Iran’s regime is “a theocratic autocracy” waging war by proxy—from Hamas and Hezbollah to militias and the Houthis—while crushing dissent at home. In this in-depth of The Brief, Jonathan Schanzer (FDD) explains Iran’s power structure, the protest waves since 2009, what recent nuclear site strikes actually set back, the state of the economy/sanctions, and how proxy networks amplify Tehran’s reach.
We also cover Khamenei’s system vs. elections, internet blackouts, terror finance, and what a post-regime Middle East might look like.
What is going on in Iran right now?
Are the protests over?
They have crushed the rights of their people.
They have spent enormous sums of money sponsoring terrorism.
They have a lot of blood on their hands, and there are receipts to prove it.
Why should the American people actually care about a country like Iran?
Well, they've declared war against the United States.
Everybody knows it's not a good thing for the regime to get a nuke.
Are we going to war with Iran?
And welcome back to The Brief.
We are joined today by Jonathan Schanzer.
Jonathan is an American author and the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.
Jonathan, thank you so much for joining us.
Great to be with you, Chavis.
So there's a lot to talk about as it pertains to Iran, the current geopolitical conflict.
But before we talk about the specifics, I want to just zoom out for a second, and perhaps
you can educate myself, educate our viewers.
If I'm an outside observer and I look into the country of Iran, I see that they have
a constitution.
They've never declared war on a Western country, including the United States, relative to other
Middle Eastern countries.
They have a sizable Jewish population, a sizable Christian population.
In fact, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he was actually banned from running for a third term because
of the strong constitutional provisions.
So what am I getting wrong about Iran?
And then why should the American people actually care about a country like Iran?
Well, I mean, I think your framing is, it really highlights the paradox of the Islamic
Republic.
And I think this is what you need to understand first.
It's an Islamic Republic.
It is a theocracy and it is run by a guy who calls himself the supreme leader, which should
give you a sense that we're not dealing with a democracy or a country that deals in pluralism.
And so what you have is a bunch of trappings below the supreme leader that look like it's
a democracy.
And there are all these people that, you know, are in the ecosystem that I work in in Washington,
where people talk about the, you know, the elections and the surprise results and the
deliberations that occur within the regime.
But you need to understand something, that this regime is run by the people at the very
top, that these are clerics.
This is a theocratic autocracy.
They have crushed the rights of their people.
They mow down those that would dare to come out and protest against them.
They have spent enormous sums of money sponsoring terrorism by proxy.
And that's interesting, by the way, because you say that, well, they haven't been at war
with Western countries.
Well, they've declared war against the United States.
They call for death to America every day.
This is their sort of official creed.
But then on top of that, they are waging a war by proxy on multiple fronts.
Hamas, Hezbollah, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis, various groups in places like
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, a massive amount of mayhem that they have funded.
They are the source of instability across the region and a source of misery for their
own people at home.
So then let's go to the actual protests then.
So in 2009, we, of course, had this famous Green Revolution.
In 2019, there were these mass fuel protests in the streets of Iran.
And then most recently, the 2022 Women Life Freedom Movement.
So why is this particular movement, crisis, whatever the right terminology is, why is
it different than all the other protests and movements and revolutions in the past?
So it's a great question.
I mean, number one, I think it's important.
You mentioned Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The first one in 2009 that you mentioned was a response to him walking away with a stolen
election. Nobody believed that he actually won that election, which should, you know,
that sort of dovetails with your first question to me about democracy.
Nobody believed it.
And in fact, people came out into the streets protesting what they believe was a rigged
election. And the regime just mowed down the protesters as we're watching right now.
The difference then was that President Barack Obama, then President Barack Obama, did not
come out in support of the people.
He he threw his lot with the regime, hoping that maybe he'd be able to get a nuclear deal
signed, which he ultimately did.
And it was a terrible deal that locked in a lot of things that the regime wanted.
Now, fast forward to the protests that we saw in 2018, 1920.
A lot of these, as I think, as you suggested, were economic related.
But you got to remember, the people of Iran were frustrated for lots of reasons beyond
just the economics.
The one that I think was most important was the Women, Life, Freedom movement.
This is the one in response to the the arrest of the Kurdish woman, Masa Amini.
She was then brought into custody, beaten and killed.
And this sparked a feminist protest.
What's amazing, though, is that we did not see a U.S.
president get behind the people of Iran until the current protests.
And here I think this is the big difference maker.
Donald Trump has come out in support of the Iranian people.
Rhetorically, there's, of course, questions about whether he would go any further beyond
that, kinetically, you know, taking out elements of the Iranian regime.
But what we've not seen is that kind of moment where a U.S.
president says, you know, Mr.
Supreme Leader, tear down this wall, kind of invoking President Ronald Reagan in his
famous call to the Soviet Union to, you know, to to basically disband itself.
This is the moment that we're at right now.
And I think that's what is really important.
You get a sense that the United States is on the side of the Iranian people for once,
finally. But the question is, what does that mean in practice?
And I think we had that moment where Donald Trump deployed aircraft.
He looked like he was ready to strike the Iranian regime.
And then something happened that prompted him to pull back.
And so the Iranian people are in suspension right now.
They know that he is with them, but they also are not sure what that means, practically
speaking. And so we're sort of a pregnant moment, if you will, a crossroads where, you
know, Donald Trump could become the next Reagan and have his evil empire moment where he
breaks one down. Or he could have a Barack Obama moment.
Barack Obama famously drew a red line back in 2013, telling the regime in Syria not to
use chemical weapons against its own people.
They did. And there was no consequence.
So really, Donald Trump has a choice right now between these two presidential models.
I think it's safe to say we all hope he becomes Reagan and not Obama.
But we're still standing at that crossroads.
OK, a lot there to unpack, especially the crossroads that we find ourselves in in this
bizarre suspension of time.
Having said that, though, I do just want to unpack and piggyback on a point you made,
the JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
The Iranian nuclear deal, in hindsight, certainly allowed the Iranian regime to bolster
their economic and financial means.
President Trump campaigned and then fulfilled his campaign promise of tearing down the
Iranian nuclear deal. And then perhaps the crescendo was this past June.
So President Trump bombed the nuclear facilities at Fordow, at Natanz, at Isfahan.
So just two very basic questions.
Number one, there seems to be some conflicting reports.
How successful were these American strikes to Iran's strategic nuclear mission?
And then what extent did it actually contribute to today's unrest?
And then just like practically speaking, is Iran still trying to develop a nuclear
weapon today? So I'll try to answer the last question first.
And the answer is maybe.
We don't know. You know, I think the regime understands, especially now, as it feels
like it's fighting for its very existence.
It's like an existential battle that it may be fighting, not just against its own
people, but against foreign actors that are trying to bring it down.
They may see the nuke as their way out.
It's the ultimate insurance policy, if you will.
You know, no one wants to mess with a nuclear armed regime.
And so that may be the reason why they think about doing this.
But, you know, when we look at what happened, there was a lot of damage done to those
three sites. The obliteration claim by Donald Trump.
May have been a little bit too far.
But let me also just say we have three more years of the Trump administration, which
means that for three years, the regime would be crazy to try to actively rebuild its
nuclear program because Trump would say, absolutely not.
We're going back in again. We're going to bomb again.
So what that's done is it's bought three years plus whatever it would take for the
regime to rebuild what was destroyed in those strikes back in June of last year.
And on top of that, the Iranian nuclear scientist, Qadri, has been eviscerated.
The Israelis killed a large number of their scientists and a lot of their research
facilities also destroyed.
So I see this as a setback of five years, give or take, which is pretty good because
from what I understood from Israelis going into this, that they wanted to set back the
regime by seven to eight years.
So they got two thirds of what they were looking for.
Not, you know, it doesn't sound like a bad thing from my perspective, but, you know,
we're still dealing with a regime at its essence that would like to get a nuke.
And, you know, nobody knows whether they would test it on Israel or whether they just
want to keep it as that insurance policy in perpetuity.
But this is either way not something that the Israelis are going to countenance.
And so expect them to be vigilant and expect the United States, certainly as long as
Donald Trump's in, to be vigilant as well, but maybe after because, you know, look, I
will say this, no president of the United States, Democrat or Republican, Trump or not
Trump, wants to be the president that allowed Iran to go nuclear on their watch.
Everybody knows it's not a good thing for the regime to get a nuke.
So I think we've got a runway here where we can expect Iran to not be a nuclear power
for some time. Starting with a nation of Iran, my position is very simple.
The world's number one sponsor of terror can never be allowed to possess the most
dangerous weapon.
Again, a lot, a lot there to unpack.
I'm going to be a little dangerous and have you speculate for a second.
So Iran also suffered major decline in global influence with the fall of the Assad
regime in Syria.
We know that the country is facing unprecedented year-on-year inflation.
It rose more than 43 percent in the last year alone.
And again, the nuclear strikes in June on their nuclear reactors also set them back.
Would you say that the Islamic regime had been exposed as more of a paper tiger?
How strong is the regime today?
So they're strong in the sense that they can mow down as many as 16,500 Iranian
protesters, right?
Internally, they still control the guns.
And that's the important, I think, element to look at as we watch the unrest unfold.
And by the way, that 16,000, it could be as high as 20 or more that we don't know
because the Internet's been shut down.
And that's another part of what's going on here right now, that the regime has control
over the means of communication, Internet phone lines, apart from a hack that took
place over the weekend where somebody was piping in messages from the exiled crown
prince. The Iranian regime still controls a lot of what's happening on the ground.
But the big picture that you've just sketched is really important, right?
The regime suffered 12 days of a beating at the hands of Israel during the war last
year. Then Donald Trump comes in and drops the midnight hammer and takes out those
three nuclear sites.
Again, how much they were obliterated, we can debate.
But it was still an emphatic exclamation point at the end of a long 12 day process.
But then on top of that, right, you have sanctions returning to Iran after Trump got
out of the nuclear deal.
We've watched the return of these sanctions.
The the real, the currency has absolutely plummeted.
And the purchasing power inside Iran is a disaster.
There are environmental challenges.
There's a lack of water.
There's poor air quality.
I mean, at one point, the Iranian regime was talking about moving its capital from Tehran
to some other place because there weren't enough natural resources.
There's electrical grid challenges and shortages, brownouts and the like.
So when you look around at what's going on here right now, there's mismanagement,
there's economic malaise, there's weakness in terms of their policies abroad.
And look at all these assets that the regime was propping up with hundreds of millions,
maybe billions of dollars that could have gone to the regime, could have gone to help
build up society, bridges, hospitals, roads, the whole thing.
And instead, what they did is they sponsored Hamas.
They sponsored Hezbollah.
They sponsored the Houthis.
They sponsored the Assad regime.
And look where they all are.
Hamas is effectively destroyed.
Hezbollah, you know, essentially destroyed.
The Houthis pretty beat up Assad regime toppled.
And don't forget, you know, the Maduro regime in Venezuela collapsed.
That was one of their friends, too.
So when you look around right now, things don't look rosy for the regime.
And now they're under siege at home.
So let me just clarify, then, are you implying or otherwise suggesting that without Iran,
without the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, there is no Hamas, there is no Hezbollah,
there are no Houthis?
Is that what you're saying, that so many of these other proxy smaller terrorist groups
go go away so long as the Iranian regime goes away?
They're going to be a heck of a lot weaker.
I can't promise you that they go away.
I mean, Hamas was formed before Iran started to give it funding.
OK, the Iranian funding came after the group's creation in 1988.
Hezbollah, absolutely a creation of the Iranian regime.
It is an IRGC extension.
OK, the Houthis, they had their own, you know, nationalistic reasons for being before the
regime came in to help them.
So when you look around the region, it's a mixed bag.
My contention is, is that these terrorist groups all become enormously weaker as a result
of the regime collapsing.
And so when people say, oh, we don't know what kind of, you know, what the region looks
like and there's too much danger in toppling the regime, I say, you know what, I think
it's worth a shot here, right?
Not only are you talking about getting rid of one of the worst anti-American, anti-Western
terror supporting regimes on the planet, but they're also the patron of multiple terror
proxies that I'd like to see weakened over the entire region.
Now, I will also just say that there are other sponsors of some of these groups.
OK, the Turks, they're sponsors of Hamas.
And they also, by the way, have lately started to support Hezbollah, which is kind of
shocking because it's a Sunni group, a Sunni country supporting a Shiite group.
Makes no sense, right?
At least according to our logic, that's one to watch.
I think the Turks may try to fill in some of the vacuum left by the Iranians.
You also have the Qataris.
The Qataris have been sponsoring Hamas and a wide range of other terrorist groups around
the region. So it's not like all of the funding goes away and you could see some of
these other states, other terrible regimes that purport to be American allies filling
the vacuum left by the regime.
But still, that said, bringing down the regime will help in terms of terror finance.
Undeniably worldwide.
So I do want to talk about regime change.
But just before I do, you mentioned the death toll, which it could be anywhere from the
low thousands to the high tens of thousands.
We know Internet has been shut down.
We know that the information that we're getting from Iran has been trickling from
Telegram channels. So what are we to believe, right?
What is going on in Iran right now?
Are the protests over?
Has the regime survived?
My understanding is that the regime has mowed down a lot of people.
They've shot their way through the protests.
It doesn't mean that more people won't come out, but I think the bravest people, the
people that were inclined to go out and protest, they've either been killed, injured
or have decided to go home because they don't see a future with the protest movement as
we see it. But now let me just say, if the Trump administration begins to engage
kinetically beyond whatever just happened on the cyber and I don't know if it was the
U.S. or if it was Israel or it was some other hacking group that, you know, that that
broke into the airwaves in Iran, you know, that that was a I mean, a good non kinetic
thing to do to let the people of Iran know that people were on their side.
But I don't think the people come out into the streets again in large numbers.
They may still be coming out.
I don't know if the window is closed, by the way.
I mean, I do think that the Trump administration still, you know, they've got assets
in the region, military assets.
There is a lot of, you know, I mean, nobody knows the mind of Donald Trump.
And I think that's kind of the big, you know, all the the protesters in Iran, they're
all wondering what happened to the president.
He said help was on the way and then helped it in come.
Does that mean that he decided to not help or does it mean that he decided to not help
at that moment?
We don't know.
But I will say that a lot of what happens on the ground in Iran probably is hitched
to whatever Donald Trump decides to do next.
So so let's talk about Donald Trump.
And actually, correct me if I'm wrong.
The last time we saw each other in person was at the White House.
My understanding, based on my friends and sources in the White House, is no one really
knows what Donald Trump is going to do except for Donald Trump.
So speculation within politics, especially speculation pertaining to Donald Trump, is
a fool's errand. But nevertheless, I'm going to ask you to speculate and say, what do
you think is actually going to happen?
Are we going to war with Iran?
And then the second question I have is, what would your message be to Americans,
particularly young Americans who grew up in the shadows of the Iraq war in Afghanistan?
If we were to deploy troops or if we were to engage in other militaristic ways against
Iran, how is this not just another Iraq war, war in Afghanistan?
Why is this different?
OK, so look, first, asking me to predict Donald Trump, I'm sorry, I don't I don't I
don't make bets like that.
I mean, as we say in my business, it's hard enough to predict the past, let alone the
future. Right. I mean, I you know, we have such a hard time just even assessing what
occurred, you know, years ago as opposed to what might happen next.
And Donald Trump is mercurial.
I mean, it's funny. I've been talking to journalists about this.
I mean, I call it the fog of Trump.
It's not the fog of war.
It's the fog that we all have without knowing what Donald Trump is going to do next.
And it's his it's it's it's one of his greatest assets in foreign policy.
But it also is one of the things that can be frustrating for somebody like me when I'm
trying to game this out.
I mean, the fact that our enemies don't know what he's going to do next, the fact that
he is so unpredictable makes him dangerous and it makes them nervous.
And I like that.
I like that they're off balance.
They're on tilt, to use a poker term.
Right. That's all good.
But we don't have a Trump doctrine to work from here.
And so what we can say is based on past performance, Donald Trump didn't mind ripping up
the nuclear deal. He didn't mind dropping the midnight app or hammer on the Iranian
nuclear sites.
It means that he doesn't fear the regime.
But, you know, he apparently got phone calls from a nervous Arab world, maybe from a
nervous Israel, maybe from a nervous intelligence community here in the United States.
Until I understand exactly what got him to step back from the brink, I don't know how
to game this out. Now, as for the folks out there that might think that this is a bad
idea based on some of our past wars, this is an interesting thing that I think folks
need to understand. The reason why we failed in Iraq and Afghanistan is
inextricably tied to the Iranian regime.
They were among those, not the only ones, but they were the ones that were waging
insurgencies against the United States.
It was their IEDs.
It was their attacks.
It was their brutality.
They were the ones that killed American soldiers.
They were the ones that maimed our men and women in uniform in Iraq, in Afghanistan and
beyond. And so when you want to talk about the lessons that we've learned from those
two wars, yeah, we're not great at state building.
We're not talking about state building here.
The question is, are we good at toppling bad regimes?
The answer is we can do that in a heartbeat.
And then the question is, if we want to be involved in the stabilization of Iran or any
other country afterwards, we need to make sure that countries like Iran, the regime
in Iran, does not have any vote in what we do.
I hold them largely responsible for what occurred in those two failed experiments.
They have a lot of blood on their hands and there are receipts to prove it.
The weapon systems that were used, the intelligence that we derived.
I worked at the Treasury Department during that time period.
There was no doubt in anybody's mind that the Iranians were playing a huge role in both
of these campaigns to kill and maim Americans.
Now, the other thing that I would just note is looking forward.
Number one, if you get Iran out of the region, right, they're not the one that that is
sponsoring mayhem all over the Middle East.
We may need to deploy fewer troops over time.
This is a way of bringing additional stability to the Middle East, not necessarily
making things worse.
Now, there's no guarantees that we don't see more chaos evolve.
This is kind of a, you know, it's a characteristic of the Middle East that chaos
begets chaos. But usually it's been the Iranians that have been doing it.
So I would say that you might you might have a decrease in the need for deploying
forces. The other thing is, of course, by liberating a country that has enormous oil
wealth, this could lead to a different era of energy dominance, as the president would
call it. You know, you could see a freer flow of oil and a more affordable supply of
oil as a result of the downfall of the regime.
The last thing I would just note is the people of Iran are incredibly pro West, pro
America, pro liberal values.
Most of them hate this regime.
And so if the regime that is put in its place, if we bring down the Islamic Republic,
is anything like the people, then I think it will be a friend to the United States for
years to come. Lastly, before I let you go, we first got to know each other, Jonathan,
over the campus protesters after October 7th.
We have seen that Israel-Palestine has just dominated the minds of every single young
person on American college campuses.
What does it suggest?
Very quickly, there has not been a single major campus protest for the people of Iran
as they're trying to obtain life and freedom and democracy.
Oh, just absolute hypocrisy.
And I, you know, I'm glad you asked the question.
But I mean, because there's been nothing out there as we've learned about the slaughter,
as we've learned about the maiming of these protesters.
And, you know, I mean, the protesters on the Gaza front, they came out within 24 hours
before a war even started, telling the world that Israel was genocidal.
Right. And now you've got 16,000 people killed since, you know, December 28th.
And they haven't said a word.
I think this should give you a sense of the social justice that these people believe in.
And it's not social justice at all.
It is selective outrage and it is faux outrage.
I think that these people have been manipulated.
I think they're useful idiots for people that I think are professional agitators that have
coordinated their activities.
And it's been exposed.
It's been exposed in lots of different ways.
But I have to say, it is disappointing.
When you look at these schools, they're supposed to be bastions of education and morality.
Right. We're supposed to be teaching our young people the ethics and morals that we've been
trying to pass on from generation to generation here in this country.
And when you see the way in which they, I mean, it was organized and it was it was done
in such a way that it was just so transparent that they were targeting Israel.
That was their ulterior motive.
And the motive of supporting people that want nothing more than democracy, that happen to
be pro-America, that are fighting against a truly evil regime, it's it's it's beyond
disappointing. It really does make you begin to lose faith in the next generation.
Unfortunately, I have to agree with you on that.
Jonathan Chandler, this has been a really illuminating conversation.
Jonathan is the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
If you are not following him and or the FDD online, you are missing out.
Jonathan, thank you so much for your time and everything you've been doing these last few
years. My pleasure.
Thank you. Well, thank you so much for watching.
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