LIVE: House Homeland Security Committee Examines Coast Guard’s Fight Against Maritime Threats

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The House Homeland Security Committee holds a hearing at 10 a.m. ET on Feb. 3 titled “Frontline Defenders: How the Coast Guard’s Deployable Specialized Forces Combat Narcoterrorists and Other Maritime Threats on the High Seas.”
Witnesses:
Rear Adm. David C. Barata, deputy commandant for operations policy and commander, U.S. Coast Guard.
Heather MacLeod, director of the Homeland Security and Justice Team, Government Accountability Office.
The United States must not be trifled with. This operation is personally significant to me,
as my family fled to America from the Cuban communist regime over 70 years ago,
actually 65 years ago. The United States is the shining light of democracy and through this
operation can support a future of democracy in Venezuela. America is a leader in peace
through strength and must continue to confront threats around the world. Cuba must be considered
next. Just the other day, I echoed President Trump's executive order to impose strict tariffs
on all countries that end or send oil to Cuba's dictatorships to end the Castro's regime once and
for all. I have called for the immediate end of all shipments to Cuba that fund the corrupt
communist regime and crush the Cuban people. It's why I'm eager to hold today's hearing on
the Coast Guard's role in protecting our homeland from Venezuela's actions, which help pave the way
for the success of Operation Absolute Resolve. Securing our maritime front by halting and
disrupting these sanctioned oil tankers from Venezuela is key to unlocking security and
freedom in our corner of the Western Hemisphere. We are grateful for the Coast Guard's bravery
and exceptional tactical operations to properly conduct these right of visitation boardings and
seize vessels found in violation of U.S. and international law. This hearing will highlight
the Deployable Specialized Force historic drug interdiction results, seizing nearly 510,000 pounds
of cocaine in fiscal year 2025. We have also the opportunity to hear how the Deployable Specialized
Forces have become one of the most tactically capable maritime forces of the United States
and what their future holds amid an ever-increasing maritime threat landscape.
We appreciate GAO for being here to testify to its review of the Coast Guard's Deployable
Specialized Forces and areas for improvement. Congress should consider GAO's recommendations
and provide further direction for the future of the Coast Guard. We should also consider the
initiatives laid out in the Coast Guard's recently released Force Design 2028, which calls for a
Deployable Specialized Forces Command. We are grateful to have witnesses here today to discuss
this important topic and also appreciate the Coast Guard's willingness to work with us in order to
continue this dialogue in a classified setting in the near future, so members can learn more
about the specifics of these oil tanker seizures off the coast of Venezuela. Hearing directly from
operational leaders from the Joint Interagency Task Force South would be beneficial for members
to receive further details on operational impacts, emerging threats, and any ongoing challenges.
Thank you, and I'll recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for sitting in for a ranking
member, McIver, today for his five minutes for an opening statement. Good morning. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing. Thank you for also recognizing me to write opening remarks
as ranking member McIver, regrettably, could not be here today. I'd also like to thank our
witnesses for joining us today. Rear Admiral Baratta, I recognize you joining us amid a
shutdown affecting the Coast Guard and other branches of the Armed Forces. Thank you for
your incredible service. To state the obvious, our military service members deserve to be paid for
their service, and I hope we can come together quickly to pass funding for the Coast Guard,
along with reforms desperately needed at the Department of Homeland Security. Today, we're
here to discuss Coast Guard's deployable specialized forces. These specialized forces
comprise some of the Coast Guard's most elite, highly trained units. Their activities
exemplify the Coast Guard's wide range of critical missions, as they deploy to conduct conduct some
of the most important services at high risk operations across a variety of challenging
environments. Specialized forces missions vary from advanced interdiction and boarding against
hostile targets to responding to oil spills and hazardous material releases. These specialized
forces dive underwater to repair ships in harsh environments of remote polar regions,
chase down narcotic traffickers on the high seas, and help protect national security
events like the United Nations General Assembly. Last year, maritime safety and security terms
were among the most the Coast Guard forces that deployed to my home city of New Orleans to help
protect Super Bowl 59. I want to thank you and the hard-working Coast Guard personnel who helped
make that event safe and successful, along with all of the work you do for Louisiana to ensure
the community of maritime commerce and the safety of my constituents always out at its highest.
Most recently, the Coast Guard's deployable specialized forces have conducted a series
of high-profile, high-risk boardings of sanctioned oil tankers near the coast of Venezuela.
While I strongly disagree with the Trump administration's operation last month
to deploy forces on land in Venezuela without congressional authorization, as well as this
bombing of alleged drug boats, which are not only illegal but undermine the Coast Guard's efforts
to encourage international maritime cooperation. In contrast, these oil tanker boardings
represent a legal and effective way to enforce sanctions, enforce international maritime laws,
and exert U.S. influence. The Coast Guard should be commended for conducting these
high-risk boardings without incident, demonstrating the skill and training of the
specialized forces. The deployable specialized forces are critical to the Coast Guard's success
as a service. We must ensure that the Coast Guard has the resources, personnel, training,
and strategies and authorities to utilize these units effectively. The Government Accountability
Office has done vital research to help the Coast Guard grow smarter, leaner, and more effective
across its many missions. I look forward to hearing from both of our witnesses about the
capabilities of the Coast Guard's specialized forces offer and how our committee can help
the services come to grow to fruition and give you the absolute most state-of-the-art tools
to do your jobs. I thank the witnesses for joining us and Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Carter. Are the members of the committee reminded that opening statements may
be submitted for the record? I am pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us
today on this critical topic. I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their right hands.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security of
the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God? Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in
the affirmative. Thank you and please be seated. I would now like to formally introduce our
witnesses. Rear Admiral David Barato serves as Deputy Commandant for Operations Policy and as
Commander, 8th Coast Guard District, overseeing Coast Guard operations across 26 states,
including the Gulf of Mexico, adjacent offshore waters and major inland waterways such as the
Mississippi and Ohio River systems. Previously, he served as Commander, Coast Guard Personnel
Services Center, where he led human resource policy and workforce management for nearly 45,000
active duty and reserve members. A 1993 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy,
Rear Admiral Barato holds a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the
Naval War College and served as Senior Military Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
And I also misstated something. You are overseeing Coast Guard operations across 26 states,
including the Gulf of America, right? Okay. Heather McLeod is a Director in the Homeland
Security and Justice Team for the United States Government Accountability Office.
Ms. McLeod joined GAO in 2002. During the last 22 years, Ms. McLeod has worked on a range of public
policy issues at GAO. She currently leads the Coast Guard and Maritime Security Issues Portfolio
and conducting a variety of reviews addressing issues such as Coast Guard workforce and
strategic planning efforts, and maritime port and supply chain cargo security. Prior to joining
the Homeland Security and Justice Team, Ms. McLeod led reviews covering a broad range of
topics in transportation policy, including aviation safety, airline competition, transit programs,
and highway bridge management. Ms. McLeod has a Master's Degree in Public Administrations from
the University of Washington and a Bachelor's Degree in International Relations from American
University. I thank each of our distinguished witnesses for being here today. I now recognize
Rear Admiral Baratta for five minutes to summarize his opening statement. Good morning, Chairman,
Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. I request that my written testimony be submitted for the record.
Without objection. The United States is a maritime nation, and the Coast Guard stands as a vital
instrument of national power, a military service, a federal law enforcement agency, and a member of
the intelligence community. Tasked with controlling, securing, and defending our maritime borders and
their approaches, facilitating commerce, vital to economic prosperity, and responding to crises and
contingencies that often arise with little or no warning. Our nation faces significant and evolving
threats, including narco-terrorists and transnational criminal organizations that
smuggle deadly drugs, traffic people, bring violence to our communities, and use illicit cash through
sanctioned oil to buy influence throughout the hemisphere. The Coast Guard is on the front line
of these fights, pushing our borders out and targeting these networks where they are most
vulnerable. The dedicated men and women of the Coast Guard are at the forefront of our efforts
to defend our homeland. At the tip of the spear are the service's deployable specialized forces.
These highly skilled teams provide operational commanders with a versatile and rapidly
deployable toolkit to address ever-changing and asymmetric threats. For instance,
our maritime security response teams provide the nation's only federal maritime counterterrorism
capability, and our tactical law enforcement teams embed with naval partners to execute
dangerous drug interdictions. Our deployable specialized forces are prepared for the most
demanding missions. Their rigorous training, often with the Department of War colleagues,
ensures that they can deploy globally at a moment's notice, bringing unparalleled skills
to bear against terrorism, weapons proliferation, piracy, transnational crime, and other domestic
contingencies. Most recently, our operators conducted several law enforcement boardings
aboard dark fleet tankers to enforce sanctions at sea and uphold international law. These highly
capable units are a crucial and adaptable force, ensuring the Coast Guard cannot only patrol our
waters, but dominate the maritime environment where the nation needs them most. Employing
well-organized force packages, in fiscal year 25, the Coast Guard achieved the largest annual
maritime drug interdiction results in service history, seizing over 511,000 pounds of narcotics,
valued at more than $3.8 billion. This stopped over 193 million potentially lethal doses from
reaching American communities. Over the past year, the Coast Guard has hardened and sustained
our border to control and secure and defend that border and our maritime approaches,
starting with the southern border, where the President declared a national emergency.
For example, along the Rio Grande Valley, Operation Riverwall has already supported
the apprehension or deterrence of over 300 individuals illegally trying to cross since
it began in October of 25. And Operation Border tried to increase interdictions of aliens along
the southwest border by 44% over the previous year. Our enhanced enforcement presence at our
borders and maritime approaches protects the country against transnational criminal organizations
and illegal aliens attempting to unlawfully enter the country, upholding our national sovereignty.
To effectively meet these dynamic threats, the Coast Guard is pursuing a bold modernization
of its people, assets, and capabilities through Force Design 28. Coupled with the historic
investments made through the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the support of this subcommittee,
we are transforming our service into a more agile, capable, and responsive fighting force
to protect the American people and advance our national security. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today and allowing me to speak on behalf of the Coast Guard's men and women who
have volunteered to serve the nation. I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Admiral
Barada. I now recognize Ms. McLeod for five minutes to summarize her opening statement.
Chairman Jimenez, Ranking Member Carter, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO's work examining Coast Guard maritime security
operations. These operations may be carried out by specialized forces units, which have the training
and capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, and other threats. My testimony today
focuses on persistent challenges Coast Guard faces in carrying out missions, including those
involving specialized forces units and actions that GAO's work has identified to help Coast Guard
address them. We've made dozens of recommendations to the Coast Guard to help address key challenges
like staffing shortfalls, declining availability of vessels and aircraft, and acquisition issues.
Regarding Coast Guard staffing shortfalls, in recent years, the Coast Guard has raised concerns
that its mission workload has outpaced its workforce levels. Staffing gaps, particularly
in specialized units like tactical law enforcement teams, can hinder drug interdiction efforts,
counterterrorism operations, and missions. While the service recruited more enlisted service
members than it lost in 2024, that had not been the case in years prior. In April 2025, we reported
that even with the increase in recruiting, the service remained short of its enlisted workforce
target. As a result, the Coast Guard was operating below the workforce level it deemed necessary.
We made three recommendations to help address these challenges, including that the Coast Guard
develop a clear plan to support its retention initiatives. Specific to specialized forces,
in 2019, we reported that the Coast Guard has taken steps to create a maritime law enforcement
career path, which helped them retain qualified personnel. We also reported that the Coast Guard
might not have the right mix and number of specialized forces to meet mission demands.
For example, we reported that officials from some specialized forces units were underused while
others were so busy that they had to turn down operations. In November 2024, the Coast Guard
acknowledged that significant overlap in mission and mission capabilities related to specialized
forces exist. Continued analysis remains important as the Coast Guard moves to establish a deployable
specialized forces command as part of force design 2028. Another challenge I'd like to
highlight is vessel and aircraft availability. Assets that specialized forces are often deployed
from. The condition of Coast Guard assets has been in a state of decline for decades.
Our work has shown a concerning trend that the cost of maintaining these assets is increasing
at the same time that their availability is decreasing. For example, in June, we reported
that operation availability of cutters that the Coast Guard relies on for its maritime security
operations declined. We also reported that increasing maintenance challenges have led
to cutters missing patrol obligations. These readiness challenges are not limited to cutters.
In a separate report, we found that Coast Guard aircraft were not available for missions as often
as the service deemed necessary. We made 10 recommendations in these reports to address
cutter and aircraft challenges. Finally, our work has noted that acquisition program delays
have been a longstanding challenge for the service and continue to affect the availability
of Coast Guard assets. For example, the Coast Guard's newest cutters, the offshore patrol cutter
and the polar security cutter are intended to support maritime security operations.
But we found that combined, these two programs are years behind schedule and billions of dollars
over their initial cost estimates. We've made dozens of recommendations on how Coast Guard
can better manage acquisition programs. In conclusion, the Coast Guard specialized forces
units include a range of capabilities that are vital to the service's ability to fulfill its
missions. However, the Coast Guard faces significant challenges that can hinder its maritime
security operations. Addressing our recommendations in these areas will help to ensure the Coast
Guard is effectively and efficiently using available resources to carry out these operations
and support national interests. This completes my prepared statement and I'd be pleased to answer
any questions you may have. Thank you, Ms. McLeod. Members will be recognized by order
of seniority for their five minutes of questioning. I will recognize myself for five minutes of
questioning. Ms. McLeod, your report is quite troubling. And so I'd like to get to the root
causes of this on staffing. Are you saying that the Coast Guard has a number of authorized
positions, right? I mean, this is the number of people you should have. And that we're, are we
short on the authorized positions or do we need more authorized positions or both? I mean, what
is your estimate of what we need in order to get the Coast Guard up to its strength, the strength
that is needed in order to carry out its mission? More authorized positions or we just need to fill
the ones that we have? At the time of our review, the Coast Guard was short of its authorized
positions. Since then, in force design 2028, the Coast Guard has plans to increase authorized
positions, which we envision would have the same, they would have the same challenges in recruiting
and retention with even more positions to fill. Are they, are they short right now of recruiting
up to their authorized positions? At the time of our review, yes. Do you know if that's still the
case? The Coast Guard reported its highest recruiting numbers last year, and then it's on
track to meet its targets. Which means filling every authorized position? Correct. Okay, so now
if we have the number of people that we need, the problem then becomes to the assets that they need
in order to carry out their mission, which are the ships and the aircraft of the Coast Guard,
correct? Right, and so you're talking about ships and aircraft. Is it due to age? Is it due to the,
is it due to the ships and, and the construction of them themselves? Is it due to the fact that
we don't have enough maintenance personnel? What is, what is causing the deficiency and the
readiness of these assets? Our work has shown more recently the maintenance challenges
facing these older cutters and aircraft are increasing. Because we don't have enough people,
or it's just a matter they're old and they're just breaking down more often? The age of the cutters,
some of the parts are unavailable, obsolete parts, and, and things like that. And the,
you're saying that the, the, the plan to replace these assets is way behind schedule and billions
of dollars over? Yes. Okay, that calls for another hearing, I guess. All right. And so,
Admiral, I got a couple of minutes left. What percentage of the sanctioned oil
vessels that are out there? What percentage of them do you think that you actually, you know,
interdict? Chairman, good morning. A very small percentage. Frankly, we estimate that there's
probably about six or 800 sanctioned dark fleet vessels in and about between Iran and Venezuela,
China and Russia. We've interdicted about seven, eight over the last two months. And some other
countries are starting to chip in. I think over in the Mediterranean, we've seen the British and the
French do some things, but it's a very small percentage. They operate out of the rule of law,
and on a consistent basis. Six to 800 of these ghost ships? That's, that's what we estimate
operating around the world. Wow. Okay. And what makes it so difficult to spot, interdict,
etc? Just assets? Or can you spot them? Or they just they go completely off the radar? Okay.
It's a combination of things, Chairman. They are, they obfuscate their position a lot of times,
you know, all of our large commercial foreign vessels are required to do use an automatic
identification system. Many of these vessels have the means to easily have two or three sets of AIS
aboard and kind of project their position somewhere else. They, they use false documents,
they use false ownership, they claim the numbers of vessels that have already been destroyed and
taken apart in other places so that they look like they're another vessel. And so,
even when we can track them, though, they're very hard to interdict. You know, for instance,
these some of these vessels that we've seen in Venezuela, if they're coming from the Middle East
or the Far East, they'll go around the south, the southern tip of Africa and go right into
Venezuela. So without the right assets, and the reasoning to board them on the high seas,
it's very hard to get aboard. And I think you've seen us do a lot of counter drug interdictions
on smaller vessels and even dows over in the Middle East. You know, what some of the vessels
we're going on right now are 1100 feet long, very large, crude carriers, very hard to interdict at
sea without the without some support from the Department of War or other assets.
Fair enough. Thank you. I yield now. I recognize Mr. Carter from Louisiana for his five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Varada, let's discuss the recent boardings of
ball tankers. First, I want to note that this committee has requested classified briefing
on these operations, and we haven't received one yet. I hope we can work to make that happen in
the near future. My question concerns the video that administration has posted on some of these
operations. I understand it may be good PR, but I want to make sure that we're not broadcasting
sensitive tactics or the identities of our special operators to our enemies, putting them in harm's
way. Is the Coast Guard being given the opportunity to review, and if necessary,
redact or block any of these videos before they share it with the world?
Thank you, member. Good morning. We see a lot of this footage before it goes out,
not all of it. It depends. Some of it's Department of War footage, some of it's
Department of Homeland Security, but it's all being processed through the White House.
I think they are taking a close look at protecting the identity and the tactics that our teams use.
And I think the best way to do that, obviously, is to have you guys involved. I won't put you
in the middle of that, but Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we, where possible, request that the
administration has heightened sensitivity of the protection of our men and women who are carrying
out these highly sensitive operations, just to be sure that in our haste to bring public awareness
that we don't put our servicemen and women in harm's way. As you know, one of the oil tankers,
the Coast Guard recently targeted the Bella One, later renamed the Marinera,
was able to bypass U.S. forces and escape into the Atlantic. While the Coast Guard pursued it,
Russian military reportedly began repositioning naval assets as a submarine to protect the ship
from seizure. Thankfully, U.S. forces eventually intercepted the tanker without incident.
The episode raises some questions about the potential impacts of these boardings.
While enforcing sanctions is important, and we all can agree, we do not want to inadvertently
escalate into direct hostilities with nations, including Russia. What contingency plans are in
place when the Coast Guard is pursuing these vessels and might encounter foreign military
vessels? What are the rules of engagement your forces are operating under? And would you please
if we run out of time, if we can back this up with some written documentations on the actual
policies that we have for the rules of engagement?
Thank you, member. Thanks for the question there. As far as the risks and the protocols
and the contingencies in place, we put stringent security measures, stringent contingency measures
in place. In the case of the Bella One, we worked closely with our Department of War partners over
at UCOM. As far as Russian assets, Russian military assets, deployers, we ensured that we
weren't at risk of anything happening there. We were never concerned at the risk level with Russian
deployers impacting our ability to conduct those law enforcement activities. We can give you a
You mentioned a classified briefing, sir. We'd be happy to do that, and we've prepared that,
and when we can set up a time, we'd like to come over and talk to you a little bit more about it.
That'd be great. Without going into anything that might be confidential or might be
that we should do in a more secure setting, the contingency plan of what happens
in the case of meeting some other resurgence that may have bigger power or anticipate,
or maybe even an ambush, we should always, obviously, and I'm preaching to the choir,
but talking from a member of Congress's standpoint, we want to make sure that we're
giving you all the tools that you need in our quest to capture these illegal vessels
that we never put at risk our men and women in uniform who are out doing an incredible job,
and I can't thank you enough for the incredible work that you do,
not just when the cameras are rolling, as they've been doing most recently,
but when no one's watching. Rather, it is search and rescue or capturing these tankers. We know
that the work of the Coast Guard is vast. You guys have been phenomenal partners for us in
Louisiana, particularly in the aftermath of these horrific storms that we continue to have
facing our communities. You're sitting before Congress. Tell us what can we do,
and my time's already up, but if you could, just finish, tell us what we can do to arm you better.
If you had a magic wand that you could wave today, recognizing that this committee,
particularly this one, in a bipartisan vein, wants to give you the tools that you need to
carry out your function safely. Ranking Member, I think the number one thing that you continue to
give us is resources. I think under the Reconciliation Act, we've tried to get after
some of the things that Ms. McLeod highlighted, assets. What we need on an annual basis is the
OE money, the operating funds, to hire more personnel to operate these ships, to do our
deployable celestialized forces missions, and also sustain those assets as we move forward.
We really appreciate your support. Thank you. We're out of time.
Gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the panelists for showing up to this
subcommittee on frontline defenders and how the Coast Guard's deployable special forces
combat narco-terrorists and other maritime threats on high seas.
Admiral, when we talk about deployable specialized forces, are we primarily talking about VBSS?
We're talking about a group of teams, which includes our maritime security response team,
our boat forces teams that deploy domestically and internationally, our port security units that
do expeditionary. There's a number of units that fall under that category for us.
Okay. Thank you, Admiral. I have a little bit of experience with VBSS myself. I was on a VBSS
team on the USS Gettysburg a couple decades ago. My last job in the Navy was in the SEAL teams.
My job was to train and coach SEALs on the West Coast on how to do VBSS, so a little bit of
experience with what you guys are doing. I know that's a very complicated mission set, and I
appreciate all the hard work that you guys do. Admiral, I want to ask you if you believe that
the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief under Article 2 of the Constitution
has broad executive powers for maritime security. Do you recognize that, sir?
Yes. Yes, I recognize that.
Do you recognize that the President made direct maritime interdictions when enforcing sanctions
or national security measures, Admiral? Yes, I do. We follow that.
Okay. So one of the things that's concerned me as a former service member myself is a video
that was made by Senator Mark Kelly and several other senators who just a couple months ago,
they made a video to tell service members that they don't need to follow unlawful orders.
Admiral, are you familiar with this video? I have not seen the video itself. I was following
the news story, obviously, and the escalation of the decision.
It made national news, did it not, Admiral? It did, indeed.
Did you or any of the other high-ranking Coast Guard officers that you work with fear that a
video like that might undermine your chain of command? From my standpoint, I have found that
service members will follow lawful orders as given.
I find it interesting, Admiral, that I didn't see any videos made like that from members of Congress
during the Biden administration. I want to submit an article for the record.
This is from CNN. Biden finalizes new rules for US drone strikes. President Joe Biden
has signed a long-awaited classified policy tightening the rules for the CIA and Pentagon
to carry out deadly drone strikes and commando raids conducted outside of traditional war zones,
US officials said on Friday. This was October 7, 2022. Did you notice that no members of Congress,
including Senator Kelly, made any videos during this time, Admiral?
I'm not familiar with that article. But you didn't see any videos, did you?
I didn't. Not that I recall, no.
As service members, we tend to follow these types of things, right?
Yes. Yeah. I found that very interesting
that they weren't making videos during that time frame about whether or not service members follow
lawful orders or not. And I think we all know that, right, Admiral? Don't we get that training
and basic training that we're not supposed to follow unlawful orders?
Absolutely. And at all the session sources, that is what we train our personnel.
Yeah. So did you find that video a little bit odd, knowing that we all know that?
I find that it's, for me, as I reflect on it, I think it's unnecessary. I think our
personnel will know to follow lawful orders and to question unlawful orders.
Yeah. That's what I thought too. Admiral, Congress delivered for you guys in a pretty big way during
the reconciliation package. Is that correct? That is absolutely correct.
We gave you about $25 billion. Is that correct? Yes. Generational change for the Coast Guard,
Congressman. And you guys had about $7 billion in
maintenance backlog for infrastructure. Is that correct?
Yes. That's correct. How do you see the Coast Guard deploying that money to make sure that
the Coast Guard is ready to carry out the nation's national security and homeland security needs in
the next couple of years? Under Force Design 28, Congressman,
we have reorganized to ensure that the Coast Guard can obligate all of those funds
quickly. We're not waiting for the five years that they're available to us. We want to spend
those right away on maintenance, on shore infrastructure, to get after the problems
that we have. Thank you. My last question for you,
Admiral, is do you feel in the last couple months with the boat strikes and everything else going
on, do you feel like you have given orders to your men to carry out any of these strikes,
any of these interdictions that have been deemed unlawful?
The Department of War has had the lead for these kinetic strikes. The Coast Guard has not been
involved with them. So I can answer that we have not. I have not felt that way at all.
Thank you, Admiral. I yield back. Thank you, gentlemen. From Arizona,
are you submitting that report for the record? Without objection. I now recognize the gentlewoman
from South Carolina, Ms. Biggs, for her five minutes. Thank you so much. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. And I'll direct my first question to Admiral Barato. So Force
Design, and I may overlap a little bit with Congressman Crane, but hopefully it'll kind of
go in a different direction. So the Force Design 28-2028 outlines a plan to modernize the Coast
Guard and to expand deployable capabilities. So how does Force Design 28 aim to expand the
recruitment of DSF personnel and set up training centers to equip the future of the DSF workforce?
And for instance, does the special mission training center have the capacity to support
that growth? Congresswoman, good morning. So under Force Design 28, we do intend to
expand our workforce by 15,000 personnel. And that'll include personnel to man the ships that
you've helped us acquire, the aircraft, but it'll also be operators for our unmanned systems and
also our deployable specialized forces. So we intend to grow and we envision a very agile,
adaptable workforce that includes a lot of deployable specialized forces.
The special missions training center is a real valuable part of that. Our MLAA Academy in
Charleston is also a big part of that for our baseline law enforcement. And then the SMTC is
more of our advanced tactics. And we plan to make some investments there. We need some assistance
with the infrastructure there, the number of personnel who are training, the type of training
that we do, some of these vertical insertion tactics that we use for VBSS, sir. So those
type of things are the ones that we need, Congresswoman. Thank you. And my second question,
what are the details on the Coast Guard standup of a DSF command and why is it necessary and what
value does it add? Congresswoman, I appreciate that question. For us, in response to Ms. McLeod's work
at GAO and her colleagues, we've taken a look at DSF and we think we need to unify
the command structure for all of our forces there. We have seen functional commands work over in
Department of War like SOCOM and JSOC and some of these other functional commands. We've seen it
work for us as well for our Coast Guard Cyber Command. And so we think that unifying these
elements will help us man, train, equip, deploy our specialized forces in a better way, equip
them in a better way, whether that's travel money, whether that's funding for weapons,
specialized tactics, all of those things. We think that putting that under one header will
help us be a lot more efficient. Great. And I'll go a little bit further.
What is the anticipated size of the command and where might it be located?
Congresswoman, we're still early in that. We are hoping by October to have a location. We
do have a team put together that's making some proposals and we're going to base some of the
factors on can we deploy out of there, can we command out of there, can we support the
operational commander. But we have not narrowed that down. And the exact size still is to be
determined. We don't plan to move any of our current units, any of our deployable specialized
forces, the units themselves. What we do expect is a command element that can focus on the training,
that can focus on the funding and the equipping and how we deploy them.
I'll just end since my time is about to expire. But thank you for your service and for what you
do. I have a huge respect for you and I'm very grateful. Thank you. And I'll yield back.
General woman yields back. And I recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Van Epps.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Admiral Baratta and Director McCloud for being here
today. The United States has the best armed forces in the world. And as we've heard already,
the Coast Guard's deployable specialized forces are one of the most agile.
Seeing their work in a public eye recently has been gratifying. And I want to thank you,
Admiral Baratta, for the part the Coast Guard has played in making our country and the waters
around us safer. The DSF is often the tip of the spear in actions that can quickly become
interagency operations. When a DSF unit boards a vessel, for example, those service members
may need to quickly loop in interagency partners as they find illegal cargo.
Admiral, can you walk us through the Maritime Operational Threat Response
process used to manage the moving pieces of interagency coordination between the Coast Guard,
Department of Justice, Statement, Department of War and others?
Congressman, good morning. Yeah, so our process there for counter drug for these dark shadow
fleets are very similar. Once we get aboard, the first thing we do is we want to establish
the nationality of the vessel. And we then have to call back to the motor process. And the motor
process, what that involves is the entirety of the interagency, Department of State, Department of
Justice, other elements, maybe even in the case of the tankers, Department of Energy, up to the
White House, so that we ensure that we are following international law and that we are able
to exercise U.S. law and authorities aboard the vessel. So, for instance, when we board a drug
vessel, we will call back to the motor process and we'll either engage one of our bilateral
agreements that we have or we will go back to the Department of State to call that individual
country and assess whether or not they agree, concur with the vessel's claim or they're allowing
us to operate on a vessel that's subject to their authority. So on the tankers, we're doing
something similar. And once we do that, we know we're in a good position to follow the law.
Great. Thank you. Are there are there gaps that exist between the Coast Guard and these
interagency partners when conducting operations? And is there anything we can do in Congress to
help close any of those gaps? We've found that it's been very successful
in practice. As I've said, we had our largest counter drug year last year in FY25, 511,000
pounds over three times some of our previous years. And our tanker operations, I will tell
you, the motor process has been vital for us for our success here. But there's no gaps that I can
see right now, Congressman. Thanks. Thanks, Admiral. Pivoting here, the Trump administration has
prioritized Western Hemisphere security and law enforcement, such as enforcing sanctioned
Venezuelan oil and the Coast Guard has been a crucial part of the overall approach. In the
past year, it has seized huge amounts of illicit substances and disrupted criminal networks.
Admiral, can you talk about how criminal organizations are adapting to increased
law enforcement operations in the Caribbean and East Pacific? Congressman, I can give you a couple
examples. We've talked about the dark fleet tanker operations. The use of those funds and
revenue that come from the oil that's being sold overseas is then replicated back in and put into
the organizations. So we've seen that. We've seen that revenues from illegal fishing, from illegal
arms sales, human smuggling, those are all being used to feed drug networks. They're being used to
then come back and rearm and re-resource some of the traffickers or semi-submersibles and those
type of assets that they know are really hard to find at sea. And so we've had to adjust our tactics
as we go. One follow-up to that. How are the Coast Guard's maritime, to that note, how are
your maritime drug interdiction operations changing and what do you need to continue adapting to new
trends? I think what we need is exactly what Congress has given us and we need to obligate
those funds. We need more cutters. We need more unmanned systems. We need more intelligence
programs. I think what last year showed us for Operation Pacific Viper over in the Eastern Pacific
that when we have a cutter, like a national security cutter that has a Hitron helicopter
on the back with precision marksmen and the right small boats over the horizon, the right intelligence
and the right tactical teams aboard to gather the evidence that we need, we are very effective in
stopping the drug traffickers. Admiral, thank you so much. Thank you for what you do. And Mr.
Chairman, I yield back. The gentleman yields back. Thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some
additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in
writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7E, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
