A Trillion-Dollar Time Bomb Just Went Off on Wall Street

Global Finance News
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Down a couple of its heads actually was reported initially was that it's shutting down one hedge fund
After it was likely to suffer losses related to exposures to first brands the bankruptcy the factor firms
the factor firms that gave it money and then all the
Allegedly fake collateral and fraudulent collateral that goes along with it. That's already. That's something
But then it was reported because you know what what happens some media outlet gets the story
Then the rest of the media start making phone calls and you get more information
So this morning we get more information and it's not just one hedge fund the UBS is shutting down
It is shutting down a second hedge fund that has no exposure to
First brands at all. And so that's the signal that I wanted to talk to you about today because it's an important one
Especially as it relates to the our word and the our word. I don't mean recession here though
That's a possibility the art. Well, we'll get into that in just a minute
Now I'm gonna make some comparisons to 2008 before we get into that too, I want to be absolutely clear
We're not saying there's going to be a rerun of 2008
What we're really talking about is in this case
And the reason why I'm reaching back to 2008 really 2007 is that we're looking for parallels
Crisis or you know, even just new economic downturns or what we're seeing here in private credit and shadow banking
These are processes and these are processes that even as time changes and the world evolves
There's a lot of the similarities with them
There's not necessarily a template but there definitely is a pattern as the guy once said history doesn't repeat
But it does friggin rhyme
and so we're looking at certain things in certain parallels and and so when we look at the parallels to
2007 I want to make sure make clear here. I'm not saying that 2008 is happening. We're gonna repeat that
There are definitely some differences here and some differences that are in our favor
But we're saying is what we're seeing are signs that are consistent with that process playing out
And as I've been saying for how long now I'm gonna talk about repo. These are signs of escalation
So UBS shutting down these two hedge funds, especially the second hedge fund which brings up the our word
These are critical signs of escalation. So let's get into what we have here. So give me just a second
To get the information all ready to go. All right
Okay. So like I said, we got the information yesterday
It was the Financial Times that first broke at UBS is gonna liquidate a funds though as we say
They don't like to use the word liquidation because there's negative connotations with that, but they said okay
There's a fund that has exposure to first brands. They're gonna liquidate it shut it down makes perfect sense
I mean, you want to keep that sucker open and then we get more media reports
And the one we're gonna refer to here is from Bloomberg that says, okay. Yeah, they're shutting down the one fund
There's exposure to first brands. There's losses, but there's a little bit more going on to the story
And that's really the part that we're gonna focus on
It brings up the our word here
the reason why they're shutting down the funds is not necessarily losses the reason they're shutting down these funds is because
Investors are saying we want our effing money back. We weren't supposed to have losses here
We want our money back. And so they're they're being forced to
Not necessarily stand behind the fund
We don't know if that's the case just yet like like we'll see in the previous example in 2007
But either way this the the O'Connor group of funds which are in working capital finance
Factoring exactly the type the parts of the private credit market that we've been focusing on now. We're seeing redemption requests
That's the our word and redemption requests is a serious potentially really serious
Escalation in not just the situation
but also what it means for liquidity and the ability of the entire space to
Maintain as it is to stay as it is because once you start getting redemption requests that puts liquidity pressure on funds on spun
Sponsors on the entire system, maybe even on the repo market to the point that if it doesn't
Doesn't resolve itself very quickly
And if it leads to more redemption requests at other funds and then systemic liquidity pressure
That's when you start getting not just funds being shut down, but as they're being shut down they're forced to
Monetize their assets, which is really just some fancy word or a euphemism to avoid having to say
Liquidate fire sales distressed sales. That's what we're talking about here
We talk about the our word and that has just shown up in these UBS funds
So continuing here with Bloomberg what they reported late last night, I believe or early this morning
What they said was the one fund that we're talking about the working capital
opportunistic fund is being wound down and the majority of the assets are going to be monetized and again monetize is just a euphemism to
Avoid saying liquidated and they say by the end of the year, which I think is not real
I mean, I don't think there's anything to Ferris about that
I think just relates to the fact that first brands is going through a bankruptcy and therefore we mean they don't know what the bankruptcy
I mean, obviously these funds are gonna put in creditor claims. They don't know how they're gonna be worked out
They don't know if there's any assets left
So what they're basically saying is we're gonna wind down the rest of the fund that isn't in bankruptcy
And we're gonna liquidate everything by the end of the year
It's so this is the parts of this one fund that really sticks out
Is that only about 70% of the value?
Did they expect to recover by the end of the year, which means that they were exposed to first brands and the bankruptcy
It 30% so this is an enormous exposure to first brands enormous exposure to fraudulent collateral
All of that stuff therefore bankruptcy courts lots of uncertainty huge exposure. I mean 30% is huge. It's a big chunk
So I mean for this one you could say, okay this one fund they stupidly let the first brands
They did a lot of you know, all the investors did the same thing, but they stupidly let the first brands
They were way overexposed. So it makes sense. They're gonna shut down the funds this fund. What's the big deal here?
Even if there's redemptions, I mean you can't blame investors for saying you guys did something
We weren't expecting you to do you took you looks like you might be taking huge losses
So they're just shutting down the one fund end of story just another one-off or just another one-off cockroach, right?
but then
Deep buried a little bit a little ways down this article here and there was actually reporting a couple articles, too
He also said UBS is liquidating a high-grade strategy fund with no exposure to first brands
In other words not being tied up in the bankruptcy not being tied up to the losses and the fraud and everything that we already know
about so either this other fund is experiencing problems or what's really happening here is
Redemption requests the redemption requests are hitting other funds and not just those that are tied directly to the cockroaches that we know about
which suggests
That wealthy investors who've seeded all of these funds who are the responsible for the equity and a lot of these private credit arrangements shadow
Banks and therefore are the key behind the ability of private credit to basically exist
They're saying okay first brands this one fund we get it. That's bad. But what else is there?
Maybe we should just start reading redeeming our investments and ask questions later. That's the thing
That's the alarm bell. This other fund is saying we're getting what UBS is saying
Is this other fund is getting redemption requests again?
That's not confirmed, but we're reading between the lines here
This other fund is getting redemption requests that has no exposure to first brands
Which means these institutional investors are saying we don't want any exposure to factoring credit
Maybe even private credit and maybe even going beyond that. So that's the key here
That's what we're really focused on not just the one fund
but the second fund and what it suggests about the
Willingness of these key investors to stick around and see how this all works out
And by the way, the term high-grade strategy, you know, we all laugh about how high-grade strategy the experience huge losses
That isn't it isn't just a marketing label. That is a technical term
And that's the one we're gonna continue to run up continue to see as we go through the 2007 example
High-grade strategy means something specific and again something technical
These are investments that are supposed to be high-grade and what that means is usually we're talking about asset-backed
Securitizations these senior pieces and so that tells you something important, too
There's not supposed to be any losses in high-grade because they're senior that's supposed to be protected
but if
Investors are redeeming them or they're trying to get redemptions in some of these funds that are supposed to be high-grade
Whether they're exposed to first brands or not
It tells you that there's a lot of investors out there
Who are likely starting to get cold feet about more than just the cockroaches that we know
Like I said, it's about maybe the entire space maybe private credit overall
Not really weren't willing to stick around and see how everything works out with all of the questions surrounding the entire private credit marketplace
You see what other cockroaches pop up and really do you want to stick around in a fund whether they call it high-grade or not?
Whether it's invested in the senior tranches of securitizations or not. Do you really want to stick around in the fund?
Just to figure out to find out how many other cockroaches are coming out
But also waiting to see how everyone else reacts to it. This is one of those cases
this is one of those signals where he's when people start to think I
Should just make sure I get to the exit before everybody else does that's a significant sign of escalation
Like I said, our focus is here is on the process and this is an important sign in that process
Unfortunately going in the wrong direction. So high-grade not supposed to be losses. Not just a marketing term. There's something specific there
So let's go back to 2007. If you remember everything anything about the 2008 crisis
It really began in 2006 and it really got to be serious in early 2007
in fact
the Bear Stearns hedge funds and
The losses that they were starting to take was one of the earliest warning signs that this thing was getting seriously
in fact
It was one of the episodes that precipitated Ben Bernanke going in front of Congress in March of 2007 and saying subprime is contained
Bear Stearns had you know, these two two hedge funds one of them. They just set up the year before
But Bear Stearns by the middle of 2007
So this is even before August of 2007 before the real crisis finally broke out
Like I said
These things are a process and this was one of the warning signs that said this thing is escalating getting
Increasingly serious when you started to see hedge funds and you started to see well
everything that we just talked about with these UBS funds except for some key differences about why this is taking place and
Differences in terms of scale as well as what particular parts of the credit markets were talking back then it was, you know
Banks and their sponsored SIVs here. We're talking about shadow banks and credits
I'm not really sure about how much exposures to banks, but the process is very similar
It's it has a lot to do with the r-word and cold feet
so back in June of 2007
So a couple months before the real breakdown and aug it real six weeks before the August 9th breakdown in the marketplace
He had Bear Stearns that said look we've got some hedge funds. They suffered some losses
We're gonna buy out the one fund just because we don't want there to be, you know
A spreading risk especially to other banks that have lent money to the funds. That's another thing
We didn't talk about with UBS how much bank exposures there are
Funding the funds of funds and all those kinds of other things
But either way Bear Stearns shocking announcement and by the way 3.2 billion back then
Huge amount. I mean everybody was comparing that to LCCM which was you know a decade before then LCCM was I mean
Monster thing LCCM was less than what we're talking about here with these Bear Stearns hedge funds, which had everybody
Really buzzing at that point, especially since there was a second fund involved that was even larger
in the reason why Bear Stearns felt that had to step in was because of
Redemptions so for the couple months up until June of 2007
the fund kept on reporting a little bit of losses and a little bit more losses and a little bit more losses and finally investors said
We've had enough of this
Start giving us our money back or at least start giving us as much money back as we can possibly get and it just kept
Escalating and escalating and escalating not just with the Bear Stearns funds
But the overall the entire hedge fund space the entire subprime mortgage base
And then the mortgage space entirely as more and more investors got cold feet as more and more hedge funds were hit with redemptions
That led to more and more strain on the system more banks had to step in more strains in repo fire sales took place
Stress liquidations as I talked about in yesterday's deep dive analysis at your dollar University
There was a there was an instance where Merrill Lynch had to step in and seize
Collateral and found that they had no buyers for the collateral
So the redemptions here the our word again suggests a serious amount of escalation as it did back in 2007
So once you started getting those redemptions
You have a couple of choices
either the fund sponsor can step in and make everyone whole to try to maintain or try to limit and contain the damage or
They can have to start
Monetizing their assets would and get whatever price that they can which means in an illiquid market or an increasingly illiquid market
Distress sales at lower prices meaning greater losses
Which leads to that that vicious cycle of distress sales lower prices less collateral value less liquidity
Distress sale lower prices and on and on it goes and again, just like in UBS's funds here Bear Stearns funds
Both of them that we're talking about high-grade not a marketing slogan
This meant that the structure credit tells you right in the name high-grade structured credit meant that these Bear Stearns funds were invested in
Senior and super senior tranches of mortgage bond securities and mortgage, but you know and the MBS securitizations
But it also meant because you're in these high-grade parts of the securitized structure on their face
Nominally, I have lower bit lower levels of returns because they're safer
That's just how basic finance works
Which means they were all in order to make these worthwhile to institutional investors or wealthy investors or hedge fund investors overall
They have to be
highly highly
Leveraged which which brings in the repo market because repo is where all that leverage comes from
With these assets in these securitization structures as the collateral
So you have this high-grade set of assets that attracts all of these investors who are told these are high-grade assets
Therefore very low credit risk, which was absolutely true
But they never really tell you about the liquidity risk and once the liquidity situation starts to turn in the wrong direction
That's where the losses actually come from not necessarily the credit risk and we'll get into that a little bit here, though
I did a retube video on this a little while ago
But it wasn't just the one fund. The other fund was also high-grade structured credit
Same thing supposed to be credit risk very low very minimal credit risk
Which was true, but in the situation that we're seeing with redemptions and hedge funds low liquidity repo problems repo providers and fund leverage providers overall
Increasingly unwilling to fund some of these structures regardless of whether or not they're money good
It leads to that vicious cycle that I just talked about in a lot of ways that vicious cycle gets kicked off when these
Institutional hedge fund investors start getting cold feet and start demanding their money back
Which means these these hedge funds themselves are not able to continue to fund their positions. There's your sales and there's the bigger problems
again, when you're advertised high-grade, you know from the perspective of
Institutional investors are just head fund investors wealthy investors when you're advertised high-grade
You're thinking there's no possibility of losses. And of course, that's what they tell you
So when you start getting losses, you can't really blame people for saying we want to start redeeming
I don't care what the you know, give us our money back today monetize the damn thing
What do I care about?
I need to get back as much as I can because and this is the other part why I want to bring up
2007 the lack of information the opacity the information asymmetry that really really worked against us in
2007 and in many ways, which is why we use the term shadow banks. It's also a major problem here in
2025 we don't have information
We're not getting information as the Bank of England's governor said Andrew Bailey when he investigated started asking questions about private credit in the UK
He came out and told Parliament. He's been given the runaround by private credit providers
He knows they're blowing smoke up his his arse because it's plain common sense that level of information
Asymmetry really works against us because then investors who are seeing those guys over there asking for their money back from the hedge fund
And they're taking losses and me I said, maybe it's a one-off with first brands, but then they're taking you know
They're asking for their money back in another hedge fund that has to do with factor credit
Nobody's giving us a whole lot of answers
It's becomes one of those things where you say redeem my investment today ask questions later
You get to the point where you don't care about information anymore because you're not getting information that you need to say
Okay, that's just a one-off thing. I'm gonna I'm just gonna sit tight and not worry about it too much my own investments
So the lack of information this information asymmetry really does work against us in these systemic
periods where you don't have a lot of information, but you can see there is something to be concerned about and that's something to be
Concerned about is escalating to a point where it is actually creating loss
You don't care where those losses are coming from from the perspective of individual investors
You could you could not possibly care less. All you're seeing is that there's losses over there
This is in an area that's questionable begin with we all know there's stupid stuff there
there's losses being taken and now we know that other investors are saying give us our money back give us our money back a
Potential this is the this is the avenue for contagion and it starts with the r-word and redemption
So like I said the UBS
Not necessarily the first fund but talking about the second fund that's being shut down
No exposure to first brands
Suggests that we're getting to the maybe the initial stage of that nest next step in the process where redemptions are creating the bigger
escalation
Maybe it's a crisis. Maybe it's not a crisis. Whatever. This thing is gonna work out to be that's what we're getting here
This is an important step toward that toward that direction
Again, it was same thing with Bear Stearns in 2007 long before you got to June
Problems started to show up, you know
Not just with investors asking for their money back
But then you get Wall Street firms leverage providers liquidity providers that start asking for either their money back or better
Collateral because they realize like I said with Merrill Lynch Merrill Lynch went through a really troubling episode
That was one of the ways that one of the episodes that was
Maybe the biggest spark that lit the actual crisis in August of 2007
Merrill Lynch, like I said seized collateral found no takers for the collateral basically was stuck with it with assets that they couldn't sell
Which is the worst-case scenario when you're a collateralized lender
You're supposed to have dependable collateral that you can liquidate at a moment's notice and get all of your money back
So you get to this this escalating situation?
Investors are asking for their money back
They're redeeming stuff Wall Street leverage and liquidity providers are asking for either their money back or better collateral
But as we know in these situations
There isn't money there isn't collateral there isn't markets of dependable markets and liquid markets available to sell assets to be able to you know
Monetize everything in a way that it can lead that makes everybody happy
The stresses start to build they start to build with hedge funds. They start to build in repo with collateral
Should start to sound familiar here
So that's what we're seeing and that's what we're looking for in this process building toward what looks to be a pretty serious
Development here
Like I said, I did a YouTube video about
specifically what happened in
2007 as far as what was causing the depressed values in some of these high-grade assets
It wasn't credit risk. It wasn't losses
I know subprime mortgages are treated and talked about as toxic waste
But a lot of those things were never there was never any credit losses
It was all about illiquidity
and so I talked about what that was in the YouTube video not long ago that relates to
The most critical variable in all of not just structured finance all of finance and especially modern finance
correlation and talk about how important that is to valuing these senior pieces and
really how how little margin there is for them because
just because I don't need to get into it here, but because
Senior pieces do have some risk related to pricing and liquidity something called a correlation smile
which you can see here, which is an actual one from 2006, but
what the trigger was back then was liquidity in the mortgage market led to
Revaluations of even senior pieces of securitization and we don't have that problem here. We're not talking about mortgages
In fact, that's the that's the good news in all of us
The reason why we're not making a comparison to 2008 is because we don't have the same scale
We don't have a mortgage credit problem, which is basically the vast majority of financing credit anyway
So we don't have that level of difficulty here
however
that said
everything that we see about private credit and shadow banking and bank exposures to private credit and shadow banking suggests that while we're not talking about
a 2008 level of downturn or you know
Obliteration of the entire world. We're not talking about a huge crash a monster crash that takes out everything
We are talking about significant enough money that it's going to be painful if it continues to move and continues to escalate
So I'm not necessarily 2008 that doesn't mean we're in the clear here
In fact, it looks like there's going to be a tremendous amount of pain that comes along with it if it continues to escalate in
this manner, so in 2007 2008 what was what was triggering the
high-grade asset losses was correlation among mortgage bonds and really the
Illiquidity credit default swaps. I don't need to get into all so but it's stuff related to housing in
2025 what we're talking about here part of it is fraud
Which is which is the common thing that we keep getting in all of these collateral cases, whether it's tricolor first brands
There's so many
Zions and Western Alliance the one we didn't see it was primal end
But primal end had collateral problems to related to something else that Steve and I gonna talk about this weekend in the car business
So there's always a collateral thing in there, but we're not talking about housing market here instead. It all comes back to in this case
Jobs is why I keep pointing to the macroeconomic situation in the labor market and they keep using the term flat beverage
Because flat beverage is everything here all the stupidity in these private credit markets relates to
Giving firms or individual borrowers credit based on the idea the labor market was solid the economy's in good shape
Jay Powell knows what he's talking about
Take all that stuff away start to see layoffs come from challenger gray and Christmas at the level that they did in October
Suddenly those assumptions the idea that private credit is is is nothing like what subprime mortgages were
You know a generation ago that gets thrown out the window
And so the worst the macroeconomic situation, especially the US labor market looks to be it's not even about the actual pricing or credit risk
It's about perceptions, especially when you throw in there that investors are already redeeming their fund positions
They're already getting cold feet
Then you start to see job losses and you know weak labor market statistics come out all over the place
It raises the level of itchy tringer finger. It makes them even itchier
It makes people want to just go for the exits regardless. Just give me my money back
I don't care what it is. Just give me what you can give me back today the more we see macroeconomic
degradation the more it's gonna lead to problems over here in the private credit markets and funding them in hedge funds and
Redemptions and liquidity and leverage providers and everything else that we saw in 2007 heading into 2008
Just one final point. I want to make here
Actually two final points. One is we haven't seen you know ever since the last week in
the big big
Volatility and repo markets illiquidity repo markets leading to the you know
The huge spike in activity at the feds repo window not surprised that this week. We've seen everything calm down
In fact actually wrote about it in our deep dive analysis on Monday said look we expect the repo
Situation to calm down in the short run now that we got through the month end. That was what was weird
I mentioned this before
About the huge surge in repo activity and then the volatile huge spike in SOFR rates last week. Was it last week?
No, October 31st at the end of the month
You usually didn't see those at the end of the month or at the beginning of the month not the end
So that was that was unusual to begin with but either way
Not surprised that the repo situation has calmed down SOFR rates have come back down below the Fed Funds upper limit
In fact this last check. I think SOFR was
390 ish 3 somewhere around there not actually that far from federal funds rate. That is not abnormal
That's not unexpected
Like I said, we expect the repo market situation to calm down in the short run
Even though we have all this other stuff going on in the background with UBS shutting or shutting down hedge funds
Suggesting that there's a strong escalation there because even when you go back to 2007
Before August 9th of 2007
Same types of things that we got here, you know that the Bear Stearns hedge fund saga began really around
I mean you started hearing things in February
2007 then they got to March and the Ben Bernanke said subprime is contained and just look at how the money markets behave in that
Period that that preliminary period preceding the clean break and the real start of the crisis in August of 2007
So you had you had the Bear Stearns bailing out hedge funds
You've got Merrill Lynch seizing collateral in June and July of 2007 and you look at money markets and they look relatively
Placid and stable one of the reasons why Ben Bernanke says subprime was contained is because you look you said look money markets seem to
Be okay. Yeah, we hear some market disruptions
We don't like what's going on in some of the ABX indexes and credit default swaps, but overall things seem to be relatively good
But this is this one I'm talking about the process that takes place behind the scenes in the shadows under the surface
whatever euphemism you want to use you can see these escalations be
They're they're taking place under the surface and they start to get worse and worse and worse until the point that they actually break out
What I'm saying is I think that we've seen already some of this spill out because of the nature of what we're talking about
Here, but it's not in the context of what we're seeing in the repo market this week
It's not abnormal to see money market rates start to calm down
Even though we've got something what looks like a pretty significant piece of evidence that things are moving in the wrong direction and escalate
So we've got high-grade hedge funds
Once again, not one but two of them and the second of those is not even related to the first brands
Bankruptcy which tells us in a small scale right now the series of escalation
We're talking about a small step in that direction at the very least
Investors are saying we don't care that it's not exposed to first brands
We don't care that there's not losses that are that you're gonna tell us about
We don't care that we only have this group of cockroaches that has revealed itself
What we're saying is we don't want to be exposed to the business overall
Give us our money back before something bad happens
And if they're doing that at UBS
Chances are there's a lot of phone calls taking place all across the private credit land hedge funds and everything else saying
What do you got there at the very least people are making?
Investigatory phone calls trying to get more information that we know
They're not gonna get but the fact that we're seeing redemptions the fact that we're seeing again a fund that is not experiencing losses
That is significant. We don't know exactly what it means moving forward
but it fits with where we've been going up to this point and remember our long run of
Picture here a long run picture that was given to us by the swap market years ago
Was that in the language of interest rates rates are gonna go down
They say it with me. They're gonna go down by a lot and they're gonna stay there a long time
We aren't there yet. We still don't know exactly we get there, but this fits and it fits only too well
So I wanted to bring it to your attention a couple of really serious pieces of news here
Don't want to get too too over excited about it. It is very serious
It's something to be concerned about doesn't mean the end of the world doesn't mean we're repeating 2008
It's what it does mean is that we need to pay close attention to what's going on here. And if you're one who is
Predisposed to look at the stock market and say Oh stock markets fine
None of this could take place remember the stock market was hitting all-time highs in October of 2007
Anyway, it completely ignoring what was going on in this in the shadows at the same time
So we need to be careful what's going on. We need to be on our game. We need to be talking about everything
We need to be
examining as much information and details we can possibly get so
Want to make sure everybody had this UBS information and what it actually meant because it is in my opinion a very significant
Development. So hope everyone has a great rest of your Friday and a great weekend anything else that comes up
Let me I'll make sure I let you know what's what's going on. See you all again very soon
