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This video comes as a culmination of previous Units of History episodes on individual elements of the Spartan Army like the Spartan Royal Guard and the Spartan Skiritai. In this history documentary we bring it all together to see how all these forces came together. We cover this in the mechanical process from making the initial decision to go to war to the mustering and deployment of troops in battle.
We begin by looking at the reasons why Sparta might go to war in the first place. This can best be understood according to two main time periods of Spartan history, the archaic and the classical period. The former saw Sparta engage in direct conquest against its neighbors while the latter saw Sparta expand through the formation of the Peloponnesian league. Each of these methods would have different triggers for conflict.
We then discuss the process by which a war was declared. This involved the internal politics in Sparta, discussions within the Peloponnesian league, seeking approval from the gods, and so on. But finally once a war had been declared it was time to summon the Spartan army. We again talk about what this looked like in early versus late Spartan history with examples from the Greco Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War. Its all a fascinating process that we hope to cover more of in the future. Stay tuned for more Units of History episodes and How to Raise an Army episodes!
Sources and Suggested Reading "Classical Greek Tactics: A Cultural History" by Roel Konijnendijk T. Figueira, ‘The Spartan hippeis’, in S. Hodkinson and A. Powell (eds.), Sparta & War (2006), 57-84
Today, the Spartans are known as a warlike people whose whole society was geared for war.
It would therefore seem logical to assume that when a conflict broke out,
they would be ready to fight at the drop of a hat.
However, the ancient Greeks knew them as a people who were notoriously reluctant to get involved
in wars beyond their sphere of influence and who rarely left their homes to fight abroad.
So how do we reconcile these two ideas?
In this video, we will be answering this question by exploring the mechanics
of what it was like to raise a Spartan army and deploy it for battle.
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Before we begin the video, it will be necessary to add a general disclaimer to the visuals.
People in antiquity did not make use of accurate bird's eye view maps. Rather,
they experienced and presented their world from the ground level, relying more on first-hand
exploration of the world by commanders, scouts, or guides. Travel maps, if they were used at all,
were therefore more akin to metro line diagrams with the route from point A to B being described
as distances between important landmarks. We have an entire video on this subject if you want to
learn more. However, using this more accurate depiction would prove quite confusing for our
purposes and so we've chosen to use the modern style map for this video. Please try to keep this
in the back of your mind as we proceed. With that out of the way, let's get started.
We will begin by examining what might prompt the Spartans to go to war in the first place.
Broadly speaking, there could be any number of reasons as is evidenced by the rowdy Greek world,
which was embroiled in a near constant state of internal and external fighting over the centuries.
With regards to Spartan history, however, we can identify a distinct difference in their
war-making mentality between two key periods, the Archaic and the Classical.
The first chapter of Spartan history is the Archaic period, which spans from around 800 to
500 BC. Unfortunately, the specifics of this era are difficult to reconstruct. Generally, however,
it seemed that wars were often about outright conquest. Neighbor fought neighbor over arable
land, grazing rights, and control of sacred places. Towns that couldn't defend themselves
against larger opponents were often absorbed in some way or razed to the ground, and whole
populations were enslaved. It's in this manner that all the larger states of the region gradually
expanded throughout the Archaic period. We know, for instance, of the brutal wars in which Argos
wiped out its neighbors and took their lands. As for Sparta, things were not so different.
It seized the plain of Eurotas first, then it subjugated the coastal and mountainous borders
of Larchidaemon. Finally, it crossed over the mountains to conquer Mycenae in the west and
the Theriatus in the east. By the middle of the 500s BC, Sparta directly controlled the entire
southern half of the Peloponnese. It is around this point that we begin to transition to the
second chapter of its history. The key moment appears to have occurred around 550 BC,
when Sparta attempted to conquer Tygia, but failed. According to legend, its soldiers,
who had come with chains to take captives, found themselves made prisoner by their own shackles
in defeat. As would occur elsewhere in Greece, a city-state had just found the limit of how much
territory it could directly conquer. From now on, expansion would be carried out indirectly
through the formation of a network of unequal alliances that would become known as the
Peloponnesian League. No longer did Sparta itself have to be strong enough to take on everyone at
once. It merely had to be strong enough to maintain its status as head bully. From this position,
it could then leverage the united might of the group to do the true heavy lifting of policing
its members and countering enemy forces. In this new paradigm, the reasons to go to war became more
complex. The first major change was that now wars had to be justifiable not just to the people of
Sparta, but also to the allied members of the League. The second major change was that matters
of status and honor had to be considered more heavily. If either was successfully challenged,
Sparta could lose its legitimacy as a hegemonic power. This risked having subordinate states
break away. If these were not quickly brought back in line, further legitimacy would be lost
and the entire Peloponnesian League could quickly dissolve. As a result, the Spartans had to assert
their supremacy and take any slight to their honor very seriously. A threat could be anything
from attacks on its allies to attempts to block its right to make sacrifices at a particular
sanctuary. All required a forceful response. Throughout the classical period, this would be
done through a combination of hard power and soft power. History focuses quite a lot on the instances
where Sparta flexed the hard power of its military superiority. In contrast, we hear
little of its more subtle moves. I'd now like to elaborate on this briefly before we move on.
The main way Sparta attempted to do so was by making itself known as the benevolent protector
of states, sanctuaries, and people. For instance, it made a habit of deposing tyrants that took
control of Greek cities or breaking up powerful leagues that sought to dominate their neighbors.
On paper, this was done for the benefit of the oppressed. In reality, though, it put a check
on would-be rivals and allowed Sparta to back factions that were more amenable to its interests.
Thus, we see that reasons for war could prove quite complex. So, let's assume that for one
reason or another, a war was to happen. What did this process look like? In the Spartan political
system, declaring wars was technically the prerogative of the two kings, who could decide
to do so at any time. But Spartan kings were not absolute rulers. They were more like hereditary
priest generals who served as representatives of their state. They had to follow the instructions
of the assembly of all citizens, and they were accountable to the board of five annually elected
magistrates called the aethors. It was these aethors who held the real executive power in
Sparta. They decided on everyday matters, received foreign envoys, presided over meetings of the
assembly, and handled the practical side of mustering armies, including the decision which
year groups would be sent out, who would lead the army, and which men would form the royal guard.
Only the most charismatic and powerful kings were able to bend the aethoret and assembly to their
will. In practice, therefore, wars were rarely declared just because a king said so. Instead,
the idea would first arise from discussions among the aethors, or within the council of elders,
or between the king and his closest companions. The proposal would then be submitted to the
assembly for ratification. At Sparta, the assembly could not make its own proposals,
but only vote on proposals presented by the elders, the aethors, or the kings. They voted
by shouting. If those in favor shouted loud enough, the decision was made, and Sparta was committed to
war. But this was not the final step in the process. In some cases, most notably the war
against Athens in 431 BC, the Spartans would now submit their decision to the council of the
Peloponnesian League, in which each member had a vote. In theory, this council could reject the
hegemon's proposal for war. More often than not, however, the Spartans had already laid the
groundwork in advance, sending envoys to the allies to persuade them to vote in their favor.
If some allies were still not willing to join, the best they could do was refuse to march out.
Yet they did so at their own peril. Refusal to march could invoke Sparta's wrath at the exact
time when it was raising a massive army. Should the hegemon choose to make an example of this
stubborn member of the League, things would not turn out well. Better to comply begrudgingly than
risk punitive invasion. Thus, by the 4th century BC, it seems the Spartans often skipped the step
of asking permission from the League and simply ordered the members to gather their troops.
A final, crucial consideration was the support of the gods. The Spartans were famously pious
and generally refused to do anything without the explicit approval of one deity or another.
On campaign, they brought whole flocks of sheep or goats with them so that they could make sacrifices
at any moment when doubt might creep into the men, on crossing the border, crossing into enemy
territory, crossing rivers when there were thunderstorms or earthquakes, when deciding to
fight a battle, and so on. Further routine sacrifices were offered every morning in the
presence of all officers and the aethors sent to supervise the army. Unsurprisingly, this piety also
played a part in declaring war. First, the Spartans would of course consult the gods about the wisdom
of going to war. They were particularly keen to hear the verdict of the oracle at Delphi,
where Apollo was thought to speak through the priestess. The gods' declaration of support for
Sparta in the Peloponnesian War was a huge boost to the confidence of Sparta and its allies.
Sometimes, just to be sure, they would ask several oracles about a decision to go to war.
Second, the Spartans, like all Greeks, could not simply go to war whenever they wanted.
The seasons played a role, with most campaigning taking place in the summer before the harvest,
but the festival calendar also reduced the available options. Major religious festivals
were sacred to the gods they celebrated, and failing to observe them was a sacrilege.
Officially, there was no fighting among the Greeks during the Olympic truce, when the games were held
at Olympia in honor of Zeus. Similarly, the Dorian Greeks of the Peloponnese,
including the Spartans, celebrated a festival called the Carnea, which prevented campaigning
for several weeks at the end of summer. Sometimes these truces were earnestly observed, but at other
times they could be cited as an excuse to get out of an undesired campaign, or as an excuse
for a lackluster Spartan response to an allied call for help. Whatever the case, when the assembly,
allies, and gods had all given their consent, a herald might be sent to the enemy state to
deliver an ultimatum or make a formal declaration of war. However, there was no fixed procedure for
this among the Greeks, and no expectation that wars should be declared in advance.
Thus, more often than not, the target of a campaign would only find out about the war
when news reached them that Spartan forces were gathering. But what would this look like?
The first step would be the call to arms. The composition of an army might vary from time to
time and depend on the nature of the campaign in question. For instance, when Sparta was at the
who were helots, promised their freedom in return for military service.
These armies would only have a small corps of actual Spartiates to command them. In this way,
the Spartans relied on men they considered expendable instead of risking precious citizen
manpower. But in the centuries before and after Sparta's supremacy in Greece, and whenever Sparta
faced threats close to home, it fielded its own population in arms, just like every other Greek
state. When it came to mustering the Spartan militia, the aethors were in charge. The
Spartans had a unique expression for this process, the fruran finine, which literally means something
like summoning the guard, but which scholars usually translate as calling out the ban.
At the time of the Persian Wars, the Spartans may have mustered in villages or tribal units,
just like the Athenians and other Greek states. Each town or administrative district would have
had a fixed number of men it was expected to contribute to the militia. The communities of
perioikoi, freeborn non-citizens, would then be expected to provide an additional number
set by the aethors. Unfortunately, we have very little information about this early system.
We are better informed about the mustering system the Spartans developed in the course
of the classical period. Here, the whole population of Sparta and Laconia, including the Spartiates,
perioikoi, and probably helots too, was divided into year classes for military service.
The aethors could then simply decide how many and which of these should serve as cavalry,
poplites, and craftsmen to support the army. Usually, the field army would consist of all
eligible men aged 29-30 or 20-44, which represented about two-thirds of the available manpower.
Helots, most of whom were busy working, do not seem to have been included in such levies,
and only the Spartiates' personal servants and shield-bearers would march.
In extreme crises, though, like the aftermath of the disaster at Leuctra, the aethors might
call up all the year classes up to age 59 and march out pandeme with the whole people.
Whilst all of this was going on, the message would be sent out to all the smaller towns
and villages under Spartan control to let them know when and where they were expected to muster.
Simultaneously, messengers would be sent to the allies with similar instructions.
These allies were usually expected to contribute a similar share of their own militia as the
Spartans. As for the response to this call to arms, we don't have any details about the actual
experience of mustering a Spartan army. We know that Athenian levies would be ordered to gather
at a few fixed open spaces within or outside the city, such as the Agora or the Lycaeum.
Perhaps it was the same at Sparta. If so, given the size of Laconia, it would have taken the army
a long time to come together. Spartiates were required by law to live in the central villages
of Sparta proper, but perioikoi from outlying regions, like the Teneron peninsula or Messenia,
would have to assemble in local rallying points and then spend several days making their way to
Sparta. Those who lived on the border in the direction the army was headed
might simply be told to wait there and join as the army came up. In the meantime, the allies
would go through a similar process of gathering those who were eligible to serve in a suitable
mustering field in or near their own cities and then setting out to meet the main body.
Since Sparta had many allies both within and beyond the Peloponnese, it would often be a
waste of time to ask all these states to send their troops to Sparta first and then march out
together. Instead, they would be told to gather somewhere near the enemy, in the territory of a
local ally, for example, and wait for the Spartans to arrive. With friendly contingents coming in
from different directions, the Spartans sometimes tried to coordinate pincer movements against their
targets, but most often they would gather everyone in one spot before advancing into enemy lands.
As you might expect, this mustering process was rather slow and decentralized, especially in
conflicts where the Spartan army consisted heavily of allied forces. In this regard,
the Corinthian general Timolaos artfully compared the mustering of a Spartan army
to a river which gathered strength as smaller tributaries flowed into it. Such a river, he
argued, was easy to cross near the source, but further downstream it became an unstoppable torrent.
Much of what we have discussed so far about Sparta was quite similar to the process of other
Greek states. But once their army was in the field, the differences started to show. By the
4th century BC, Spartan armies had a noted advantage over their rivals in organization,
flexibility, and speed. Let us discuss why. The first reason is that the Spartans were the only
Greeks to centralize the making of food for troops and the sale of plunder to supply the army.
No Greek army ever had a proper logistics division or quartermaster, but the Spartans
came closest by formalizing these common habits. They also considered their regular performance of
sacrifices and reading of omens as a marked increase in professionalism over other Greeks.
Better logistics and a more systematic approach to the gods made their armies more confident
and strategically ready to meet any threat.
The second reason the Spartans differed from other Greeks is the way they marched to war.
This was done in a strict order with specialized troops in the vanguard to act as scouts and
screens for the main body of infantry that followed. But rather than being an unwieldy
mob, these forces were organized according to a clear hierarchy that was studied with officers
to maintain proper discipline. Smaller groups coalesced into six so-called mori or battalion
sized army units that could be dispatched to act as needed. Typical battle would see them deploy
from column to line with the first mora at the head of the force taking up position on the extreme
right. If necessary, they could wheel and even countermarch in the face of the enemy, a feat
unheard of among the other Greeks. This was all made possible thanks to the formation drill
practiced by the men who advanced smoothly in lockstep to the sound of flutes. The end result
of all this was a Spartan army that could maneuver in a manner both strategically and
tactically superior to its contemporaries. Over the course of their history, this would prove to
be as much a key to their success as any advantage they held in combat itself. I hope
you've appreciated this exploration of the mechanics behind what it would take to raise
and deploy a Spartan army for war. We love discussing these sort of under-the-hood topics
of how the ancient world actually worked. What sorts of topics would you like to see us cover
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