Operation Barbarossa: The attack / Hitler's Wehrmacht Attacks Russia

In the early morning hours of the historic 22nd of June, on a front width of 2,400 kilometers, the largest march that history has ever seen takes place. Operation Barbarossa had actually failed even before it was launched, because, with the possibilities open to Germany's political and military leaders in 1941, in the absence of a clear strategic objective, a war against the Soviet Union could never have been won. It was the great conflict between two major ideologies of the time, fascism and communism. They clashed head-on with all the manpower and material the two sides could mobilize. It was a war of conquest, a war of aggression in violation of international law, and a war of annihilation waged against the backdrop of national socialist racial ideology. People in the Soviet Union thought, the Nazi regime has begun a war of annihilation, so there is no question of me ever being ready to compromise, because that compromise will cost me my life. Right from the start, it was an operation in which criminal behavior played a central role. The unusual, indeed specific, characteristic of this operation is that law and morality were totally disregarded. There wasn't really a plan, apart from, we are going to attack the Soviet Union and take Moscow, and, ideally, by then we'll have won. That was so detached from reality. They left too hastily to change the side. Along the cold stretches of the road back, the retreating supermen left the marks of their bestiality. June 23, 1941. Headlines in the Soviet Union were dominated by the news that Germany had invaded. In Moscow, people patiently stood in line to buy the party newspaper. Although its citizens were surprised by the outbreak of war, there was no visible sign of panic. That statement by the Soviet foreign minister was the only comment from the government. Stalin himself remained silent. In December 1940, Soviet intelligence reported that a German invasion was to be expected. This information was passed on to Stalin. He was urged to strengthen his forces on the western border to repel any such assault. But the focus then shifted from a major counterattack to counterattacks on a more local level. This explains why so many Soviet units were pushed forward to the border. And when news was received that the Germans had amassed forces on the other side of the border, troops in a central role also advanced a little further to repel any attack. In doing so, the Soviets played into the Germans' hands, because with their breakthroughs and their encirclement maneuvers, they were able to surround vast numbers of enemy troops. This was something the Russians hadn't expected. They thought they would be able to fend off any German attacks. Stalin gave no credence to the warnings from his intelligence services. He just couldn't believe that Hitler would be so stupid as to wage a war on two fronts. Stalin was convinced that a dictator should only start wars he could win. To secure his hold on power, since 1937, Stalin had had around 1.5 million people arrested. They were either shot or disappeared into the labor camps of the Gulag. Virtually the entire leadership of the Red Army had also fallen victim to the Great Terror. Now, around 3 million soldiers only listen to orders from their Wocht, their Führer, Joseph Stalin. Basically, when you compare these two adversaries, a few statistics suffice to show what the Germans took on in the summer of 1941. Germany had a population of 90 million, while the Soviet Union had 190 million inhabitants. The Soviets were proud of the fact that their country covered around one-seventh of the Earth's surface. Germany had an area of half a million square kilometers. Those are quite some dimensions. The Russians weren't quite so professional when operating outside their borders, but when it was a case of defending the motherland, we can assume that they mobilized all existing resources. In and after 1941, that was also the case. The problem was, all that counted in the Red Army was loyalty to the party line and unconditional obedience. On the one hand, the Red Army had a relatively rigid command schema. You had your orders where you stood, and that's where you fought. What is more, many commanders had fallen victim to the Great Terror of the late 30s, and the next generation had little or no experience. When the Germans made their breaches, Soviet troops did not retreat, which would have been the logical response, because the command structure prevented Soviet officers from thinking independently. Naturally, they were also intimidated. So, without orders from the rear, they failed to retreat. This enabled the Germans to mount and close pincer movements, trapping vast numbers of Soviet troops. In the months prior to the German invasion, Stalin had insisted on his troops advancing beyond the heavily defended Stalin Line to establish positions on Russia's new western border. But by June 21st, these positions were only half finished. The German leadership had a low opinion of the Soviet military. Its officers were thought incapable of stopping the Wehrmacht. And in the first few months of the war, that really was the case. What was underestimated, however, was the toughness of the Russian soldier and the skill of the Soviet leadership at improvisation, in assembling new and effective units time and again. Stalin avoided the general public for nearly two weeks. His successors claimed later that the dictator was a broken man and had hidden away outside Moscow. But in reality, he travelled every day from his dacha to his study in the Kremlin to organise resistance and talks with high-ranking officers. Finally, on July 3rd, Stalin turned to his people. Soviet cinemas showed scenes designed to underline the heroic resistance of the Red Army. In reality, however, the Soviet air force in particular was vastly inferior. Very few of its fighters or bombers even managed to get off the ground to engage the invader. Consequently, German armour broke through Soviet defensive lines with ease. Red Army leaders were actually under double pressure. There was the military foe, the German aggressors and their allies, but then there was also Stalin. He had taken drastic measures in response to defeat in the early days of the war. Army commanders were sacked, arrested and shot. Consequently, the lives of Soviet military commanders were also at risk from within their own ranks. With a courage born of desperation, Red Army units fought the enemy and inflicted heavy losses. If needed, Soviet propaganda also lands a hand. Leaflets were dropped, calling on working class soldiers in particular to change sides. German soldiers, go through the front line with this pass. All those who come over to the Red Army will be treated well and guaranteed a safe return home at the end of the war. Come to us, save your lives. Very few took up the offer and so Army Group North continued its advance on Leningrad. On all sides, the German columns advance against Leningrad. The steel ring around the city is getting tighter and tighter. Certain cities were also of symbolic importance to the Nazi regime. They were the cities of Bolshevism and they had to disappear. Wehrmacht generals saw them as more of a military issue. But when we look at memoranda from Heydrich and others from early 1941 and statements by Hitler himself, it is clear what was intended. The complete elimination of Bolshevism. Time and again the attempt was made to achieve this with Leningrad. That proved unsuccessful. But in the final analysis, the total number of deaths can be attributed to this rigor and the resolute intention to capture the city and totally destroy it. In mid-August, the Red Army succeeded in repelling the assault on Leningrad. On September 8, 1941, a second Wehrmacht attack was launched with massive air support. Leningrad, with its 3 million inhabitants, was almost completely cut off from the outside world. First of all, there was this ring of steel which, apart from a small gap, virtually encircled the city. That was the classic military situation. But there was also another strategy designed to destroy the civilian population. The Germans shelled grain and flour warehouses. They bombarded anything that could in any way be used to feed the city. They attacked anything that might support life. And they spurred one another on by referring time and again to the city's Bolshevist past and using this as an excuse for its total destruction. For weeks, Hitler and his military leaders assumed that the fall of Leningrad would be merely a matter of time. But in the beleaguered city, all possible forces were mobilized to defend it. What Soviet propaganda didn't show were the queues outside banks and stores. People wanted to secure their savings and the food supply in case the German invaders were not repulsed. With the approval of his generals, in early October, Hitler changed his plans and ordered Army Group North to head straight for Moscow. Not having to take Leningrad saved troops, of course. Capturing any town involved casualties, and Leningrad was prepared for defense. Its population knew that they would have to fight. Then came the advance on Moscow. Not having to take Leningrad released troops for that operation. And besides, since there had never been any intention to keep large sections of the Soviet population alive, the military probably thought that by leaving the surrounded city to its own devices, people would simply starve to death anyway. Hitler thought economically and ideologically. So, after Leningrad, he wanted to head for the south of Russia with its industrial regions. But his military leaders thought along classic military-political lines. They wanted to make a beeline for Moscow, and Smolensk would be a great victory along the way, so to speak. After the capture of Smolensk, everything was concentrated in the center, which resulted in a major dispute amongst Germany's military leaders. Do we push on centrally to Moscow, in the middle of the country, a city which plays a totally predominant role, or do we focus on the flanks? In bitter street fights, our troops entered the city on 16 July. For two weeks, Soviet and British lies and propaganda claimed that Smolensk was still in Bolshevist hands. After the fall of Smolensk in the late summer of 1941, there was already a rigid front in the central region. Troops were often reminded of conditions in the First World War, with trenches and devastating artillery barrages. Any real activity took place on the flanks. But in autumn 1941, the generals realized that this change of focus was not effective. So everything was again concentrated on the center. And in October, what was expected to be the final assault on Moscow began. But if we reduced everything to separate operations, it was clear from the starting position that the war could not be won. For two months, Operation Barbarossa was characterized by German euphoria as one battle after another was won. The Red Army suffered horrendous losses, but hundreds of thousands of German troops were also killed. This amateur footage, which Gerd Bruegelmann took after a battle, is an uncensored documentation of the horrors. After the biggest encirclement battle in military history, on September 26, 1941, the capital of the Ukraine also fell into German hands. Nearly 700,000 Red Army troops were trapped in Kiev. The German Luftwaffe had systematically reduced the city to rubble. Kiev had been fiercely defended and the Germans had suffered heavy losses in capturing it. This showed how costly fighting for towns was, especially big cities. Amongst other things, it led to the decision just to lay siege to Leningrad and not to try to take it militarily, to shell and bomb it, but not capture it in a direct ground assault. While Wehrmacht officers were enjoying the sight of Kiev in flames, SS Death Squad 6, together with the 6th Army, was planning to eliminate those sections of the populace who didn't sympathize with the invaders. The operation was disguised as a reprisal for partisan attacks. According to Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, the Wehrmacht welcomes measures and calls for a radical approach. Babi Yar is a ravine on the edge of Kiev, where Jews from the city and surrounding area were taken and murdered with the active participation of Wehrmacht troops. Tens of thousands of Jews were killed and the German army played an active role, not only in the massacre itself, but also in covering it up. Babi Yar is a good example of a massacre taking place with the tolerance of the Wehrmacht. To a certain extent, the SS Death Squads which carried out the killings benefited from the Wehrmacht's infrastructure. Vehicles were made available, Wehrmacht units sealed off the Babi Yar ravine and in the end bulldozed the site. Wehrmacht sappers collapsed the sides of the ravine and in doing so possibly killed people who might still have been alive. So, while the massacre itself was perpetrated by the SS Death Squads, the Wehrmacht was either present or provided assistance. After the war in Kiev in 1946, 15 Germans were charged with war crimes. It was a show trial. The outcome had already been decided. Nevertheless, thanks to statements by those involved, more and more details came to light. Hans Eisenmann from the SS Viking Division had this to say about the events of the 29th and 30th of September 1941. There were 320 people missing from the police battalion who carried out the executions by gunfire. Most of the executed were drunk. The people asked us to spare their lives. How many were executed in all? Up to 25,000. In 1941, Wilhelm Hellerford headed a section of the intelligence service. There the executions were carried out at these graves. How many people did you personally shoot in these two days? Approximately up to 120 people. Together with ten other accused, including two generals, Eisenmann and Hellerford were sentenced to death and hanged in Kiev at the end of January 1946. In the southern Ukraine, the Italian forces are attacking a village that was fiercely defended by the Soviets. The Bolsheviks are coming out of their resistance nests. The prisoners are being interrogated. The international staffs thought the Soviet Union might lose the war. Such was the speed of the Wehrmacht's advance that even military professionals abroad reckoned the Red Army could never hold out. This was a time when the whole of Europe suddenly thought, OK, so the Germans are going to succeed again. Thanks to the Lease Land Act, as it was known, the neutral United States made economic and military aid available to those countries fighting against the Axis powers. Germany, Italy and Japan. In September 1941, a delegation travelled from Washington to Moscow to provide Stalin with generous help in the form of arms, raw materials and food. When the agreement was signed, a Soviet People's Commissar is said to have leaped up from his chair and exclaimed, now we'll win the war. The supplies were urgently needed because on October 20th, 1941, the 6th Army reached Kharkov in the eastern Ukraine and captured the city within five days. The path to the Donbas coal mining region lay open. But victory over the Red Army was still a long way off. The brutality shown by the Germans on their push for Moscow, but also in other regions in both the north and south of the country, was in every respect the basis for the resistance shown by the Soviet people. Despite all their reservations about the Bolshevist system, or indeed their opposition to it, they moved closer together. This was the old reflex which was already manifest in the war against Napoleon. Whenever an invader had to be driven out of Russia, people stood shoulder to shoulder. Moscow was preparing for a siege. Some 300,000 volunteers worked on building fortifications around the capital. Tank traps and barricades were also put in place in the city centre. The Kremlin made provisions for the government to be taken to safety. The mummified body of Lenin, the country's gold reserves, and the Tsarist treasure had already been taken to Siberia in strict secrecy. The rainy season had come early, and Gerd Bruegelmann's unit often had great difficulty organising supplies. An insurmountable problem in every section of the front. The need for logistical support had been fully underestimated. When the campaign began it was thought, and here the word hubris comes to mind, that resistance would collapse in the first week and the Urals could be reached within 25 days. In my opinion, no one ever considered what logical dimensions this would involve. There was no plan B. What steps would be taken if the original plan didn't work? Within a few days, the unpaved roads and the vast expanses of Russia were just mud tracks. In many places, the supply routes for convoys were impassable. German military leaders had always more or less looked down on logistics. In German military thinking, operational warfare had traditionally played the decisive role. How do I win battles with the troops available to me? How supplies would arrive, what equipment the men had, played a role at best in assessing the situation. And in the war against the Soviet Union it was no different. To some extent it was a case of living from hand to mouth. The troops could at least live off the land. That was, after all, a war of annihilation, and the technology would arrive somehow or other. The Wehrmacht was in no way prepared for such a long war. Only fully tracked vehicles still had a certain mobility. Heavy equipment could only be transported by rail. There were several areas where the Germans made mistakes right from the start. Like the railways, which were to play an increasingly important role in the war. Russian broad-gauge track first had to be reduced to German normal-gauge track. The second mistake was to rely far too much on trucks, which are not cross-country vehicles, and soon break down. Sappers had been working on converting Russian rail track right from the start, but progress was far too slow. Rapid sweeping operations, the actual strength of the German war machine, were no longer possible. During the war, the Wehrmacht's spearheads became blunt very quickly. Not only in the winter of 1941-1942, but actually in the summer and autumn of 1941. The problem was not only the shortage of spare parts for the Germans' vehicles, but also the fact that by now the Wehrmacht also had a large range of captured vehicles at its disposal. So, various people were sent back to Germany to organize certain spare parts. Naturally, this too proved to be unparalleled dilettantism. Another problem was not just the cold or the mud, but also the dust, which exposed all the Wehrmacht's material to incredible wear and tear. We were always on time, Gerd Brüggelmann proudly pointed out when showing his films after the war. He returned to Paderborn in November 1941. The Lieutenant's unit had been completely wiped out in the major attack on Moscow. The Soviet capital was prepared for a siege. The German advance was to be stopped by six armies. The Soviet Union also had virtually inexhaustible manpower potential, which enabled it to form units time and again. And these units were supplied with material and vast quantities of ammunition. That was all something the Wehrmacht no longer had at its disposal. In the first encirclement battles everything had gone well, the motivation was also there. But, leading up to Moscow, this weapon consisting of fast-moving units breaking through in support of flanking operations had become blunt. And basically, after Moscow, it was not in a position to do anything other than defend. Moscow had been conquered once before by enemy troops from Western Europe. In 1812 Napoleon had led his troops through Russia, but the French campaign had ended in bitter defeat. Anyone studying Russian history and going back as far as 1812 will notice that, including the war from 1914 to 1917, the Russians were never willing to give up. There was this inbred feeling that the motherland had to be defended at all costs. Patriotism has a long tradition that is part of their lives, and in 1941 the situation was no different. Declaring a state of siege was intended to make it easier for our troops at the front to defend Moscow. Citizens stay calm and show the soldiers and defenders of the capital that you are worthy. Such exhortations were designed to stop citizens panicking in fear of a hunger blockade. German commanders still believe that, basically, the Soviet Union was defeated and that it would only take one more decisive battle of annihilation. Its expanses and climate have always been Russia's traditional allies. It was the sheer size of the country that was Napoleon's downfall. At first the Wehrmacht quite naturally thought, we've got motorised vehicles, we've got aircraft, we've got all we need for modern warfare. But if we take a very close look at the Wehrmacht, we see that it advanced in exactly the same way as Napoleon's army, on foot or with draft horses. And accordingly the same thing happened. The army, which was always the front line, was like a big funnel. This funnel got wider and wider, and basically the army was gradually swallowed up by this vast country. By the time the Wehrmacht reached Moscow, its victories had taken a heavy toll. Its units were not equipped, nor were its plans designed, for more than six months of war, and especially against a Red Army, which, despite its losses, offered stubborn defence. The losses the Wehrmacht had suffered in men and material were so high that by December nothing more was possible. The penetrating power was lacking. Not that most of the tanks had been destroyed by the Red Army, armour was available, but because of wear and tear and a shortage of spare parts, it couldn't be serviced or repaired. So it was no longer operational. The armaments industry in Nazi Germany couldn't meet the output required by the Wehrmacht. Propaganda footage like this from the Krupp works in Essen was designed to suggest that the country's manufacturing processes made mass production possible. But that stage was still a long way off. First, it must be said that the German economy was not really turned into a war economy until 1941, which explains why Wehrmacht units had supply problems relatively quickly. And these problems increased the longer the war lasted. What is more, a war is also a competition between the latest armament technologies. The longer a war lasts, the more new weapons are introduced. You react to what your enemy is doing, and vice versa. The introduction of the Russian T-34 tank was decisive, but not necessarily because of its quality. That was quite impressive, but other tanks were better. What made the difference was the speed with which the T-34 could be built and supplied to the front. In the second half of 1941, the Soviet armaments industry supplied nearly 5,000 tanks of different kinds, and in 1942 the figure was five times as many. It must have been clear to experts that the war could no longer be won, definitely not in the way that had been planned. At this crucial time, there must have been one or two military figures who said, we need to pull back, or do this or that differently. But Hitler prevailed and said, we will defend every metre as well as we can, or for as long as we can. In the end, however, the Wehrmacht had to fall back a little. It had no other choice, because if it hadn't, there was a risk of the Soviets breaching the German lines. On December 5, 1941, the Red Army launched its counteroffensive. The Wehrmacht was forced on to the defensive. Three days later, a German soldier wrote in his diary, are we going to have to do a bunk? If so, may God help us. And Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder noted, to effect redeployment, manpower will have to be provided with all possible means. On the one hand, the vast expanses and the weather made that impossible. And on the other, the enemy had of course learnt at this point in time, with Moscow almost within reach, the Wehrmacht was totally exhausted. Some of its units had been totally depleted. The Wehrmacht had suffered around 800,000 casualties, dead, missing and wounded. That was a quarter of its entire force. Because of the geographical situation, lines were overstretched. So the logistical planning proved worthless. And there was no winter clothing available, as protection from the bitter cold. Looking back at 1941, it must be said that winter came exceptionally early, with temperatures as much as 40 below. In Berlin, the bad news from Russia came at an inauspicious time. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan was now at war with the United States. Only a few days later, Hitler positioned himself alongside his Japanese ally. As for the situation on the Eastern Front, the Führer was certain that ultimately an unbending will would prevail. When things started to go wrong, the generals spoke up more. Perhaps we need to change this or that after all, or pull back a little, they said. Hitler's response was, there will be no retreat. During the further course of the war, this resistance intensified. But there was also what I would call a kind of subconscious agreement with regard to action. So, in the final analysis, it is hard to say who had the upper hand, in what way and when. In case of doubt, however, it was always down to what Hitler had said. On December the 13th, 1941, Soviet High Command announced that the fascist offensive against Moscow has now collapsed. Enemy attacking positions and defensive lines have been breached along the entire front. I'm convinced that even if Moscow had fallen, the Soviets would have fought on. They would still have had sufficient resources, material resources, through the industrial capacity, which had in many cases been re-established behind the Urals, but also resources in terms of manpower. In 1941, 97 new divisions were formed in the Far East alone, in other words, east of the Urals. So, Soviet fighting spirit and also the capacity to suffer would have remained unbroken. Soviet propaganda showed pictures of towns and villages that had been liberated by the Red Army. The Wehrmacht had taken Kalinin, north of Moscow, on October 14th, 1941. On December 16th, it was finally re-taken by Soviet troops. Scattered German soldiers who had been cut off came out of their positions to be taken prisoner. The offensive gains momentum all along the line. This town was held by the Nazis for 45 days. A handful of survivors come out of hiding. This is the meaning of the word deliverance. And this. I get a bite of food from the Nazis. Take it, please. And this. Let me press your hand. And yours. And yours. And this. I have a grandson like you somewhere at the front. These are not dolls, but children. The vandals stripped them first. No accident. Slaughter of the innocent by official order. No isolated instance. Policy. Not hundreds of bodies like these, not thousands, but tens of thousands. No words, no statistics can sum up the brutality of a generation reared by Nazis. Mass torture, mass murder by order of the high command. The joy at being liberated went hand in hand with infinite pain and sadness. And the suffering of the civilian population would go on, because the Germans had been ordered to follow a scorched earth policy as they retreated. Through their love of their motherland, combined with their capacity for suffering, they would have fought on in the great patriotic war until they had achieved victory. Of that I am absolutely sure. And the Wehrmacht would have had nothing to set against that, even in the long run. Compare that situation with Napoleon's in 1812. Moscow had been evacuated, so he set fire to it. Yet the Russians still fought on. The early onset of winter had made the situation in besieged Leningrad even worse. With a cold came hunger. The young, the weak and the old received a daily ration of three thin slices of bread, and a ridiculously small quantity of meat and fat. At first, the will of the people to stick together was still perceptible. They helped one another as best they could. But in December 1941, the people of Leningrad fell into the funnel, as historian Sergei Yarov put it. Now corpses and coffins were part of everyday life. The siege of Leningrad was an appalling course of action taken by the Wehrmacht. The city was certainly of military value, but laying siege to it was a crime. A horrific crime. When we consider that the Wehrmacht was not facing armed men, but as a rule the old, the young, women, the sick and the disabled, who were left to their own devices and forced to do terrible things, like resort to cannibalism, we are talking about a terrible crime. By the end of 1941, the official number of deaths in Leningrad totalled 54,000. The dead were buried in mass graves. People only left their homes to go to work or to organise some food. That would have been easier had not Stalin himself prevented additional supplies being provided before the blockade. In the winter of 1941-42, Father Frost proved to be particularly unforgiving. At temperatures of 38 below, homes could no longer be heated. People stopped undressing and slept with everything they had. At night, their hair froze to their blankets. But for most of the Germans laying siege to Leningrad, those dying in the city were only subhuman Slavs. There are various scenarios that can't be implemented, but they are still in your head. And in this respect, Leningrad is different from Moscow, which the Germans couldn't quite reach. Yet Leningrad was where the Nazis wanted to see their policy realised. And it is thanks to the resistance of its citizens that this never happened. But the million or so lives that this resistance cost, we'll never know the exact number, shows how brutal this policy was, and in a certain context, how successful. It also shows how, irrespective of the terrors of the Bolshevist regime under which they lived, people were determined to drive out the invader. The people of Leningrad were being buried alive. While outside the city, the Germans were calmly waiting for the catastrophe they had purposely created. In 1942, deaths in Leningrad in January, February and March alone totalled around 300,000. It was not until the spring of 1942 that the first relief supplies reached the city. The blockade only ended in January 1944. By then, the people of Leningrad had suffered and died over a period of 872 days.