美聯儲主席鮑威爾出席史丹佛大學活動

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982 次觀看·2025年12月2日
美東12月1日,美聯儲主席傑羅姆·H·鮑威爾(Jerome H. Powell)在史丹佛大學胡佛研究所舉辦的「喬治舒爾茨及其經濟政策貢獻」紀念講座系列活動,並參與了「喬治舒爾茨及其經濟政策貢獻」小組討論。新唐人、大紀元進行網絡重播,中文即時翻譯字幕。
他堅持他的原則,同時也對人們以誠懇和尊敬的態度
包括與他有關的政策不符
勞工領袖歡迎他的任職,擔任勞工總裁
正如多位他的同輩所說
面對多元的觀點和困難的問題
他非常擅長引導人們走向協議
他的主要策略是讓各方達成自己的最終協議
這樣他們就擁有了協議,而更有可能榮譽它
他的友誼和合作超越了數量,並不具有批判性的限制
他經常說,信任是這個世界的硬幣
好事只有在有共同信任的環境下才能實現
他的慷慨為了這個信任提供了基礎
所有希望為公眾服務的人,都可以從他的例子學到
謝謝
勞工經濟學的專業訓練教授,George Shultz
George Shultz在1949年獲得了MIT博士
在MIT讀了9年,然後在芝加哥大學讀了11年
讀了6年,成為商學院教授
Jay,勞工經濟學
在上個世紀,勞工的重要性
幫助我們重新建立這個智慧世界
這是一個非常不同的世界
現今美國的私人行業集團佔6%
當時佔了30%
大型工廠集團的集中投資
如鋼,汽車等等
這些都是全球最新的消息
任何一個政府的勞工總裁的職責
就是要了解勞工運動,瞭解領導人
明白他們想要什麼
這是一個非常非常不同的時代
當然,George Shultz
曾經研究過集中投資
這是他作為勞工經濟學家的主要領域
他非常有資格
面對勞工總裁的挑戰
他去洛杉磯
與川普總統討論
確保川普總統知道
George Shultz對勞工經濟的看法
他是一位勞工經濟學家
這是上個世紀的中間
當時有一個很大的爭議
關於勞工的發展
共產黨人對勞工有一定的看法
勞工與世界的工作者聯合起來
這是George Shultz
我正在回顧他在Hoover的採訪
回顧了他的事業
Chicago School
為自由和自由市場的基礎價值
麥肯尼
他如何將自由市場的信念
融入勞工經濟
我先說
當我被川普總統
請我擔任國務院副總裁時
其實我致電的唯一人
是George Shultz
我問他
George你覺得怎麼樣
他說這是政府最好的工作
我說George你應該知道
因為你擔任了
幾乎所有的政府工作
但他說的原因
也許是回答你的問題
Peter
他說他一直認為
美國有正確的基礎價值
這是我們成功的原因
其中一個基礎價值
當然是自由市場
而Chicago School
尤其在拉丁美洲
和其他地方
他認為它有機會
把其他國家
從貧困之中
使用他們最好的資源
來獲得繁榮
但他也相信
自由市場和個人自由
之間的不可削減的聯繫
這在他擔任國務院副總裁時
就像蘇聯正在
面臨極端時期一樣
我們忘記了
George的第一年擔任國務院副總裁
蘇聯在1982、83、84年
就像蘇聯的未來一樣
從George的角度來看
這只是胡言亂語
這也是他與
Ronald Reagan分享的
這次實驗
就像Reagan所說的
這次實驗
是在討論
人們的不可削減的歷史
George是一位偉大的國務院副總裁
他也不會像Reagan
這麼明顯地說
但因為他們相信
自由市場和個人自由
的基本原則
蘇聯是歷史錯誤的一方
他們在一起
完全願意說出這句話
完全願意挑戰這個系統
有一個故事
Mike想告訴我們
George與Gorbachev會面
他對Gorbachev說
你知道你正在做的
中央計劃
也許你也該開始計劃
因為你們都做得不太好
你能想像Gorbachev
在這個時候會想
這個人是誰
他為什麼要告訴我
我自己的經濟
但因為他是偉大的經濟學家
因為他擔任國務院副總裁
George能夠帶來
自由市場的發展知識
他對自由市場的信仰
和個人自由的信仰
他能夠挑戰
蘇聯的強硬度
在那個時候
最後才能在那裡
做出決定
Mike有一個問題
關於蘇聯戰爭
讓我解釋一下
在尼克森的年代
在尼克森在1969年
就擔任國務院副總裁
他遇到長沙人的襲擊
他受到強烈的壓迫
讓政府做出行動
但他堅持
把國務院撤出
強迫長沙人和管理層
在自己的交易桌上
而不是破壞整個經濟
這場戰爭結束
一個月後
約翰·索爾斯就任
為什麼這場戰爭
是這麼重要的一場戰爭
首先
這是一個很重要的例子
第一
政府的行動
有時會成為一個障礙
而不是成功的結果
第二
這是非常重要的
因為這證明瞭
人們可以做出自己的決定
而被迫
如果他們面對彼此
而不是等待政府進來
他們不會做出最好的提議
他們不會變得認真
這對我來說很明顯
我得到約翰·索爾斯的建議
和友誼
我們在這幾年間
我們稍後再談
但這變得很明顯
當你面對
一個完全不同的境界
人們不習慣
思考市場
人們不習慣
思考個人贊助
人們能夠這樣想
這又回到約翰·索爾斯的評論
和唐吉斯的評論
他作為一個經濟學家
他習慣了這個想法
人們會盡自己的努力
視乎他們的環境
如果讓他們這樣做
這樣會帶來最好的結果
這是一個基本的理論
基本的經濟學
有些人會忘記
政府總是有壓力
要做一些事情
我們都在公眾辦公室
每天早上
我們都會問
總統會做什麼
這可以是任何事情
總統不必擔心
不必知道
所以我們必須設定一個例子
讓事情發生
直到有些事情
政府必須
參與
如果發生了
兩件事件
在混合的年代
比較不像經濟和社會
例如菲律賓計劃
1969年春天
約翰·塞爾茨提出了菲律賓計劃
要求聯邦企業
聘請少數工人
他聲稱
他不是在擬定貨幣
而是在擬定貨幣
他擬定貨幣
是對黑人工人
而是零貨幣
他擬定貨幣
國務卿離開了
我正在引用約翰·塞爾茨
我早就學會了
你之前也提到過
我早就學會了
當兩黨這麼接近協議時
最好是讓兩黨
自行完成協議
這樣協議就屬於兩黨
在尼克森政府的結束後
這是一個令人困惑的數據
我還沒有意識到
超過90%的黑人小孩
在南方參加了
融合學校
好了
他是一個勞動經濟學家
但在菲律賓計劃
和南方的融合學校
他在解決社會問題
這裡發生了什麼
這和他自己的原則有關
和所有人的尊重有關
傑克,你會否介紹一下
這部電視劇
我會
這是人們需要知道更多的
約翰·塞爾茨是一個
不可思議的成就
他的事業經驗很堅固
他在他的事業經驗當中
他成立了第一個少數民族教育機構
帶孩子進入
新加坡商學院大學
和其他許多其他項目
但在這個情況下
約翰·塞爾茨在1954年決定
這是15年後的事
有7個南方國家
他們只是沒有融合學校
法庭顯示
這個爭議已經結束
我們要做這件事
約翰·塞爾茨
他接管了這個委員會
他把一個黑人和一個白人
從每個7個國家
他把他們聯合起來
他們才知道要怎麼做
因為他們現在知道
這件事將會發生
他讓他們意識到
這件事必須沒有暴力
他成功做到了
這是一個奇妙的成就
他怎麼做到的
這就是
約翰·塞爾茨的整個計劃
把人們聯合起來
尊重和尊重他們
讓他們有能力
讓他們能夠接受這件事
這個艱難的問題
這件事成功了
學校沒有暴力
在這7個南方國家
開學了
這是一個奇妙的故事
他真的讓這件事發生了
所以非常感激
其實我感受到了
因為我小時候
在伯明翰·阿拉巴納
在1960年代初
伯明翰·阿拉巴納
和國民教育委員會
在1954年
基本上沒有發生任何事
在學校的融合
儘管戰爭是分裂的
但同樣地
他們只是忽略了
只是忽略了
然後最後
在法庭之後
他們提出了一個計劃
在約翰·阿拉巴納之前
叫做選擇
現在選擇是一件好事
在那些年代
選擇並不是特別好的
因為
這是一個好主意
因為這個主意
可能是白人父母
會選擇把孩子留在白人學校
而黑人父母會選擇
把孩子留在白人學校
事實上
沒有人選擇做任何事
而有幾個
這是一個有趣的故事
有幾個
很窮的老師
被派去融合
這些學校的教師
而我的母親
被派去白人學校
真的嗎
是的
我的父親很害怕
因為他擔心
可能會發生暴力
事實上
我的母親沒有去
但是他們派了一個
很可憐的白人女孩
來我們德魯特學校
我對她感到很難過
因為所有人都對她
非常非常不好
她是唯一的
所以這件事
是非常不完美的
我告訴這個故事給約翰·阿拉巴納
我認為有一個原因
是要把人們聯合起來
然後有一個計劃
如何做到
這就是
菲律賓的計劃
因為這件事
沒有發生過
而且它在哪裡
都沒有走到很好的方向
所以約翰·阿拉巴納
我會笑笑的
分享我個人的經歷
在南部的
菲律賓計劃之前
值得一提的是
這個確定性行動
很遲遲地被取消
加州的投票人
也被拒絕了兩次
可能是因為太過分了
但是在那時
在菲律賓的建築物
有一個零數的
非洲裔人
所以經濟學家討厭零數
零數是一個壞的零數
就像一個大量的零數
所以我認為
這反映了
他的思想作為一個經濟學家
就像傑斯所說
當然也有道德
和經濟的分歧
我認為他對道德
非常強烈
因為在菲律賓計劃
以及在學校系統上的工作
因為這又回到了
約翰·阿拉巴納的觀點
美國是世界的希望
但是有些時候
美國沒有做得對
回到經濟學和政府
我會請你們三人
給我一個講座
我們有金窗的關閉
我們有價值和價格的控制
我會用我所知的
這是很少的
1970年
薛侯斯擔任財政總裁
他成為了
財政總裁約翰·康尼利
和財政總裁布魯克爾
他建議納粹主席
將美元轉換成金
納粹主席在8月15日
就關閉了金窗
1971年
我會引用
Milton Friedman的觀點
關閉金窗
將導致一個免費的市場
免費的市場
沒有任何貨幣
我們正在處理的事情
和我們做生意的方式
和我們思考現今的貨幣
這需要一點點的努力
讓我們回到當時
當美元被貼在金窗
誰想先說
我先說
如果我們回到
二次世界大戰結束
如果我們回到
世界貿易和安全共識
國際貿易組織
我們設立了美元
為交易率系統的中心
大部分國家會有
和自由貿易政策
因為如果他們的利率
比我們的低
財產會流出
他們會被壓迫
把財產的價值降低
相反的
如果他們的利率
比我們的高
所以這造成了一個複雜的現象
我們在最近幾年
看到國家把財產和美元
我們看到了
財產和美元的變化
所以我認為這是一個重要的變化
經歷了數十年的大智慧辯論
在經濟方面
是否維持或是
更好的交易率
我認為
更好的市場主導方式
我認為是世界的優勢
所以這就是第一部分
第二部分是
因為這個突然的變化
我們不再會交易
35美元
不再是一毫克的金額
外國人
持有美元儲備
將會受到制裁
所以我們不能重新價值美元
他們必須重新價值
所以發生的是
特朗普總統
強迫出售10%的貨幣
這將會被取消
當他們重新價值
他們的貨幣正確
這是發生的
18個月後
世界的平衡
一年後
我們會有油的震撼
所以我無法抗拒
我無法抗拒
我認為會成功
如果沒有油的震撼
這會是一個好主意
我們將會轉移到
流動的流動的流動
流動的流動
牛頓·弗裏蒙
這位女士說
Kandi,你會不會
跳進金門
哪一個人
不像其他人
我將這留給經濟學家
好的
那麼價格控制
我會再說一次
尼克森總統
強制價格控制
他當時是總理
在經濟和管理局
尼克森
在1972年
尼克森他自己
成為財政部長
在1973年1月
他通過了
大部分的強制控制
他通過了控制
完全在4月
1974年
在4月之前
他成為財政部長
在4月之前
這是無法想像的
這個概念
美國總統
強制價格控制
We weren't really sure what we could do about inflation and unemployment occurring at the same time.
We had to do something.
We didn't want to inflict any pain about disinflating the economy and causing a recession.
We couldn't use monetary and fiscal policy very well.
This became a big debate.
We thought it had ended successfully with the end of wage and price controls, but it came back.
In fact, when I was advising candidate Reagan in 1980,
the campaign asked me to debate Walter Heller,
who had been President Kennedy's Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers and key architect of the Kennedy tax cuts,
on this precise point.
You had, like the head of the AFL-CIO,
key industrial business leaders, like the head of DuPont,
Lane Kirkland and Ernie Shapiro,
they would decide what to do with the government in the room,
kind of getting back to the point Jay made earlier.
Fortunately, that didn't happen.
We had a successful and painful disinflation.
I'll turn it back to Jay,
because I know he has some views on this as well.
Yes, Jay.
I mean, the interesting thing to me is that,
as Michael pointed out,
it was almost a consensus that we needed income policy.
In other words, that the government needed to jawbone companies informally at least,
and then maybe we would eventually need to do wage and price control.
So you go back to 1966,
George Shultz had held a famous conference with another University of Chicago person,
and it was on guidelines.
And the big names of the era debated.
Milton Freeman famously debated Bob Solow over this.
But people really thought that there was a problem to solve.
There was a general agreement that the problem of high inflation and high unemployment,
that fiscal policy wasn't going to be able to handle that.
Monetary policy wasn't.
So you needed the government to somehow do this.
This was a bad idea.
It was a really bad idea.
And somehow it had become approximately conventional wisdom in these days.
Milton Freeman, of course, was a big exception.
George Shultz was on the right side of that.
Paul Volcker was on the right side of that.
But to me, there's a takeaway there,
which is that our understanding of the economy is ever-evolving.
The economy itself is ever-evolving.
So I think those of us who are doing economic policy
have always got to remember that the structure of the economy is always changing,
and that our understanding of it is always highly uncertain.
So certain things that are sometimes accepted as conventional wisdom,
people will look back in 50 years and think,
like we're doing with wage price controls.
They're going to say, what were they thinking at the time?
Well, that's what they were thinking.
They were thinking it was really the beginnings of stagflation.
High unemployment and high inflation.
What do we do?
Very difficult problem.
And Paul Volcker kind of had the answer and eventually did it.
George Shultz deserves credit for supporting him,
and Reagan deserves credit for supporting him as well.
Yes, Connie, please.
I was just going to say that this is also quintessentially George Shultz.
So he lost the argument.
But he understood who was elected,
and he was able to bide his time,
and then he had the opportunity.
He worked to move things in the other direction.
But George was in that way quintessentially pragmatist also.
He played a long game.
He played a long game,
and I think it isn't as well understood
that when you're in government sometimes,
you're going to win some and you're going to lose some.
But if you never lose sight of what you think is right,
you might have a chance to correct it.
And I know that the wage and price controls for George,
this was really an anathema.
And he thought one of the arguments that he was most unhappy that he lost
because he thought it did great damage.
But when he had the opportunity, he reversed it.
So just one quick comment
with respect to Connie's comment about winning some and losing some.
We always thought we were doing well
if we were above Shaq's free throw percentage.
But it's important to remember
what was going on in the economy as Jay has mentioned.
Nixon imposed wage and price controls
when inflation got up to 4%.
It's important to have that historical reference in the back of your mind.
So thank you for the seminar.
What I hadn't realized is the extent
to which there was a debate going on
within the discipline of economics
when the shock hits,
which means you don't have,
I don't know how to put it.
I don't want to use the word establishment.
But you don't have consensus
on how to respond when the oil shock hits.
In the 70s, the economy is taking one blow after another.
And the economists are,
there's a debate about what should be done.
There's a kind of uncertainty.
Is that fair?
Absolutely.
All right.
So then we get to Ronald Reagan.
And I hadn't thought of it this way before.
But this is a moment when one side wins the debate
is one way of thinking about it.
George Shultz, before becoming Secretary of State,
which he did about a year into the administration,
he chaired President Reagan's
Economic Policy Advisory Group,
a group that included figures such as Milton Friedman.
This is Mr. Shultz in a 2000 interview
talking about those times.
The advisory group said the essence
of the inflation problem is monetary policy.
And to deal with it effectively,
you've got to discipline the money supply.
People warned President Reagan
that if he did this,
there's likely to be a recession.
By the way, I was there for that bit.
And people did warn him just that.
Back to George Shultz.
But he did the right thing.
And we did have a recession.
But inflation dropped like a stone.
And that has been one of the primary reasons
why our economy has been as strong as it has been."
So from Richard Nixon's wage and price controls
to the moment when Ronald Reagan
backs Paul Volcker in disciplining the dollar
represents an intellectual,
it's not just a policy,
it's an intellectual victory.
Is that right?
Am I understanding that correctly?
In that 10-year period,
we also had President Carter in 1979
go on national television
and complain about high inflation in the letters
and said the Fed should lower interest rates
to reduce inflation.
So there's a lot of misunderstanding
and apology as well.
But it's a remarkable transformation.
In 1979, this goes back to Condi's discussion
with George like to garden.
But he also did that in economic policy.
Not only bided his time and changed things
when he had the opportunity,
but he prepared.
And so in 1979,
he had a dinner with candidate Reagan.
He invited myself and Milton Friedman
and a couple of other economists
to kick the tires
about supply-side economics
and about inflation.
And I was very much impressed
because Reagan's knowledge
and subtlety of understanding these things
and depth of understanding
was quite a bit different
from the caricature of his portrayal at the time.
And so I think that
George is preparing for this moment
and letting Reagan talk to some people
that he came to respect
that worked with him and for him
and developed an understanding
And Reagan also had very strong principles
and he understood
how serious high inflation was.
Keynes in a remarkable book in 1919
saying what will happen
from the Treaty of Versailles,
hyperinflation, etc.
in Germany will destroy the society
quoted Lenin's injunction
that the blotching of the currency
is the surest way to destroy capitalism.
And so it's a very, very strong sense
in Reagan that we have
as at the time,
inflation is double digits.
And it's been rising
at the same point at every business cycle
since the 1960s.
If you measure the trough,
the midpoint of the peak,
it's going up and up and up.
And it peaked at around 13%.
And so there was a desperate need
to disinflate the economy.
It was painful,
but it was the right thing to do.
Connie, do you remember those...
Well, you were still in Denver,
weren't you?
No, I'd just become
a faculty member at Stanford
and was trying to buy a house.
And I do remember...
Well, you do remember inflation.
I remember it very, very well.
You remember interest rates.
But I was going to make a point
about George in this regard
because we all know
that George Shultz
was a very fine public servant
and it was mentioned
he was also an academic
and he cared about
these intellectual debates.
He cared about winning
the debate with ideas.
It wasn't name-calling.
It wasn't, you know,
you're just evil.
He actually liked to get ideas
on the table and debate them.
And he liked to debate them
with people who disagreed.
And when he had an opportunity
with Reagan,
he brought people together
for Reagan to listen
and to hear the ideas.
And Mike mentioned this
because you were there.
I would see it later
with George W. Bush.
And that George would bring together
these groups of people
for these politicians
and he would count on
the ability to convince and persuade
through good ideas
to really challenge people
who wanted to be the elected officials
who were going to carry out policy
to really understand
what they were listening to.
And I have to say
the Hoover Institution
played quite an important role in this,
people like Milton Friedman and others,
Mike Boskin.
But it was George
who would convene these people
with people who were going to
actually be in government,
who were actually going to run for office.
You know, we sometimes,
as people in the academy
or people who like Mike and I
or Jay have served in government,
people say,
well, I like policy but not politics.
Well, unfortunately,
policy has to go through politics
to actually become policy.
And George understood that
and so he often spent a lot of time
with the people
who were actually making decisions
trying to convince them.
With Ronald Reagan,
he found somebody
who had everything that needed
to change many of our assumptions
about the way the world works.
It wasn't just in Washington.
The second time George
drew me into doing something,
the first time when his Treasury Secretary
called me,
I'd never met him,
and he got me involved,
Larry Feldstein,
as the advisors to a commission
to talk about the benefits of philanthropy
and the benefits of the tax deduction
for raising lots of money for charities
probably more than the government
was losing in revenue
by allowing the deduction.
Then a few years later,
it was to go up to Sacramento
and talk to then-Governor Brown
in his first of his two-term stints
as governor.
And California's running a large surplus.
We had a very high inflation.
The tax brackets weren't indexed
and revenue was rolling into the state
and property taxes were going up
because they were being revalued
And the governor wanted to convince us
to back him running a bigger and bigger surplus,
which I think he wanted to do
to later on have an even larger tax cut
and run for president,
but in any event.
So we went up there,
and a cute anecdote is
at the time,
he was dating Linda Ronstadt.
And so lunch...
He, Governor Brown.
Governor Brown, not George.
Absolutely.
Obie wouldn't have gone for that.
And in any event,
and so lunch was kind of dietetic
in training.
In any event,
we thought this was a bad idea,
and that's one of the untold stories
of how Prop 13,
the California's property tax revolt
and initiative
of limited property tax increases,
happened because this was going on
while the state had a gigantic surplus.
Jay, can you work with Linda Ronstadt into...
I don't think I can.
Oh, all right.
So when you look back on this
on this episode with Nixon,
which I now see actually
it's important to understand
that it's part of a continuum.
From Nixon wage and price controls
to what takes place in 81,
backing Volcker
to shrink the money supply.
I'm struck that again and again,
George Shultz is there.
Furthermore,
that we think of him so often
people emphasize character,
which is totally fair and true, of course.
But he took the life of the mind,
this is the point Condi made,
he took his intellectual life
extremely seriously.
And we've got this
intellectual project taking place
at the University of Chicago.
They believe they reach conclusions,
Milton Friedman and George Stigler
and George Shultz.
And then it's George Shultz
who has this kind of genius
to take the intellectual findings
and work this strange territory
between intellectuals
and office holders
to get the right thing done.
So what does that...
Now I know you knew
George Shultz the least,
but I actually find that
a striking datum
that you took the time
to fly out here
because he means so much to you
as an example.
So what does that tell us about
the way an intellectual,
an academic
goes about public service
at its best?
He obviously got the big things
he got right.
So collective bargaining
he got right.
Exchange rates he got right.
Price, wage and price controls.
He was right on those issues.
And history has very much vindicated that.
And of course he was
a great Secretary of State
and helped end the Cold War.
I mean we could be here
just listing his little
and discussing his many accomplishments.
But I would say as important
as his extraordinary achievements
is the way he approached public policy.
I am very...
It resonates very much with me
that the way he brought people together
with respect and integrity
and wound up being able
to foster agreements
on super difficult issues
like this desegregation of schools
in the Deep South
and many other areas.
He was an extraordinary public servant
even if you didn't agree
with those policy propositions
which I did.
So that's another aspect.
And he continued to do that
until very late in life.
He was convening things at Hoover.
Hoover, he was a huge presence here.
He often convened groups
on various issues.
I was privileged to do many
sometimes with colleagues here
especially John Colgan and John Taylor
on economic stuff.
But he always tried to get
alternative points of view.
Tried to get people debating
and discussing.
He tried to get people
in a conference room
called Manberg here.
And we would sit there
and we'd understand facts
and theories and data and history
and debate about
what the best path forward was
on a variety of pretty complicated issues
that often don't have
just singularly clear conclusions
but have trade-offs
involving something else
and being an economist
teaches you to pay a lot of attention to it.
George Shultz as teacher.
George Shultz becomes
secretary of state in 1982
and he serves until the end
of the Reagan administration.
Most of his work as secretary of state
will belong to the third
of these conversations about him.
But there's an episode
or an aspect of his time
as secretary of state
that shows George Shultz
right back where he started
teaching economics.
I'm quoting now
from the Cold War by John Lewis Gaddis.
Gaddis notes that as early as 1985
secretary of state George Shultz
began telling General Secretary Gorbachev
that the Soviet Union
would continue falling behind
as long as it had a command economy.
I'm quoting Gaddis.
You should take over the planning office
here in Moscow, Gorbachev joked,
because you have more ideas than they have.
In a way, that is what Shultz did.
Over the next several years,
he used his trips to Moscow
to run tutorials
for Gorbachev and his advisers
even bringing pie charts to the Kremlin.
Gorbachev proved surprisingly receptive.
Close quote.
Condi, what this is, this is,
I mean, it sounds almost
like a Monty Python sketch.
Right, right.
And look, I think this is one
where George had mixed results.
And I would say they were mixed results
because it was very hard to penetrate
the Soviet, Gorbachev or any of them,
the idea that this thing
called capitalism and markets
could actually make everybody richer.
And I remember Gorbachev saying
at one point, actually George H.W. Bush,
he was trying to explain how in capitalism
somebody will found a company.
And yes, they'll get rich from that,
but there'll be all these jobs
and the economy will grow
and so forth and so on.
And at one point, George H.W. Bush
turned to me and said,
are they translating this?
And I said, Mr. President,
I'm afraid this just doesn't translate.
So, but George was indefatigable.
He would go and he would take his pie charts
and he would explain
why central planning didn't work.
And maybe underneath
it eventually had an effect
because one of the things
that Gorbachev tried to do
and George was very proud of this
was he actually tried to have
these little private enterprise shoots.
They wouldn't privatize the economy as a whole,
but they had little entrepreneurial businesses
that they started to build called collectives
so that somebody would be able
to have a restaurant that was private.
And this is sort of 1987, 1988
and George actually would go
once in a while to these little collectives
where a man and his wife,
you could only have eight tables, by the way,
couldn't have more than eight tables.
And so he would go because,
by the way, much to the chagrin
of the diplomatic security and the like,
he would go down into some town
and go to one of these collectives
because he actually did believe
that that could be the beginning of capitalism.
So he understood that it was too much
to try to explain to them
that you could have this thing called the market
and it would all work out.
But these little experiments,
he was always very proud of.
Maybe you had a point.
I can pick up on that
because I got to deal with it subsequently
when the Berlin Wall fell, etc.
And so first of all,
Gorbachev may have been receptive,
but he didn't understand it.
He had grown up in the agriculture,
he was Secretary of Agriculture,
and they were making sure
he knew exactly where everything was
all the time.
So when Bush,
Senior Bush sent me to help him
with economic reform
because they announced
they were going to become
a capitalist economy in 500 days,
not the five centuries
it took to develop capitalism,
but that's a whole other story.
So I met with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
and it was pretty clear,
I'm Bush's chief economic advisor,
so I actually know how all this works.
So he sends me to see
the head of Gosprom State Planning Agency.
He's always an interpreter.
He asks me,
who sets the prices in your economy?
And I try to explain,
we have a few regulated industries,
etc.,
and I've won teaching awards in my day,
but he wasn't having it.
He just didn't understand
that lots of consumers,
lots of producers interact
and that would determine prices, etc.
And so he finally gets very frustrated
and motions me to wait.
He goes back to his office
and we're in the ante room
and he comes back
with one of these 1970s
we would think of here,
but there it's 1990 flip charts
and it's these Fortran flip charts.
It's the price list for the Soviet Union.
He hands me a pen
and he wants me to cross out the old prices
and write in the new ones.
He can't believe
Gorbachev has told him,
I'm Bush's chief economic advisor.
I know what the prices should be.
So he's convinced
that I should just read out the new prices
and that would solve his problem
because he's been told
he has to get to a price system
in 500 days
and has the slightest idea
of what he's doing.
Both in China and in Russia
I've had the experience
of people who are more reformers
who spoke some English
but also generally relied on translation
to be precise
tell me that you can't get this across
because all these people
have been trained as Marxists.
When you ask them
how do you measure
how do you know
what's actually going on in the economy?
They've never thought about
how to measure something like GDP
because the outputs
are weighted by market prices.
They don't have market prices.
They're just used to
everything being quantity.
These many shoes of this size
for this style of lady's shoe
will get shipped to Leningrad
or to Vladivostok, etc.
That's all they knew.
So in any event,
it became interesting
and later on,
George was a big help to me
and Condi,
who was a rising superstar
of the NSC staff at the time
when I was asked to negotiate
a potential bailout with Gorbachev
and he told me,
push them hard,
they have to threaten
to walk out twice
so they don't get serious
and then be careful
because, you know,
you can do more harm than good
and that's why we decided to do...
Even though Bush
was being pressured by John Major
and Francois Miro
and Helmut Kohl
to bail out Gorbachev,
we decided to do very little.
Jay, I'm wondering if this...
if you'll buy this idea,
if this represents another aspect
of the way George Shultz
did public service.
He was always teaching.
Gorbachev in this case.
But I think, Condi,
I think back to his...
There would be some big meeting,
some big summit
and he would go to the press
and it would be very methodical.
He would want everyone to understand
what had happened,
what were the central issues,
who took what position
and where matters stood now.
George never talked in sound bites.
He simply didn't.
There was always depth to it.
I think sometimes
this was a little frustrating
for the press
because they wanted him
to talk in sound bites.
Having been in that job,
I know they'd like him
to talk in sound bites,
but he was determined
that people were going to have
a real understanding of it.
Jay is not known for sound bites
either, right?
No, no.
I would say also
George, in a sense,
was AI before AI
because having been in boardrooms
and academic seminars,
he always would listen carefully
and he would summarize things
in a way that really got
to the essence of the issue
and what the issues were
and what the path forward
or the potential paths forward were.
It was quite an amazing thing.
He'd sit in the boardroom
and people would be arguing
about this, that and the other thing.
He'd just sit there quietly
and at the end,
he'd give a succinct,
maybe not always succinct summary
and wrap things up.
Jay, so I think
I didn't know anything
like both of these folks knew him,
but it seems to me
people who met him
trusted him.
And it was based on his integrity
and his knowledge
and his work product
and just the way he dealt with people.
So he holds three cabinets
of his ascending importance,
labor, OMB and then Treasury
in three years, really.
So he's getting promoted
really quickly
and being given the job
of desegregating the schools,
which wasn't obviously
connected to any of those jobs.
Then as Secretary of State,
the Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
just take tremendous liking to him
and they want to work with him.
Some of the people who study this stuff
give him a lot of credit for
he didn't compromise on his principles,
but they trusted him
and they felt that this was someone
they could work with
and that President Reagan
was really aligned with him.
Critically, Reagan was aligned
with these goals.
So just very effective in that way.
And again, I think it was
liking him, trusting him,
having strong principles
he didn't compromise
just made him very effective,
remarkably effective.
across so many issues.
Back at Stanford.
After the Reagan administration,
Mr. Shultz returns to Stanford.
He proposes his memoirs,
Triumph and Turmoil.
He convenes study groups.
He continues coming into
his Hoover office
well into his...
I think he was still showing up
in his 99th year, as I recall.
Two or three days a week.
Which, by the way,
is about as often as kids show up
in the office these days,
two or three days a week.
And so I am just struck
with the same things he was doing
at the University of Chicago
and all of these jobs,
Secretary of Labor,
Director of OMB,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Secretary of State.
He continues to do here
at the Hoover Institution,
convene, talk.
That says something about him.
Of course, let me know
what you think it says about him
that he keeps at it so long.
But it also says something
about the Hoover Institution
that this remarkable man
thought that it was worth
making this institution
the central activity of his life
for the final decades
of his time on this planet.
Condi?
Well, we called him
the great convener
because George would really
decide that there was a subject
that was of importance
and we ought to get
the smartest people in the room
to talk about it.
And it was that simple.
And then he would call them up
and, of course, they would all show up.
And everything from...
And it was not just economics.
Mike mentioned
he had a very deep interest
in California
and in trying to make this state better.
And you might know that Charlotte,
the great Charlotte,
was chief of protocol
to several mayors
and governors of the state.
And so he was very involved
in California
and in California policy.
Not so much politics, but policy.
George took a tremendous interest
in energy policy.
And together with Tom Stevenson
convened a task force on energy
in which they were concerned
not just about energy
but about the issues
that related to a clean environment,
the climate change.
And so worked very hard on those issues.
Obviously, anything to do
with national security.
Another area that people
perhaps don't realize
how important he thought it was,
North America.
He cared about North America
because he believed
it could be an economic engine.
If you thought about the assets
of Canada, the United States
and Mexico together,
that this could be
a tremendous economic engine.
And so I always thought
of George's life as an economist,
his understanding of the economy
and the way that he engaged
these incredibly important
public policy issues
as being inherently linked.
And it goes back
to that belief in markets,
to that belief in free enterprise,
to that belief in individual liberty.
And they would all show up
in these convenings
that George would do.
But his reach
across so many public policy issues,
very often starting
from the economic side
and branching out
is really quite extraordinary.
I think it made him
a far better Secretary of State.
Because he really understood
what a lot of these countries
were trying to do
in providing for their people.
And they, Hoover and George,
are a perfect complement to each other
because of the wide breadth of interest
in the Hoover Scholars.
We have experts in economics
and national security
and foreign affairs
and education and political science.
You go on and on
through energy, et cetera.
So we have area studies
of particular interest.
And George was really, in a sense,
interested in everything
or as much as he could
with his immense capacity
to accommodate.
A couple last questions
for all three of you.
If possible, we'll go right down.
I'm struck by this notion
that he participates.
He's right in the middle
of a great debate
that takes place
for a couple of decades
in this country.
And by the 1980s,
when we get economic revival
and a victory in the Cold War,
it feels as though
we've gotten someplace.
It feels as though
one side of the debate has won,
which brings us to today.
The former Soviet Union, now Russia,
still has not embraced free markets.
China has embraced markets,
but has not embraced democracy.
The economy that we inhabit,
which AI,
every person I know
who participates,
even people who are making money
on AI already,
are nervous about
what it's going to do
to the labor force
restructuring jobs.
We've got new forms of currency.
This is, you know,
this is always a question
that you really can't get.
It's not a rigorous question,
but at the same time,
it gets at something.
What would George Shultz
tell us today?
What are the permanent lessons
that we should grasp
as we face this changed world
in which we live?
Mike, would you like to go?
I would say that
at the core of the way
George thought about things
was combining facts, ideas,
and experience.
He firmly believed
you didn't really understand
something deeply
unless you understood it
intellectually
and had experienced it in your gut.
I've come to that point of view
over a long time,
partly under George's influence,
but just from my own experiences.
And so I think he would
try to make sure
that you merge those things
in your thinking about issues.
Number two, he would say,
stay engaged.
Stay engaged.
Try to be constructive
in any way you can.
And to me,
that's a great lesson from his life.
Stay engaged,
whether that's, you know,
in the cabinet
at the federal government level,
whether it's your local school board
or whatever you happen to do,
stay engaged
and try to make things better.
He loved the phrase
democracy is not a spectator sport.
So stay engaged.
Jay,
what are the permanent lessons?
I agree with all of that.
I mean,
history doesn't end,
so now we're into
a whole different set of challenges
looking forward.
And, you know,
we need to remain engaged,
to Michael's point,
with our main allies and rivals,
and we just need to keep working
on all the things.
We need to keep working
that we confront now,
which are to some extent,
some of the issues are settled,
like the issue of price controls
is no longer.
We understand now
that the central bank
is responsible for price stability.
So that issue is settled.
It doesn't mean it's easy to do,
but the issue is settled.
You make it look so easy.
That's the trick.
No,
but so things like nuclear disarmament,
we were talking more,
we were probably closer to that,
you know,
20 years ago than we are now.
So, you know,
these issues don't go away
and new issues arise
and I call for very much,
I think the way
George Shultz approached
public policy and engagement
are exactly what we need now.
I think George would be excited
by this moment,
understanding that
it was a challenging moment,
but he always saw opportunity.
He was the,
ultimately he was an optimist.
He believed things could be solved
if you kept at the core
of the principles
on which the United States was founded.
You know, there's a story
that when George would swear in
as Secretary of State,
ambassadors,
he would go to a big globe
and he would say to the
about to be ambassador,
show me your country
and that person would point
to Brazil or to Paraguay or to Kenya
and George would say,
no, no, this is your country
and he would point
to the United States of America
Because the one lesson
that I think he would
want us all to remember
is that since the war,
and remember,
George was a young marine
in that war.
He was part of the
greatest generation
that fought and won
first the war against Nazism
and later on
the war against communism.
George would want,
I think us to remember
that central to,
essentially eight plus decades
of relative peace
and relative prosperity.
If you think about
what had come before,
the United States
was central to that.
The United States
was central to it
because it was founded
on the right principles.
It worked through
its problems like segregation.
It worked through issues
and came to the right answers
on how to stimulate
the private sector
without wage and price controls.
And he just had
an unfailing belief
in this country.
And so I think he would say,
garden with your allies.
They're important.
But never think
that anything good
is going to happen
if the United States
of America withdraws.
Last question.
I see some Stanford students here.
They didn't know George.
They were born after
the Soviet Union became defunct.
As a matter of fact,
we might as well
have been talking
about the Grover Cleveland
administration
as far as they're concerned.
So can you sum up
just in one sentence
that they need to understand
about George Shultz?
Mike?
That you can serve
with integrity
in anything you do,
whether that's
in public life,
in the business world,
in a think tank,
in academe.
You can serve with integrity,
try to do the best you can,
and try to make sure
that you take
your God-given skills
and make the most of them.
You only have one shot at it.
Jay?
I think the things
that he accomplished
were hugely beneficial
to this country.
We can all be grateful for that,
and those of you
who are students
and looking ahead,
I would hope people
would look at him
as an example
and think,
I'd like to do public service.
I'd like to serve
this great country
and make my own contribution.
I would say to my students,
you want to participate
in this democracy.
You want to participate
in the solution of its problems.
It's an obligation.
It's a privilege to do so.
But George Shultz
would have probably said,
first know something
about the problems
you're trying to solve.
Michael Boskin,
Condoleezza Rice,
and Jay Powell,
thank you.
Thank you.
Thanks.
Thanks, Peter.
Jay.
Pleasure.
Thank you so much.
That was terrific.
Thank you.
We'll see you next time.
Have a nice day.
