LIVE: Senate Subcommittee Holds Hearings to Examine Cyber Force Generation Plan and Implementation

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The Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Cybersecurity holds hearings at 2:30 p.m. ET on Jan. 28 to examine a cyber force generation plan and associated implementation plan.
Thank you, Chairman Rounds. I have a very short opening remarks, so I'm going to read those in
and then we'll get right to it. So this hearing is so important. I again appreciate the way that
the Chairman and I work together, hearing from all of you about the Department of Defense,
your Cyber Force Generation Plan, the Associated Implementation Plan, CyberCom 2.0. And for the
witnesses here, thank you for your service and your commitment. Because now more than ever,
the United States needs a cyber workforce equipped with the acumen expertise to defend our networks,
to execute offensive operations in a rapidly, is not a fast enough word to even describe it,
a rapidly changing battle space that achieves our national security objectives. I would point out,
however, that the new national defense strategy publicly released on Friday
only mentions cyber in three places. Cyber is everywhere. I'm frankly surprised at how little
emphasis has been placed on cyber in comparison to other capabilities in the NDS. It doesn't
engender much confidence that cyber is being treated with the necessary urgency or priority
by this administration that I think we would all agree that we need. The Department of Defense
must take swift action to develop programs that enable our cyber warfighters to increase cyber
domain mastery and operational readiness. It's critical. We have to promote standardized training
across all of our services. We need a sustainable talent pipeline. I know you're going to talk about
that. And we need effective initiatives for retention. Because in an era of persistent
cyber threats and foreign adversaries like China and Russia and Iran, they're probing and testing
and challenging our systems, I would say, by the nanosecond. Not even enough to say daily.
Every single second. They're seeking any opportunity they can to degrade our command
control, disrupt our operations, steal our most sensitive information. And they're using
sophisticated cyber tactics to disrupt military operations, spreading dangerous propaganda to
American citizens and denying access to life-saving goods. So advancements in artificial intelligence
adversaries, of course, they heighten the sense of urgency we must all feel right now. We must have
to protect against AI-orchestrated campaigns aimed at targeting, well, targeting us, our critical
infrastructure, our supply chains. And we can't defend against these disturbing yet real threats
without cyber professionals every step along the way, armed with the requisite skills and abilities
to bolster the cyber enterprise. And so for too long, the approach to manning,
training, equipping our cyber forces, we've just lagged behind. And we need to really step that up,
in my opinion. And the Department of Defense, we know we struggle, continue to struggle with
recruitment, retaining cyber talent, particularly against such a competitive private sector.
And so this issue undermines our readiness across all domains. And it's a priority of
this subcommittee and the committee at large to help the department do everything that we can
to fix it, because we can't fight today's digital wars without the outdated infrastructure,
with our inflexible personnel structures. We need a skilled professional cybersecurity force. It's
not a luxury. It's a foundational requirement for all of us. So I am committed to work together
in a bipartisan way on this committee, on the full committee with all of you, to be sure that
we have the cyber force of the future that we need and will continue to need going forward.
Thank you again for your work and for being here, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Rosen, and distinguished members of the committee.
It is an honor to appear before you today. As you mentioned, it's really quite the privilege to be
on this side of the table, representing the department and all of the efforts that we're
working forward to tackle those challenges that Senator Rosen highlighted in her opening remarks.
I'm grateful for the opportunity today, in particular, to discuss the Department
of War's comprehensive efforts to organize, train and equip our cyber forces to meet the
challenges the nation faces in the 21st century. The subject of today's hearing,
Cyber Command 2.0, represents what the Secretary of War, Secretary Hekseth,
mentioned at the Reagan Defense Forum, the most significant transformation of U.S. Cyber Command
since its inception 15 years ago. This initiative is the cornerstone of our effort to ensure
American dominance in a rapidly evolving cyberspace domain, meeting the President's
clear mission to the Department of War, achieving peace through strength. Cyber Command 2.0 is only
one of the key initiatives we're working to maximize our cyber forces. We are also working
to validate and, if necessary, update our force design and force employment to ensure we are able
to achieve the maximum outcomes. For many years, the department has recognized that our approach
to building and sustaining cyber talent was not keeping pace. Our adversaries are investing
heavily in cyber, while we have been constrained by traditional force generation models, which,
while effective for conventional forces, fail to fully address the unique requirements of
cyberspace operations. This has created significant challenges in recruiting the right people,
retaining our best operators and providing the agile, specialized training needed to win.
Our legacy force generation model is inconsistent, hindering our ability to adapt at speed,
and scale to counter threats like Volt Typhoon and Salt Typhoon, and quickly integrate emerging
technologies like artificial intelligence. To address these systematic challenges head-on,
the Secretary of War approved Cyber Command 2.0, a fundamental reimagining
of how we build and manage our cyber forces. At its core, Cyber Command 2.0 is founded on three
essential fundamental pillars. The first of those is domain mastery. We're shifting from a
compliance-based paradigm to one that fosters deep, career-long expertise. Our goal is to cultivate a
cadre of cyber personnel who achieve true mastery through enduring operational experience, rather
than rotating through cyber assignments as generalists. Second is specialization. The cyber
domain is not one size fits all. Cyber Command 2.0 establishes dedicated pathways for our personnel
to become deep experts in fields like industrial control systems or space asset protection,
resulting in specialized units aligned to our most critical missions. And third is agility. The
cyber threat landscape evolves with unparalleled speed. We require a force that can adapt and employ
new technology just as quickly. This model allows for dynamic allocation of talent, ensuring we
maintain a proactive posture against the most pressing threats. To bring these pillars to life,
we are implementing seven core attributes. The first is targeted recruiting and assessment.
We're shifting from general recruiting to targeted talent acquisition, beginning with an in-service
recruiting pilot using validated instruments like a cyber assessment battery to identify
individuals with the inherent aptitude and suitability for cyber warfare. Second are
incentives for recruiting and retention. To remain competitive, we must implement robust incentive
pay and retention bonuses that reward mastery, and we will standardize this pay across the services.
Third is tailored and agile training. Through our advanced cyber training and education center, we
will focus mission-specific skills on demand, ensuring our forces remain ahead of technological
advancements and adversary tactics. Fourth, tailored assignment management. We're engaging
career pathways that, or sorry, we are engineering career pathways that enable sustained operator
engagement, allowing operators to build a comprehensive portfolio of tailored experience
rather than being forced to move on after a single tour. This approach generates domain
mastery within the cyber mission force while also providing greater operational effectiveness
when warfighters return to their services and apply their developed talent to service mission sets.
Fifth is specialized mission sets. We are developing dedicated units of experts focused
on highly specialized missions, such as protection of space assets or the defense of critical
infrastructure, making them the world's leading authorities in their fields. Six is integrated
headquarters and combat support. Our tactical cyber teams will be presented with dedicated
headquarters and combat support, ensuring they have the leadership and resources needed to execute
their missions without the distractions they have today. And last is optimized unit phasing.
To prevent burnout and sustain readiness, we are instituting a unit phasing model that creates a
sustainable operational tempo, keeping our personnel focused and effective for the long haul.
While each one of these attributes offers merit, the true power lies in their synergy,
creating an exponential effect on our ability to generate and sustain cyber talent across the
talent management lifecycle. These efforts are driven by the creation of three enabler
organizations within Cyber Command that General Hartman will talk about in his speech.
As directed by the Secretary of War, I will oversee the Cyber Command 2.0 implementation,
consisting of 97 tasks across 26 lines of effort. This revised force generation model empowers the
commander of U.S. Cyber Command to directly influence how our forces are manned, trained,
and equipped to deliver immediate warfighting outcomes while preserving decision space on future
organizational constructs. The core attributes of mastery, specialization, and agility are
indispensable regardless of any future structural changes. Cyber Command 2.0 represents the beginning
of a necessary journey and the Department's commitment to providing our cyber warriors
with the careers, talent, and support they deserve. In addition to Cyber Command 2.0,
the Department is undertaking several initiatives to enhance our warfighting
capabilities in the cyber domain. They include validating and updating our cyber force design
and developing a force employment model that ensures maximum lethality and operational outcomes.
Importantly, Cyber Command 2.0's purpose extends beyond the cyber domain.
It is a critical joint force capability that must be integrated across all warfighting domains.
This sends a clear message to our adversaries. The United States is all in on achieving and
maintaining cyber superiority in support of our national interests. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. I look forward to continuing to work closely with the subcommittee on this
critical national security priority, and I welcome any questions that you have.
Thank you, and I appreciate your comments, Secretary Sutton. General Hartman, welcome,
and as you get started, I just want to personally say thank you for your dedicated
service to our country and everything that you've done to forward our security through
implementation of these types of policies in the cyber domain, and I appreciate that. Thank you,
sir. Go ahead with your statement, please. Thank you, Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Rosen,
and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the future of
our nation's cyber force. Thank you specifically for the requirements in Section 1533 of the
Fiscal Year 23 NDAA that brings us here today. The revised cyber force generation model approved
by the department is fundamental to a more lethal, agile, and enduring cyber force capable of
deterring and, if necessary, defeating our adversaries in cyberspace. CyberCom 2.0 directly
addresses our national security challenges and fixes many of the issues facing our service
members. This is a significant upgrade in how we man, train, and equip the world's best cyber
force. Since the stand-up of U.S. Cyber Command, we've had challenges manning the cyber force and
ensuring we had viable cyber-centric career models across all services. We face many challenges
ranging from duplicative training, uncompetitive and inconsistent compensation, excessive
administrative burdens, and a high operational tempo that contributes to an unsustainable stress
on the force. CyberCom 2.0 targets these problems through seven key deliverables.
They're over how the Department of War generates and sustains lethal cyber warfighters.
These deliverables include overhauls and targeted recruiting, modernized incentives,
specialized mission teams, and optimized operational tempos. This plan gives us what
we need. It forges cyber warriors by building upon the warfighting culture and lethal capabilities
of the military departments, harnessing their institutional mastery of sustained warfare,
their capacity for precise global operations, and their core competency in expeditionary
and agile power projection in denied environments. To lead this effort, I've established three key
enabling organizations. The Cyber Talent Management Organization is developing the
cyber assessment battery test to better align incoming talent to ensure we retain high-end
warfighters. We're using our Title X Section 167 Bravo authorities to budget for standard
skills pay and will next focus on retention incentives. The Advanced Cyber Training and
Education Center is tailoring training to specialize mission needs while eliminating
training redundancy in areas like artificial intelligence, expeditionary cyber, and advanced
tradecraft. Our Cyber Innovation Warfare Center will more rapidly equip our cyber forces with
cutting-edge capabilities in game-changing tradecraft. We will build capabilities we
need for the future, not focused on past requirements. This center will serve as a
central point of collaboration for industry, academia, government partners, and the cyber
operating force. These enabling organizations are being designed to be AI by birth, built from the
outset to be data-centric, automated, and decision-optimized. This means that data will
be treated as a strategic asset. Workflows are engineered for automation. Artificial
intelligence is embedded into planning, operations, and sustainment, not bolted on later.
Artificial intelligence is no longer a future concept. It is an operational capability we are
integrating today. In line with our Cyber Command 2.0 vision, we are transforming how the command
is organized, enabled, and resourced to operate at the speed and scale required in the cyber domain.
We are fundamentally changing how we bring technology into the fight.
Rather than relying on long, bespoke government development cycles,
we are aggressively leveraging commercial-proven AI technologies,
the same systems driving productivity, analytics, and automation across the global economy,
and rapidly adapting them for military use, while also building classified and mission-specific
capabilities internally when required. This industry-first approach allows us to move at
the pace of relevance. It enables continuous iteration, rapid upgrades, in alignment with
the global AI innovation ecosystem, which no single government entity can replicate on its own.
In a domain where our adversaries are already exploiting automation, machine learning,
and large-scale data analytics, speed is not a luxury. It is a necessity.
Importantly, we are no longer piloting AI for learning. We are operating AI for mission
outcomes. Today, AI is being used to accelerate cyber threat detection and response,
prioritize and automate defensive actions across large networks, improve operational planning,
targeting, and operations, and reduce analyst workload so human expertise
is focused on the highest-value decisions. These are not experiments. These are capabilities
already being delivered across the force. Because getting this right is so critical,
we have aligned our chief AI officer as a direct report to me outside traditional stovepipes.
This ensures AI data architecture and operational design are integrated from day one,
rather than competing for priority after the fact.
Cybercom 2.0 strengthens our integration with other combatant commands. By building more
proficient cyber forces, we provide more lethal and capable support to the joint force.
When our cyber operators are expertly matched to their roles, receive cutting-edge training,
and are freed from administrative burdens to focus on the fight,
their operational effectiveness increases exponentially.
This enhanced capability directly translates to delivering
decisive outcomes for Cybercom and other combatant commanders at the timing and tempo
our senior leaders require.
In closing, I want to reiterate my appreciation for Congress' support
and partnership over the past several years. Changes to our budget and acquisition authorities,
as well as the FY23 NDAA Section 1533, provided us the required tools and a clear mandate to
address persistent readiness challenges and implement solutions across the cyber mission
force. We are using those authorities to implement Cybercom 2.0.
ISS implementing Cybercom 2.0 is the best path to get our cyber warriors and our cyber force
where it needs to be to support the joint force in crisis and conflict. The Secretary's direction
is clear, and we have buy-in and participation in services. Already, we are leveraging the Army
model for proficiency pay, and the Navy is implementing clear career progression for
the Maritime Cyber Warfare Officers. Your continued support, both in sustained investment
and providing flexible authorities to partner with the full spectrum of USAI companies,
from major defense primes to venture-backed startups, is what allows us to move fast,
stay secure, and maintain our advantage.
The success of this endeavor will depend on continued partnership with Congress and the
Department to ensure adequate oversight and sustained funding to implement these necessary
changes and maintain the world's premier cyber force. This is how we ensure that American
innovation remains decisive in cyberspace. Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
Thank you, General Hartman. General Messer, thank you. Welcome. Appreciate your service
to our country. With your statement, please proceed.
Chairman Rounds, Ranking Member Rosen, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to join this hearing and speak to the importance of cyberspace as an
integral part of joint all-domain military operations. Joint operations are reliant on
operators who are masters of their craft. For example, an aviation strike operation requires
aircrew who are exceptionally skilled in aerial refueling, air intercept control,
air-to-air warfare, and strike warfare. It takes years of specialized training to build a team who
can succeed in such mission areas. The same is true for our cyber operations. At the same time,
the demand for cyber forces across the joint force is steadily rising. As you will hear in
combatant commander posture statements, our adversaries are using the cyber domain as part
of their multifaceted campaigns to degrade U.S. and allied interests. U.S. Indo-PACOM has
emphasized the defensive cyber operations as the joint force's first line of defense in their
theater. And U.S. SOUTHCOM has highlighted that cyber espionage as a vector for both intelligence
gathering and persuading audience against U.S. interests in their theater. Amid these threats,
demand for cyber capabilities is at an all-time high. Threats in cyberspace are currently growing
faster than we can scale our actions. The size of the existing cyber mission force requires us to
prioritize some efforts and take risk in others, which could delay our response to meeting emerging
threats. For all military operations, actions in cyberspace are playing an increasingly important
role. That includes operations where the cyber element may not be self-evident. Whether
protecting our forces from harm, complementing kinetic action, imposing costs on adversaries,
or defending friendly infrastructure, cyberspace operations are critical to the successful
employment of the joint force. To succeed, we must be proactive, not reactive. Cyber
activities must be integrated into every phase of operations, starting with concept development.
Military operations in every domain require specialists. Just as specialized air crew
support every air operation, specialized cyber operators are essential to ensure U.S. dominance
in cyber and all domain operations. Cybercom 2.0 will help us combat the adversary's ability to
with domain mastery and advanced tools, extracting the greatest value from the force that we have.
Training, experience, tools, and resourcing will give our operators what they need to prevail
in this dynamic domain. On behalf of the men and women of the joint force, we appreciate your
support for the cyber mission force and for this vital initiative. With that, we'll open it up for
questions. Thank you, General Messer. To begin with, we're in an open session right now,
so we have an opportunity to not only ask questions, but to help educate as well.
Five domains, air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. It appears that there will never
be another kinetic activity that goes on in terms of our Department of Defense or the Department of
War without having some cyber activity to the left of it, basically to make the field of battle
a little bit safer for our young men and women. But in order to do that, it has to be integrated
and a part of the larger force. In order to make that happen, you need professionals that clearly
understand their role. That's a lot about what this discussion today is about. It's about the
force itself and how they actually provide the needed services to the different COCOM commanders,
combatant commanders that we lay out throughout the world. In order to do that, we've got to make
sure that the cyber operations can be integrated as quickly and as efficiently as possible.
Ms. Sutton, part of the CYBERCOM 2.0 initiative recommends maturing the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Cyber Policy position to meet the demands of executing Section 167B authority for
cyberspace operations peculiar activities. I just want you to describe what that maturation
might look like in practice. Specifically, how would an enhanced Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Cyber Policy, how would that office support the force generation objectives outlined in CYBERCOM
2.0, and what additional responsibilities or authorities would be necessary to effectively
execute this expanded role? In other words, what specific resourcing would be required to enable
that maturity of the ASD Cyber Policy Office? I know you're new in the role and so forth, but
you've got a great deal of experience in the cyber domain and what we've done within the National
Defense Authorization Act in the past. Your thoughts, please. Senator Rounds, thank you
for that really important question. As you mentioned, one of my top priorities going
forward and what I think one of the key responsibilities of my office is to make
sure that cyber is integrated into multi-domain operations. Having this role be fundamental and
be embedded within the Undersecretary of Policy's organization allows that to happen on a daily basis
to bring the cyber domain to all of the policy discussions happening more broadly. I think
historically we've seen cyber treated very much in a stovepipe where the cyber people go off and
talk about the cyber domain and do their things in a silo and in a vacuum. I see one of the primary
roles of my office, both as the Assistant Secretary for Cyber Policy as well as the Principal Cyber
Advisor in my role to be an advisor to the Secretary of War, is to be that coordinating
function across the department to really bring cyber to all of the other domains of warfighting,
to coordinate across the services, and to look for opportunities where resourcing is needed
and where we need to really focus the department's efforts to achieve these outcomes that
are going to be critical to all future conflicts going forward. Thank you. Just in order to make
sure that all of our members get an opportunity to speak, and we're going to do several
rounds of questions, I'll defer right now to Senator Rosen. I'm going to defer to Senator
Gillibrand because we're here the whole time and everyone has a lot of hearings going on. So,
Senator Gillibrand, you're recognized. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam Vice Chairman.
General Hartman, since the fiscal year 2017 NDAA, CyberComm has had the authority over
the training of assigned joint forces, conducting specialized courses of instruction,
monitoring and promotion of cyber operation forces, coordinating with the military departments
regarding assignment, retention, training, education, and special and incentive pays for
cyber operation forces. The command has been the joint force trainer for almost as long.
Much of CyberComm 2.0 appears to be tinkering with this space rather than fundamental reimagining.
Can you speak to why the command did not take these steps before and why you believe this is
a dramatic transformation? Senator, thanks for your questions. As you point out,
in 2017, we were given certain authorities. But what we didn't have control of at the time was
the funding, Senator. And so as you're aware, in 2023, we were given enhanced budget control.
There were a series of issues that actually caused us to not receive that control of that funding
until 2024. And so while we had some authorities, we really had no enforcement mechanisms.
And we have started to execute those enforcement mechanisms. And we've seen benefit from that.
Senator, CyberComm 2.0 does not intend to totally reinvent how we train the force.
But what it does intend to do is make sure that the services are held to the standard
of 1000 level training. Okay, the CyberComm J7 will continue to execute 2000 level training.
So basic training by the services, qualification through CyberComm,
which we've made a lot of progress on the last two years. And then what CyberComm 2.0 is really
going to bring is advanced and specialized training, moving at the pace of industry
that is really required that will allow us to both compete and really plan to outpace China.
That is the construct that we're laying out. Thank you. Secretary Sutton, while the services
largely say cyber is important, it is not a top priority for any of them. Agreeing to a not a
notional plan is easy, but the services are notoriously protective of their control over
the recruiting, retention and talent management. How will your office hold services accountable
and ensure they do not steamroll CyberComm on career and talent management. And I will just
say that this committee, we have had hearing after hearing year after year. And we have drilled down
to how many personnel you're getting from each service and which services are slower than the
other and what level of staff you can acquire. And frankly, it is never good enough. So I just
really want to know how you intend to succeed. Senator, I appreciate your question and
understand the frustration. I think you're really highlighting what is fundamental about
CyberCommand 2.0, which is involvement at the secretary's level to really coordinate and make
sure that the services are all doing things consistently and that we rise everybody to
the top bar. We see best practices and pockets across the services, but have historically lacked
a coherent effort to bring all those together and rise all levels up. It is going to require
hard discussions internal to the building. It's going to require prioritization. And we have a
clear direction from the Secretary of War when he approved this plan about the importance
of increasing the lethality of our cyber warriors. I look forward to having all those
internal battles within the Pentagon, because I think it is fundamental to what we owe our
cyber warriors that come to work every day and do this mission is to be able to train them and
retain them in ways that allow us to maintain the world's most competitive cyber force.
It was just reported that China approved the import of the H200 chips to ByteDance,
Alibaba and Tencent. These companies all work closely with Chinese military and just a few
months ago, reports indicated a White House memo raised concerns that Alibaba provided support
for PRC military operations against targets in the US. If these sales go through, what impact
will this acquisition of H200s have on their ability to target the US military
and US critical infrastructure? Senator, I haven't studied that question,
and so I'll agree to get back to you with an answer. Thank you. And just my last point,
I'd like to hear from each of you. I still don't understand why you don't want a cyber academy. I
just don't know why you don't want a service academy that will just train the personnel you
need from top to bottom consistently and regularly. We tried to create small pipelines
for you through cyber academy for non-military personnel, but I still don't know why you don't
want your own. I get why you are going to use existing services and try to do better training,
but the future of war is going to be cyber. I don't know why we're taking so long to do this.
I think also in your testimony, you said that your goal for the ACTEC, the Advanced Cyber
Training and Education Center, won't be fully operational capable to Q3 fiscal year 31. That's
a really long time for any bricks and mortar, but can you just each talk about why you don't
have this vision and why is it so difficult? I really appreciate that question because I think
how we get the right training to our people and what courses we have available and what
mechanisms we have is really important. I really want to highlight the importance
in Cyber Command 2.0 of the ACTEC, the Advanced Cyber Training and Education Center,
and the intent of it is actually not to be a brick and mortar institution because what we
see is having an internal developed training system is probably always going to be slow to need
as we look at the timelines it takes to get basic training updated.
We're losing out to the best of breed that's happening in industry and academia,
and so that Advanced Cyber Training and Education Center model is really intended to figure out
what our requirements are, where we have skills and key knowledge gaps that we need training on,
and then to be able to go out to industry and academia, find the best of breed,
if it's available out there, bring that in, and then we can have standards that we're trained to
and so that's really the model that we're looking to move out on quickly.
The timelines that we're talking about are to get it fully up and scaled across the entire force,
across an entire curriculum. I'll let Gerald Hartman talk about some of the early pilots
that we're aiming to get some quick wins in right off the bat.
I just don't, again the chairman can take control of this, but honestly we've been saying that for
a decade and it just doesn't work. We can't compete, we don't pay enough, our salaries are too low,
and so the benefit that the service academies have is it's free college for four years or two years
or whatever it's going to be, and so kids will choose to do that route because we can compete
on that. We cannot compete if you, let's say you set your standard every six months of the perfect
person, they're not going to join you because they're making $400,000 or $600,000 where they are,
you're not going to get them. So you guys can answer the question if you want, but you can also
take the time back if you like Mr. Chairman. I will allow the question and if you've got it and
if not we can bring it back in and you can respond with a written response, but I'd be curious to
hear what your thoughts are. So I just one thing and then I'll let Gerald Hartman also provide his
answer. So I am a firm believer in exactly what you mentioned. I am a scholarship for service
recipient. My master's degree was funded through government funds within a service obligation
and over 20 years later, I'm still in government. I see it's a very powerful recruiting tool
and something that we are continuing to look to opportunities to continue to leverage.
Senator, I'm not opposed to a joint cyber service training academy. I think there's great merit in
that. What I don't think is the best answer right now is to divorce our cyber capability
in the department from the services. And that is based on everything that we're doing from
an operational standpoint. And if I've got to build a cyber plan against an adversary's air
defense network, the Air Force as a service brings tremendous capability to me that I don't believe
we need to separate. And then the second piece is the advanced cyber training academy. What we
are trying to do is really marry the training to the operational elements of the command.
And so we learn things in an ops room, both offensive and defensively, that we immediately
turn into a training requirement that we train across the force. And so each disparate element
isn't learning every time they get on keyboard in order to execute operations. We just think
that's fundamentally important. But there is a huge institutional training requirement. And
I support your idea. Thank you, Senator Gillibrand,
for the excellent questions. Appreciate that. Ms. Sutton and General Hartman, you're likely aware
of the calls, and this follows the same line, but for the establishment of a separate military
service dedicated to the cyber domain or a cyber force. Like me, you are no doubt close with and
respect many of those who are supportive of a cyber force. What would you say to those national
security and cyber experts who are advocating for a separate cyber force? Step right into it.
So I appreciate that question. I think this is a really important debate for us all to be having
about the future of the cyber warfighting domain. I do think one of the most common misconceptions
about Cyber Command is that it's a debate between Cyber Command 2.0 and a cyber force. And they're
actually separate debates that I believe both need to be had, and we need to look closely at
the pros and cons of both. Cyber Command 2.0 is inherently about building a talent model.
It's looking across the entire talent pipeline from when we recruit someone, how we make sure
we have the right talent, how we train them, how we retain them, how we build careers for them,
how we really build our cyber warriors. We know how to do this. As Cyber Command has become
operational, we've built a set of very capable cyber operators. Now we need to do that at scale
and have a system that supports that rather than doing it at an ad hoc method. And so Cyber Command
2.0 is really that talent management model, and we've been very careful as we've built that model
that it's agnostic to the organizational model and that it would support both the current model
that where five services present as well as other organizational models such as the establishment
of a cyber force. So I think they're both really important debates to have, but they are separate
debates that we need to make sure that we're quickly moving ahead with Cyber Command 2.0.
We have a lot of work done, and it's required regardless of what model we have,
we have to build the talent. And so that's our immediate focus is working on all of these
fundamental activities that we're going to need going forward that would enable any future
decisions to be made about an organizational change. General Hartman? Chairman, just would
like to add three things to what the Honorable Sutton said. So agree with her that this Cyber
Command 2.0 is certainly important regardless of any future decision.
I do believe when we did the analysis for Cyber Command 2.0, the timeline was fundamentally
important. All right. And so we did view this through a 2027 lens. We viewed it through a
resourcing lens. And through that lens, Cyber Command 2.0 provided us the best opportunity
in order to build the force that we needed on a 2027 timeline. And I think that's important.
The second piece is I fundamentally believe the ability to integrate across the joint force
is best suited to the model that we are developing here in Cyber Command 2.0.
And that is fundamentally important. I didn't answer the question that you asked earlier,
but our ability to integrate not just left of conflict, but during a conflict in all phases
of the operation, just like any other traditional military capability, is absolutely essential to
delivering the capability that the nation needs. And I think Cyber Command 2.0 is really the best
course to do that. And I'm going to be asking a question a little bit about some of the cyber
activity that might occur during an operation as well. But I do want to follow up a little bit.
With Cyber Command 2.0, where does a civilian workforce fit into a Cyber Command 2.0 concept?
So the scope of Cyber Command 2.0 is primarily focused on the cyber mission force,
and it's enabling organizations, the headquarters, Cyber Command headquarters,
the joint force cyber headquarters, which is a blended workforce of both military and civilian
and contractor work roles. So as a result, within Cyber Command 2.0, the majority of the initiatives
do apply to both military and civilian populations. And we have sort of dedicated
lines of effort that also targets some things that are unique to both sides. So in short,
we're addressing both issues for those elements that support the cyber mission force.
Plenty of room for guard units to continue to participate?
Absolutely. The guard and the reserve are going to be critical on how we bring in some of that
unique talent that has special expertise. And there are specific lines of effort in
the implementation plan where we look at how to bring that in, as well as they will be a
fundamental part of our cross-functional team that we're building to roll out the implementation.
Senator Rosen.
Thank you. Well, you actually set me up for my next question. You didn't even know. But I want
to thank you for the testimony so far, because cyber isn't an add-on or service adjacent anymore.
It has to be part of the fabric of everything we do woven in. And talking about data, I always say
this data tells a story if you know how to listen to it. And so I hope that we can maybe have a
hearing to talk about how we think about data and its role in everything that we do going forward.
But I actually want to talk about the service members to what Senator Rounds was talking about.
So I have two questions for you, General Hartman. One is on the regular force,
and the second one is on the guard and reserve. So the first one, can you talk a little bit how
you build a fully qualified cyber operator? What does a training pipeline look like at
service and joint level? And what kind of on-the-job experience is required before they
can be deemed fully qualified? And how often do they, I guess, have their benchmarks taken,
I guess, if you think of it like that? Thanks, Senator. And so each of the services
produce a cyber operator, and that's a blanket term. We have a number of different specialties
across the force. And then we cyber comm supervise what we call work role training.
If you're an interactive on-net operator, you go to a specific training course. If you're an
exploitation analyst or another specialty, you would do the same thing. And we work through a
process that allows them to meet a series of benchmarks and then become fully qualified.
Once they become fully qualified, they execute a series of operations and move from basic to
journeyman to master level of qualification. Historically, we haven't produced a lot of
operators at the master level, because the training and the certification process has taken
too long. And part of cyber comm 2.0 is how do we reduce that training timeline and allow them to
more on operations, vice less on qualifications. And so I think we have, over the years,
reduced that benchmark. But you get trained, you get qualified, you execute operations,
you become a non-commissioned officer, and then you supervise the next group of people that we're
bringing up. It is a process that works, but it doesn't work fast enough. And that is really the
focus of 2.0 in the ACTEC program. Thank you. I want to ask a similar question
about the skills of our National Guard and Reserve members. They're not currently tracked,
it's my understanding, as the same fidelity as the active force, and so they're going to be a
critical part, to your point, of bringing in the public sector, I guess, if you will say it that
way. So what specific steps, can you talk to me about, talk to us about how you're going to ensure
that a Guardsman or Reservist with those high-end cyber skills, they might be doing it in the
regular world, their civilian career, how can they be activated for special mission,
how are you working with that? Because I do think that is a big part of our
pipeline and training. So whomever, whatever you want, both can answer, please.
Thanks, Senator. And so we do have organizations in the National Guard that are exemplars that we
are trying to really use to leverage it across the entire Reserve component. We've got the Delaware
and the Maryland Air National Guard that is part of our Cyber National Mission Force.
So one of our most elite organizations really for the last decade, we bring those service members on
active duty and they participate as full members of the team. To be honest with you,
they bring deep expertise because when they're not mobilized, as you highlighted, they go back to
civilian jobs. We have an organization down in Texas supporting our Air Force Cyber Organization
that again provides a significant amount of expertise. We have the same model on the defensive
side. What we have to do is scale that across the force. We've got to get them all in JCC2R,
our readiness tool, and we've got to be able to track them just like we're tracking our active
duty service members. Because you may, across the country,
each state may have one or two that are working in this area in their civilian life.
And so how do we pull them in? Senator, that is our plan. We are at relatively early stages,
but as we build this out, that is our intent. Thank you, Senator Ramos.
Thank you. You know, Ambassador, you've gotten off too easy so far.
I'm going to throw you the hard one now. And this is sitting in an unclassified setting.
I want you to talk a little bit about successes. And I want to specifically talk Venezuela. It's
been in the news, and a lot of discussion about the fact that this was a good example of what
happens when you combine all of the joint forces, including cyber operations. Once again, I
understand that this is an unclassified, but there's a lot of folks out there that might now
have a curiosity about this. And they may very well want to be a part of a team in the future
that you're going to have to try to recruit. Can you share with us, and I would open up to anyone
else as well here, but can you share with us the types of operations and how this happened? It's
not just at the national level or the international level or the big picture strategically, but
tactically, how critical cyber is when you're doing, and this was a law enforcement operation,
but it required the support of the armed forces of the United States. Can you share a little bit
about what that meant for the cyber teams involved? And a no answer is not acceptable.
Senator, thanks for the question. What I probably won't do is go into the specifics of the Venezuela
operation. But what I will tell you is, as has been mentioned by Secretary, Honorable Sutton
and General Hartman, the role that they play as leaders in pushing cyber to the forefront, I think
is critical. And that's one of the things we've seen from Chairman Cain is his emphasis on not
just traditional kinetic effects, but the role non-kinetic effects play in all of our global
operations, especially cyber. So leading up to the events in Venezuela over the last six months,
we've been developing something new on the joint staff called a non-kinetic effect cell.
This is designed to integrate, coordinate and synchronize all of our non-kinetics into
the planning. And then of course, the execution of any operation globally. I think it's important
to point out that one of the reasons that has been successful is the emphasis that the chairman
has placed on the role of non-kinetics and in particular cyber. And then the coordination
that has continued to grow and mature with cybercom as we work through various operations
around the globe. So in this particular case, not only there was a huge amount of work to be done
beforehand, but then it had to be executed at the time, as we say, not just on the left side,
but during the operation itself. For young men and women that are out there and they want to
be involved in a growing and very exciting field. Can you talk a little bit about what that means
in terms of why we want these folks to actually be a part of not just the large cyber mission
force, but actually within their own branches and the need to maintain that continuity and
understanding of the big picture by individuals who are back in with their regular units and how
that gets integrated in terms of providing direct assistance on a unit by unit basis.
How integrated this is, and as representative of the joint forces, I just kind of wanted to
hear you talk about how critical that is. Yes, sir. So cyber operations are critical
to everything we do, whether it's just day-to-day operations of the functionings
of the Department of War or its actual execution in operations. One of the things that I'll point
out is growing up in the Air Force, there was always a non-kinetic effect cell at an air
operations center. But it usually existed back in a back room. It was a very dark place. And
usually we didn't ask for many inputs from that team until we wanted to sprinkle what we call
the lightning bolts onto some form of operation. The reality is that we've now pulled cyber
operators to the forefront. So if I were talking to a group of young people who are considering a
career and joining General Hartman's team over at Cyber Comm, I would say you're not just going
to be integral to every operation we are going to do, but you will be at the forefront of everything
we do, both now and in the future. So let's just say that there's a young man or woman out there,
and they enjoy the keyboard work, and they're fascinated by cyber. They've seen what hackers do.
Is there a place for the good guy hackers to be, and how would they be able to let you know that
they want to go to work for you? What's the best way to get that word out? Sir, I think there would
absolutely be a role for them to play. And I think that the targeted recruiting and assessments that
will be a focus of Cyber Comm 2.0 will open up more of those opportunities to find those unique
individuals. And I wanted to see if General Hartman wanted to say more about that.
There is a place for them to go, Chairman. Absolutely. And so our intent as part of
Cyber Comm 2.0 is, you know, if you're a young person, a hacker, you want to come serve your
country, when you show up at your recruiting station, we want you to be administered a
cyber aptitude test. If you score well on that test, we would like you to be offered a contract
to become a cyber operator in whatever your service of choice is. And we would like you to
then go through the pipeline and come to Cyber Comm. That's the first way. The second way is
we are going to execute an in-service recruiting pilot. And so if you are out in another specialty,
the same way that you might attract a Delta Force operator in the Army,
we're going to also give you an aptitude test. And if you meet a certain score on that aptitude test,
we're going to work with your service to have you move to the cyber operational force. And so we
believe those two areas are ways that we can really attract world-class talent. I do want to
go back, if you would allow me to just address a little bit the question you asked the J39.
And so I would tell you, not just Absolute Resolve, but Midnight Hammer and a number of
other operations, we've really graduated to the point where we're treating a cyber capability
just like we would a kinetic capability. We're not sprinkling cyber on. We are integrating
cyber operations into the joint force commander's plan. And we're executing it to achieve specific
effects that are ultimately tied to what the commander is trying to achieve. And we're doing
it in a repeatable, sustainable manner across a number of different COCOMs. And so while we can't
go in detail here, Chairman, I would love to get an opportunity to brief you in some level of detail.
I do believe it is fundamentally one of the reasons we created CyberCom.
And I do believe we've achieved a certain level of integration that's really important for our
nation. Thank you for that. And we will make arrangements to have a classified meeting,
and we would invite you to come back and share that with the members of this subcommittee.
Thank you for that. Senator Rosen. Thank you. I can tell you the young woman who started her
career in computer programming in the 1980s, something. I couldn't dream of what's happening
now and would have been so excited about all the things that you're doing or having even been
recruited. Of course, none of these things didn't exist in the same way they do now. So I can tell
you.
