afghanistan, which have been underway since January 20 of last year.
Quite honestly, the Biden administration's disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021,
that was a true betrayal of our Afghan allies,
and it led to thousands of Afghan allies being left behind fearing for their lives.
It's well documented that the Taliban has committed numerous reprisal killings,
otherwise detained or forced the disappearance of other Afghans who have served alongside U.S. service members,
and there are many outstanding questions in Congress about the nature of the U.S. policy towards Afghanistan
and where it is going.
So, Assistant Secretary Fork, when can we expect information on the State Department's Afghan policy,
and will you commit to a member-level briefing so that we can have a better understanding of that issue?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The review to which you refer is an ongoing process, and it's also an interagency process,
and many moving pieces to it.
I don't know exactly what the schedule looks like or the timeline looks like,
but I can commit to remaining in touch with you and with the committee and your staff
and letting them know when we reach some sort of consensus on that.
Maybe let me ask more specific.
Before there is a final report, are you willing to come in and brief us on what we're looking at?
Okay, I appreciate that. Thank you.
So, after President Trump's historic trade agreement with India was signed last week,
we can look forward to a deepening relationship with India.
India shares our objective of ensuring that China cannot bully its neighbors
or threaten American assets in the Indian Ocean.
What next steps can we take to advance our relationship with India, particularly in the defense sector?
Well, I think we can keep going the way we have been going.
One of the remarkable things about the relationship is that,
despite some of the uncertainties surrounding the trade relationship in recent months,
our other initiatives in Africa and India have been moving forward, defense, energy, technology, and so on.
And on the defense side, we have a robust agenda.
We just signed a 10-year framework, which is going to help us move forward in interoperability,
in joint exercises, and many of the things that we do and have been doing in recent years.
We will expand that.
We have also some potential purchases of weapons systems in the pipeline
that will help India protect itself better, ensure its sovereignty,
and also create an American job for both sides.
So we have a number of things in the pipeline,
and I think that momentum is going to continue despite some of the uncertainties around trading.
It's going to continue now even more so because that's the tradition that's been out there in most of the world.
I appreciate that.
I want to talk about the Indian Ocean and the importance strategically and operationally for us,
specifically Diego Garcia, who has been in the news a little bit.
We have operated an American naval support facility there since 1977,
allowing our Navy to operate throughout the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.
It's clearly an extremely important asset for national security.
Describe why Diego Garcia is important to our power projection in the region,
especially with China growing its influence,
and what, if anything, can Congress do to ensure that it stays that way?
Well, the Indian Ocean is actually the Indo-Pacific,
and one of the insights of that term is that it recognizes that this is a holistic approach to the region.
When you think about the Pacific, it's not in isolation,
but it actually connects all the way to the Indian Ocean and the coast of Africa.
Diego Garcia is kind of in the middle of the ocean,
but it's a very important outlet for projecting air power.
And the President has said that it's a crucial outlet.
And we're going to work towards maintaining our presence there.
The President has said that Diego Garcia is very important strategically,
so I would imagine that's the goal.
In my remaining 20 seconds, I don't have enough time to discuss Bangladesh elections,
but I assume that you are engaging with the Bangladesh government,
and as we're seeing this new election, if you want to take 10 seconds there.
Yeah, we're excited about it.
We've been in touch with the interim government.
I think they have a strong sense of their responsibility in making this go forward in a way that is secure and peaceful,
and we hope that that is, in fact, what happens.
We expect it will be.
I appreciate that.
With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Kamala Gurdup.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you, Assistant Secretary, for coming to talk to us today.
So you are the Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia,
and does that mean that all of the ambassadors in the region report to you?
The organizational structure of the Bureau works that way.
Okay.
So given that you oversee the ambassadors, and this is the most transparent administration in history,
can you commit to working with us, the Chair and I,
to bring Sergio Gore, Ambassador to India, to meet with members of the committee?
Mr. Gore is, I think, a very effective ambassador.
He's done a number of really good outcomes.
He's also a close confidant of the President.
He's a trusted confidant.
And he and I work together well.
And I will discuss all manner of things with him.
That is good.
And I do recognize that he is a special envoy.
But he's ambassador.
And as you just stated, you have command over ambassadors in the region.
And I think that it would be important for him, given both of his roles,
to come before the committee and answer questions, because as you mentioned, as we've all mentioned,
this is an incredibly strategic and important and mighty region.
So I just want to know if you would be willing to have him come before us,
if you would work with us to bring him here.
He and I discuss many issues, and I will discuss them.
Please let him know.
I now want to turn to Afghanistan.
And I believe that we share common goals and a common humanity.
Nonetheless, one of the great moral catastrophes of this administration is happening on your watch,
which is the betrayal of our Afghan allies.
For every female interpreter left behind and assaulted by the Taliban,
for every Afghan department the department pays to leave CAF and return to mortal danger,
for every child separated from their siblings and parents separated from their kids,
your name, your name will be on that policy, for the history books, for the documentary, for the Wikipedia.
And there are people in the audience today who have been directly impacted.
I want to thank you for staying on the record and answering the chair's question
about continuing to update members of this committee on the Afghan policy,
because it is so important, and I would hope that you would commit to making sure that that happens
by or before March 31st.
I would also ask that you commit to making sure that our staff are able to receive those briefings as well.
Can you commit to also ensuring that our staff have access?
I hope that means our staff and the members are able to brief.
The State Department said it aims to close down CAF by the end of March
and relocate over 1,000 Afghans to third countries,
breaking our promise to give them a future in the United States.
So can you commit that no Afghan will be forcibly repatriated to Afghanistan?
We are not forcibly repatriating Afghans to Afghanistan.
Some have gone of their own volition, but we are not forcibly repatriating them.
Okay, that is good to know.
Do you know which countries have agreed to accept Afghan refugees?
And do you know how many Afghans are being relocated?
There are between 1,100 and 1,200 Afghans on the facility at CAF,
and we are looking to relocate them.
And we are in negotiations with third countries on that,
and our belief is that that is actually a good outcome,
keeping them indefinitely on CAF is really not a good outcome.
When we talked about that yesterday,
I hope that you will be able to give this committee a list of the countries
that you are negotiating with
or the ones that have said yes before everything is finalized.
I just want to close with a few minutes I have left.
I read up on you.
I know you care about this region.
I believe we have the same goals, that we want partnership,
predictability, and peace in the region.
I have to tell you, this issue with the Afghan policy is incredibly alarming.
I am serious when I say that this country, that your position,
your position will be carrying that legacy,
and if those women, if those girls, if those allies are beaten, killed, tortured,
murdered, taken by the Taliban, it will be something that you have to answer to.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The lady's time has expired.
Would that the Chair now recognize the Subcommittee Chair on Europe, Mr. Sok.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You wrote a book, Jihad as Grand Strategy,
Islamist Militancy, National Security, and the Pakistani State.
The summary of it starts that Islamic militants based in Pakistan
have played a major role in terrorism around the world
and pose a significant threat to regional and international security.
Are there Islamic groups operating from the South Central Asia region of the world
operating in the United States today?
Well, it depends on what you mean by operating.
There could be members of those groups around.
I can't give you exact numbers or where they might be.
The point of the book was to look back at Pakistani strategy
and discuss how the Pakistanis have interacted with militant terrorists.
Okay, so you're saying that you don't know of South Central Asia Islamic groups
that were importing Sharia into the United States.
Is that true?
I don't know of groups as coherent organizations.
There may be members of those groups that are here.
They could be anywhere.
That's one of the challenges of dealing with terrorism
is that there are small numbers of people that blend into the population.
I don't know.
Moving to China and India,
obviously the two largest countries by population in the world,
this newfound relationship with India,
what is your assessment of how India is going to support our efforts,
our increasing allied efforts around the Indo-Pacific region
to counter an increasingly aggressive China,
setting trade routes aside?
Well, an India that can be independent and stand up for itself
and preserve its freedom of action
actually works to our strategic advantage
and promotes our strategic interest
because what we're trying to do fundamentally
is not to keep China out of the region,
but to prevent China or any single hegemon
from taking over or imposing towards the West.
So an India that is able to be independent
and preserve its freedom of action
takes a huge swath of the Indo-Pacific off its own plate
and almost by definition prevents it from becoming a dominant power.
Do you think that China has a true blue water enabler?
They have blue water capability.
Okay.
I understand India is not a fan of the Belt and Road Initiative.
How would they impact that in the South Central Asia area?
The Belt and Road is about getting Chinese,
enabling the Chinese to influence over regional countries
and allocate capital for development.
Well, when India develops an economy
and develops infrastructure and develops into a military independent of China
and is able to maintain its freedom of action,
it prevents the Chinese from using the Belt and Road strategy
in that, again, a big swath of the Indo-Pacific.
So India is replacing the Belt and Road Initiative in some places?
Well, if the Belt and Road doesn't take root in India,
that means that there's a very large part of the Indo-Pacific
that is not under Chinese control.
So you're not saying they're impacting it beyond India?
I think at this point the goal is to ensure that India can stand up for itself
and of course it is, but the more wherewithal that it has,
economically, militarily,
How about its actions in the Quad?
India has been an active member of the Quad
and we interact with India both bilaterally and in the Quad context
and that is a promising venue for us to cooperate
and for us to cooperate with other like-minded states in the region.
Are they aggressive in the Quad?
I don't know if I'd say they're aggressive,
but they are important members of the Quad.
Yeah, Secretary, I think India is an important ally in our move against China.
So I'm trying to pick at your brain to see how they are supporting
our broader global effort against China.
So I guess I understand your question.
What I'm saying is that they don't have to go far afield to support our strategic interests
and an independent, strong, prosperous India
takes a big swath of the Indo-Pacific away from China
and that is actually a strategic win for us.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's time has expired.
With that, the gentleman from California, Mr. Barra, is recognized.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary, I appreciate your statement in the opening comments.
This is a vital region and we're playing a long game here.
Our competitors, adversaries in the region are playing a long game.
I implore you to work with Congress
and certainly take a message back to the administration
because I'm starting my 14th year in Congress
and having been on this committee, have deep relations, and have focused on the region.
So we're always going to get better policy when we're working with Congress.
We're playing a long game.
We're appropriating and authorizing our own strategies.
So I'll take your word on that.
And, again, I think it is better for us to work closely with the administration
so it doesn't change from one administration to the next.
But we play that long game.
I'm going to ask you a quick question about Central Asia.
It's an issue that we've been working on for a long time.
The repeal of Jackson-Bannock, which really is a Cold War relic
that doesn't really apply to today's world.
It does inhibit U.S. companies from fully investing in some of the Central Asian nations.
And it hasn't been a partisan issue.
We've introduced legislation in bipartisan fashion.
And administrations, Democratic and Republican administrations, have all said it is a relic of the past.
Secretary Rubio, in his confirmation hearing, also acknowledged that.
So I think now is the time for us to fully repeal Jackson-Bannock.
They want our companies investing.
There are critical minerals, energy resources, et cetera.
And they're in a tough neighborhood between Russia and China.
So I'd love your commitment to say you'll work with us on getting that repeal across the finish line.
Yes, sir.
This is a great example of a bipartisan issue, as you point out.
We believe that Jackson-Bannock is a relic of the Cold War.
You said the Secretary was 17 then, and we appreciate bipartisan support.
Okay.
We might have to put a little pressure on the Ways and Means Committee, but I think we can get this done.
Let's shift to South Asia and India.
I was there in September.
The relationship was not a great place at that point for lots of reasons.
I think there was concern about President Trump welcoming some senior Pakistani leaders into the Oval Office,
concerns about the 50 percent tariff.
I got on the plane on a Friday, landed on a Saturday, and there was an H-1B visa, $100,000 visa.
I spent a lot of time addressing these issues, but also spent a lot of time speaking through the media to the public
that nothing has changed from a congressional perspective in terms of a three-decade strategy going back to President Clinton,
through President Bush, through President Obama, through President Trump's first term, President Biden.
That has deviated our strategy.
We see India as a strategic piece of the puzzle in stabilizing the Indo-Pacific.
They still see that.
We see the economic relationship.
So I'm cautiously optimistic about the trade deal, but there's still a lot of detail to be worked through.
India is not always the easiest place to build bureaucracy, but it has been an ever-loosening trade deal.
So, again, that would be a place where we're due to work closely with Congress.
We also introduced a resolution, H.R. 880, which is a bipartisan resolution that reestablished
and recodified 24 members of Congress, 12 Democrats, 12 Republicans, the importance of this relationship.
So, again, I don't think anything has changed in how Congress looks at this issue of importance.
If you could just give us a quick update, we saw the tensions between India and Pakistan.
Obviously, we've studied this region quite a bit.
It seems quieter at this juncture, but if you could update us on what you're seeing with the relationship to India and Pakistan.
Thank you, and I think that was a very insightful summary of the relationship, frankly.
I agree with you that this kind of strategic thinking has transcended both Democratic and Republican administrations,
and I would say that—I mentioned this earlier, but I'd repeat it—that despite some of the uncertainties around trade negotiations,
we continue to move forward on most aspects of the relationship in a pretty robust way.
And we've got civil nuclear legislation, and we've got the defense framework.
So, a lot of good things happen.
Again, hopefully, the nuclear—that's always been an issue as well.
That's in a better place.
I guess, just in my last few seconds, the one thing I've pushed the Indians on is,
I'll take the President's base value that he really does want to bring this trade conflict to an end.
The Indians do have lines of communication with the Russians, but we don't.
This is an opportunity for India to flex some of its diplomatic muscle and get the President to win that he wants,
as you interact with your Indian counterparts.
If you could push them to use their diplomatic lines of communication to help bring this conflict to an end,
and then the post-conflict action can get started a little bit.
Thank you.
The gentleman's time has expired.
We are going to do a second round of question and answer in five minutes as well.
I don't know if you wanted to expand.
I kind of ended on the Bangladeshi elections,
but we also have the Nepalese elections upcoming.
If you want to briefly comment on that,
and then what I'd like to do is talk a little bit about the strategic issues regarding Maldives and Sri Lanka
and the Chinese view of their string of pearls,
the theory of how they are going to spread their influence around the Middle East.
Sure, thank you.
We talked about Bangladesh, and again, that election is going to happen tomorrow.
I think it's a great thing to see, and we're very optimistic about it.
Our approach to Nepal is similar.
These are both examples of youth movements overthrowing older governments
and now creating the opportunity for democratic participation.
With Nepal, we also trust that Nepal will have a secure and peaceful electoral process,
and we are prepared to work very hard with whoever wins.
Thank you.
How about Sri Lanka and the Maldives and any other strategic locations that we can think of?
Sure.
Those smaller oceanic South Asian states have, I think, outsized importance because of their location.
I believe I heard Sri Lanka had something that set it up in terms of all the energy passes
that were going on for miles at a time.
That's right, and probably about half of the container shipping, I believe,
whatever the exact number is, is a lot,
and so those slots, those sea lanes of communication are really important.
They're important to keep them free and open for the world economy,
and those countries are proficient in ways that they can have actually undue,
not undue, but outsized impact on trade and export.
So it's really important that those countries are able to maintain their freedom of action
and not be coerced by China, by predatory lending, and the kind of thing you talked about earlier.
Some of the ways that we can do that is to engage these countries with financing,
to kind of identify strategic infrastructure, and not allow them all to be dominated by China.
I think that's really what China wants to do.
If you think about Sri Lanka and Hambantota Port, they have a 99 rule on it,
and those are the kinds of dangers that we see with Chinese developments.
So we need to be able to offer alternatives, high-quality, transparent, non-coercive alternatives,
and I think we can do that with our financing mechanisms, our technology,
and our private enterprise, our private business,
and it's something very important that President Trump is able to create opportunities for U.S. business.
Have you seen some of that same infrastructure in Maldives?
Yeah. Yeah, so there's a port in Maldives.
It was actually designated a port of the future by the Quad, I believe,
and so there's been some Chinese investment there.
Not the whole thing, but there has been some investment there.
We've heard it, folks. We've been urged just to go investigate.
So we have to take that step.
Well, with that, I do appreciate it, and I will yield back down to my time
and turn to Representative Russell for five minutes,
and then I'll turn it over to you.
If we do have one of our other special guests, I'd like to turn it back over to Mr. Russell.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go to Russian oil because the sale of Russian oil continues to fund the refinery.
Let's just be honest.
So if supposedly India has pledged to cease importing Russian oil, how are you going to enforce that?
Because we've talked about does that include third-party traders, blended cargo, ship-to-ship, ghost ships.
How are you going to enforce that?
Well, fortunately, I won't be in the enforcement business.
That will be, I think, probably my DAW colleagues will be thinking about ships that are traveling around.
But I think—
Well, then maybe the question for you is how are you going to measure it?
Yeah, I don't know the details of how that's going to be worked out.
I'm happy to talk to you about it.
But the Indians have been reducing their purchases of Russian oil in a diversifying way,
which is what we wanted them to do.
And they've actually been buying more U.S. energy,
and that's, I think, a promising possibility to obtain some U.S. energy for the Russian industry.
But other—and buying some of it.
Yeah, because we have credible reports.
I don't think there's any question that Russia sold energy to India and turned around and then exported it to Europe.
So it's a—and that could be opaque to you.
So I think this is important in our efforts to control the sale of Russian energy,
just making sure it doesn't go to a third party through India.
Even if it doesn't touch Indian pipelines or territory,
I think that's an important issue in terms of cutting off the sale of Russian oil.
China is also interested in that.
I got it.
But India, here before, has been a major participant in that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman yields back.
Thank you.
And I just want to apologize for leaving because I'm going to be on another committee.
So I wanted to get back to the questions around Afghanistan.
The State Department has confirmed that it is offering payments to Afghan allies that cast to self-deport back to the Taliban,
using funds specifically appropriated by Congress to support the Afghan relocation.
I know you said that some are going voluntarily, but do you know how many Afghan allies have accepted payments so far?
I believe it's in the neighborhood of 150, but I can check on that.
Okay.
And how many of those individuals were trying to reunite with family members in the United States?
I don't have that number for you.
Okay.
Could you, when we have our briefing, we love it.
I will see what I can find in terms of numbers.
Great.
And do you know how many of the Afghans who took the payment and self-deported, do you know how many of them are still alive?
I don't know individual cases.
All right.
That would also be great because I think one of the things that we are interested in is how we are supporting our allies
and making sure that, obviously, if they're going back voluntarily or not, that they are alive.
So Congress passed a law requiring the appointment of a coordinator for Afghan relocation efforts in 2024,
and in July, Deputy Secretary Riguez told us that the coordinator would be the new SBA Assistant Secretary.
So, Mr. Kapoor, are you the new coordinator for Afghan relocation efforts?
Well, I am the Assistant Secretary of South and Central Asia, and CARE comes under SBA, the Office of Afghan Affairs.
So you're either that coordinator and you're doing multiple jobs, like Marco Rubio, the Secretary,
or that person yet has not been identified.
Well, I have that responsibility structurally right now.
Okay.
I think it's also important that we get that information.
I think that's something that should have been coordinated with Congress, or at least it should have been alerted,
given it was a law passed by us.
So the U.S. used to provide scholarships for Rohingya and Afghan women to attend the Asian University for Women in Bangladesh,
a crucial educational lifeline for women in the region, deprived of schooling opportunities.
Do you think that it's in the U.S.'s interest to support women's education in the region?
We support that women should be educated just like all boys.
So would you consider resuming U.S. support for the university?
I don't know about the particular case of the university.
I know that we support scholarships for Afghan girls and women to study.
We also have a virtual program that has been tuned into Afghanistan.
And so it's located outside, so it doesn't benefit Taliban.
But we do take that seriously, and I certainly believe that girls and women should be educated.
I'm glad that you do, and I actually think that educating women and girls tends to be a bipartisan issue,
and so it would also be great to get that information.
As you can see, we have been waiting for you or someone to come before this committee
and answer some questions that will help us in how we are engaging with our partners in the region
and putting our best foot forward.
And it's hard to do that, as we shared with you, when there's no one here
and when we don't get a call back and we can't get briefings.
So the Quad, I think, is very important and how we can get it back on track.
From your perspective, are there issues that need to be resolved as preconditions
before the United States participates in a Quad Leaders Summit?
I think the Quad is a very important platform that has done well.
It was defunct in 2017 when it was revived during the first Trump administration,
and it's grown in importance since then.
And it's a platform that enables us to connect and cooperate in unique ways with our like-minded partners.
We were talking about India earlier in the Quad, and India has been an active participant.
There are humanitarian, tech-related events and income-related and trade-related interests.
I want to make sure I get my last 18 seconds in,
but I appreciate you saying all of that and sharing those examples
because I think it underscores that you believe that the Quad is very important.
I was concerned that it's only mentioned twice in the 2025 National Security Strategy,
so I hope you can lean in in your role and remind everyone else how important the Quad is
and how strategic it is to the work we're trying to do in the region.
Thank you very much.
I would just point out that the Quad is important to us,
and Secretary Rubio's first engagement when he became Secretary of State was in fact a Quad engagement,
so it's important to us.
With that, I want to thank you, Assistant Secretary,
for your very valuable information and testimony and for answering all of those questions.
Members of the Subcommittee are reminded that if they have additional questions for the witness,
they can submit those in writing to the Chair.
We will pass those along and ask you to respond to those questions in writing.
All Committee members have five days to submit statements, questions,
and extraneous materials for the record subject to length limitations.
Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
Thank you.
