REPLAY: Federal Reserve's Powell Participates a Panel at Stanford University

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Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell gives brief remarks and participates in “George Schultz and his Economic Policy Contributions” panel on the evening of Dec. 1 before the Hoover Institution George P. Shultz Memorial Lecture Series: George Shultz and Economic Policy, in Stanford, California.
(Livestream courtesy of Hoover Institution, Stanford University)
change, nuclear disarmament, and other areas.
He may be less well-known for this,
but George Shultz was deeply concerned
about racial discrimination in the workplace
and in our society more broadly.
He consistently and effectively used his positions of authority
to increase opportunities for minorities.
And he later noted that there was
both a moral and an economic case for this.
He stuck to his principles while also treating people
with honesty and respect, including
those with whom he had policy disagreements.
Labor leaders welcomed his appointment
as Secretary of Labor.
And as many of his contemporaries
remarked, faced with divergent views and difficult issues,
he was extraordinarily good at steering people
toward agreement.
A key part of that strategy was to let the parties reach
the final agreement themselves.
That way, they owned the agreement
and were more likely to honor it.
His friendships and collaborations
were beyond number and knew no partisan bounds.
He often said that trust is the coin of the realm
and that good things were only possible
where there was mutual trust.
His integrity provided the basis for that trust.
All of those who aspire to serve the public
can learn from his example.
Thank you.
George Shultz's professional training, Labor Economics.
Mr. Shultz earned his doctorate from MIT in 1949,
taught at MIT for nine years, then
moved to the University of Chicago
where he served for 11 years, six years,
as dean of the business school.
Jay, labor economics, the importance
of labor in the last century.
Help us reconstruct that intellectual world.
So it was such a different world.
Private sector unionization today in the United States
is under 6%.
In those days, it was around 30%.
And collective bargaining for the major manufacturing
unions in steel and autos and things like that,
that was front page news everywhere.
The job of the Secretary of Labor in any administration
was to know the labor movement, know the leaders,
and understand what they wanted.
It was a very, very different time.
And of course, George Shultz had studied collective bargaining.
That was one of his main topics in his work
as a labor economist.
And he was extraordinarily well qualified
to face the challenges of a labor secretary
and, indeed, went to Los Angeles to talk to President-elect
Nixon just to make sure that President-elect Nixon knew
what George's views were on labor economics.
And he's a labor economist.
This is the middle of the last century
when there's a great debate about labor
taking place in the world.
The communists had a certain view about labor.
Workers of the world unite.
This is Mr. Shultz.
I'm quoting an interview he gave when he was here at Hoover
looking back over his career.
The Chicago School stood for the fundamental value of freedom
and free markets, close quote.
Mike Conde, how did he integrate this belief
in free markets into labor economics?
Well, let me start by saying that when
I was asked to be Secretary of State by President Bush,
actually, the only person I called to ask about the job
was George Shultz.
And I said, well, George, what do you think?
He said, well, it's the best job in government.
And I said, well, George, you should know,
because you've held almost every other job in government.
But the reason that he said that is perhaps
part of the answer to your question, Peter.
He said that he always fundamentally
believed that the United States had
the right foundational principles
and that that was much of the reason for our success.
One of those foundational principles
was, of course, the free market.
And of course, the Chicago School
spread particularly in Latin America and other places
had, he thought, the chance to bring other countries out
of poverty to use their resources best
and to gain prosperity.
But he also believed in the inextricable link
between free markets and individual liberty.
And that reflected in the way that he took on the challenge,
of course, of being the Secretary of State
as the Soviet Union was beginning
to go into its twilight.
We forget that George's first year as Secretary,
the Soviet Union was a bit on the march.
This is 1982, 83, 84, the sense that the Soviet Union
was really the future.
And from George's point of view, this was nonsense.
And this is something that he shared, of course,
with Ronald Reagan, that this experiment,
as Reagan had called it, this experiment that
was practiced on a hapless people
would end up on the ash heap of history.
Now, George, who was a great diplomat,
would never have said it so boldly as Reagan did.
But because they believed in the fundamental principles
of the free market and individual liberty,
the Soviet Union was on the wrong side of history.
And they were together perfectly willing to say that,
perfectly willing to challenge the system.
There's a story that Mike likes to tell of George meeting
with Gorbachev and saying to Gorbachev,
you know that central planning thing that you've got going.
Maybe you'd better take off with planning,
because you all aren't doing it very well.
And can you imagine Gorbachev at that point thinking,
who is this guy, and why is he telling me
about my own economy?
But because he had been a great economist,
because he'd been Secretary of the Treasury,
I think George was able to bring this knowledge of how
the free market worked, along with his belief
in the free market, and his belief in individual liberty,
to really challenge many of the assumptions
about the strength of the Soviet Union
at that particular point in time,
and then to be there, of course, for the beginning
of the end.
Mike, a question for you on the longshoreman strike.
Let me set it up.
The Nixon years, just after George
becomes Secretary of Labor under President Nixon in January
69, he finds himself confronted with a longshoreman strike.
He's under intense pressure for the government to intervene,
but he insists on keeping the federal government out of it,
forcing the longshoremen and management
to the bargaining table on their own.
Instead of damaging the entire economy,
the strike settles just a month after George
Shultz takes office.
Why was that such an important episode?
First of all, it set a really important example.
Number one, that government intervention sometimes
can be an obstacle, rather than a provider
of successful outcomes.
Number two, it's really important
because it signaled that people could make their own decisions
and would be forced to, if they were confronting each other,
rather than wait around for the government to come in.
They wouldn't make their best offers.
They wouldn't get serious.
This became very clear to me.
I was a beneficiary of George's advice and friendship,
and we did a lot of things together over the years.
Maybe talk about that a bit later.
But it becomes really apparent when
you're dealing with a whole different context of people
that aren't used to thinking about markets, people
that aren't used to thinking about individual incentives,
people being able to think that way.
And that goes back to your and Jay's comments
and Condi's about as being an economist.
He was used to this idea that people
were trying to do the best they can themselves,
given their environment, and that if you let them do that,
that would collectively lead to the best possible outcome.
Kind of a basic theorem of basic economics,
which some people forget.
And there's always a pressure for the government
to do something.
All of us have been, and Jay still is,
but we're in public office.
And the first thing every morning in the briefing room
is, what's the president going to do about x?
And it could be anything.
It could be anything the president shouldn't
have any worry about, shouldn't even know about.
So it's important to set that example
and to let things play out until there really
is something that you desperately
need the government to intervene for if that happens.
Two incidents in the Nixon years that are less, strictly
speaking, economic than social, the Philadelphia plan.
In the spring of 1969, George Shultz
issues the Philadelphia plan, which
requires federal contractors to hire minority workers.
And he famously makes the remark that he's not
imposing quotas, he's ending the quota.
And the quota that he was ending was on black workers,
and it was zero.
As Secretary of Labor, he also ran the White House Cabinet
Committee on Education, which was charged
with developing a strategy for the peaceful integration
of schools in the seven states of the Deep South.
He ended up running it because Vice President Spiro Agnew
wanted nothing to do with it.
He was given the chairmanship and never
turned up for any meetings.
There's a famous moment.
I heard Mr. Shultz himself tell this story.
George Shultz has the chairs of the Mississippi Committee
come in.
It's a white man and a black man.
And he has them sit down together in the White House.
And as they get close to an agreement,
Secretary of State leaves the room.
And I'm quoting George Shultz here.
You mentioned this in your remarks, Jay.
I learned long ago that when parties
get this close to an agreement, it's
best to let them complete their deal on their own.
That way, the agreement belongs to them, close quote.
By the end of the Nixon administration,
this is a statistic I found staggering.
I wasn't aware of it.
More than 90% of black children in the South
were attending integrated schools.
All right.
He's a labor economist.
But in the Philadelphia Plan and the integration
of schools in the South, he's solving social problems.
What's going on here?
This has something to do with his own principles,
with the respect in which everyone holds him.
Jay, would you like to address this episode?
I would.
So this is something that people need
to know more about George Shultz.
This is an extraordinary accomplishment.
And it is consistent through his career.
He started the first minority program
to bring kids into the University of Chicago Business
School and many other things along the way.
But in this case, Brown v. Board is decided in 1954.
This is 15 years later.
And there are seven Southern states
that have just not desegregated their schools.
Supreme Court makes it clear that the argument is over
and we're going to do this.
George Shultz, he takes over this commission.
And he picks a black person and a white person
from each of the seven states.
He gets them together.
And they figure out how to do this.
Because they now know this is going to happen.
And he gets them to realize that.
And the whole idea is this has got
to be done without violence.
And he manages to get that done.
It's an extraordinary accomplishment.
How did he do it?
This is sort of the full Shultz playbook
of bringing people together, treating them with respect,
empowering them, enabling them to take
on this thing, this terrible, difficult issue.
And it really worked.
I mean, the schools did open without violence
in these seven Southern states.
And it's quite a remarkable story.
And he really made it happen.
So, quite extraordinary.
Well, actually, I lived it.
Yeah. Because I was a kid in elementary school
in Birmingham, Alabama, in the early 1960s.
And Brown versus Board of Education, 54,
essentially nothing happens in integration
of the schools, despite the striking
balance separate but equal.
They just ignored it.
Just ignored it.
And then, finally, after the Supreme Court,
so they came up with this plan called,
just before George's intervention, called choice.
Now, choice is a good thing these days.
In those days, it wasn't a particularly good choice,
a good idea.
Because the idea was probably white parents
would choose to keep their kids in white schools.
And black parents would choose to send their kids
to white schools.
As it turns out, nobody chose to do anything.
And a few, this is actually kind of a funny story,
a few poor teachers were sent to integrate
the faculties of these schools.
And my mother was one who was gonna be sent
to a white school.
Really?
Yes, my father was terrified because he was worried
about the potential violence.
As it turns out, my mother didn't go.
But they sent this poor white woman to our school
at Druid High School.
And I felt so bad for her because everybody
just treated her really, really badly.
You know, she was the only one.
So this was going pretty imperfectly.
And I think one reason that, I told this story to George,
and I think one reason it was important
to get people together and then get a plan
for how to do this, which is what the Philadelphia plan
really was, was because it was going nowhere.
And to the degree that it was going anywhere,
it wasn't going in a very good direction.
And so George and I would kind of laugh
about my own personal experience in what was going on
in the South before the Philadelphia plan.
It's worth mentioning that affirmative action
has gotten a bad name of late.
And California voters have rejected it twice.
And perhaps it went overboard a bit.
But back then, in the Philadelphia building trades,
there was a quota of zero African-Americans.
And so economists hate quotas.
And a quota of zero is a bad quota,
just like a quota of a large amount.
So I think it reflects back on his thinking as an economist.
And as Jay said, there was obviously a moral
as well as an economic justification.
Well, I think he felt the moral side very strongly
because both in the Philadelphia plan
and in the work with the school system.
Because again, it went back to George's view
that America was the hope of the world.
America was the place that had gotten mostly right.
But there were times when America had not gotten it right.
And on this, we had not.
Back to economics and the Nixon administration.
And here I'm going to ask the three of you
just to give me a seminar.
We've got the closing of the gold window.
And we've got wage and price controls.
So I'll set up with what I know,
which is very little.
In 1970, Mr. Schultz becomes director of OMB.
He's one of a circle of advisors,
including Secretary of Treasury John Connolly
and Undersecretary of the Treasury Paul Volcker,
who advised President Nixon to end
the convertibility of the dollar into gold.
President Nixon closes the gold window on August 15th, 1971.
I'm going to quote Milton Friedman,
his observation on this.
Quote, the closing of the gold window
opened the way to a free market for the dollar
where there was none before, close quote.
Again, we're dealing with something here
so foreign to the way we do business
and think about the currencies today
that it requires a little bit of effort
simply to take us back to the moment
when the dollar was pegged to gold
and what the debate concerned, why it was important.
Who would like to take it on?
I guess I'll start.
So if we go back to the end of World War II
and what George and Condi like to call
the Global Economic and Security Commons was established,
the International Monetary Fund,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
and the World Bank were established.
And we established that the dollar
is the centerpiece of the exchange rate system.
Most countries would have fixed exchange rates
and the U.S. would peg the dollar,
exchange dollars for $35 per ounce of gold
and pledged to do that for the foreign reserves,
dollar reserves of foreign countries.
So this again was George in the international arena as well
because it affected other countries.
Now-
That enabled us to backstop economic growth
across much of the world, is that the idea?
It's a little more complicated than that
and I don't want to bore people in the audience with this.
But what it meant was you could not have other countries
and could not have an independent monetary policy
along with the fixed exchange rates and free capital flows
because if their interest rates were lower than ours,
capital would flow out.
They'd be pressured to devalue their currencies
and the opposite if their interest rates
were higher than ours.
So it created quite a conundrum
and we've seen that in more recent years
when countries have pegged their currency to the dollar,
ended that, and we've seen what happens.
It was a little chaotic.
So this I think was a major move.
There had been a big intellectual debate for decades
in economics about whether fixed
or flexible exchange rates were better
and I think the flexible market-oriented approach
wound up winning, I think, the world's advantage.
So that was part one.
Part two was because of this sudden change
and we weren't gonna exchange a dollar,
$35 for an ounce of gold anymore.
Foreigners were, foreign holders of US dollar reserves
were gonna be in a pickle and so they had to,
we couldn't revalue the dollar.
They had to revalue against us
and so what happened was President Nixon
imposed a 10% import charge that was gonna be removed
if and when they revalued their currencies appropriately,
which is what happened.
And within 18 months, the world kind of came
to a bit of a equilibrium and things were going okay
and then a year later,
we had the oil shock, as you referred to earlier.
And so I can't resist asking
the chairman of the Fed if it worked.
If we hadn't had the oil shock, it was a good idea.
We were going to switch
to a floating rate system eventually.
Milton Friedman was right about this.
It was a good thing that we did.
Okay, so this brings us, Connie,
would you hop in on the gold window?
Which person here is not like the others?
I'll leave that to the economist.
All right, then the wage and price controls.
Again, I'll set it up.
President Nixon imposes wage and price controls.
Director, as he was then,
Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
George Shultz opposes the measure
but finds himself overruled by John Connolly,
a Secretary of the Treasury, and Richard Nixon.
In 1972, George Shultz himself
becomes Secretary of the Treasury
and by January 1973,
he had abolished most of the mandatory controls.
He abolished the controls entirely in April 1974
just before stepping down
as Secretary of the Treasury in May.
So again, it is inconceivable
the notion that a president of the United States
would impose wage and price controls
strikes me as inconceivable now.
So we need this sort of reconstruction
of what were they thinking.
And then also, is it fair to see this episode
as a kind of the old statist view
represented by John Connolly
versus the new Chicago school thinking
in terms of free markets represented by George Shultz?
Is it as simple and straightforward as that?
Mike, do you want to take a shot at this?
For many, many decades, economists have debated
and we thought we had won this battle
but it's come back several times since
the propriety of using what's called incomes policies
which were basically the government
job-owning business and labor
which may have made sense in the economy
where a large fraction of the labor force
was unionized, unions were very powerful.
If it made sense at all, that's when it made sense.
But in any event, we wound up in the situation
where we had just a remarkable series
of key intellectuals coming to the conclusion
that we weren't really sure what we could do
about inflation and unemployment
occurring at the same time.
We had to do something.
We didn't want to inflict any pain
about disinflating the economy and causing a recession.
We couldn't use monetary and fiscal policy very well.
And this became a big debate.
And we thought it had ended successfully
with the end of wage and price controls, but it came back.
In fact, when I was advising candidate Reagan in 1980,
they asked me, the campaign asked me to debate Walter Heller
who'd been President Kennedy's Chair
of the Council of Economic Advisors
and a key architect of the Kennedy tax cuts
on this precise point.
And you had like the head of the AFL-CIO,
key industrial business leaders
like the heads of DuPont, Lane Kirkland, Ernie Shapiro
they would decide what to do
with the government in the room
kind of getting back to the point Jay made earlier.
And fortunately that didn't happen.
We had a successful and painful disinflation.
Well, I'll turn it back to Jay
because I know he has some views on this as well.
Yes, Jay.
So, I mean, the interesting thing to me
is that as Michael pointed out,
it was almost a consensus that we needed income policy.
And in other words,
that the government needed to jawbone companies
informally at least, let alone,
and then maybe would eventually
need to do wage and price control.
So you go back to 1966,
George Shultz had held a famous conference
with another University of Chicago person
and it was on guidelines.
And the big names of the era debated,
Milton Freeman famously debated Bob Solow over this,
but people really thought that there was a problem to solve.
There was a general agreement
that the problem of high inflation and high unemployment,
that fiscal policy wasn't gonna be able to handle that.
Monetary policy wasn't.
So you needed the government to somehow do this.
This was a bad idea.
It was a really bad idea.
And somehow it had become
approximately conventional wisdom in these days.
Milton Freedman, of course, was a big exception.
George Shultz was on the right side of that.
Paul Volcker was on the right side of that.
But to me, there's a takeaway there,
which is that our understanding of the economy
is ever evolving.
The economy itself is ever evolving.
So I think we always,
those of us who are doing economic policy,
have always gotta remember
that the structure of the economy is always changing
and that our understanding of it is always highly uncertain.
So certain things that are sometimes accepted
as conventional wisdom,
people will look back in 50 years
and think like we're doing with wage price controls.
They're gonna say,
what were they thinking at the time?
Well, that's what they were thinking.
They were thinking,
it was really the beginnings of stagflation.
High unemployment and high inflation.
What do we do?
Very difficult problem.
And Paul Volcker kind of had the answer
and eventually did it.
George Shultz deserves credit for supporting him
and Reagan deserves credit for supporting him as well.
Yes, Connie, first.
I was just gonna say
that this is also quintessentially George Shultz.
So he lost the argument.
But he understood who was elected
and he was able to bide his time
and then we had the opportunity.
He worked to move things in the other direction.
But George was, in that way,
quintessentially a pragmatist also.
He played a long game.
And I think it isn't as well understood
that when you're in government sometimes,
you're gonna win some and you're gonna lose some.
But if you never lose sight of what you think is right,
you might have a chance to correct it.
And I know that the wage and price controls for George,
this was really an anathema.
And he thought one of the arguments
that he was most unhappy that he lost
because he thought it did great damage.
But when he had the opportunity, he reversed it.
So just one quick comment.
Respect to Connie's comment about winning some, losing.
We always thought we were doing well
if we were above Shaq's free throw percentage.
But it's important to remember what was going on
in the economy, as Jay has mentioned.
Nixon imposed wage and price controls
when inflation got up to 4%.
It's important to have that historical reference
in the back of your mind.
So thank you for the seminar.
What I hadn't realized is the extent
to which there was a debate going on
within the discipline of economics when the shock hits,
which means you don't have, I don't know how to put it,
I don't want to use the word establishment,
but you don't have consensus on how to respond
when the oil shock hits.
In the 70s, the economy is taking one blow after another,
and the economists are, there's a debate
about what should be done.
There's a kind of uncertainty.
Is that fair?
A fair description?
Absolutely.
All right, so then we get to Ronald Reagan
and I hadn't thought of it this way before,
but this is a moment when one side wins the debate
is one way of thinking about it.
George Shultz, before becoming Secretary of State,
which he did about a year into the administration,
he chaired President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Group,
a group that included figures such as Milton Friedman.
This is Mr. Shultz in a 2000 interview
talking about those times.
The advisory group said the essence
of the inflation problem is monetary policy,
and to deal with it effectively,
you've got to discipline the money supply.
People warned President Reagan that if he did this,
there's likely to be a recession.
By the way, I was there for that bit,
and people did warn him just that.
Back to George Shultz, but he did the right thing,
and we did have a recession,
but inflation dropped like a stone,
and that has been one of the primary reasons
why our economy has been as strong as it has been,
close quote.
So from Richard Nixon's wage and price controls
to the moment when Ronald Reagan backs Paul Volcker
in disciplining the dollar represents an intellectual,
it's not just a, it's an intellectual victory.
Is that right?
Am I understanding that correctly?
In that 10-year period,
we also had President Carter in 1979
go on national television,
complain about high inflation in the letters,
and said the Fed should lower interest rates
to reduce inflation.
So there's a lot of misunderstanding
and apology as well,
but it's a remarkable transformation.
In 1979, this goes back to Condi's discussion
of George liked to garden,
but he also did that in economic policy.
Not only bided his time and changed things
when he had the opportunity, but he prepared,
and so in 1979, he had a dinner with candidate Reagan,
and he invited myself and Milton Friedman
and a couple of other economists to kick the tires
about supply-side economics and about inflation,
and I was very much impressed
because Reagan's knowledge
and subtlety of understanding these things
and depth of understanding was quite a bit different
from the caricature of his portrayal at the time.
And so I think that George was preparing for this moment,
and letting Reagan talk to some people
that he came to respect, that worked with him and for him,
and developed an understanding,
and Reagan also had very strong principles,
and he understood how serious high inflation was.
Keynes, in a remarkable book, 1919,
saying what will happen from the Treaty of Versailles,
hyperinflation, et cetera, in Germany,
will destroy the society,
quoted Lenin's injunction that debauching the currency
is the surest way to destroy capitalism,
and so it's a very, very strong sense in Reagan
that we have, at the time, inflation's double digits,
and had been rising at the same point
at every business cycle since the 1960s.
If you measure the trough, the midpoint, or the peak,
it's going up and up and up,
and it peaked at around 13%.
So there was a desperate need to disinflate the economy.
It was painful, but it was the right thing to do.
Condi, you remember those,
well, you were still at Denver, weren't you?
No, I'd just become a faculty member at Stanford
and was trying to buy a house,
and I do remember, as a high inflation,
I remember it very, very well.
You remember interest rates.
But I was gonna make a point about George in this regard,
because we all know that George Shultz
was a very fine public servant,
and it was mentioned he was also an academic,
and he cared about these intellectual debates.
He cared about winning the debate with ideas.
It wasn't name-calling.
It wasn't, you know, you're just evil.
He actually liked to get ideas on the table and debate them,
and he liked to debate them with people who disagreed.
And when he had an opportunity with Reagan,
he brought people together for Reagan
to listen and to hear the ideas,
and Mike mentioned this, because you were there.
I would see it later with George W. Bush,
and that George would bring together these groups of people
for these politicians,
and he would count on the ability to convince and persuade
through good ideas to really challenge people
who wanted to be the elected officials
who were going to carry out policy,
to really understand what they were listening to.
And I have to say, the Hoover Institution
played quite an important role in this,
people like Milton Friedman and others, Mike Boskin,
but it was George who would convene these people
with people who were gonna actually be in government,
who were actually gonna run for office.
You know, we sometimes, as people in the academy
or people who, like Mike and I or Jay,
have served in government, people say,
well, I like policy but not politics.
Well, unfortunately, policy has to go through politics
to actually become policy, and George understood that,
and so he often spent a lot of time
with the people who were actually making decisions,
trying to convince them, and with Ronald Reagan,
he found somebody who had everything that needed
to change many of our assumptions
about the way the world worked.
It wasn't just in Washington.
The second time George dragooned me into doing something,
the first time when his treasury secretary called me,
I'd never met him, and he got me involved,
Larry Feldstein, as the advisors to a commission
to talk about the benefits of philanthropy
and the benefits of the tax deduction
for raising lots of money for charities,
probably more than the government was losing in revenue
by allowing the deduction.
Then a few years later, it was to go up to Sacramento
and talk to then-Governor Brown
and his first of his two stints as governor,
and California's running a large surplus.
We had a very high inflation.
The tax brackets weren't indexed,
and revenue was rolling into the state,
and property taxes were going up
because they were being revalued,
and the governor wanted to convince us
to back him running a bigger and bigger surplus,
and which I think he wanted to do
to later on have an even larger tax cut
and run for president, but in any event,
so we went up there, and a cute anecdote is,
at the time, he was dating Linda Ronstadt,
and so lunch-
He, Governor Brown.
Governor Brown, not George.
Absolutely, absolutely.
Obie wouldn't have gone for that,
and in any event, and so lunch was kind of dietetic,
it was in training.
In any event, we thought this was a bad idea,
and that's one of the untold stories
of how Prop 13, the California's property tax revolt,
an initiative that limited property tax increases,
happened because this was going on
while the state had a gigantic surplus.
Jay, can you work Linda Ronstadt into-
I don't think I can.
Oh, all right.
So when you look back on this episode with Nixon,
which I now see, actually,
it's important to understand it as part of a continuum,
from Nixon wage and price controls
to what takes place in 81,
backing Volcker to shrink the money supply.
I'm struck that, again and again,
George Shultz is there.
Furthermore, that we think of him so often,
people emphasize character,
which is totally fair, and true, of course,
but he took the life of the mind,
this is the point Kanye made,
he took his intellectual life extremely seriously,
and we've got this intellectual project
taking place at the University of Chicago.
They believe they reach conclusions,
Milton Friedman and George Stigler and George Shultz,
and then it's George Shultz who has this kind of genius
to take the intellectual findings
and work this strange territory between intellectuals
and office holders to get the right thing done.
So what does that,
now I know you knew George Shultz the least,
but I actually find that a striking datum
that you took the time to fly out here
because he means so much to you as an example.
So what does that tell us about the way
an intellectual, an academic,
goes about public service at its best?
So he obviously got the big things he got right,
so collective bargaining he got right,
exchange rates he got right,
wage and price controls, he was right on those issues,
and history has very much vindicated that.
And of course he was a great Secretary of State
and helped end the Cold War,
I mean we could be here just listing his,
let alone discussing his many accomplishments.
But I would say as important
as his extraordinary achievements
is the way he approached public policy.
I am very, it resonates very much with me
that the way he brought people together
with respect and integrity
and wound up being able to foster agreements
on super difficult issues like the desegregation
of schools in the Deep South and many other areas.
He was an extraordinary public servant
even if you didn't agree with those policy conclusions,
which I did, so that's another aspect.
And he continued to do that until very late in life.
He was convening things at Hoover.
Hoover, he was a huge presence here.
He often convened groups on various issues.
I was privileged to do many,
sometimes with colleagues here,
especially John Kogan and John Taylor on economic stuff.
But he always tried to get alternative points of view,
tried to get people debating and discussing,
and he tried to get people in a conference room,
we had a call at the Annenberg here,
and we would sit there and we'd understand facts
and theories and data and history
and debate about what the best path forward was
on a variety of pretty complicated issues
that often don't have just singularly clear conclusions
but have trade-offs involved,
something else that being an economist
teaches you to pay a lot of attention to.
George Shultz as teacher.
George Shultz becomes Secretary of State in 1982,
and he serves until the end of the Reagan administration.
Most of his work as Secretary of State
will belong to the third of these conversations about him.
But there's an episode or an aspect of his time
as Secretary of State that shows George Shultz
right back where he started, teaching economics.
I'm quoting now from The Cold War by John Lewis Gaddis.
Gaddis notes that as early as 1985,
Secretary of State George Shultz
began telling General Secretary Gorbachev
that the Soviet Union would continue falling behind
as long as it had a command economy.
I'm quoting Gaddis.
"'You should take over the planning office here in Moscow,'
Gorbachev joked,
"'because you have more ideas than they have.'"
In a way, that is what Shultz did.
Over the next several years,
he used his trips to Moscow to run tutorials
for Gorbachev and his advisors,
even bringing pie charts to the Kremlin.
Gorbachev proved surprisingly receptive, close quote.
Condi, what, this is,
this is, I mean, it's,
it sounds almost like a Monty Python sketch.
Right, right, and look,
I think this is one where George had mixed results.
And I would say they were mixed results
because it was very hard to penetrate the Soviet,
the Gorbachev or any of them,
the idea that this thing called capitalism and markets
could actually make everybody richer.
And I remember Gorbachev saying at one point,
actually, George H. W. Bush,
he was trying to explain how in capitalism,
somebody will found a company.
And yes, they'll get rich from that,
but there'll be all these jobs
and the economy will grow and so forth and so on.
And at one point, George H. W. Bush turned to me and said,
are they translating this?
And I said, Mr. President,
I'm afraid this just doesn't translate.
All right.
So, but George was indefatigable.
He would go and he would take his pie charts
and he would explain why central planning didn't work.
And maybe underneath it eventually had an effect
because one of the things that Gorbachev tried to do,
and George was very proud of this,
was he actually tried to have
these little private enterprise shoots.
They wouldn't privatize the economy as a whole,
but they had little entrepreneurial businesses
that they started to build called collectives
so that somebody would be able to have a restaurant
that was private.
And this is sort of 1987, 1988,
and George actually would go once in a while
to these little collectives
where a man and his wife,
you can only have eight tables, by the way,
couldn't have more than eight tables.
And so he would go because, by the way,
much to the chagrin of the diplomatic security and the like,
he would go down into some town
and go to one of these collectives
because he actually did believe
that that could be the beginning of capitalism.
So he understood that it was too much
to try to explain to them
that you could have this thing called the market
and it would all work out.
But these little experiments he was always very proud of
and thought maybe he'd had a point,
a part in getting them to do it.
I can pick up on that because I got to deal with it
subsequently when the Berlin Wall fell, et cetera.
And so first of all, Gorbachev may have been receptive
but he didn't understand it.
He had grown up in the, he was Secretary of Agriculture
and they were making sure he knew exactly
where everything was all the time.
So when Bush, Senior Bush sent me to help them
with economic reform because they announced
they were gonna become a capitalist economy in 500 days.
Not the five centuries it took to develop capitalism
but that's a whole nother story.
So I met with Gorbachev and Chevron odds
and it's pretty clear, you know,
I'm Bush's chief economic advisor
so I actually know how all this works.
So he sends me to see the head of Gospel
on the State Planning Agency.
Through his interpreter, he asked me,
who sets the prices in your economy?
And I try to explain, you know,
we have a few regulated industries and there's et cetera.
And you know, I've won teaching awards in my day
but he wasn't having it.
He just didn't understand that lots of consumers,
lots of producers can interact
and that would determine prices, et cetera.
And so he finally gets very frustrated, motions me away.
He goes back to his office and we're in an ante room.
He comes back with one of these 1970s
we would think of here but there it's 1990 flip charts
and it's, you know, these Fortran flip charts.
It's the price list for the Soviet Union.
He hands me a penny, he wants me to cross out
the old prices and write in the new ones.
He can't believe since Gorbachev has told him
I'm Bush's chief economic advisor,
I know what the prices should be.
So he's convinced that I should just read in the new prices
and that would solve his problem
because he's been told he has to get to a price system
in 500 days, he has the slightest idea what he's doing.
Both in China and in Russia, I've had the experience
of people who are more reformers, who spoke some English
but also generally relied on translation to be precise,
tell me that you can't get this across
because all these people have been trained as Marxists.
They can't, when you ask them how do you measure,
how do you know what's actually going on in the economy?
They've never thought about how to measure
something like GDP because the outputs
are weighted by market prices.
They don't have market prices.
They're just used to everything being quantities.
These many shoes of this size for,
this style of lady's shoe will get shipped to Leningrad
or to Vladivostok, et cetera.
That's all they knew.
So in any event, it became interesting
and later on, George was a big help to me
and Condi who was a rising superstar of the NSC staff
at the time when I was asked to negotiate
a potential bailout with Gorbachev
and he told me push them hard,
they have to threaten to walk out twice
so they don't get serious and then be careful
because you can do more harm than good
and that's why we decided to do,
even though Bush was being pressured by John Major
and Francois Miron, Helmut Kohl to bail out Gorbachev,
we decided to do very little.
Jay, I'm wondering if you'll buy this idea
that this represents another aspect
of the way George Shultz did public service.
He was always teaching.
Gorbachev in this case, but I think,
Condi, I think back to his,
there would be some big meeting, some big summit
and he would go to the press
and it would be very methodical.
He would want everyone to understand
what had happened, what were the central issues,
who took what position and where matters stood now.
George never talked in soundbites, he simply didn't.
There was always depth to it.
I think sometimes it was a little frustrating for the press
because they wanted him to talk in soundbites
having been in that job.
I know they'd like you to talk in soundbites,
but he was determined that people
were gonna have a real understanding of it.
Jay is not known for soundbites either, right?
No, no.
Yeah, no, I would say also,
George in a sense was AI before AI
because having been in boardrooms and academic seminars,
he always would listen carefully
and he would summarize things in a way
that really got to the essence of the issue
and what the issues were and what the path forward
the potential paths forward were.
And it was quite an amazing thing.
He'd sit in a boardroom and people would be arguing
about this, that, and the other thing.
He'd just sit there quietly and at the end,
he'd give a succinct, maybe not always so succinct,
summary and wrap things up.
Jay.
So I think, I didn't know him anything
like both of these folks knew him,
but it seems to me people who met him
and worked with him trusted him
and it was based on his integrity and his knowledge
and his work product and just the way he dealt with people.
So he holds three cabinet off in ascending importance,
Labor, OMB, and then Treasury in three years really.
So he's getting promoted really quickly
and being given the job of desegregating the schools,
which wasn't obviously connected to any of those jobs.
Then as Secretary of State,
Gorbachev and Shevardnadze just take tremendous liking
to him and they want to work with him.
Some of the people who study this stuff
give him a lot of credit for,
they didn't compromise on his principles,
but they trusted him and they felt
that this was someone they could work with
and that President Reagan was really aligned with him.
Critically, Reagan was aligned with these goals.
So just very effective in that way.
And again, I think it was liking him, trusting him,
having strong principles he didn't compromise
just made him very effective,
remarkably effective across so many issues.
Back at Stanford.
After the Reagan administration,
Mr. Schultz returns to Stanford.
He composes his memoirs, Triumph and Turmoil.
He convenes study groups.
He continues coming into his Hoover office
well into his, I think he was still showing up
in his 99th year as I recall.
Two or three days a week in his 99th,
which is by the way is about as often
as kids show up for in the office these days,
two or three days a week.
And so I am just struck that the same things he was doing
at the University of Chicago
and all of these jobs, Secretary of Labor,
Director of OMB, Secretary of the Treasury,
Secretary of State, he continues to do here
at the Hoover Institution, convene, talk.
That says something about him.
Of course, let me know what you think it says about him
that he keeps at it so long,
but it also says something about the Hoover Institution,
that this remarkable man thought that it was worth
making this institution the central activity of his life
for the final decades of his time on this planet.
Condi?
Well, we called him the great convener
because George would really, he would decide
that there was a subject that was of importance
and we ought to get the smartest people in the room
to talk about it.
And it was that simple.
And then he would call them up
and of course they would all show up.
And everything from, and it was not just economics.
Mike mentioned he had a very deep interest in California
and in trying to make this state better.
And you might know that Charlotte,
the great Charlotte, was chief of protocol
to several mayors and governors of the state.
And so he was very involved in California
and in California policy, not so much politics, but policy.
George took a tremendous interest in energy policy.
And together with Tom Stevenson,
convened a task force on energy
in which they were concerned, not just about energy,
but about the issues that related to a clean environment,
to climate change, and so worked very hard on those issues.
Obviously, anything to do with national security.
Another area that people perhaps don't realize
how important he thought it was, North America.
He cared about North America
because he believed it could be an economic engine.
If you thought about the assets of Canada,
the United States, and Mexico together,
that this could be a tremendous economic engine.
And so I always thought of George's life as an economist,
his understanding of the economy,
and the way that he engaged
these incredibly important public policy issues
as being inherently linked.
And it goes back to that belief in markets,
to that belief in free enterprise,
to that belief in individual liberty,
and it would all show up in these convenings
that George would do.
But his reach across so many public policy issues,
very often starting from the economic side
and branching out, is really quite extraordinary.
I think it made him a far better Secretary of State
because he really understood
what a lot of these countries were trying to do
in providing for their people.
Yeah, and it made Hoover and George
a perfect complement to each other
because of the wide breadth of interests
of the Hoover scholars.
We have experts in economics, and national security,
and foreign affairs, and education, and political science.
You go on and on for energy, et cetera.
So we have area studies of particular interest.
And George was really, in a sense,
interested in everything, or as much as he could,
with his immense capacity, accommodating.
A couple last questions for all three of you.
If possible, we'll go right down.
I'm struck that by this notion that he participates,
he's right in the middle of a great debate
that takes place for a couple of decades in this country.
And by the 1980s, when we get economic revival,
and a victory in the Cold War,
it feels as though we've gotten someplace.
It feels as though one side of the debate has won.
Which brings us to today.
The former Soviet Union, now Russia,
still has not embraced free markets.
China has embraced markets,
but has not embraced democracy.
The economy that we inhabit,
which AI, every person I know who participates,
even people who are making money on AI already,
are nervous about what it's going to do
to the labor force, restructuring jobs.
We've got new forms of currency.
This is always a question you really can't get,
it's not a rigorous question,
but at the same time, it gets at something.
What would George Shultz tell us today?
What are the permanent lessons that we should grasp
as we face this changed world in which we live?
Mike, would you like to go start that?
Yeah, I would say that at the core
of the way George thought about things
was combining facts, ideas, and experience.
He firmly believed you didn't really understand
something deeply unless you understood it intellectually
and had experienced it in your gut.
And I've come to that point of view over a long time,
partly under George's influence,
but just my own experiences.
And so I think he would try to make sure
that you merge those things in your thinking about issues.
Number two, he would say, stay engaged.
Stay engaged, try to be constructive in any way you can.
And to me, that's a great lesson from his life.
Stay engaged, whether that's in the cabinet
at the federal government level,
whether it's your local school board,
or whatever you happen to do,
stay engaged and try to make things better.
He loved the phrase, democracy's not a spectator sport.
So stay engaged.
Jay, what are the permanent lessons?
I agree with all of that.
I mean, history doesn't end,
so now we're into a whole different
set of challenges looking forward.
And we need to remain engaged, to Michael's point,
with our main allies and rivals,
and we just need to keep working
on all the things that we confront now,
which to some extent, some of the issues are settled.
Like the issue of price controls is no longer,
we understand now that the central bank
is responsible for price stability.
So that issue is settled.
It doesn't mean it's easy to do,
but the issue is settled.
So this is new issues.
You make it look so easy, you make it look so easy, Jay.
Yeah, well, that's the trick.
No, but so things like nuclear disarmament,
we were talking more,
we were probably closer to that 20 years ago
than we are now.
So these issues don't go away and new issues arise,
and I call for very much,
I think the way George Shultz approached public policy
and engagement are exactly what we need now.
I think George would be excited by this moment,
understanding that it was a challenging moment,
but he always saw opportunity.
He was the, ultimately, he was an optimist.
He believed things could be solved
if you kept at the core the principles
on which the United States was founded.
You know, there's a story that when George would swear in
as Secretary of State ambassadors,
he would go to a big globe,
and he would say to the about to be ambassador,
show me your country.
And that person would point to Brazil
or to Paraguay or to Kenya.
And George would say, no, no, this is your country,
and he would point to the United States of America.
Because the one lesson that I think he would want us all
to remember is that since the war,
and remember, George was a young Marine in that war.
He was part of the greatest generation that fought
and won first the war against Nazism
and later on the war against communism.
George would want, I think, us to remember
that central to essentially eight plus decades
of relative peace and relative prosperity,
if we think about what had come before,
the United States was central to that.
The United States was central to it
because it was founded on the right principles.
It worked through its problems like segregation.
It worked through issues and came to the right answers
on how to stimulate the private sector
without wage and price controls.
And he just had an unfailing belief in this country.
And so I think he would say, garden with your allies.
They're important.
But never think that anything good is gonna happen
if the United States of America withdraws.
Last question.
I see some Stanford students here.
They didn't know George.
They were born after the Soviet Union became defunct.
As a matter of fact, we might as well have been talking
about the Grover Cleveland administration
as far as they're concerned.
So can you sum up just in one, give me one sentence
that they need to understand about George Shultz?
Mike?
That you can serve with integrity in anything you do,
whether that's in public life, in the business world,
in a think tank, in academe, you can serve with integrity.
Try to do the best you can and try to make sure
that you take your God-given skills
and make the most of them.
You only have one shot at it.
Jay?
Yeah, I mean, I think the things that he accomplished
were hugely beneficial to this country.
We can all be grateful for that.
And those of you who are students and looking ahead,
you should, I would hope people would look at him
as an example and think, I'd like to do public service.
I'd like to serve this great country
and make my own contribution.
I would say to my students,
you want to participate in this democracy.
You want to participate in the solution of its problems.
It's an obligation, it's a privilege to do so.
But George Shultz would have probably said,
first know something about the problems
you're trying to solve.
Michael Laskin, Condoleezza Rice, Jay Powell.
Thank you.
That's great.
Good to be with you.
Thanks, Peter.
Jay, pleasure.
Oh, yeah, pleasure.
Thank you so much.
