Transfusion-Transmitted Infections

CDC
258 followers
Jan 18, 2026
Isabel Griffin provides some historical context on transfusion-transmitted infections (TTIs) and share what we are doing to improve hemovigilance in the United States.
This video can also be viewed at
https://www.cdc.gov/wcms/video/low-res/nhsn/2026/9009002025NHSNATTransfusionTransmittedInfections.mp4
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My name is Isabel Griffin.
I'm an epidemiologist in CDC's Office of Blood, Organ,
and Other Tissue Safety.
We also go by the name BOOTS.
I'm sure many of you have worked with us.
Our office is tasked with investigating
infectious disease transmissions from donor
to recipient through blood product transfusion,
solid organ transplantation, and tissue implantation.
Today, I will provide some historical context
on transfusion-transmitted infections, or TTIs,
and share what we're doing to improve hemovigilance
in the United States.
Transfusion-transmitted infections, or TTIs,
can be severe and result in death.
The problem is that TTI surveillance
in the United States is inadequate.
Compared to hemovigilance programs in countries
like the United Kingdom, France, and Canada,
where hemovigilance reporting is mandatory,
reporting TTIs to CDC is voluntary.
In the United States, there's no requirement
for transfusing hospitals to report transfusion-related
adverse events to CDC.
And for nationally notifiable pathogens,
transfusion history questions on the case report forms
are not required, and this data is often missing
from data transmitted to CDC.
This lack of TTI surveillance leaves a major gap
and an opportunity for a pathogen
to emerge in the blood supply.
And we've seen this in the past.
In June of 1981, CDC published an MMWR
describing a rare pneumonia in five young men.
The disease went by many names, but we now know it as AIDS.
At the beginning of the outbreak,
it was unclear how the disease was spreading.
It was suspected to be through sexual transmission,
primarily among men who have sex with men, or MSM,
or those who have sex with MSM.
But another transmission route soon appeared.
Hemophiliacs were being diagnosed with AIDS
at an alarming rate,
but they didn't have typical risk factors,
just frequent transfusions of Factor VIII,
a clotting product produced from plasma donations.
By December of 1982, several MMWRs
describing case reports of HIV
among hemophiliacs had been published.
But it was an MMWR describing a 20-month-old infant
who developed AIDS after receiving blood transfusions
that provided the hemophilia community
the strongest evidence that there was an issue
with the blood supply.
The hemophiliac community demanded that something be done.
A month later, in January of 1983,
CDC hosted a meeting with partners in the blood community
to address this growing concern
over the safety of the nation's blood supply.
During this meeting, a CDC official,
Don Francis, notoriously asked an industry,
how many people with hemophilia have to die?
Is it three enough?
Is six?
Is 10?
Is 100 enough?
To prevent this, this meeting brought up
the same issues in blood safety that we have today,
how to strike a balance between the theoretical
recipient risk, product availability,
cost of screening, and commercial interest.
Unfortunately, this meeting produced
no recommendations or changes.
As early as 1983, there was evidence to suggest
that HIV contamination of the blood supply
might have been prevented.
The hemophilia community demanded
a government investigation into the events
that led up to the epidemic.
The Institute of Medicine, IOM,
of the National Academy of Science,
convened a public hearing to identify
the institutional determinants of HIV-AIDS epidemics
among U.S. hemophilia patients.
In 1995, this committee published 14 recommendations,
two of which were for CDC.
The first recommendation was that federal agencies
must understand, support, and respond
to CDC's responsibility to serve
as the nation's early warning system
for threats to the health of the public.
The second recommendation was that the public health service
within CDC should establish a surveillance system
to detect, monitor, and warn of adverse events
in recipients of blood and blood products.
This IOM report was considered
a turning point in blood safety.
For decades, federal agencies have worked together
to provide oversight and monitoring
of blood safety in the United States.
The U.S. FDA has direct regulatory responsibility
for blood and blood products.
This includes a license of blood components,
derivatives, and donor screening tests.
FDA also receives reports of transfusion-related deaths
via MedWatch.
The National Institute of Health,
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
provides funding for basic and translational research
related to the availability, efficacy, and safety
of blood products in the development of alternatives.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
is responsible for conducting surveillance
and detection of public health risks related to blood.
CDC works with federal partners
to determine whether safety measures are needed.
CDC and our Boots Office
have led many TTI investigations since 2015.
These include arboviral infections,
bacterial contamination of platelets,
parasitic infections such as malaria,
and arboviral infections,
including some very severe infections
like West Nile virus and Cache Valley fever virus transmission.
Many of these investigations have resulted in policy changes
and updates to donor screening recommendations.
Federal agencies have worked together
to identify donor deferral criteria
to exclude donors with infectious disease risk factors.
And today's Blood Donor History Questionnaire
asks about specific risk behaviors,
such as injection drug use or recent tattoos,
that may put somebody at a higher risk
of having an infectious disease.
Since the 1970s, serological assays
targeting virus-specific antibodies and antigens
have been effective in identifying
transfusion-transmitted infectious agents.
Recent implementation of nucleic acid amplification technology
or NAT screening for HIV, hepatitis C,
and B have also greatly reduced the risk
by reducing the window periods for donations,
as evidenced in Part A of that figure.
NAT screening has also emerged as the preferred option
for emerging pathogens like West Nile, Zika, and Babesia.
As these NAT tests can be quickly developed
and deployed within several months.
However, NAT screening is more expensive,
as shown in the middle figure.
And if you look at Part C of this figure,
there has been a constant need to reevaluate
the risks of emerging pathogens to the blood supply
for the past several decades.
Some of these emerging threats in red,
which is West Nile and Babesia,
are true public health safety threats.
In response to IOM's call for action,
in 2010, CDC began operating
the National Healthcare Safety Network
Biovigilance Component Hemovigilance Module,
a voluntary passive surveillance system.
The Hemovigilance Module serves
as the only national surveillance platform
for recipient hemovigilance that is available
for use by all healthcare facilities
in the U.S. performing transfusion.
Remember our list of TTI investigations?
None of these were reported officially
through the Hemovigilance Module.
And it's likely that serious TTIs may have gone unrecognized
and continue to go undetected.
As a result, we are modernizing hemovigilance efforts
to rapidly and systematically identify
emerging pathogens transmitted through blood transfusions.
But strong collaborations are needed
with healthcare facilities, blood banks,
and transfusion services to systematically,
one, identify pathogens of interest
in a patient receiving a transfusion,
and two, notify CDC.
We also plan to work closely with health departments
and healthcare facilities to complete
an updated TTI investigation form.
For the past 15 years,
CDC's NHSN Hemovigilance Module
has monitored transfusion-associated adverse reactions,
including acute hemolytic transfusion reactions,
acute lung injury or TRALI,
transfusion-associated circulatory overload, TACO,
and transfusion-transmitted infections,
as well as a number of transfusion-related incidents
and errors and monthly denominator data
describing the number of transfusions at a facility level.
Participation in the module was and is voluntary,
except for in the state of Massachusetts,
which mandates reporting to the module.
Version 2.8 was robust in data collection fields and quality,
but not so much in capturing
a robust representative data set.
Over the past year,
CDC has been working to streamline reporting,
modernize data collection efforts,
and reduce the burden of reporting
to focus primarily on elements
with the highest public health priority.
We have gone from 20 unique reporting forms to only four.
For those familiar with the module,
you will see that many data elements are being retired
to shift the focus of the module
to the rapid identification
of transfusion-transmitted infections
and acute transfusion reactions.
Some of you may have noticed
that several of our pathogens of interest
in the footnotes on the last few slides
include those that are nationally notifiable,
meaning health departments report these
to various SMU teams at CDC.
And some of this reporting
may include transfusion history of the patient,
but that this is not a required field
in most case report forms.
And you'll also see that many of these pathogens
are not nationally notifiable,
so there isn't necessarily a reporting pathway
to detect these on a nationwide scale
other than voluntary reporting to the hemovigilance module.
So here's what we're planning.
We will provide healthcare facilities
with our pathogens of interest list,
a list of pathogens known or capable
of being transfusion-transmitted.
Facilities will use those to flag a laboratory result.
The hospital epidemiologist, or ICP,
will receive this flag and determine
whether the patient has received a transfusion
in the prior 30 days.
If the patient meets both criteria,
having a pathogen of interest
and a transfusion in the prior 30 days,
then this would trigger the hospital epidemiologist, or ICP,
to notify CDC via the NHSN hemovigilance module
new TTI rapid alert form.
CDC will use this report to notify the health department
to begin working on a TTI investigation
with the healthcare facility.
The health department and the facility
will be able to simultaneously complete
this investigation form in the module.
CDC staff will review these reports daily
and follow up with the health department
and our facility if a public health response is triggered.
For example, if an implicated product
was given to more than one recipient.
In the event that TTIs were to become nationally notifiable
or mandatory reporting for a specific state,
the state also has the option
to build out the TTI investigation form
in their surveillance system,
and CDC can work with the health department
to electronically transmit this data in real time
if there's interest in this option.
This is what the new two-question TTI rapid alert form
will contain.
It's straightforward and simple.
The goal is to enable facilities to rapidly alert CDC
that a TTI investigation is taking place.
This is also to quickly alert the health department
of a potential TTI investigation
so the health department can reach out to the facility
to help with the investigation.
The TTI investigation form has also been expanded
to include additional details concerning laboratory tests
relevant to the investigation
and epidemiologic risk factors
that may rule out exposure to the pathogen
through the transfusion.
The investigation form also contains
an updated components detailed section or table
which collects more detailed information
about the transfused components,
such as ISBT code and test results,
to assist with traceback effort.
The form will continue to use CDC's
standardized case definition,
imputability and severity criteria for TTIs,
and lastly, new sections capturing facility
and CDC investigation notes will be used
to help communicate between partners
during TTI investigation.
As of March 2025, 380 facilities in the United States
are actively enrolled in the module,
of which 75 are in Massachusetts
where reporting is mandated.
But most states only have a couple facilities enrolled.
For example, Florida only has six
and West Virginia only has one.
Of note, these are just facilities enrolled in the module.
Not all of these have consistently reported data.
For example, only 61 or 16% of enrolled facilities
have submitted their annual facility survey
that was due in June.
And as far as TTI reporting,
only three TTIs have been reported to CDC this calendar year.
But again, reporting TTIs to the module is not mandatory.
We believe that we need to increase enrollment efforts
to include another potentially 4,000
eligible transfusing facilities
in order to capture robust TTI surveillance data.
Ultimately, we need your help.
While a mosquito bite or tick bite may be more likely
if your patient hasn't left the hospital in three weeks,
then it may be a good idea to ask about transfusion history.
And also, please ask your NHSN facility administrator
to consider adding the biovigilance component
to help with our reporting.
Thank you for your time.
If you're interested in enrolling
in the hemovigilance module,
you can send an email to the NHSN help desk
with hemovigilance in the subject line.
Thank you.
