【直播精選】紅二代集体上書習近平｜蔡奇出馬新一輪清洗拉开序幕（20251103第800期） #直播精選

我得到的消息或者聽到的消息 The information I’ve received, or the reports I’ve heard, 說有200多個紅二代聯名上書習近平 is that more than 200 “second-generation reds” jointly submitted a letter to Xi Jinping, 提出來希望進一步 calling for further 完善黨和國家接班人的培養工作 improvement in how the Party and the state cultivate successors. 因爲這個政治制度不能丟 Because, in their view, this political system must not be abandoned. 當然他們是以一種善意的 Of course, they spoke in a tone of goodwill, 苦口相勸的這種方式來給習近平提出這樣的建議 earnestly urging Xi with well-meant advice. 並不是逼宮 It was not an attempt to force him off the throne. 他們一再強調沒有任何逼宮的意思 They repeatedly stressed there was absolutely no intention of a palace coup. 希望習近平 What they hope is that Xi Jinping, 現在還能夠決定未來的接班人的時候 while he still has the power to decide his future successor, 要有一個接班人的制度 can restore or establish a clear succession mechanism. 因爲他們認爲習近平也是年事已高了 Because they feel Xi himself is already getting on in years, 70多歲 he’s in his seventies. 毛澤東70多歲就已經在開始 Mao Zedong, once he was in his seventies, 尋找接班人了 had already begun searching for a successor. 儘管接班人最後都沒有 Even though none of those designated successors 真正的接到班 ever actually took over in the end, 最後的一個最年輕的王洪文 the last one, and youngest, Wang Hongwen, 是在36歲就被拿下了 was purged at just 36. 在牢裏關了20年 He then spent twenty years in prison 最後56歲死在牢裏面 and died behind bars at the age of 56. 習近平是不是已經 So has Xi Jinping already 吸取了這方面的經驗教訓 drawn lessons from that experience? 到現在爲止 So far, 他並沒有選拔接班人的意向 he has shown no intention of grooming a successor, 也沒有露出這樣的苗頭 nor even the slightest sign of such a plan. 這批紅二代 This group of second-generation reds, 當然他們是出於一個保黨 of course, are motivated by a desire to protect the Party, 保政權或者是保財富的目的 preserve the regime, and safeguard their own wealth. 他們認爲跟習近平都是在同一條船上的 They see themselves and Xi Jinping as all being in the same boat. 他們的父輩也跟習近平的父親一樣 Their fathers, like Xi’s own father, 通過了艱苦的一場又一場的戰爭 fought through one hard war after another 最後打下了江山 and ultimately won this country for the Party. 江山延續到現在 That power has continued up to today, 不能在習近平的手上丟掉了 and, in their eyes, it must not be lost in Xi’s hands. 所以他們從這樣的一個視角 So from this perspective, 來寫了這封上書的信 they wrote this joint letter to the top. 這封信的內容可能分了好幾個方面 The letter itself can probably be divided into several main points. 一個就是 One is this: 70多歲 At over seventy, 儘管現在醫療條件都很好 although modern medical care is much better, 但是畢竟年事已高精力有限 one is still old, with limited energy. 很多的事情都必須 A lot of work inevitably 要讓精力充沛的年輕一代去做了 has to be handed over to a more energetic younger generation. 尤其是現在中國面臨的國際環境 Especially given China’s current international environment, 國內的現在的經濟形勢 the domestic economic situation, 就業壓力 and the pressure on jobs, 年輕人現在普遍的感到看不到希望 young people now generally feel they see no future. 在這樣的一種情況下 In this kind of situation, 如果是有一個交接班制度 if there were a clear mechanism for handing over power, 選拔好接班人 with a properly chosen successor, 把權力交到所謂的政治可靠 power could be passed on to someone politically reliable, 能力又過硬 德才兼備的年輕人手上 a younger figure who is both highly capable and of solid character. 就能夠保持黨的事業薪火不斷基業常青 That would keep the Party’s cause alive and its rule long-lasting. 而且這封信還提到說 The letter also points out that 毛澤東早在延安的時候 as early as the Yan’an years, Mao Zedong 就特別的強調要注意培養選拔接班人 was already stressing the need to train and select successors. 並且在1949年建政之後 And after the PRC was founded in 1949, 提拔了一大批年輕幹部 he promoted a large number of young cadres 進入到重要的領導崗位 into key leadership positions. 比如說當年的五馬進京 For example, the famous “Five Ma’s Enter Beijing” group 那都是屬於很年輕的 were all very young at the time. 習仲勳也好 Whether it was Xi Zhongxun 鄧小平也好 or Deng Xiaoping and others, 鄧小平當總書記的時候還非常年輕 Deng was still very young when he first served as General Secretary. 到了 Later on, 鄧小平當時主政的時候 when Deng was really the one calling the shots, 能夠有發言權的時候也是快80歲了 he was already nearing eighty by the time he truly held sway. 他是急急忙忙的 So he hurriedly 推動了幹部的年輕化制度化知識化 pushed to make the cadre corps younger, more institutionalized and better-educated. 我們上個世紀80年代的人 Those of us who lived through the 1980s 很多人應該都還記得很清楚 should still remember this very clearly. 84年 85年那個階段 Around 1984 and 1985, 一大批的領導幹部 a large number of officials 從一個普通的科技幹部 rose from ordinary technical staff 就一下子成爲廳級幹部甚至是副省級幹部 straight into bureau-director rank, even to vice-provincial level. 在那個年代非常之多 Cases like that were very common back then. 很多後來在改革開放的年代 Many of the technocrats who later, 在重要的崗位上的一批技術官僚 during the reform-and-opening era, held key positions, 都是在胡耀邦擔任總書記期間 were promoted during Hu Yaobang’s time as General Secretary, 一口氣提上來的 in one big wave. 主要是因爲當時打倒四人幫 Mainly because after the Gang of Four were brought down 清算了華國鋒之後 and Hua Guofeng was sidelined, 原有的一批老幹部都年事已高 the old generation of cadres were already quite advanced in age, 都讓他們退出了領導崗位 so they were asked to withdraw from leading posts. 因爲這批人 Because that generation, 很多人都是 many of them 文化水平不高 had limited formal education, 沒讀什麼書的 had barely been to school, 也稱之爲所謂的老革命 they were the so-called “old revolutionaries.” 這一批人在上個世紀80年代初期 In the early 1980s, 可以說是一股腦的 you could say they were pretty much all 全部讓他們退出了領導崗位 moved out of leadership roles in one go. 一大批年富力強的 And a big cohort of vigorous, 特別是 especially 有讀書的經歷的 those with proper schooling, 有過大學或者是中專教育的 with university or vocational college education, 接受過這樣教育的人紛紛的走上了領導崗位 were promoted en masse into leadership positions. 這也是這批紅二代 This is also something this group of “red second-generation” figures 在這次上書中特別提到的 specifically emphasized in their joint letter this time. 而且希望還要構建一個長效機制 They also hope to build a long-term mechanism 讓領導崗位培養人才選拔人才 so that leadership posts can be used to cultivate and select talent. 在制度化規範化方面 In terms of institutionalization and standardization, 要有有序的或者是平穩的交接過程 there should be an orderly and smooth handover process. 在政治制度上能夠確保黨和國家安全的重要舉措 They see this as an important institutional step to ensure the Party’s and the country’s security. 當然他們也認同習近平 Of course, they also agree with Xi Jinping 在政治標準上面來選拔幹部 on using political criteria to select officials, 凸出理想信念的教育 with a strong emphasis on educating ideals and convictions. 當然也還是要注重有沒有實踐工作經驗 At the same time, they stress the importance of practical work experience 治理能力怎麼樣 and how strong a person’s governing ability is, 使得這個接班人 so that the designated successor 既要有堅定的信仰 not only has firm beliefs 又能夠勝任現代化的國家管理 but is also capable of managing a modern state 以及應對現在複雜的國際環境 and dealing with today’s complex international environment. 當然了這封信是跟習近平同輩的 What’s more, this letter was written by people of Xi’s own generation, 200多個紅二代他們聯名上書的 over 200 “red second-generation” signatories jointly addressing him. 這封信對習近平有沒有影響 As for whether this letter has had any impact on Xi, 在這個傳遞消息的人看來 in the view of the person conveying this information, 他認爲有一定的影響 they believe it has had some effect. 因爲他們不是逼宮 Because they are not trying to force him off the throne; 是對習近平好言相勸 they are offering Xi well-meant advice. 習近平聽不聽得進去 Whether Xi is willing to listen, 會不會考慮 whether he will take it into account, 這是下一步要值得觀察的 is something to watch in the next stage. 如果說習近平做出妥協的話 If Xi does make some compromise, 在二十一大這個班子組成的人員方面 then in the line-up chosen for the 21st Party Congress leadership, 應該就看得到非常明顯的變化 we should see very obvious changes. 在各種各樣議論現有接班人的階段 Right now, when there is so much talk about who the current successor might be, 我現在聽到的消息 the information I’m hearing 傳遞消息的人認爲 from the person passing on the news is that 二十一大的接班人 the successor chosen at the 21st Party Congress 不會在現有的政治局委員或者是中央委員 will not come from the current Politburo members or Central Committee members, 甚至是候補中央委員裏面產生 nor even from among the alternate Central Committee members. 很可能在二十一大上面 It’s quite possible that at the 21st Party Congress 真正的這個接班人是一個70後 the real designated successor will be someone born in the 1970s, 而且是往更後的 and from the later part of that decade, 不是現在70年到75年 not from the 1970–1975 cohort, 不是75年之前的人 not anyone born before 1975. 那也就是現在傳的這些接班人 Which means all the people currently rumored as successors 都不可能成爲習近平的接班人 are unlikely to become Xi Jinping’s heir apparent. 哪怕是在二十一大在總理的位置上 Even if, at the 21st Congress, a relatively young person 有相對年輕的人進到總理的位置上 were to move into the premier’s position, 也不可能成爲接班人 they still would not necessarily be the chosen successor. 因爲在習近平看來 Because in Xi Jinping’s eyes, 60後的那些黨政軍的在重要崗位上的人 all those born in the 1960s who now hold key Party, government or military posts 習近平都不會輕易的把權力交給他們 are not people to whom he will readily hand over power. 因爲這一批人 Because this entire cohort 他們跟過去的那些江胡時期的領導人 is closely connected with the leaders from the Jiang and Hu eras in the past. 都有或多或少的聯繫 They all have ties to them, more or less. 而且他們的身上都打上了他們的烙印 And they all carry the imprint of those earlier leaders. 元老們對他們的影響也比較深 The party elders have also had a deep influence on them. 習近平據說他現在比較中意的接班人 It’s said that the kind of successor Xi Jinping now favors 很可能是在一個75後 is very likely someone born after 1975, 或者是80後這樣的人在挑選 or even from the post-1980 generation. 因爲這樣的人跟江胡時期的領導幹部 Because people like that and the leading cadres from the Jiang and Hu eras 沒有什麼太多的聯繫了 no longer have many direct connections. 完全是在習近平時期成長起來的 They grew up politically entirely in Xi’s era 或者是脫穎而出選拔起來的 or emerged and were selected under his rule. 所以習近平很大程度上 So to a large extent, Xi Jinping 在他們中間來選拔 is choosing from among this group, 以保證他選定的這個接班人 to ensure that the successor he settles on 今後不至於被清洗 will not be purged in the future, 或者是不至於偏離他現在所選擇的道路 and will not stray from the path he has chosen now. 當然了 Of course, 這據說是習近平個人的想法 this is said to be Xi Jinping’s personal thinking. 黨內其他的人 As for others within the Party, 現在在接班人的問題上 on the matter of a future successor, 還有沒有發言的權力 whether they still have any say at all, 或者是能不能夠起到很大的作用 or can still play any significant role, 從目前的來看 from what we can see now, 黨內現在中央委員的以上的這批人 this group of cadres at Central Committee level and above 基本上他們對習近平的接班人 basically, when it comes to Xi’s successor, 他們沒有任何舉薦的權力 have no power at all to recommend anyone, 甚至是沒有任何的想法 and may not even dare to form their own ideas. 一旦在政治局委員裏面 If any Politburo member 有人現在已經在佈局或者想接班的話 is already laying out a plan or harbors ambitions to take over, 那麼他的下場 then their fate 可能就跟當初的孫政才 could end up like Sun Zhengcai back then, 甚至是令計劃下場一樣 or even like Ling Jihua’s. 所以現在在政治局層面的這批人 So right now, at the Politburo level, 誰都不敢輕舉妄動 no one dares to make rash moves, 也不敢栽培自己的人馬 nor dare they openly cultivate their own factions. 據說現在在政治局裏面 It’s said that even within the Politburo, 過去這幾年喜歡栽培人馬的何立峯 He Lifeng, who in recent years liked to groom his own people, 也受到了警告 has also been warned. 所以何立峯 So He Lifeng, 原本他推薦了一大批的人 who had originally recommended a large number of people 也提拔了一大批的人 and helped many of them get promoted, 據說現在已經收斂了很多了 is said to have reined himself in a great deal now. 他再不提任何人事方面的建議 He no longer puts forward any suggestions on personnel matters. 你想想何立峯跟習近平的關係 Just think about the relationship between He Lifeng and Xi Jinping— 已經長達將近40年 it has already lasted nearly forty years. 這樣的一個人 If even someone like that 他現在都不敢栽培自己的人馬 now dares not cultivate his own followers, 那麼其他的政治局委員 then the other Politburo members 我相信誰也不敢輕舉妄動 I don’t believe any of them would risk acting rashly either, 包括蔡奇 including Cai Qi. 蔡奇之所以現在還能夠得到習近平的賞識 As for why Cai Qi can still enjoy Xi Jinping’s favor today, 很大程度上蔡奇是沒有自己的班子 To a large extent, Cai Qi has no faction or team of his own. 也沒有自己的人馬 He doesn’t have his own network of loyal subordinates either. 這一點讓習近平比較放心 That’s exactly what puts Xi Jinping at ease about him. 蔡奇在四中全會之後 After the Fourth Plenum, 也就是今天在人民日報 Cai Qi published a piece in People’s Daily today, 發表了一篇非常長的文章 a very long article, 佔了一半以上的篇幅 taking up more than half a page. 在這篇文章中 In this article, 他特別強調要持之以恆 he especially stresses the need to stay the course 推進了全面的從嚴治黨 and keep pushing forward the comprehensive strict governance of the Party. 始終在政治立場 政治方向 He calls for always keeping in terms of political stance and direction, 政治原則 政治道路上 as well as political principles and political line, 同習近平爲核心的黨中央保持高度一致 a high degree of unity with the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at its core. 而且從現在開始就要堅持不懈的開展 And from now on, he says, we must persistently carry out 習近平思想的學習宣傳教育活動 campaigns to study, promote and implement Xi Jinping Thought. 我們認爲 In our view, 蔡奇主導的新一輪整黨 a new round of intra-Party rectification led by Cai Qi 又將正式的拉開 is about to be officially launched again. 這也是爲二十一大的人選做準備工作 This is also part of the groundwork for personnel choices at the 21st Party Congress. 我們之前多次的談到過蔡奇 We’ve talked about Cai Qi many times before. 特別是在今年兩會之後 Especially right after this year’s Two Sessions, 兩會之後第二天 on the very next day after they ended, 蔡奇就主持召開了一個關於八項規定的 Cai Qi presided over a meeting on enforcing the Eight-Point Regulation, 全面的整風教育 launching a comprehensive rectification and education campaign. 這個整風教育當時說要持續到今年的7月份 At the time, this rectification drive was said to last until July this year. 但是後來一再的延長 But it kept being extended, 實際上延長到四中全會 in fact extended all the way to the Fourth Plenum, 到現在這個八項規定的整風還在延續當中 and even now this Eight-Point rectification is still ongoing. 所以使得今年上半年 As a result, in the first half of this year, 中管幹部被清洗落馬的破了記錄 the number of centrally managed cadres purged and brought down hit a record high. 以往每一年的中管幹部 In past years, at the central management level, 可能只有幾十個人被清除落馬 only a few dozen such cadres might be removed in a whole year. 但是今年上半年 But in just the first half of this year, 就已經超過了往年全年的總和 the number has already exceeded the full-year totals of previous years. 而且我相信到今年剩下來的兩個月 And I believe that in the remaining two months of this year, 還會有一大批的中管幹部接連落馬 there will be another large batch of centrally managed cadres going down one after another. 不管他們是以什麼樣的方式落馬 No matter in what form they fall— 有一些比方說在軍隊中 take the military, for example— 現在有一些是沒有參加四中全會的這批人 some of those who didn’t attend the Fourth Plenum 也不見得就是完全都會被抓或者被判 won’t necessarily all be arrested or sentenced. 很多人可能只是問問話 Many may just be called in for questioning, 或者是退點錢 or told to return some illicit gains. 比方說前幾天我們提到的 For instance, we mentioned a few days ago 原來的空軍司令員馬曉天的事情 the case of former Air Force commander Ma Xiaotian. 馬曉天只是被叫去問了話 Ma Xiaotian was only summoned for questioning; 並沒有對他人身進行限制 there were no restrictions placed on his personal freedom. 現在已經又恢復了自由 He has now returned to normal life. 可能也只是有些事情牽扯到他 It may simply be that some issues were connected to him 要把他叫去問一下話 so they needed to bring him in to clarify a few points. 看跟這個事情跟這些人有沒有什麼牽連 They needed to see whether he was implicated, and to what extent, in those matters and those people. 據說馬曉天問題不大 It’s said that Ma Xiaotian’s problems are not very serious. 整個空軍系統 The entire Air Force system 到現在爲止並沒有受到太大的影響 has so far not been significantly affected. 包括現任的空軍司令員政委 Including the current Air Force commander and political commissar, 在這輪清洗當中還在位 they have both remained in their posts in this round of purges. 而且這次參加了四中全會 They also took part in this Fourth Plenum. 還有其他的人也可能 There are others who may also 多多少少受一些影響 be affected to varying degrees. 比如說前段時間我們說到的 For example, what we mentioned earlier, 南部戰區司令員吳亞男被抓的事情 the arrest of Southern Theater commander Wu Yanan. 因爲吳亞男可以稱爲是張又俠的舊部 Because Wu Yanan can be considered part of Zhang Youxia’s old network, 如果是吳亞男被抓的話 if Wu Yanan were actually arrested, 意味着張又俠的地位也會受到影響 it would mean Zhang Youxia’s position would also be affected. 但是我聽到了最新的消息 But the latest information I’ve heard is that 吳亞男只是從大軍區的正職 Wu Yanan has only been moved down from a full theater-command rank, 也就是過去我們講的兵團司令正職 which is what we used to call a full corps-commander grade, 上將的級別 at the rank of full general. 現在給他降職了 He has now been demoted 降到了副軍的待遇 to deputy army-level待遇, 也就是享受副軍的待遇 meaning he only enjoys deputy army-level待遇 now, 退出了軍隊 and has left active military service. 類似這樣的情況 Cases like this, 就是這次在四中全會 among those who didn’t show up 沒有出來的一批中央委員 at this Fourth Plenum as Central Committee members, 或者是一批軍中的中央候補委員 or as military alternate Central Committee members, 估計有一半以上的都會像吳亞男一樣 it’s estimated that more than half will be handled the way Wu Yanan was. 並不是說個個都像 It’s not that each of them will be treated 四中全會之前的9個上將一樣的 like the nine generals dealt with before the Fourth Plenum— 開除黨籍 開除軍籍 expelled from the Party, expelled from the military, 送交司法處理 and handed over for judicial prosecution. 還不一定是這樣 It won’t necessarily be like that for everyone. 所以說 So, 現在處理的流程 the current handling procedures 可能分不同的層次或者不同的派系 may differ by level and by faction, 可能做出不同的處理意見 leading to different outcomes for different people. 當然也有人會說 Of course, some people say 這是張又俠 this is Zhang Youxia 或者是之前政治局成立的一個議事小組在發揮作用 or a leading group set up earlier by the Politburo that is playing the key role, 不是說習近平在發揮作用 and that it’s not really Xi Jinping who is deciding things. 因爲最近這段時間 Because lately, 很多人認爲習近平現在只是一個維持會長 many people think Xi Jinping is just a caretaker chairman, 表面上給他留點面子 kept on the surface for the sake of face, 讓他繼續的 letting him continue 把工作維持到二十一大 to hold things together until the 21st Party Congress. 但是現在我得到的消息 But based on the information I have now, 恐怕不是現在大家所想象的 it’s probably not as simple as many people imagine— 那麼簡單的一件事情 the situation is not that straightforward. 權力依然還在習近平的手上 Real power is still in Xi Jinping’s hands. 至於在二十一大他會選拔 As for whether, at the 21st Party Congress, he will select 或者是推不推出新的接班人 or even put forward a new designated successor—that remains to be seen. 現在也還在觀望 For now everyone is still watching and waiting. 他最終會不會做出妥協 To see whether he will ultimately make a compromise. 尤其是向這批紅二代做出妥協 Especially whether he will compromise with this group of “second-generation reds.” 給他施加壓力的不是所謂的軍方 The pressure on him is not really coming from the military, 也不是所謂的黨內的元老 nor from so-called party elders, 而是跟他同輩的 but from people of his own generation— 他們的父輩當初跟他的父輩一樣 whose fathers, just like his father, 都是同樣打江山的這批人 were all part of the group that “fought to seize the country.” 他們是本着保黨保政權保財富的目的 Their goal is to protect the Party, protect the regime, and protect their own wealth, 給習近平提出一個善意的建議 and to offer Xi Jinping a “kind-hearted” piece of advice. 而且不是逼宮 They stress that this is not an attempt to force him off the throne. 希望習近平能夠聽得進去 They hope Xi Jinping will actually take it on board, 也希望習近平通過這樣的一種方式 and that through this kind of arrangement 能夠使他們那個江山千秋萬代 their “red regime” can last for generations, 永保他那個江山永不變色 and remain “red” forever without changing color. 我們可以繼續觀察 So we can keep watching how this plays out. 如果是習近平要在二十一大做出妥協的話 If Xi Jinping is going to compromise at the 21st Party Congress, 那麼我們會看到 then we should see that 在政治局的層面 at the Politburo level 可能會有一個非常年輕的人進入到政治局 a very young person is brought into the Politburo, 或者有非常年輕的人進入到更高的政治局常委 or even an unusually young person elevated into the Politburo Standing Committee. 這是值得觀察的 That will be something to watch closely. 就像毛澤東的晚年 It would be a bit like in Mao’s later years, 林彪出事之後 when Lin Biao fell from power, 他急急忙忙的又把王洪文 and Mao hastily picked Wang Hongwen 從上海一個普通的工人 from an ordinary worker in Shanghai 提拔到北京擔任軍委副主席 to Beijing as a vice-chairman of the Military Commission, 擔任國家主席 state leader, 擔任黨中央的主席 and top Party leader. 當時30多歲擺在那個位置上 He was in his thirties in that role— 是明擺着是可以接班的 plainly positioned as a successor, 或者是培養作爲接班人來培養的 or at least being groomed to be one. 習近平會不會在二十一大做出妥協 Whether Xi Jinping will make such a compromise at the 21st Congress 值得觀察 is something worth watching. 這200多個紅二代 These more than 200 “second-generation reds” 沒有一個是在體制裏面的 are all currently outside the official system, 而且沒有一個過去是反習近平的 and none of them have previously been known as anti-Xi, 至少沒有一個是公開反習近平的 at least not openly opposed to him. 所以我在這裏提醒一下 So I want to stress this point: 他們之所以聯名上書 the reason they jointly submitted this letter 他們是本着一種善意的心態 was out of what they see as good intentions, 不是在妄議習近平 not to “recklessly criticize” Xi, 也不是在逼宮習近平 and not to force him to step down. 現在紅二代裏面有一批反對習近平的 Right now there is a group of red second-generation figures who do oppose Xi, 我聽到的消息說 and from what I’ve heard, 四中全會之後 after the Fourth Plenum 習近平可能會拿下一兩個紅二代來殺雞儆猴 Xi may take down one or two of them as a warning to the rest. 因爲到現在爲止 Because up to now, 真正的紅二代沒有一個出事的 none of the “real” second-generation reds have actually been purged, 也沒有一個被拿下來的 and not a single one has been formally taken down. 如果是四中全會之後 If, after the Fourth Plenum, 習近平要拿下一兩個紅二代的話 Xi Jinping really does take down one or two “second-generation reds,” 那麼就意味着習近平 then it would mean that Xi 已經感受到紅二代對他的權力形成了威脅 already feels the red second generation is threatening his power, 或者是給他製造了很多的障礙 or at least creating serious obstacles for him. 他必須要殺雞儆猴來威懾一下紅二代 So he has to “kill the chicken to scare the monkeys” and warn the rest of them. 因爲他想完全的封住紅二代的嘴 Because if he wants to silence the red second generation completely, 他是封不住的 that’s something he simply can’t do. 我看到前幾天 I saw just a few days ago 馬曉力 馬文瑞的女兒 that Ma Xiaoli, the daughter of Ma Wenrui, 年初寫了一封信 wrote a letter early this year. 這封信在外面是公開的 That letter has been made public. 就是希望習近平 In it, she appeals to Xi Jinping 也希望現在的黨中央在內蒙古的語言方面 and to the current Party leadership to ease up on language policy in Inner Mongolia, 要放一馬 to give Mongolian a bit of leeway. 認爲內蒙古文字已經傳承了幾千年 She argues that Mongolian script there has been passed down for thousands of years, 現在在內蒙古推行的漢化教育 and that the Sinicized education now being pushed in Inner Mongolia, 把蒙古語完全的排除在外 which completely pushes Mongolian out of the classroom, 這是對少數民族沒有基本的尊重 shows a basic lack of respect for ethnic minorities. 當然我不認爲它只是蒙古語的問題 Of course, I don’t think this is only a Mongolian-language issue. 你想想維吾爾語藏語甚至是粵語 Think about Uyghur, Tibetan, even Cantonese— 今後都會在習近平的這個時代 under Xi’s rule, all of these 都會把他們逼出去 are being steadily squeezed out. 普通話也就是漢語 Standard Mandarin, Putonghua, 將成爲這個國家的一個基本標誌形態 is being turned into the country’s core linguistic marker. 因爲我們知道香港人講粵語 We know people in Hong Kong speak Cantonese, 廣東人部分講粵語 and many in Guangdong do as well, 但是現在廣東講粵語的人都在日漸減少 but the number of Cantonese speakers in Guangdong is shrinking year by year. 尤其是在官方的平臺 Especially on official platforms, 過去可能粵語的電臺粵語的電視臺 where there used to be plenty of Cantonese-language radio and TV, 都可以說是還是很多的 you could say they were once very common, 但是現在會越來越少 but now they’re steadily disappearing. 香港也是這樣 The same thing is happening in Hong Kong, 當然有一個過程 though it’s happening more gradually there. 但是在內蒙古是一刀切 But in Inner Mongolia it was a one-size-fits-all, overnight change: 現在不允許再用蒙古語進行中小學的教育 Mongolian can no longer be used as the language of instruction in primary and secondary schools. 所以馬文瑞的女兒牽頭給習近平寫了這封信 That’s why Ma Wenrui’s daughter took the lead in writing this letter to Xi. 當然習近平應該是對這件事情早有準備 Of course, Xi was surely prepared for this kind of pushback. 我認爲對少數民族的漢化 In my view, the Sinicization of ethnic minorities 習近平時期已經在快步加速 has already been accelerating rapidly under Xi’s rule, 這也是做了充分的部署 and it’s something for which the groundwork has been thoroughly laid.