California’s community colleges have been confronting a growing wave of enrollment fraud. Through stolen identities, fake students are collecting financial aid meant for real applicants.
In this episode, N2N Services CEO Kiran Kodithala explains how large-scale fraud networks infiltrated the system and what investigators are now uncovering behind the surge.
00:00 - Intro 00:56 - Fake Students Phenomenon in Colleges 03:31 - Financial Aid and Application Process 07:13 - Impact on Real Students and Institutions 10:29 - Origins and Methods of Fraudsters 15:07 - Efforts to Combat Fraud 18:02 - National and International Impact 32:17 - Selective Admissions Fraud 34:46 - Challenges and Solutions
Views expressed in this video are the opinions of the host and guests and do not necessarily reflect the views of The California Insider.
The number of fake students applying to California community colleges are on the rise.
Not only they're getting in, some of them are taking classes and they're taking places of
legitimate students and applying for financial aid. Our guest today is someone who has been
on the forefront of fighting this phenomenon. They set it up on multiple identities. They don't
have to pay a single penny and they were able to get away with billions of dollars of financial
I'm Samer Kourami. Welcome to California Insider. We want to talk to you about a very important
topic is the fake students phenomenon, which are bots, right? You're in the forefront of
fighting this. Can you tell us what's happening? So what we've seen with these attacks is people
have went to dark web where you all are social security numbers, your social security number,
mine and my kids' social security numbers, dates of birth, first name and last name
are available for this. We'll call them miscreants or bots or fraudsters to take the data from and
use it to apply for financial aid. Community colleges are open access institutions where
they are specifically designed to accept anybody who applies. And at the minimum, a financial aid
for a student is around $3,000. And these bots have figured out that all I have to do is apply
to these colleges and get steel financial aid. That's why this issue became a real problem around
2020, 2023, 2024, where institutions are like, this needs to be stopped and this needs to be
resolved. And that's why we came into focus on that. You mentioned these students, these
bots are coming, they're applying and getting financial aid. Do they pay a tuition and where
do they get the money? How do they get the money to their bank accounts? Yeah, so two things.
California does not charge admissions application fee. So what they do is they apply with no
financial obligation. They can register without no financial obligation and they apply for
financial aid. And some community colleges also provide housing assistance, food assistance,
and other assistance as well. So they get either disbursement wise, they do set up a shell bank
account. And those are also very hard to track because they set it up on multiple identities.
So eventually the bank account they set up is the only financial instrument they have to
submit the money to, but they don't have to pay a single penny and they were able to get away with
billions of dollars of financial aid theft with this process. So you think it's billions, it's not
millions? Over the last four years, it was over a billion, three to four billion dollars
from one of the inside higher education article I've seen. These are stolen identities, right?
Somebody might take my name or somebody else's name using their social security number and
just go and register for college. Would it be under the same name?
Yeah, institutions don't really have sophistication to kind of do those level of tracking. So they
very likely might set up a name bank account under this person's name, right? An account that
is untraceable, they call it, where it is integrated with multiple things. But institutions only
recently started checking, does the account name match the person's name? But all of these are new
tools. But originally they would just set up like a fake account, bank account that's connected to
some kind of a shell account that institutions did not even know that most of the money was just
going to the shell accounts. And the money is going to these accounts and then the accounts
will get closed and a new one would open. Exactly. Yeah, they were shell accounts, they were not
really tied to a real person. And it took them for a while to realize that, you know, there's 100
people's financial disbursement was going to the same bank account. Wow. Yeah, it's scary. And what
about the fact that some of these bots were taking a lot of classes? Is there an explanation for that?
Because we heard that they were taking so many classes and they're taking classes for real
students and it was hard for them to register. That's when it came to head. I don't think it
knowingly or unknowingly, some institutions were aware of this fraud problem, but since their
funding is tied to the enrollment, they didn't want to overreact in their mind and put additional
friction to all the institutions, right? All the students. Because in a lot of ways, some
institutions, like for example, Ivy Tech, they ask every student to go through an ID verification
process where they have to submit their ID, driver's license and front and back and selfie
check. And they, but the friction does impact the enrollment negatively because a lot of times
community college students are not really, they're not looking to do a four-year degree. Sometimes
they just have a temptation to say, let me go get this computer science course. Let me get this
potting course or flower pottery course. And they say, I need to now submit these three documents.
They were worried that it would prevent them from continuing the journey and ergo impacting
enrollment. However, this was a direct result of my discussion with Dr. Kim, where we implemented
Foothill-Lienza and I presented at Future Summit last year in November or September last year.
And after the panel discussion, Dr. Jeannie Kim from San Diego Canyon came and said, Kiran,
we have a serious problem with enrollment. These bots were attacking at such ferocity that they
were taking away seats from students that really wanted to get into that sewing lesson or welding
lesson or computer science course or physics course. And because of that, the good students
or real students were unable to get into their classes. In the last year, we've seen so many
real problems where institutions have to turn off registration to just to stop the bots from
attacking at the level they are just so that they can get this piece. So what we have implemented
over the last six months is what's called a pre-import process. Think of like a ring camera.
When the student applies, we look at their profile and say, this is very likely a bot. So let's put
them in a purgatory and not let this person or let this student get enrolled. You mentioned these
bots attacking. Who are they? So they're taking our information from dark web, but who is doing
it? Is it a computer system? Is it a bunch of people? It's definitely not a computer system.
There's real bad actors that are benefiting from this. We talked about it in the Fortune magazine
article under Amanda Gertz. Amanda talked about these actors being out of North Korea or
Iran or even India as well. There is some evidence to show that there are some people from South
Africa. But the reason why they were getting caught like that is because what they have done
is they try to, when they apply, they use VPNs and proxies to apply. But then to do the enrollment,
they have to finish things like their assignments. They have to respond to the instructor discussion.
And when they do that, they forget that and they try to log in directly from their computer. That's
when we are able to see the IP addresses on where these attacks are coming from.
There's evidence to prove that North Korea is involved, not as a nation organization, but it's
people in North Korea, Russia, Iran, India, and South Africa as well.
Is it only a few individuals launching these kinds of attacks or is it a lot of people in
those countries? Is there one individual doing that or is it each individual has
hundreds of thousands of students that are applying from their setup?
I think it's definitely fraud rings, they call them. If you think about it,
if the United States has lost over $40 billion in the last five years on these fraudsters,
that means that this $40 billion went to some bad organizations or bad actors. So these bad
actors are now addicted to this money. So they are now finding different kinds of things.
Is this from the EDD fraud, the unemployment fraud that started?
I think that was also one of the factors we've seen. But at least unemployment fraud,
it was caught a little sooner because they have more sophisticated tools. The difference between
attacking an unemployment organization or an automobile or banking sector is that they have
real fraud detection tools. Because it's been there before,
people have tried to fraud them before. But here, it was a new thing.
And also, it is completely democratized, right? Each institution has to fight it on their own.
They were literally, A&R team, they call them, admissions team, they would look at the phone
number, they would call the phone number, they would check, go to Google Maps and see if there's
a real address or not. They would send an email to see if the email responds back. Very, very
low-level manual checks. Even if the fraudster responds back, sometimes fraudster would actually
say, yeah, here's my driver's license. And they don't know how to even verify if it's a real
driver's license because they're just not fraud sleuths or fraud detectives. So they figured out
that because of the community colleges and their level of sophistication catching this, it was low
hanging fruit for them. How much effort these bots fake students would put into doing homework
and doing the work? I mean, this is a controversial discussion. But if you think about the way
AI, especially ChatGPT or Gemini is helping real students, you can take any assignment and put it
on ChatGPT. And with minor prompts, ChatGPT can generate better answer than a real person.
So they are putting just as much effort as some of the lazy students, you want to call them.
So unfortunately, that's a real dilemma that instructors are facing when trying to figure
out if they're real students or not. Because when you look at assignments, so many students,
real students are also using these tools and their answers just look like bot responses,
but they're definitely not putting real effort into this. They're just copy pasting question
into ChatGPT and others. They're only attacking online courses. They have a fraud ring where
they're absolutely, each of the fraudster in that ring can simulate at least 100 students per day.
You mentioned you started four years ago, but really the community colleges started noticing it.
2023-2024 is when they started seeing the fraud come into full force.
Until then, obviously, we all know that 2020 was, we'll always remember as the crisis year,
where everybody moved to COVID and we didn't know what was happening. And that's when fraudsters
started to test the system. 2021 is when they built their, we'll call them alpha
version of their attack pipeline and they made a lot of money. And 2022 is when they went into
production. So that's when institutions started to realize that we need to do something
about it. And they started, some institutions started building rules-based engines, rules-based
systems or applications, APIs or whatever. And 2023 is when they knew it was a problem.
And 2024 is when we got into action. In terms of the amount of fraud that is there now,
we saw that there was 1.2 million applicants that were fake last year, something like that.
I'm not sure this is the exact number, but is that the same amount of activity? Is there a lot of fake
students still applying? There are 100% a lot of fake students applying. So the latest numbers we've
seen from California Tech Center, which is the center that manages the CCC Apply, the admissions
process, they said that about 5.45 million applications came in this year. And then out of
the 5.45 million, 2.45 was fraud. And that is just based on their spam filter because they built their
own controls and spam filter in the tech center. But even in those 3.2 million applications,
we're still seeing... The ones that got in, right? Yeah. So we still saw in spring 2024,
about 30% to 40% of them were fraud that Lightly Pay could catch. And in fall,
it was an average of 20% fraud. One out of five that get in. So there's a filter to catch them
before they get in. Yeah. So that's called a spam filter that's implemented by Tech Center. And then
they come to the institutions and then Lightly, our AI platform, catches the remaining. And we're
catching one out of five applications as fraudulent across the state of California. And these numbers
are the same because we're working with schools in Michigan, Minnesota, Illinois, Texas, and Oregon.
And the numbers are between 20 and 25%. So it's the same nationally. This is a massive national...
And what about the financial aid side of it? Do you think... Is there any progress in making sure
that there's some guardrails on how we pay when people apply? Yeah. Federal government has made
some really good changes over the last couple of years. Three years ago, we could... So there
was two main problems with the FAFSA application, RISER application, they call it, where a person
who's not alive, they can apply for a social security number. Somebody can take somebody
who's dead and use their social security number and apply for FAFSA and make some representations
on their FAFSA application, and they can get financial aid. The federal government did not
do a couple of things. One is it wouldn't check some of the verifiability of the social security
number information, but also they didn't have a way to provide a feedback to say,
this is what they submitted on their tax return last year, and this is what they submitted on
their FAFSA application. So my daughter, when she filled out this year, I have to connect my
irs.gov account to help her fill the FAFSA application. But it's a new change that happened
electronically two to three years ago. But three years ago, federal government wasn't giving the
feedback loop saying, this is what they put on your application, but this is what the parent
actually put on their irs.gov application. So that changed and that made a big difference in
getting past this bottleneck. However, what we've seen with these fraudsters is
they're pivoting to saying, I didn't make any money last year, or my parents, I don't have
parents, or my parents didn't make any money. So they're kind of getting into the homelessness
bottleneck. It's not even a shortcoming. It's an area where, how are you going to verify that?
You can't verify information when they say, I'm homeless or I don't have parents.
So now the institutions are saying, I can't just take every homeless person or anybody who
really has a need because they're an orphan, or they really are poor, or they're homeless,
and assume that they're all fraud. So that's where we're helping them by allowing them to
identify who's truly fraud versus who's just making a representation like that.
If there was no financial aid involved, if there was no money, tangible money involved,
would these bots still do this? Do they get any value from having a .edu email address?
Yeah. I mean, I think Amanda Garut talked about this in her Fortune magazine article as well,
where what we've seen is some of the bad countries, right? North Korea, she pointed out in
her article where North Korea, one of the first thing that they train there, we'll call them spies
or bad actors in US, where they say, we need to establish a level of credibility. And the easiest
way to establish credibility is to have a .edu email because that'll show that they're real
students or whatever. But also in a typical university or college admissions comes with
certain access. For example, they get Office 365 licenses. They get Google Workspace accounts.
They have Canvas licenses. Some of them have Salesforce accounts. Some of them have even
Amazon credits, or they can buy additional things on Microsoft or Apple. So what we have seen is,
in theory, all of the services are maybe a thousand bucks per student. But imagine 300 students
stealing those thousand dollars of services. That's $300,000, right? So what they're doing
is they're selling this on dark web. So even if you remove the financial aid component,
it is still an incredibly valuable asset for the fraudsters. And obviously, it's a bleed of
cash as well. And the second thing we're also seeing is somewhat of a ransomware type attack,
where if they overwhelm the system with enrollment by applying in, let's say the
institution has set up for 3,000 students. And the bots attack so much that they overwhelm the
registration system. They overwhelm the admission system. It's what's called a denial of service
attack. So they can create a denial of service where they can overwhelm admissions. So they
need to put some control so that the fraudsters don't overwhelm the systems.
In terms of people taking these classes, when I went to community college many years ago,
you had to pay tuition. Do these people pay tuition? How does that work?
Well, that's the financial aid element, right? So if you prove that you have the need,
and in California, there's a thing called Promise Grant and a few others where
if they make, if they're within a specific income tier, they don't have to pay a penny.
So that's what they're kind of building off of. And in addition, they'll also get additional
services just because they're in California. So yeah, there's no, if they fit in that needs
analysis, they call it, where they can't afford to pay their tuition, the government will pay
for them. And that's what they're building on. So they go in and they say, I don't have money
to pay for tuition. That's why I also need financial aid. That's right. So they go in,
register for four courses, and the tuition is, I don't know, $3,000. And they say, well,
I don't have a way to pay for it. So the institution says, okay, apply the financial aid,
they apply for financial aid, they get the financial aid check, they get it delivered
to their bank, and then they disappear. It's crazy because I think it's no different than people,
the reason why they don't do it in banks or automobiles or home loans is because they have
really sophisticated set up to prevent that from happening. They do background verification
checks, they do internet checks and others. And that's a system we built for California
Community College as a result of our collaboration with institutions like Fotil De Anza and Santiago
Canyon, where it actually goes and checks whether the social security number belongs to this person,
whether the address they represented is the address that the person is existing,
or if that's even a home address. Or is a phone number really an active phone number? Is it
connected to social media platforms? Is it involved in breaches? And then it looks at
every single piece of admissions application. It's called an AIML model and says, this is the
pattern of a fraudster, and this is a pattern of a real student. And that's why we're able to
identify with over 90% accuracy, whether it's fraud or not.
You found this in California, right? You started in California. Is this fraud happening
nationwide? This is a big nationwide issue or is it bigger in California? What do you see?
Oh yeah, I mean, I don't think it's a California specific issue, 100%. I think it is more of a
community college specific issue because we're working with Yavapai in Arizona. We're working
with Lane in Oregon. We're working with a school system in Illinois and many school systems in
Texas as well. So it's definitely a nationwide problem. And that's why I think Trump administration
has put in some real controls around the Department of Education, has put in some real regulations
around how to catch fraud, how to do verification when they apply for financial aid. So it's
definitely a nationwide problem, not localized to California. However, I think California is making
some real strides to be the leader in solving the crime. And one of the reasons they did that is
probably because channels by challenged by Trump administration. But Chancellor Christian has seen
the power of LightLeap AI to stop the fraud. When we started with Fortaleans around fall of 2024,
and by end of spring 2025, we were at 60 colleges at LightLeap AI because each institution took it
upon themselves to buy LightLeap directly from me and implement it. So as a result,
Chancellor Christian has decided to purchase LightLeap licenses for all the 116 colleges
and they're being implemented. The way the model works is one is called account verification API,
where as soon as they apply, it looks at the phone number, email address and sees if they're fraud or
not and lets them apply. And when they apply, then it does application verification. When they enroll,
it does enrollment verification and when they do financial aid. But our hope is to stop as many of
them at the beginning of the funnel and prevent them from going forward. But by seeing just like
California Chancellor's office has seen the value of this and implementing it system wide, one of the
leading ERP vendors, Ellucian, has also started integrating LightLeap into their product stack
because A, because DOE has been pushing the vendors to be able to stop this fraud at the
system level. So Ellucian has integrated. So when you apply and you get into the system,
then the system can recognize that this is not a student. By doing those verifications,
you guys build your systems. Exactly. So Ellucian has integrated LightLeap into their SaaS platform
so that any institution that's Ellucian institution can, with the click of a button,
start taking advantage of LightLeap and it will stop admissions at recruitment state,
admission state, enrollment state, and financial aid state. And the idea here is to stop it
at the entrance, right? So imagine your house not having a door and you're trying to stop robbers
from entering the house by holding, I don't know, a weapon in a kitchen, a weapon or something
in your bedroom or something in front of your kid's house, kid's room, and doing what's called
a guerrilla warfare inside your house. That's what's happening with institutions. But to answer
your question, it is definitely not a California specific problem. It's a nationwide problem,
specifically for community colleges. When was the first time you saw this? How did you come
in touch with this? Just as a backdrop of who I am, I started working in higher education in 1998
at the University of Illinois as a student worker. And my whole job work since 1998 to 2025, 27 years
later, is to implement ERP systems like Banner, Colleague, Janzibar, PeopleSoft, and others,
and integrate them with different systems, parking system, ID card systems, and others.
So in 2010, I launched End-to-End Services, which is a professional services company originally,
but our focus was connecting anything to anything. We wanted to allow institutions to use
web services APIs to integrate their systems with other systems, whether it's SaaS products
or mobile applications and otherwise. We have two flagship products. One of them is Illuminate,
which is our integration platform as a service, which was launched in 2016. And we serve over
500 institutions processing millions of transactions a day. Around 2024, with all the
advent of AI and ChatGPT, we realized that we needed to be AI-forward company as well.
So we launched LightLeap AI early 2024. And that was just last year. And around March last year,
I met Dr. Lee Lambert, Dr. Hadsall, and a few other presidents at a conference in California,
where we presented them this idea of a unified experience for students to be able to secure
whatever services they want. They can interact with student information system, learning
management system, content using chatbot like ChatGPT, which is what we call LightLeap AI.
However, after presenting this vision, one of the CEOs said, Kiran, all of this is great,
but we have a real problem with fraud. And that's when I was introduced to this problem in
March of 2024. And when we realized that this was a problem, we immediately got into action.
I set up a data sciences team, and we started peeling the onion with Fotillienza College as
our primary institution under Dr. Jory Hadsall and Lee Lambert's leadership. And this model went
into production around July 2024. It sounds like an eternity ago, but it was just less than a year
ago. Before we continue with the rest of this interview, let's take a look at some of the key
headlines in our newspaper Epoch Times in California. Governor Newsom just vetoed a bill
that was going to take PFAS out of cookware and other products. If this was going to go into law,
a lot of the manufacturers would have to change the way they produce this type of cookware. It
could have increased the cost of these appliances. This is the reason Governor Newsom decided to
veto it, but he agreed that this is a big problem. California has produced its own insulin
pens now, and he's selling it at $11 starting next year per pen. And pharmacies in California
can buy them at about a 20% discount and sell them at the same price. This is going to offer
about 90% of savings for people that use insulin here in California. Trump administration is
withholding about 41 million of transportation funds from California, saying that California
drivers are not meeting English requirements for truck drivers. California has been debating that
this is not the case, and California is following all the national rules when it comes to this.
Make sure to check out our newspaper Epoch Times. There's so many other headlines on national,
international, and China that you may not see in any other newspaper. We go above and beyond to
talk to different sides of the story, different players, and make sure we provide the information
as accurately as possible so you can make up your own minds. Make sure to subscribe today. You can
click on the link below, and for a dollar, you'll get a lot of value from this newspaper.
In terms of other colleges outside of community colleges, have they been impacted by this?
So they're called selective admissions colleges, right? So there's two types of fraud that's
occurring in higher education. One is obviously the financial aid fraud that's occurring in
community colleges because they're open access institutions. But in Northeastern University,
or Harvard, or Stanford, we have what's called a different type of problem, which is selective
admissions fraud, where these are real students that are making false representations of their
admissions application. So the most popular example is Mindy Kaling's brother. He, on his
admissions application, represented that he's African American, and he was able to get into
Harvard. And obviously, when he got into Harvard, his admission was rejected because he's not
African American. He just looks dark-skinned. So that's a different story. But what they could
have avoided that process is by doing some additional AI checks on their representations
to verify whether their representations are accurate, not by doing any sleuthing, but using
the information that's publicly available. So people do it all the time on their Harvard
applications or Stanford applications to say, you know, my dad is unemployed. I don't have a mom.
And they don't have a way to verify that they were just on a huge cruise ship in, I don't know,
Russia or Ukraine just a few months ago, and that's not true. That doesn't mean that they're
going to stop their admissions application, but they can flag it, and they don't need to use
human resources for this now. So we actually are working with some selective admissions institutions
to do exactly that, where we built a model that would identify a fraud on their representation
they made on their admissions application and just give them saying, this is what they said
in the application. However, these are some of the things that we saw that do not look
real so that they can... They can manually go in and analyze it. You mentioned that you guys have
been checking their phone numbers, their addresses, and social security number, and all that. If people
are buying them on the dark web, how does that work? Have you had cases where the person is real,
the number is real, and the social security is real, the name is real, but they're not
really applying themselves to the... The information is real, but actually it's a fake student.
Have you seen that? You're 100% right. They're not synthetic IDs. The name, it can be your
first name, your last name, your social security number, your date of birth. I think that one is
from dark web. The reason why they have to use a real phone number or real email address, not
real as in a phone number that they have access to. They have to have access to that email. They cannot
use my email address if you're applying under my name. That is the idea. So the email and the
phone number won't match. And the physical address also, they need some control on it because either
institutions will be unable to send a mail to that physical address, or if they send it, they have
access to it. So they are trying to use phone number, email address, and physical address to
be something that they have control on. But not to provide full secret sauce here,
we are using that as one of those payloads to say, if the phone number is a wipe number or phone
number has been set up only recently, and it's not involved in any breaches, or it doesn't have
any connections to any social media accounts, we are also flagging that as well. What about real
students? Have you guys had cases where they get flagged as fake? If you think about it,
our model works at 93% accuracy. So on the surface, it looks really good, but it's still
7 out of 100, 70 out of 1,000, 700 out of 10,000, and 7,000 out of 100,000, right?
So that's still, but it's also not just 700. It can be between 700 and 1,400 because that's how
the margin of error occurs, and we want to reduce that as much as possible. And there's another
problem that comes along with it, which is, yes, we might have falsely flagged them, but also
it's entirely possible that the fraudster is trying to say, well, I'm not fraud, I'm a real person,
and they would call the A&R team office or financial aid office and try to bully them.
So what we have is not just a fraud detection platform, but also fraud clearance platform.
So what we have is an AI agent where if we mark somebody at X percent fraud, it will send them
an ID verification link, and the person or the applicant, if they're a good actor,
they have to take a selfie using their phone, upload the driver's license, or take a picture
of their driver's license front and back, and when they upload it, it automatically clears them.
So we have a NIST level two certified ID verification utility, and we're also working
with AMBA, American Association of Motor Vehicle Agencies, to validate the driver's license as well
so that we can reduce that burden for institutions. But it also fits the DOE standards, where DOE is
saying, we need to provide the audit that you're actually doing that, so with our platform,
institutions can download all their ID verifications and send it to DOE as well.
You mentioned some of these actors are from North Korea and the countries that we may not have
access to, but India, you said, has anybody been caught? Not to get too detailed, the Department of
Education has a financial aid application, right? The financial aid application has a unique ID,
so we are building the list of people that we saw as fake recipients of financial aid
and sending it to DOE, and they're working with FBI on some of this. However, the problem we have is
the closest we have to a fingerprint of these bad actors is their IP address, and most of them are
going through proxies and others, but when they log in through their Canvas or their Learning
Management System accounts, we are seeing some of those patterns, but FBI has those
information, and they're kind of working through our partner organizations, like Fortaleza,
Santiago Canyon, and hopefully through Ellucian as well. So it looks like this was an area these
fraudsters came in, and it was easy to get in. Is there any other areas that could be vulnerable
to this type of fraud activity? Yeah, we're working with a couple of, it's called NBFC,
Non-Banking Financial Corporations, both in US and India, where they're seeing, think of them more
like SoFi type loan systems, where they give hand loans based on your paycheck, right?
So what we're seeing is, especially... There's like payday loans. Yeah, payday loans and others.
So we're seeing people attack those systems by doing what's called loan stacking. They apply at
payday, they apply at 15 other places, and by the time the credit checks report that this person
is just dinged 15 times in two days, this person has already taken $100,000 loans, and that's $100,000.
So we're seeing that as occur because, you know, same thing, right? The pawn brokers or
payday type loans, they're not really built to have like sophisticated structure. So we're trying to
implement something like that to verify this, and we're experimenting with NBFC in India and US as well.
What we're seeing is organizations that are most vulnerable to attack, these are organizations
that don't have a real sophistication behind them. They're not a banking company. They're not an
automobile company. They're not a lending company with bank or fraud detection utilities. They're
trying to do something else, and they give out a loan as a side project.
Kiran Kuditala, CEO and founder of End2End Services, it was great to have you on California Insider.
Thank you so much. I really appreciated it. It's been such an informative conversation.
Thank you so much for having me.
Hopefully you guys will block all of these.
Yeah, we already blocked close to, I think, three million fraudsters over the last two years.
Our hope is to stop these fraudsters from continuing this carnage once and for all.
Let us know what you think about the fake students in community colleges,
and tell us your potential ideas how we can solve this. You can always email us at
And when you comment, make sure to consider everyone that's involved,
because we want to create a discussion among everybody from different backgrounds and point
of views. I'm Siamak Karami. This is California Insider. We'll see you next time.