This narration explores the "rule of the section chiefs," a core dynamic in political governance where policies succeed only if they align with the interests of mid-level bureaucrats. Tracing roots from imperial China's clerk-magistrate system, it highlights how short-term officials rely on lifelong clerks for real power. In modern times, section chiefs form alliances, amplifying beneficial policies like COVID controls and environmental crackdowns while sabotaging others, such as debt curbs. Examples include health codes yielding profits and the backlash against pre-made dishes, illustrating how grassroots bureaucrats wield ultimate influence over policy execution.
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Hi, I'm Dong Seong. Welcome to Digging
into China, where we explore China in
depths to review unique perspectives.
Today, I will discuss a defining feature
of the Chinese Communist Party's
political governance, the rule of the
section chiefs.
Grasping this concept unlocks the
fundamental logic of Chinese politics.
To put it simply, for any policy to be
effectively implemented in China, it
must serve the interests of the vast
network of section chiefs. Policies that
benefit them are executed with
unwavering commitment, often amplified
at each level of administration.
Conversely, those that harm their
interests are quietly ignored, left to
gather dust. This dynamic is what we
call the rule of the section chiefs.
This distinctly Chinese political
mechanism has deep historical roots and
remains a hallmark of the current
regime. From the establishment of the
unified Han dynasty by Liu Bong through
the end of theQing dynasty, China's
grassroots governance relied on a model
known as the rule of the clerks. In
Imperial China, the lowest level of a
state funded officials was the county
magistrate. Below them, clerks received
no central funding and their numbers
depended on the magistrate's ability to
generate local revenue. A solitary
magistrate could not possibly govern
alone. Collecting taxes, adjudicating
disputes, maintaining order, or
apprehending criminals required
assistance. Thus, magistrates
established an intricate system of
clerks to handle these tasks. These
clerks held no official rank within the
imperial bureaucracy and were by design
temporary workers with no state salary.
Their income came from an array of local
search charges and miscellaneous taxes,
including levies on land, homes, shops,
boats, salt, rice, military supplies,
checkpoints, dikes, timber, reads, and
more. According to Professor Chung
Fong's research in relief or crisis, a
study of miscellaneous taxes in the
lateqing, theQing dynasty imposed 733
types of miscellaneous taxes and 1,545
search charges totaling 2,278
distinct levies. These myriad of fees
sustain a vast clerk network forming the
backbone of grassroots governance. Yet a
deeper political truth must be
understood. The current magistrate was
in fact a true temporary worker serving
terms of just 3 to 5 years before being
reassigned. Since the Song dynasty, the
imperial court enforced a strict
rotation policy to prevent officials
from establishing local power bases that
could challenge central authority. The
current communist regime has fully
adopted this rotation system, leaving
local officials with little connection
to the area state government. Unable to
initiate a long-term projects like
irrigation systems, which could take 5
to 10 years to complete, magistrates
focused on maintaining stability and
navigating their brief teners. In
contrast, the clerks, despite their
temporary status, held the lifelong
positions in local government offices.
This gave rise to the saying, "Iron
clerks flowing magistrates. Clerks
withheld the true grassroots authority,
collaborating with local elites to
undertake projects like irrigation or
community improvements. By the lateqin
dynasty, counties employed anywhere from
500 to over 1,000 clerks. handling
everything from tax collection and the
public orders to infrastructure repairs.
They control the essential political
resources and possessed the genuine
local influence. Without their
cooperation, a newly appointed
magistrate was merely a figurehead. By
the lateQing dynasty, this system had
evolved into a new grassroots political
order. Magistrates secluded themselves
in their offices, serving as ceremonial
figures who collected the bribes during
holidays while awaiting promotion.
Meanwhile, clerks managed the daily
operations holding real power. Over
time, the central government's formal
tax revenue was overshadowed by local
search charges, amounting to less than a
third of the local collections. As the
chain weakened, formal taxes became
harder to collect and the tax uras grew
common. However, local taxes tied to
clerk's livelihood were non-negotiable
to the public. The distant imperial
court or aloof magistrate pald in
comparison to the clerks they saw daily.
Clerks who delivered the results. Thus,
while imperial taxes could be evaded,
the local taxes took priority, giving
rise to the proverb, the county
magistrate is no match for the one
standing before you.
Today, the current regime, learning from
the chain's collapse, has incorporated
all grassroots governmental workers into
the state payroll as public servants.
Yet, the core issue isn't whether these
workers are state funded. They would
find ways to secure income regardless.
The real question is who is closest to
the people's daily lives. Civil servants
with lifelong tenure working directly
with the public hold the true reigns of
grassroots power. As of late 2023, the
regime's public sermons categorized in
statistical yearbooks under public
management, social security, and social
organizations numbered 19.86
million. This excludes employees of
state-owned enterprises or public
institutions like schools and hospitals.
Including those, the total approaches 80
million. Among them, top tier provincial
and administerial offi off officials
number just over 3,000. Senior bureau
level officials around 50,000 and the
mid-level county officials about
800,000.
The largest group, however, is the
section level caterers, including deputy
section chiefs totaling roughly 5
million. These section chiefs are the
most accessible bureaucrats encountered
regularly by ordinary citizens. Even
cross a population of 1.4 billion. These
5 million section chiefs from a form a
powerful force. Most crucially they
serve lifelong terms in their posts
often remaining in the same unit for
decades. Only 16 out of every 100
section chiefs are likely to be promoted
to division chief. Once promoted, they
lose lifelong tenure due to strict
rotation policies. Division chiefs are
reassigned every two terms and the
bureau level officials every term. In
essence, officials above the section
level are the true temporary workers
while section chiefs hold entrenched
positions. Over time, this has created a
large cohort of section chiefs aged 40
to 50 with extensive experience and a
deep networks of colleagues in related
fields. These relationships naturally
form stable alliances of shared
interests. Central government decisions
pass through ministers, bureau chiefs,
and division chiefs before reaching
section chiefs who interpret and
implement them, shaping their impact on
daily life. The critical point is that
section chief's alliances interpret the
central directives through the lens of
their own interests. Policies that
benefit them are enforced with added
vigor while those that threaten their
interests are quietly sidelined. This is
the heart of the rule of the section
chiefs. The three years of co policies
offer a clear example. Section chiefs
quickly recognized that using COVID
controls to encroach on public rights
was an unprecedented opportunity for
profit. They devised the countless rules
that led to immense financial gains. For
instance, in February 2020, section
chiefs in HRO introduced the health code
system. Red codes mandated centralized
quarantine. Yellow codes required home
isolation. Both involved the massive
logistic mobilizing funds in the
hundreds of billions. Section chiefs
profited handsomely. During those years,
the most lucrative businesses were
quarantine hotel and food delivery for
the isolated. With the profit margins so
high they defied imagination.
Whenever quarantine hotels had
vacancies, section chiefs could generate
new red codes unchecked by any
oversight.
Similarly, policies like the 2015
environmental crackdowns and the
property dtoing campaign perfectly
aligned with section chief's interests.
The environmental policy gave them
authority to determine whether
businesses met standards, granting them
unchecked power to shut down companies
that didn't pay enough bribes. The
detocking policy provided a pretext to
favor real estate firms, creating
endless opportunities for rent seeking
during construction approvals. These
policies were enforced with absolute
rigor. Conversely, policies that harm
section chief's collective interests
never succeed. Since 2018, efforts to
reduce ineffective infrastructure
projects and curb local debt have been
loudly promoted with the central
government even ordering a halt to
disciplinary actions in 12 provinces.
But these measures were futile.
Infrastructure projects are the largest
income source for grassroots officials
with over 90% of section chiefs tied to
profits from procurement, bidding, and
settlements. Halting any project
triggers a fierce resistance and
stopping disciplinary actions across 12
provinces provoked outright rebellion
from section chiefs. By late 2024,
China's local fiscal system faced a
cascade of defaults. Section chiefs had
previously managed to keep things afloat
by shifting funds around. But when the
central government cut their financial
lifelines, the system collapsed. In
response, the government launched a 12
trillion UN debt resolution plan.
Essentially, the central bank printed 12
trillion yen to cover local debts
through collective resistance. section
chiefs forced this massive intervention
and the central government dared not
issue public criticism. That's the power
of the section chiefs.
This brings us to a recent controversy.
The uproar over pre-made dishes sparked
by she bay restaurant. The central
government has heavily promoted the
pre-made dishes but the section chiefs
at the grassroots level are directly
affected. Local cantens offer no special
menus and when section chiefs and their
families dine out, they encounter
Chinese style pre-made dishes at the
places like a she bay restaurants. To
clarify, Chinese pre-made dishes differ
from those in Europe, America, Japan, or
Korea, where they are sold in
convenience stores or budget eeries with
a shelf life of one to three days, no
preservatives, and a clear labeling with
unsold stock discarded.
In contrast, Chinese pre-made dishes are
laden with preservatives, flavor
enhancers, water retaining agents,
leavenning agents, aroma enhancers,
coloring agents, tenderizers,
thickenizers, coagulants, and the more.
A pound of meat can be coated with three
pounds of chemicals, unregulated and
undisclosed, even in high-end
restaurants. Section chiefs, especially
those dining at a she bay restaurant
whose primary customers are civil
servant families are outraged. This
explains why the sheet controversy has
persisted, growing louder without
government suppression as critical
voices are allowed to spread.
Sheay restaurant is preparing for a 2026
IPO targeting a valuation exceeding 100
billion yen backed by powerful elites
who could typically quash negative
publicity. But this time they've met the
section chief's anger and can only watch
as the situation spirals. Sheay
restaurant's reputation is now
irreparably damaged. The section chief's
frustration with the pre-made dishes has
erupted through the sheet scandal.
Beyond the sheibay companies like
Shanghai Lu Lu, a school catering
supplier assumed elite backing would
protect them as they served the expired
pre-made dishes to school children. Many
of those children's parents are section
chiefs whose anger is uncontainable.
Shipe restaurant and Shanghai Luji are
likely finished as no elite can
withstand the collective fury of section
chiefs. As a result, China's pre-made
dish industry will face demands for
transparency built on secrecy and
deception. It will likely collapse once
exposed. This is the nature of Chinese
political dynamics. Understanding the
rule of the section chief is the key to
understanding China itself.
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