Elon Musk Doesn't Understand Why The Roman Empire Fell

The Roman Legacy - The Strength of Rome Endures.
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Nov 25, 2025
Population collapse? Not quite.
In this video, I want to spend some time talking about, as usual with this channel,
late antiquity and the end of the Western Roman Empire. Specifically, I want to address something
that's been blowing up on the internet this week and that has caused something of a storm over on
X, which is this post by Elon Musk stating, rather bluntly, that the Roman Empire
fell due to a general population collapse, which has been seen by at least 2.2 million people thus
far, and probably more by the time that I upload this. And by the way, since this is a longer
discussion, I don't really have much of a way to animate this, so you may just want to listen to
it while doing something else, like playing Hearts of Iron. So, is that line of argument correct?
Well, there was a decline in population from the 2nd century onward, perhaps as much as a 20%
decline by the 5th century, and following the 5th century, so the 500s, there was even more of
a general population decline and a general abandonment of cities. That much is true,
and no historian or archaeologist would really ever dispute it. That being said, any attempt to
explain the collapse of the Western half of the Roman Empire also has to explain why the Eastern
half of the empire did not collapse, which is where the notion of population decline essentially
just goes right out the window, never mind the fact that it is chronologically wrong.
The fall of the Western Roman Empire holds such a grip over our collective imagination because it
is central to anxieties over our own civilizational health, and it's had this grip since at least the
French Revolution, if not earlier. Essentially, the argument goes, if we can explain why the Roman
Empire fell, then we can see warning signs of this in the present day, and then we can prevent a
similar collapse of our own states. Ascribing that collapse to one single cause often says more about
the individual in question and their own concerns, rather than what actually happened, which is less
of a single, stunning cause, and more like death by a thousand cuts before, as the historian Guy
Hauser phrases it, accidentally committing suicide, which is a much less exciting and a much less
seductive answer. So, dealing with anything involving ancient population statistics is
notoriously difficult due to a general lack of sources for this particular question.
We do have, for example, fairly good records for the mid to late Republican period,
but even this data is fraught with issues. The data is derived from the famous Roman census,
which required, at least in theory, that Romans return to their hometowns and to report themselves
when the census was being gathered. The gist of the problem for the Republican period,
and here I am drawing on a rather excellent book, Nathan Rosenstein's Rome at War,
Farms, Families, and Death in the Middle Republic, is that there is a consistent fluctuation in the
population of Italy as recorded in the census, which basically comes down to us via Libby,
during the Second Punic War onwards. From the end of the war, in 201 BC until 164 BC,
there is a general population increase as recorded in the census. From 164 BC until about 125 BC,
the numbers are all over the place and they jump by quite a bit during each census,
far more than really should be expected. Historical opinion is basically broken into
two opposing camps, and just to reiterate, this is for when we do have good data by the standards of
classical history that we are able to actually work with. And those two opposing camps are
referred to as the high count and the low count, which have differing views on how accurate the
census numbers are. Essentially, was Italy overpopulated or not? The bulk of the evidence
seems now to favor the low count interpretation, which basically argues that the differences in
the census are a result of citizens not reporting for years which line up with rather costly wars
fought outside Italy, particularly in the Iberian Peninsula, where casualties are potentially up to
40%. In other words, it's not that there is a decline in population in one year, and then in
the next year there's some massive population spike, and then in the next there's a sharp drop.
It's that people were deliberately not reporting to the census in order to avoid being called up
for service in conflicts where casualties were high, and where there was not much opportunity
for plunder or booty. The point here is that there are all these debates and disagreements
when our evidence is actually fairly abundant, and much of that surviving evidence is probably
incorrect as to the population of Italy during this period. It is even more difficult to have
discussions like this for periods where our evidence for population records, such as the
census, are even more sparse, like in late antiquity. There have been attempts to determine
population numbers based on things like surviving records of the grain dole and how that changed
over time. Because the grain dole was a perk given to citizens, and after the Antonine Constitution
granted citizenship to all free men in the Roman Empire in the 200s, it might be able to be used
as a placeholder for the census, but at the end of the day, in late antiquity, our evidence for
this sort of thing simply is not as good as it is for the Republican period. With that in mind,
there are some things we can definitely say about the population of the Roman Empire,
and the historian Kyle Harper, in his book The Fate of Rome, Climate, Disease, and the End of an
Empire, puts it as follows. Trying to reconstruct population levels in the ancient world is a crude
business. It always has been. Already in the 1750s, David Hume and the Scottish divine Robert
Wallace laid out arguments for wildly divergent views of the populousness of ancient nations.
The debate has not always been so genial, but already in view with the outline of a controversy
that has continued down to the present day between high counters, such as Wallace,
and low counters, such as Hume. Even in recent times, credible voices have spoken in favor of
numbers for the Roman imperial population ranging from 44 million to 100 million.
Where there is broad agreement is around the fact that the populations within the empire grew in the
150 years after the death of Augustus, and reached their maximal extent on the cusp of the Antonine
plate. But absolute figures remain necessarily speculative. Though the debate between Hume and
Wallace carries on among modern scholars, the soundest arguments point us to believe that there
were some 60 million inhabitants in the Roman empire when Augustus died, and closer to 75
million a century and a half later when Galen first arrived in Rome. Estimates for late antiquity,
for both halves of the Roman empire in total, is perhaps somewhere around 50 million,
maybe 45 million, maybe 55 million. It's not at all clear. No matter how you attempt to estimate
the population, however, we do not have sufficient evidence that population decline was the reason
for the end of the Roman empire. Although this is not to say that it was not a factor.
So, with that in mind, what does the evidence that we do have actually point to? Well, there is a lot
going on in late antiquity when it comes to climate change, plague, and political instability.
But really, when you're talking about the end of the Roman empire, what that really means is the
and the economic system that connected them all together. So, for the rest of this video,
what I am going to try and do is summarize the views of three historians on how this all fell
apart, and those three are Guy Hausel, John Liebeschutz, and Chris Wickham, whose book,
Framing the Early Middle Ages, has essentially become the consensus on what happened to the
The city was the key to Rome's political, social, and economic life, and in the late 5th century,
many cities in the western empire were either abandoned or they were remarkably reduced in size,
with full abandonment or severe shrinkage fully arriving in the early 6th century
after the plague of Justinian and the wars of reconquest launched by the eastern half of the
empire that ravaged Italy, Spain, and North Africa. The city essentially defined Rome's
understanding of the world. It is, after all, where we get the word civilization.
When conquering a new territory, the Roman state very consciously built itself into legitimacy by
doing two things. The first is the literal construction of Roman civilization. Aqueducts,
paved roads built in the Roman manner, Roman-style walls as opposed to, say,
Gallic-style fortifications, things of that nature. The second, arguably more important
thing that they did was the implementation of what is called civic emergitism, although
sometimes you'll see it written as eugetism, it means the same thing. Local elites were co-opted
into the Roman imperial project by being given a place in Roman society. Aristocrats served as the
administrators of a given region, and while they may have had grandiose estates out in the country,
they did their governing from the city center. It was their civic duty to stand for election,
to serve on councils, and to use their wealth, much like the Roman state, to build themselves
into legitimacy. They were expected to construct amphitheaters, city streets, temples, things of
that nature. This is the system of civic emergitism. It enabled the Roman state to
operate with what we today would understand to be a small central government. Under this system,
cities flourished, but it did not last. In the 3rd century, there were a series of civil wars,
plagues, and incursions from Rome's neighbors on the frontiers, the so-called barbarians,
as well as the Persian Empire. Collectively, this is what is known as the 3rd century crisis.
Territory was lost, cities shrank in size, and the population did decline. By the time the
cities had fundamentally changed in order to respond to these challenges,
the historian Guy Halsall, in his book Barbarian Migrations in the Roman West,
376-568, writes the following.
Administratively, the basic building block of the empire remained the Kiwitas, the city district,
although there were some modifications to these. More important changes took place at higher
levels. The provinces were drastically reduced in size to make their government easier, and their
number doubled, eventually to 114. This obviously raised some cities to the status of provincial
capitals. Other towns declined in relative importance. The provinces were then grouped
into dioceses, each ruled by a vicarious, and by an uneven process during the reigns of Constantine
I and his sons, the dioceses were in turn grouped into praetorian prefectures. There were two in
regions that concern us, Gaul and Italy. Rome remained as the urban prefecture. All the rulers
of these different regions had their own administrative staffs. Atop this administrative
pyramid stood the emperor and his palatine officials. At the court were located the
officials of the bedchamber, the financial ministries, the corps of notaries, the imperial
writing offices, the agentes and rebus, and so on. These totaled a veritable army, especially
when added to the imperial bodyguards. Lactantius and other writers bemoaned the ever-increasing
number of bureaucrats, and understandably. The late Roman imperial service has been estimated
at between 25,000 and 35,000 men. The growth in the number of provinces, the
institution of two intermediate administrative levels between them and the emperor, and above
all, the uncoupling of military and civil service, effectively ended the danger of revolt from
provincial governors. The separation of the two branches of imperial service was especially
important. Henceforth, governors would not command troops within their territories,
and military commanders would not control the supply of food and pay to their soldiers.
Furthermore, military districts like the Saxon shore or the Tractus Amoricanus no longer
corresponded to civil administrative units. The importance of rank, status, and precedence
in the later Roman world cannot be overestimated. Traditionally, there had been only two aristocratic
orders, the equestrian and the senatorial. Constantine added a third, the comitiva, the
emperor's companions, in other words, those who had risen through imperial service.
The equestrian order was divided into grades of precedence, the egregie, the perfectissime,
and the eminentissime. The senatorial order had originally been made up simply of clarissime.
The comitiva was subdivided into three grades. Within all groups were complex rules of precedence
depending upon whether a rank had been bestowed personally by the emperor or in absentia,
or whether an honoris actually held a requisite office or had been bestowed an honorary title,
such as ex peccarius. Imperial service brought entry into the equestrian order, or the comitiva,
and, as the fourth century progressed, the inflation of honors set in so that offices
that had carried equestrian status brought senatorial rank. The equestrian order and the
comitiva were devalued and the former more or less disappeared. The senatorial order expanded so that
extra-honorific grades had to be created, the spectabilis, the illustris, and the gloriosi.
Eventually, the rank of clarissimus became a mere title. A leading senator's son was
automatically a clarissimus, but he needed to serve in the higher echelons of imperial service
at any time, and at the higher levels, most were not held for more than a year or two.
By the end of the fourth century, command of a regiment or the governorship of a province brought
entry into the clarissimate. It has been estimated that about 3,000 jobs per generation in each half
of the empire brought senatorial status. Some aristocrats possessed enormous wealth, but this
meant little in politics, even within their class, without the imperial service that guaranteed an
honorific title and a higher place in precedence. Furthermore, traditional Roman aristocratic
culture required periods, however brief, of service between spills of otium on one's estates.
The bureaucracy, moreover, provided aristocrats with opportunities to exercise their own patronage
by placing people in posts within it, even when themselves not serving the state in an
official capacity. As Avril Cameron has stated, the fourth century witnessed the transformation
of the old orders, still closely linked to birth and wealth, into a service aristocracy in which
rank depended upon office. The precise way in which this linked regional elite into the empire
varied. In some areas, an aristocrat would, in local or regional socioeconomic terms,
have been an aristocrat with or without the existence of the empire and its offices. In
others, it might have been the opportunities provided by imperial service that raised an
individual or his family above the others in the locality. These variations made the empire
socially and politically a more variegated entity than is often appreciated, and are
decisive in explaining the fate of different regions in the fifth century and later.
Continuing a trend begun during the third century, the emperors adopted a more autocratic
governmental style. They also moved the political core of the empire to the geographical periphery.
Through the reigns of Maximian, Constantine and his sons, of the usurper Magnentius,
of Julian as Caesar in Gaul, and into those of Valentinian I and Gratian, the emperor was to
be found, as often as not, in the far north of Gaul at Trier or on the Rhine-Danube frontier itself.
The other imperial capitals were places like Sirmium in Pannonia and Antioch in the east.
Even the great new city of Constantinople was indicative of this trend. This made much
sense. There was a great deal of movement within the enormous pyramid of interlocking
patronage networks that was the bureaucracy, and thus a vast store of patronage for the emperors,
their higher officials, and powerful noblemen to acquire, distribute, and redistribute.
The problem which should be stressed was that although the system served effectively to bind
the different regions of the western empire back into a single political unit, and thus replace
early Roman municipal service and competition comparatively well, it was nevertheless somewhat
passive. Early Roman regional elites worked to associate themselves with the empire,
the interest in imperial service laying what the empire could provide. Put another way,
in the late Roman Empire, aristocrats ceased to ask what they could do for their empire,
and instead increasingly asked what their empire could do for them.
So, a rather extended quote, but it sums up the changes to the government in response to
the third century crisis rather well. These alterations to Roman social structure and the
role of the aristocracy in the late Roman Empire not only strengthened the government and enabled
it to respond more effectively to the challenges of late antiquity, it also profoundly affected
the cities, and this is where we get to the Roman economy. The single factor which defines
the economy of the Roman Empire more than anything else, especially in late antiquity,
is the easy transport of bulk goods. These are things like olive oil, wine, flax, lumber, brick,
and of course, pottery. There are essentially two views that scholars take on the Roman economy.
There is the primitivist view, which holds that the Roman economy was fundamentally different
than ours, and there is the modernist or substantivist view, which argues the opposite,
essentially that for all the differences which exist between then and now, the economy of
ancient Rome was fundamentally like ours today. Over the past several decades, the modernist view
has largely won out, and that is because the economy of ancient Rome was, like the one we
are so familiar with today, an economy driven largely by markets and prices. Our surviving
sources, not only textual but also material, that is, archaeological, paint a pretty clear picture.
Rome's economy, especially in late antiquity, was market-based and sought intensive rationalism all
across the empire. Some regions produced vast amounts of olives and olive oil, other places
produced wine, other places produced finished goods, and there are plenty of archaeological
remains of pottery factories, for instance. There was also a healthy mix of large estates
run by aristocrats which engaged in the production of one or two goods, like olive oil, and smaller
farms run by families which exist up until the end of the 5th century, or in Italy, until the end of
the 6th century, but by and large, it was the biggest estates of the wealthy which were characteristic
of the Roman market economy, especially in late antiquity. Both cities and the Roman state and
the security which the state provided were heavily intertwined, and it's basically impossible to
understand one without the other for this particular subject. Roman cities functioned
as economic nodes and regional centers for the transport of low-value bulk goods, and they
functioned as centers of tax collection. The Roman state, essentially through the military, provided
wide-ranging security and built and maintained the famous road network of the Roman empire
to enable its armies to travel across Roman territory. That security enabled costs for
these goods to be relatively low because there was no fear of goods being stolen, and it is that
security and the ease of transport which knit the Roman world together so tightly. The state
also provided a system of insurance and contract law which private merchants could use to ensure
their own business ventures against any sort of a potential loss, much like we have today.
And then, spanning the Mediterranean Sea and connecting all of the coastal cities and towns
were shipping lanes which were absolutely crucial to the Roman economy for the following reason.
The Roman empire was, to paraphrase historian Chris Wickham, united by the tax system that
funded everything from the military, to road systems, to ports, to the procurement of bulk
goods for the military, and for the Enona system, which is essentially how large cities in classical
antiquity were able to feed themselves. It's a slightly different idea, but you basically see
the same sort of thing in Han China as regards rights to feed the cities. Now, in order to move
the tax, both in money and in kind where that was applicable, the Roman state subsidized private
shipping, a group of merchants called naviculari. Essentially, the way the system worked was that
the state contracted out a specified amount of tonnage on the ships to carry the goods or money,
coins do take up space after all, and these merchants would then travel to the specified
city to bring the tax. Once that was done, they could travel anywhere else they wanted, but what
this does essentially is it enables bulk goods that were not part of the tax system to reach
the cities with low transaction costs, because the cost of moving the ship and everything on it
was partially subsidized by the Roman state. Goods were cheap is the main idea here. To sum
everything up then, what are we looking at? Well, the Roman economy was agrarian at its base,
and much of its day-to-day functioning was predicated upon the supply and demand principle,
where low-value goods, produced and traded in high quantities across vast distances,
traveled along roads and shipping routes maintained by the Roman state for military use,
by a mix of government officials, private merchants, and individuals who operated in both
worlds, backed by complex legal systems and financed by bank loans, because the Romans had
a fairly sophisticated system of banking, utilizing a revitalized money economy. We should
be very clear here that there was a decline in late antiquity, from the empire's population peak
circa AD 200, perhaps as much as 15 or 20 percent of a decline, but while there were less people,
comparatively speaking, the 4th century was one of renewed construction all across the Roman world,
and the introduction of new coinage drastically increased the monetization of the economy,
especially because much of the new coinage was based in gold, with silver as a secondary.
The result was that the Roman world of late antiquity was far more deeply integrated than
it was during the Augustan era, and this new aristocracy which I talked about at the start
of this video, because they were so deeply tied to the Roman government and the economy,
were able to take advantage of this drastic upsurge in monetization. The result, long-term,
was that the basis of wealth shifted in late antiquity from land to physical money. Infrastructure
expanded and was repaired in order to facilitate the movement of bulk goods all across the Roman
world. Kyle Harper sums it up like this, The monetary restoration revived the financial sector.
The great banks of the Roman empire had all but vanished with the crash of the silver money regime,
but in the 4th century they came back to life. The evidence for credit and banking in the 4th
exceeds that for any period of Roman history. Nothing from antiquity can match in vividness
the priest John Chrysostom's portrait of the deposit bankers of Antioch at work in his day.
Credit markets fueled capital investment and underwrote mercantile ventures.
They turned the wheels of commerce. The merchant who wants to get rich prepares a ship,
hires sailors, summons a captain, and does all the other things necessary to set sail,
and borrows money and tries the sea, and passes into foreign lands.
The revival of money and credit reawakened commercial networks across the Mediterranean.
St. Augustine, in his port town of Hippo, evoked the allure of the trade in life.
Sailing and trading, another says, that's great. It's great to know many provinces,
make money everywhere, not to be beholden in town to some mighty man. To always travel
in foreign lands and nourish the mind on a variety of business and nations,
and then come home rich with profits. There isn't any reason really to suppose
that the Roman Empire would have fallen in the 5th century if things had not gone awry.
Indeed, some historians view the 4th century as the high point of the empire,
with the crucial difference being that in the eastern half, the cities and urban elites were
more important to the functioning of the state, while in the western half of the empire, which is
typically what people mean when they refer to the fall of Rome, the service aristocracy,
at home on their biggest dates and engaged in the pursuit of profit, for which the cities were so
key, were the more important factor in imperial governance.
So what happened? Well, it's not population collapse, it seems to be a combination of
political intrigue distracting the Roman court from military events, and a rather severe blow
to this heavily interconnected economy. Everyone watching this video is probably
familiar, in some fashion, with the barbarian invasions of late antiquity.
There is not really a one-size-fits-all answer for how this occurred, there is at least one
known instance of what we would consider to be mass migration or an invasion, and this is the
crossing of the Danube by some of the Goths in 376. The Angles, Saxons, and Utes probably fit
into this scheme as well, but while there were large-scale population movements across the
channel to the British Isles, it was drawn out over maybe two centuries whereas the Goths crossed
possibly as many as 50,000 people in one go. What concerns us here for the end of the western
empire are the Vandals. The date has been debated, it's either 405 or 406, although an
extremely good article by the historian Michael Kolakowski does argue for 406, but no matter which
year you pick, a large group of barbarians, including Suevs and Vandals, crossed the Rhine,
supposedly because it was so cold that winter that the Rhine had frozen over.
We know extremely little about this. There are, and I am not exaggerating, like three sources for
this event, one of which is just a line in a larger text, but they appear to have stayed in
Gaul for up to three years, and then, possibly by as late as 409, they crossed into Iberia.
The Visigoths, who were Roman allies by this point and who largely comprised the military in southern
Gaul, follow them into Iberia and they defeat these groups in several battles. Over the course
of the 420s, the situation flips and the Vandals and the Suevs are able to defeat forces sent
against them, and they are secure in southern Iberia. Between 425 and 429, the western Roman
court was riven with political intrigue, almost on a Game of Thrones type of level.
This results in the western government being distracted, and taking advantage of that
distraction, the Vandals, led by their king Gaiseric, at some point during these four years,
crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and they successfully invade and conquer much of North
Africa. Both halves of the Roman Empire launch several campaigns to retake North Africa in the
The loss of Iberia and North Africa is what, in the long term, does in the western Roman Empire,
although the effects are not felt all at once. The reason for this, essentially, is that Iberia
and North Africa formed the spine of the tax system, which enabled everything else to function,
and once this spine was snapped, the western Roman Empire just basically starts hemorrhaging money.
One of the methods by which the state could get troops for the military was by requesting the
aristocracy to send peasants tied to their vast estates for a period of military service.
However, those same aristocrats could get out of this by sending a certain amount of money to the
state in exchange for keeping the peasants on their land. After the loss of Iberia and North
Africa over the next few decades, requests for troops from these estates increase, but it's not
actually to get soldiers, it's done in an attempt to get money to offset the losses of the tax
system. This was so crucial to the functioning of the Roman state that even as late as 471,
the government was trying to figure out how to retake Iberia to recover at least a portion of
that tax system. As all of this is happening, two things begin occurring in increasing frequency.
The first is government coups, which decrease political stability. The second thing is the
settling of barbarian troops, whom we don't really have much of a reason to think of as being disloyal
to the Roman state. Hugh Elton wrote a whole book on this in the 90s. And these troops are
being settled in various places in western territory where they are promised something
called thirds. The Visigoths are the first to have this occur. We don't know when exactly,
but it's probably around 419. It's not entirely clear what thirds refers to, but the major
argument put forth by a historian named Walter Goffart is that it doesn't refer to a third of
land, but rather to a third of a region's tax revenue, which would have gone to the military
after being allocated by the central government. In light of all the problems Rome's facing,
settling the military in a region just cuts out the middleman, that is to say,
the central Roman government. The military is able to just collect it from the surrounding area.
So what this then leads to is a general breakdown in the economy of the western empire. The
shipping lanes are disrupted, the easy movement of bulk goods disappear, and the cities gradually
begin shrinking or are actually abandoned. Things fall into disrepair and they aren't fixed, and
local fighting begins to increase. Those aristocrats who I talked about at the start of this video
and the military stop needing the western empire as a political entity, and local ties between them
and the population gradually become more important, eventually leading to what the historian
Peter Brown, probably the dean of late antiquity, calls in his book The Rise of Western Christendom,
the development of localized Rome. And with the destruction of the tax spine, and with it the
gradual decay of the Roman economy, by the time the barbarian Odovacar overthrew Romulus Augustulus
and sent the imperial regalia to the eastern court at Constantinople, there was not a need for an
emperor in the west anymore. One emperor in the east would suffice. The loss of North Africa,
due to political infighting and the distractions they caused was an accident which came on top
of hundreds of wounds suffered by the Roman state as the emperors and the military attempted
to put the state back together again. And Guy Halsall sums up the paradox of Rome's fall like this.
Four years after Romulus's deposition in 480, evidently while plotting a campaign to restore
his authority in Italy, Julius Nepos was murdered by two retainers, apparently at the instigation
of the bishop of Salona, that same Glycerius whom he had deposed and driven into the church
six years earlier, and Odovacar took over Dalmatia. With his assassination, the empire
in the west finally came to an end. It is, as often been noted, more than a little ironic that
his last two rulers shared names with the first king of Rome, Romulus, and if not the first emperor,
then the founder of the first imperial dynasty, Julius. The most ironic thing of all, however,
is that during the preceding century it is almost impossible to identify a single figure
who had actually tried to cause its demise. All the decisive acts in bringing down the empire
were carried out by people attempting to create a better position for themselves within the sorts
of imperial structures that had existed in the 4th century. In a famous dictum, Andreas Pisanul
wrote that Roman civilization did not die a natural death, it was assassinated.
Neither alternative seems correct. The Roman empire was not murdered, nor did it die a natural
death. It accidentally committed suicide.
