You Won’t Believe What Just Happened to Chinese Banks

Wealth Wizards
9 followers
Chinese banks have had a rough couple of years.
They have been cutting back on lending,
and the Chinese economy is increasingly showing
the downside of that lack of money in credit circulation.
More recently, earlier this year,
there was an artificial uptick.
Where have we heard that before?
It is increasingly giving way to a payback period,
a sharp decline in bank lending,
which goes along with the same payback we see,
a very sharp payback emerging from the Chinese economy.
You wanna know why gold is soaring,
or why the copper to gold ratio
is plunging to record low deflation indications?
Well, China is the other half of it.
In the case of the CCP, that kind of payback
is leading to more of the political kind just this week.
As the government of China gets ready
for what's called the fourth plenum,
which is a gathering of top party officials
to hash out the country's economic strategy
for the next five-year period,
just days before it began,
the Chinese confirmed the purge
of more top military officials,
including, get this,
the second highest ranking officer of the armed forces,
a general who also had a seat on the Politburo.
What's even more intriguing is He Wei Dong
was handpicked for these top slots
by being close to Xi Jinping.
Now, there's also the timing, which is not,
I don't think it's coincidence.
China's economy right now is being held together
only by flooding the rest of the world with exports.
Apart from the distortion due to trade wars,
the economic situation has turned very grim,
to the point the Chinese labor market
is flirting with, yes, its own flat beverage.
Just look at retail sales in China.
They fell again, third time in the last four months.
Something big has changed this summer.
So you combine those macro fundamentals
with the background housing bust
that hasn't gone anywhere,
no wonder banks in China aren't lending,
and no wonder gold is soaring,
and the copper to gold ratio keeps plunging
to new and even lower record deflationary lows.
It really does seem as though
something big has changed this summer,
and we have an idea of what it is,
but these purges in the Chinese government
suggest that maybe there's more intrigue going on,
because as I always say,
as the rate of change in economy goes down a lot,
the rate of change in politics goes way up.
And that's another angle on gold and copper to gold.
In all of this, despite last year's bazooka,
anyone remember that?
Of course not.
It failed so badly,
no one ever bothers to bring it up.
Instead, it has slipped back to the overcrowded realm
of forgotten stimulus plans that never stimulated anything,
at least not beyond the very short run.
China is absolutely the perfect example
of the closest thing to a law in modern economics.
It's banks that matter,
not central banks nor central governments.
When banks are expanding their balance sheets,
when they're taking risks and circulating money via credit,
central banks look like they know what they're doing
and that they wield effective tools.
It also makes fiscal programs look like Keynes
knew what he was talking about.
Take away the banks, however, everything falls apart.
Stimulus just won't stimulate, full stop.
We've seen it in the Western world
for the full term of the silent depression since 2008,
and now it has caught up to Chinese banks
in the depression's second decade.
To begin with, the PBOC reported last week
that the total outstanding stock of RMB loans in China
grew by just 6.6% year over year in September.
That's another new record low.
And just to give you some context,
last September when the bazooka stimulus was announced,
the year over year rate for total stock of RMB loans was 8.1%.
See what I mean about a total failure?
Back in September 2023, loan stock growth was 10.9%,
from nearly 11% down to just 6.6% with a bazooka,
some other rate cuts,
and a bunch of rescue and stimulus programs
thrown in between.
Lending to households, it's another one.
Just 389 billion in September.
That's less than the half trillion in September 2024.
Again, zero bazooka effect.
And that was the worst for a September
for household loans in over a decade.
Banks aren't lending except to the safest borrowers.
And even then, they appear to be reluctant.
Not that there's a whole lot of appetite
for borrowing among those borrowers to begin with.
When you see the economic climate,
especially this summer and the dramatic turn that's taken,
you'll understand exactly what I mean.
In a world where markets swing on every headline,
focus matters.
That's why Eurodial University
offers its One Big Weekly theme,
a discipline thematic analysis that you can count on.
If you don't have time to go all the way to the depth
of Eurodial University's comprehensive deep dive analysis,
but you want to get the next best thing,
One Big Weekly theme is for you.
Each week, we pick the one high impact macro
and market theme, and we unpack it from first principles,
from fundamentals to real world implications,
so you can see the forest and the trees,
drawing from all over the vast
Eurodial University library in canon.
What you get with One Big Weekly theme
is a single focused theme each week,
unpacked with clarity from sources
you will not see anywhere else.
Data-driven analysis supported by charts and information
pulled from Eurodial University's
other subscriptions and offerings,
all in a simple, repeatable framework
you'll use week after week.
We distill the complexity into a practical
fundamentals first playbook that you can rely on.
This is not about chasing every hot idea.
It's about building a disciplined routine
that sharpens your judgment
during these periods of uncertainty.
So if you're ready to make your week count,
subscribe to One Big Weekly theme today.
Visit eurodialuniversity.substack.com
or click the link in the description to learn more.
You can sample the service or sign up
and get started straight away.
Eurodial University, a focused approach
to mastering money and macro,
one thoughtful week at a time.
But then look at the bank lending
from the perspective of total social financing,
or really what's loan flows.
For the month of September,
new RMB loans were just 846 billion.
Now September, that's a relatively important month
on the lending calendar, not like say July,
where we saw lending outright contract.
But that 846 billion is less than half the RMB loans
from September 2024,
and barely a third of new RMB loans in September 2023.
You've got to go all the way back to 2013
for fewer loan flows for a month of September.
Now this year didn't start out like this either.
There was a small yet noticeable uptick in loan activity
right out of the gate in January,
one which the mainstream was quick to attribute
to the bazooka, same as everywhere else.
Western central bankers at the same time
were taking credit for the artificial high
that they were seeing,
that was due to nothing more than the tariff distortions.
And the Western media did exactly the same thing
about the modest upturn in Chinese lending,
which is really nothing more than the tariff distortions.
It certainly wasn't the banking sector
responding to the bazooka, as we can see very clearly now.
Because it wasn't the bazooka,
and so not surprisingly,
the small uptick in lending didn't really last.
But even so, loan growth was running even with last year,
not that that was some achievement,
until around summertime.
New loan flows contracted in July,
and they just never really came back.
Yes, they turned positive,
but nowhere near even recent years.
Last year was already a huge step down,
and now 2025's second half
has stomped the brakes even more on credit creation
to the point that new R&B loans year to date
are now 10% behind the same months in 2024.
So it's not that there's just nothing here
from the Chinese bazooka,
it's that there is already problems in the banking sector
that seem to have accelerated to the downside
starting with July,
same as we see in the macroeconomy in China,
which I'll get to in just a minute.
So with no one even talking about last year's bazooka
for obvious reasons,
attention of course now turns
to the next big genius government intervention.
The CCP's fourth plenum began earlier today.
Now, as I said, this is a conclave of top party officials
that's dedicated to basically rubber stamping
the next five-year plan,
the one which will be implemented starting in 2026.
And at its core,
it's gonna be the same thing as the last five-year plan.
Xi Jinping realized a long time ago
the silent depression effectively negated
socialism with Chinese characteristics
that had been practiced since Deng Xiaoping.
In other words, Xi knows the world is in a depression
even if no one in the West does,
or no one in the West is willing to admit it.
And how do we know he knows?
Because he's trying to completely rewrite
the entire Chinese economy.
He understands that the model,
the gross economic model that turned China
into an economic miracle is no longer viable.
And so Xi realized that for China to emerge
from its own depression,
its own angle in the silent depression,
the country needs to be at the forefront
of technological change
to lead the next stage of the industrial revolution.
That means positioning China
at the top of everything from AI to quantum computing
and even space exploration.
China cannot rely on being the factory
to the world any longer since global demand fell off in 2008.
It never came back.
End of story.
Xi figured out by 2017,
it was either drastically reform
or end up like the Soviet Union.
And if you remember anything about the final years
of the evil empire,
there was a lot of political instability during that time.
That's because as I said earlier
and as I always say,
when the rate of change and economic growth
goes down enough,
the rate of change in politics goes way up.
I mean, just look around our part of the world.
You've got France, you've got Germany,
Japan, and a whole bunch of other places beside.
It's all the same things,
this time from a Chinese perspective,
not just in the long run,
but also the fact that something big
has changed this summer.
And so now we can add China to that same list
where politics is all over the front pages.
According to this article,
two top Chinese military leaders
have been expelled from the ruling communist party
and the military on corruption charges.
The country's defense ministry said last Friday,
the most senior officers to be purged
in an anti-graft drive that began,
not coincidentally in 2023,
when the banking sector and the economy
really took a stumble.
He Weidong, China's number two general
and Navy Admiral Miao Hsu,
the Chinese military's former top political officer,
are the latest senior officials
to be targeted in a campaign against corruption
in the People's Liberation Army,
at least that's what they're saying.
His removal is the first of a sitting general
on the Central Military Commission
since the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution.
He has not been seen in public since March,
which is kind of standard practice these days
for these purges,
but the investigation of the activities
had not previously been disclosed by Chinese authorities.
So you have to ask the question,
why are they disclosing it now
just before the fourth plenum?
So he, Miao, and seven other senior military officials
named in the announcement,
seriously violated party discipline
and are suspected of serious duty-related crimes
involving an extremely large amount of money,
at least according to the defense ministry spokesman.
Yeah, so some serious charges being made.
The real question is, as I said,
why, or maybe more so, why now?
The timing with the fourth plenum
seems to provide us with the answer.
Either Xi Jinping is running into opposition
to his economic plans,
the long-whispered criticisms
that maybe he's bet everything on a future
that is too far from guaranteed
to the neglect of China's current economy,
but then again,
Xi can point to any number of stimulus programs since 2009
that have basically failed to make any turnaround
at any point.
So he can ask them what good is doing more of the same
and expecting different results?
I mean, such insanity is just reserved,
usually reserved,
for Western central bankers and economists.
But while these purges may be a show of force by Xi
to continue to ram through his futuristic
sci-fi economic program for the next five years,
the targets of the purges might also suggest the opposite.
He in particular has long ties to Xi Jinping,
which has fueled speculation
that maybe factions and opposition factions of the CCP
are gaining the upper hand and taking even more control.
I mean, Xi personally had invested in
and propelled his career along.
And it was none other than the dear leader
who had pointed he to the Politburo
just a couple of years ago in 2022.
And we don't know the answers here.
We may never get them.
However, whether this was orchestrated by Xi
or against Xi,
it still fits with the rate of change in government
going way up in response to the rate of growth
in the economy being increasingly threatening.
And that includes the possibility
of China visiting the flat part of the beverage curve.
Now the country did report GDP at 4.8%.
And while that wasn't as bad as some people were expecting,
it is still the slowest this year.
And what was in the GDP report
only fuels even more problems moving forward.
Most concerning of all was that nominal GDP
was said to be just 3.7%,
which also means the GDP deflator was minus 1.1%,
the 10th straight quarter of declining overall prices.
And that's where the beverage curve comes into this.
The government had pledged to step up its efforts
to do something about these falling prices.
And they can call it oversupply or involution,
Nezhawan, they have a bunch of other names for it.
It's really nothing more than recession levels of demand.
For a long time,
China's government has intentionally been overproducing
as an unofficial jobs program,
keeping the factories running
to avoid experiencing the kind of dangerous hiring freeze
that everyone else has been dealing with.
If not worse,
potentially leading to widespread layoffs
in China of all places.
But the only way to rebalance prices economy wide
is to stop producing as much,
which necessarily means lower levels of production,
therefore less employment.
It's not like the stimulus programs work
and they can raise demand.
So the only option left is to get rid of supply.
And so you combine that with the housing bust,
this prospect for China to visit flat beverage
is one huge reason for the sudden major downturn
in China's economy.
And the banks know it,
thus the fall off in lending.
And then maybe the government officials know it too,
thus the political instability right here
at the start of the fourth plenum.
Even Bloomberg is taking a second closer look
at the GDP data,
as the article says.
But look closer at the data
and the picture is far less reassuring.
Chinese families are reluctant to buy more,
businesses are investing less.
And the only reason growth hasn't collapsed entirely
is that Chinese factories are flooding the world
with exports at record levels,
intensifying trade tensions from Washington to Brussels.
The extent of China's reliance on foreign consumers
is striking, it is enormous.
Net exports accounted for 6.2% of the economy
in the third quarter in nominal terms.
And that was down slightly from a record 6.4%
in the second quarter,
but still far higher than any other quarter
since at least 2014.
So you can see what we mean about export reliance
being the only thing in China's economy right now.
Retail sales grew at the slowest pace since November
while fixed asset investment
made its first year-to-date contraction since 2020.
And the chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management
said the decline was,
especially for fixed asset investment,
was rare and alarming.
And he added, of course,
that fresh fiscal support announced last week
could help mitigate the pressure on investment
in the current quarter.
These people just can't help themselves.
Yeah, after years of failed stimulus,
what China now needs is fresh stimulus.
Do these people even hear themselves?
It's all just reflective reaction at this point.
It's all just reciting the Keynesian textbook.
Oh, another bad batch of data from China?
More stimmy.
Look, another consumer spending contraction
and investment is crashing?
Well, Beijing just needs more stimulus.
Both retail sales and fixed asset investment
really illustrate this dramatic shift
in the macroeconomy in China
right alongside this big change in banking.
According to the National Bureau of Statistics in China,
nominal retail sales in September
were just 3% more than September 2024.
That's the slowest for them since last November.
But just look at the month-by-month figures,
the monthly data that the NBS calculates.
Retail sales fell 0.18% in September from August.
And while August sales were up a quarter percent,
they had been down by a lot more the prior two months.
And with May's government-driven surge
revised down to just half a percent,
retail sales over the past six months are really struggling,
especially more recently.
They have outright declined,
outright declined in three of the last four months.
Something big has changed this summer in China.
It's right there in retail sales,
it's right there in bank lending,
and it's right there in fixed asset investment,
where it's even worse actually.
FII has been dragged down the past several years
by real estate.
Obviously, we've been talking about this this entire time.
Real estate construction and development
have declined sharply during this entire,
but I mean, that's why there is a bust.
So too, a lot of infrastructure spending
that doesn't get made because there's no building going on.
But despite last year's bazooka,
nothing has changed as far as real estate investment either.
We know that from bank lending,
since banks need to finance everything to begin with,
and they sure aren't doing that.
But now with China tackling deflation,
that also means scaling back production.
And if you're cutting down on current production levels
to try to get prices under control,
you obviously don't need to build more productive capacity.
And so the reason why FII has fallen sharply
over the past couple months of summertime
isn't necessarily real estate
that's just still contracting at the same rate,
it's the lack of building and manufacturing
in the related stuff, in the related industries.
Fixed asset investment in manufacturing
was still increasing at a 10% rate earlier this year,
but according to the latest statistics,
that growth rate has tumbled to just 4%
and is looking even more like it's under threat.
Capital spending on infrastructure in September
was the worst since 2020.
With no capital spending or investment,
employment is going to suffer even more.
A flat beverage in China is a huge global risk,
one that is temporarily being covered up
by the export sector,
but not when you look further and further down the road,
which is what the markets have been doing,
what gold is telling you,
and the copper to gold ratio,
as it says, deflation, deflation, deflation.
So you wanna know why all those things are taking place,
why gold is soaring?
China is a huge reason.
It isn't strictly credit and macro risks
in the US and Western world.
The financial and economic dangers to the globe
are being greatly boosted by China's bazooka
in the respect it not only didn't work,
it shows that stimulus overall is not going to be able to.
China's in a position where its banks are broken.
Sad but true.
And once the banks are broken,
as we know only too well, that's it.
There's nothing central banks or central governments
can do from here that will make any difference.
So you can see where Xi Jinping is coming from.
If you have no other options in the short run,
why not throw all your chips on rolling the dice
for a sci-fi future in China?
But you can also see where there might be
some serious pushback.
With China's economy in desperate shape,
at the very least it imperils the ability of China
to achieve that future,
which is a true long shot anyway.
I mean, communists don't do economic growth.
They never have and they never will.
But that leaves China in a very, very tough spot
and especially the near term,
especially or if or really when
the export distortion gets paid back too.
And then the rate of change in the global economy
gets even worse, which means the rate of change
in Chinese politics goes up even more.
And we all get to see why from the Chinese perspective,
copper to gold is so incredibly deflationary ugly.
In order to really appreciate the copper to gold signal,
you got to understand what's happening in gold.
And I explained that last week
from the perspective of the silver squeeze.
That's in the video link below.
As always, thank you very much for joining me.
Huge thank you,
your university members and subscribers.
And until next time, take care.
