Từ súng bộ binh, xe tăng cho đến trực thăng, nhiều hệ vũ khí do Ấn Độ tự phát triển liên tục gặp vấn đề về độ tin cậy và hiệu quả tác chiến. Điều đáng chú ý là những trục trặc này không xuất hiện ngẫu nhiên, mà lặp lại trong nhiều chương trình khác nhau suốt hàng chục năm. Vậy điều gì trong tư duy thiết kế, mô hình sản xuất và cách vận hành đã khiến công nghiệp quốc phòng Ấn Độ rơi vào vòng luẩn quẩn như vậy? ----------------------------- Giảm ngay 50.000đ cho khán giả CD Media khi mua gói Gemini Pro kèm 2TB dung lượng lưu trữ.
Sở hữu AI mạnh mẽ từ ông lớn Google hỗ trợ tối đa công việc – học tập – giải trí mỗi ngày.
Nâng cấp nhanh nhất qua: Zalo 038.330.8487 Hoặc: shoptkpremium.com -----------------------------
📋 ""CDMedia - Quân sự"" là một nền tảng chuyên sâu kết nối những kiến thức và thông tin xoay quanh lĩnh vực quân sự. Dựa trên các nguồn đáng tin cậy từ nhiều phía, kênh mang đến cho khán giả một cái nhìn đa chiều về các chiến lược quân sự, công nghệ quốc phòng từ quá khứ tới hiện đại.
Mọi sự ủng hộ cho kênh mời các bạn donate qua: - STK: 0393331668 - Ngân hàng BIDV - Nguyễn Việt Cường - Momo: 0393331668"
In early 2025 India proudly ranked among the world's top 25 arms-exporting nations
However according to India Today the country accounted for only 0.2% of global sales in 2024
The main reason is that the weapons program in that region has become a mess
From the disaster known as the INSAS rifle design
even projects like the Azul tank or the INS Vikrant
aircraft carrier have faced doubts about their capabilities
As a result the Indian military remained wary of domestically produced
equipment Imported weapons meanwhile were only intermittently issued in service
Russian goods alone have reached up to 60%
Why is that
First let's examine a few examples of India's substandard weapons to
gain a clearer picture of the country's defense industry as a whole
In the mass weapon scandal the most notorious case involved the INSAS rifle
As its name suggests India's handheld weapon system
features a firearm designed with multiple variants
From assault rifles and security firearms to light machine guns
Ambition was high but upon leaving the factory the INSAS quickly
became a source of embarrassment for India's defense industry
During the Kargil War with Pakistan in 1999
The INSAS rifle suffers from two critical flaws: jamming and unreliable operation in cold weather
In some cases the INSAS still fires automatically
Worse still it might fail to fire when switching to automatic or three-round burst mode
Even after undergoing three subsequent upgrades through the 1B1 1C and Excalibur versions
The gun still couldn't resolve the escape
route and worse it caused the magazine to crack
As a result it was increasingly blocked by the enemy forces
Since 2015 India has replaced all INSAS rifles
in high-risk combat zones with imported firearms
In March 2017 approval was granted to fully retire
this firearm model after nearly 20 years of service
paving the way for the bidding round in July 2018
In December 2021 by purchasing the AK-203 rifle production line from Russia
INSAS has been officially declared dead by its own creators
Switching to armored vehicles India has a
similarly controversial product: the Arjun tank
The project was launched in the 1970s yet to this
day it remains nothing more than a tangled mess
Pretending to be a domestic brand according to a report
by India
's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) by 2024
India can only achieve self-reliance in 40% to 50% of components
Reliance on foreign parts
causing the production line
to frequently halt whenever
a partner encounters a setback For instance since 2024
Germany's MTU has delayed delivery of the engines until as late as 2027 or 2028
This forces India to seek alternatives through domestic
production or imports from the
United States Waiting is not enough
80% of the Arjun tanks in the army's first batch have been
left unused since 2020 due to
as many as 90 technical defects
Most serious of all is the vehicle with excessively thick armor
reaching up to 550–650 mm
It was designed to counter the American
M1A2 Abrams The reason lies
in the factory's choice of a modular composite structure with multiple layers stacked upon each other
This contributed to the vehicle's
weight reaching nearly 69 tons—far exceeding
the load capacity of current Indian rural road conditions
At the same time the MTU
engine failed to effectively convert power
into traction causing the vehicle
to fall short of requirements
Climbing slopes steeper than 30 degrees and conducting combat operations in mountainous terrain
It remains poorly adapted to the thin
cold air of the mountainous region
To this day the T-72 and T-90 remain the backbone of India 's
armored forces
The next notorious name appearing on this list is
an air combat representative
—Groove the helicopter
Its largest shipment came
from the export lot destined for Ecuador
In 2008 India won the contract to supply
seven Groove units to a
South American partner
with a floor valued at 45.2 million dollars
Yet just one year later a
helicopter of this type crashed during the annual parade in
the capital city of Quy To
In the presence of numerous onlookers
From then until 2015
three more were involved in accidents one after another
That set a record
4 out of 7 Groove helicopters
equivalent to 57% of the entire squadron
completely destroyed
Due to reasons unrelated to combat
Concerned about this situation in 2015
the Ecuadorian government
suspended all operations of Groove
and terminate the maintenance contracts
Finally turn your gaze toward the Indian Ocean
to see another remarkable achievement no
less impressive in its own right
The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant
Conceived in 1979 the project
has been repeatedly delayed
constantly discussed and
repeatedly approved and rejected
By the time it was actually implemented in
2003 Vikrant faced two
critical issues First
e Cochin shipyard the
primary builder had no
experience with aircraft
carriers Secondly at that time
India has not yet mastered core
technologies such
as producing steel
for this type of vessel aircraft
control systems or main gearboxes
The two issues immediately
became intertwined delaying shipbuilding
progress and driving up costs
Under the original plan the INS
Vikrant was scheduled to be handed
over between 2010 and 2012
at a cost of around 200 to 300 million VND
But it wasn't until finally 2022
that the train officially began operations
When costs skyrocketed to
3.5 billion dollars In
other words the project fell behind
schedule by about 12 years
and the team's budget exceeded the
initial estimate by more than thirteenfold
That's not all—so far INS Vikrant has still not resolved
the issue of selecting the
aircraft to operate from the ship
The MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB
fighter jets operated by their
own crew and subsequently
controlled by ground personnel
The Indian team's equipment was deemed unsuitable
due to the harsh
conditions in the Indian Ocean and inadequate maintenance standards
resulting in their combat
efficiency remaining consistently low
Although highly interested in switching India's military has
not yet decided so it
remains uncertain whether to choose France 's
Rafale or the U S F/A-18 Super Hornet
and TE-DBF electric floating vessel
That's why the MiG still
continues to fulfill its role today
Beyond the examples already mentioned
both Indian and international traditions
have consistently expressed concern over the quality of this country's weapons
All of this points to
a recurring trend India
is the world's second-largest weapons buyer
During the 2020–2024
period it accounted
for 8.3% of global import volume
So why does this nation's defense
sector continually produce disasters
Before answering that question
CDMedia would like to take a moment
o introduce the beloved
program from a familiar partner
Enter the CDMedia code to receive a 50 000 VND discount
When purchasing the Gemini Pro package with 2TB of storage capacity Contact
us for the fastest support
To answer the question of why India 's defense industry continually
produces disasters we must
go back to the earlier phase
This country was a colony of the British Empire
In 1858 after
being thoroughly exploited India was subjected to comprehensive
exploitation and extraction Heavy
industries were heavily targeted
especially the defense industry was brutally exploited by colonial powers
to stifle any
potential for development The British allowed only
There are some facilities producing
light weapons and auxiliary equipment
Among them notable ones that
still exist today are the
Isapare Gun Factory and the
Kosipare Ammunition Factory
ammunition and explosives factory
Dung and Camper's
military supplies factory
The consequences of gaining independence
rough nonviolent means in 1947
India was only capable of producing
military equipment at the most basic level
They lacked everything
o build a national defense
industry from the doctrine of
warfare to development production
and skilled craftsmanship
From here cascading
consequences began to emerge
The first issue was a sense of being overwhelmed
Among the various weapon
schools India as a non-
aligned nation has favorable
conditions for engagement
around the world They can freely attend
military schools in the
United States to study
while also purchasing the best Soviet weapons available
including T-55 tanks and SAM air defense systems
However when not accompanied by a solid war
doctrine this advantage
becomes a double-edged sword
India is prone to falling into the
trap of impressive-sounding technical
specifications on paper From there they
get caught in the next flawed assumption
creating makeshift designs by combining weapons
from various countries with
a shared desire for peace
The clearest evidence of this situation
lies in the history of domestic
tank development Until the 1960s
despite having achieved independence
India still relies on Britain
for armored vehicle donations
In response to
the demand for self-reliance New Delhi ordered the Vickers company to
develop tanks along with the condition
that a domestic production facility be built
In 1963 the
Viyayan Tá prototype was modified
However during the war
with Pakistan in 1971
It proved markedly inferior
to Linsol's T55 in both
combat capability and
legacy As a result in 1974
India has dropped the UK from its
program to develop a new generation of
indigenous tanks previously
targeting Germany's Leopard 2
In 1984 the
original Indian Leopard prototype was unveiled
However this vehicle has faced
criticism for being an enlarged
version of the original which led India
to abandon it From here onward
New Delhi lost its way in the design process
And then came the bitter twist
that produced the Azul we know
This situation also repeats
itself even more severely with Insas
From a conceptual standpoint
the weapon was designed as
a refined synthesis of legendary firearms
Inspired in design
by the FN FAL
its gas-operated system based on the principle
of the AK-47
The recoil system is influenced by the Galil
from Israel And uses
5.56 x 45 mm NATO ammunition
o enhance both accuracy and portability for the
infantryman In theory
this is nearly a revolution
In the conceptual design of the
weapon system the actual manufacturing capabilities and quality
control standards were still limited quickly
turning those ambitions into mere aspirations
a disaster
Insas and Azul have become living
proof of the gap between the beautiful
theory on paper and the actual
industrial capability of the degree
Beforehand due to a lack of skilled professionals many
types of Indian weapons did
not undergo thorough testing
Then only when the infantry
unit was fully equipped
did the technical flaws gradually become apparent
By this point the scale of the error had become so significant that it
was causing negative repercussions
across mainstream media in society
Moreover the system's bureaucratic
inefficiency and cumbersome procedures
have significantly contributed to
the stagnation of India's defense industry
Before 2020 the process of producing and purchasing weapons
typically required going through
multiple layers of complex approvals
Unlike that this activity also faces additional issues
particularly the lack of
clearly defined time milestones
Specifically the process typically
begins when the military identifies a
need and develops a technical requirements
document which is then submitted to
The Defense Procurement Board chaired by the
Minister of Defense submitted the request for approval
Proceed with inviting bids by requesting suppliers
to submit technical and financial proposals
A complete weapon system then had to undergo field testing conducted
by the team In some cases this
process was even more extensive
with the participation of the Defense
Research and Development Organization
This phase also lasted the longest as
testing had to be repeated multiple times
and technical requirements are frequently adjusted
After the weapon passed inspection the Ministry of Defense
began negotiating price and
contract terms with the contractor
The price quotation
was then submitted to the competent authority
responsible for disbursement
such as the Ministry of Finance
In certain exceptional cases
The deal still requires cabinet approval
before the formal contract can be signed
Finally after approval mass production was assigned
to the national defense
factory system known as OFB
It was also notorious for its
ineffective and poorly managed projects
That fruit can be seen as an entire operational system spanning multiple
intermediate water layers with
overlapping authority and responsibility
Every time a dispute arises technical
adjustments or political disagreements
only serve to further amplify the
risk of delayed implementation
An internal report from India 's
Ministry of Defence leaked
in 2018 revealed a startling
figure—only about 8 to 10%
Out of the 144 contracts proposed
in the past three fiscal years
144 were completed on schedule
The remainder were
largely delayed
due to unusual approval and testing cycles
A notable example in this
complex situation is the Tejas fighter jet
The project was launched in 1983
but due to India's persistent
stagnation it continues
to miss further advancements in aerospace technology
It was not until 2023 that the country decided to
begin mass-producing the Tejas amid concerns tha
This fighter model was already obsolete the moment it was introduced
Finally one cannot fail to mention the issue of corruption India's modernization
and transfer of defense production technology have been hindered by it
acknowledging numerous scandals
of particularly severe magnitude
A typical case is the Best
System Rolls-Royce consortium scandal In 2004
bribes
were paid to local officials
The poet from England has won the contract with
the following terms:
purchase 24 Hawk jet trainers
1-1-5 for £734 million
Production license for 42 additional units
via technology transfer
with an additional amount of 308 million dollars
Approval of production license
for 57 more Hawk aircraft
from the Indian Air Force with a total value
Over 2 billion dollars
By 2016
the case was officially dropped
The trial is still ongoing
Also in 2012 another
corruption scandal erupted
at OFB involving
Germany' s Raimental Air Defense集团
By bribing officials they could freely access the domestic production market even
entering local manufacturing programs This
scandal too stemmed from such misconduct
Former OFB CEO Sudip
Tagos used the elephant'
s eternal presence to
make transfer decisions
or appointment is also subject to the same restrictions
The consequence is that the German conglomerate along with five other defense companies
has been added to India's Defense Ministry' s
blacklist The same applies to this matter
is a 10-year trading ban
against this country The
aforementioned names
indicate networks channels
and the design purchased for study
had been tampered with severely
compromising India's ability to
develop quality indigenous weapons
Given the numerous flaws and mistakes mentioned above it's no
surprise that the Indian military
itself prefers imported equipment
Faced with urgent defense needs New Delhi was forced to plunge into billion-dollar deals
Over the past two decades Russia has become India's largest defense partner with their weapons
accounting for approximately 65%
New Delhi's total import volume
exceeded 60 billion dollars
Not stopping there India also
acquired licensing and production
transfer for certain products
such as the AK-203 assault rifle
T-90 tanks
Deep reliance
across multiple military branches
from armored forces navy
to air defense and air force
In the context of the Russia-Ukraine war
reshaping the global political landscape this
situation has raised concerns in India over the risk of being drawn into Moscow's orbit
Only recently did it come
under scrutiny Beyond Russian equipment India's arsenal
has become a chaotic mix
with arms from various other countries
such as France the United States and the
United Kingdom This led to a nightmare
for logistics units
when having to work with too many design schools
and a wide range of varying parameters not
to mention the inefficient investment model
that continually leaves New Delhi struggling
Criticism arose over the creation of a self-reinforcing cycle
Purchasing foreign technology
failed localization
leading to the need to buy prototype products again
foreign use so the military has something to work with
The twist of fate is greater than ever as even
within these deals India remains clueless about
how these contracts came to be
Signs of a trap losing money and suffering damage
I'm making it clear that this purchase is of the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier from Russia
On paper the ship was
sold for practically
nothing However all the costs of refitting
and modernization costs borne by India
The ambiguity in this clause
led New Delhi to delay payment for over
2.9 billion dollars to make the revisions
and refit the vessel
This one is named INS Vikramaditya
Another deal in 2012
India plans to purchase 126 Quickfire
missiles from France along with
provisions for technology transfer
and domestic production However
The plan was then unexpectedly canceled—without a
clear explanation given
to Parliament or the public
By 2015 Prime Minister Modi announced India
would directly purchase 36
completed Quickrofail aircraft
with a total value
of approximately 7.87 billion euros On
average the price per aircraft
reached around 218 million euros
More than 40% higher than the initial proposal
Moreover the vast majority of technology transfer commitments have
nearly vanished This development
swiftly led to political investigations
both India and France
Paris maintained that
the contract was entirely
transparent By 2019
The Indian Supreme Court also
dismissed the allegations of
misconduct However the rulings did not erase the fact tha
Delhi found itself at a significant disadvantage
in a long-term strategic deal especially
after the incident involving the Quickrofail team being targeted by Pakistan's air force
downed in the Kashmir air
battle in May 2025 the
incident has reignited
tensions All of this is not only
ot only the consequence but also reverting
back to become the cause of the
erosion of the nation's defense industry and
military India thus remains a military power
terms of scale yet they have never truly gained
autonomy over their own
power Facing such a reality
The Indian government could obviously not stand by and do nothing
On May 12 2020
Prime Minister Modi officially announced
India's self-reliance campaign
with an economic package worth approximately
266 billion dollars
In this strategy the defense industry
It is one of the nation's foundational
pillars and holds vital significance for national
survival The core vision consists of three main objectives
Reducing reliance on imported components
particularly in strategic computing
sectors while promoting domestic
production with the goal of export
a focus on creativity and
research and development to
enhance long-term self-reliance
To realize this ambition
The Indian government has set a series
of complementary tasks for itself
encouraging domestic production across both public and private sectors
attracting foreign investment and
technological transfer reforming
institutions infrastructure and
policies to create a favorable environme
favorable for defense investors
Immediately this dose
produced clear results
In the 2024–2025 period
domestic defense production
reached a record high
of 1.5059 trillion rupees
an increase of
18.6% compared to
2023–2024 and approximately 224%
compared to the 2014–2015 baseline
In that budget
defense spending was also significantly increased to 6.81 trillion rupees
for the 2025–2026
academic year Regarding infrastructure
defense industrial corridors are being established
across the country forming an integrated closed-loop and synchronized
production network Thanks to these
changes weapons and military equipme
India has begun a comprehensive transformation
A series of projects previously deemed stalled have been brought back
to the strategic planning table for reassessment
realignment and fundamental revision
Thanks to this the Tejas
fighters Arjun tanks and the BMD missile defense program were
given a chance to be revived
Enter mass production
Particularly noteworthy is the
BrahMos hypersonic cruise missile a
rare success story under the India
-Russia joint development model
This weapon quickly became a
symbol of India's self-reliance New
Delhi spared no expense to gain
full control over the technology
and build a closed-loop factory
Microsoft AI the
BrahMos export deal
to the Philippines has made history
For the first time
India has sold a weapon system featuring
advanced technology capable of
competing on the international market
This also makes it clear that New
Delhi is no longer merely playing
the role of a buyer but is steadily
stepping into the role of a seller
According to India's Ministry
of Defence India's defence
exports from March 2024
to March 2025 amounted to
Reached 236 billion rupees a 12% increase
compared to the previous fiscal year
Besides BrahMos many other products have also
begun to find their place in the international market such
as medium-range air defense systems
Akash has orders from
Armenia and the Philippines
At the same time the ATAGS
pull shot is also being executed
Nevertheless the question of military readiness
remains unresolved Whether these recent
advances necessarily mean India now has the
capability to stand on its own remains uncertain
How can we produce truly reliable defense products
The repeated revival of old projects reveals a serious effort to rectify
past mistakes yet simultaneously
exposes the reality that China faces
India's technological foundation
is still in the process of gradually solidifying
Even its flagship symbol
requires collaboration with foreign entities
demonstrating comprehensive self-
reliance remains an immediate goal
If not fundamentally resolved
self-reliance will remain more a
desire than a tangible capability
From here the final question arises
Is India's weapons program truly
maturing or is it merely a fleeting
burst of brilliance before losing
momentum and reverting
to old patterns