In this video, we explore the People’s Bank of China’s recent actions, including resuming treasury bond trading, arranging 1 trillion yuan in loans for local governments, and opting not to follow U.S. Federal Reserve rate cuts to stabilize stock market liquidity. The PBOC has also strengthened the yuan to 7.1, possibly as a trade war tactic. These moves, alongside increasing gold reserves, signal a complex mix of targeted monetary easing and tightening amid an economic slowdown. However, loading the central bank’s balance sheet with low-quality assets raises concerns about financial risks and potential inflation. We analyze how these policies interconnect, their implications for investors, and whether they could accelerate economic challenges, including the strain on the PBOC’s asset quality and the broader financial system.
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Hi, I'm Dong Shong. Welcome to Digging
into China, where we explore China in
depths to review unique perspectives.
In today's program, we'll take a moment
to review the recent activities of the
People's Bank of China, the nation's
central bank. Lately, it seems the
central bank has been operating quietly
while the Ministry of Finance has been
in the spotlight, frequently holding
press conferences and announcing
favorable policies. However, make no
mistake, the central bank has been far
from idle. They've been diligently
working behind the scenes on several
significant initiatives. So, what has
the uh central bank been doing? First,
they've resumed the trading in treasury
bonds. Second, they've arranged for
commercial and policy banks to extend
the 1 trillion yen in loans to local
governments. Third, they've opted not to
follow the US Federal Reserve's interest
rate cuts, aiming to manage a stock
market liquidity and prevent a crisis
like the one in 2015. Beyond these,
there is a fourth action, strengthening
the UN's exchange rate. The central bank
has successfully raised the UN's value
to around 7.1.
Have you considered how these actions
might be interconnected?
In particular, how will the central bank
managed to 1 trillion yen in loans to
local governments? Could this lead to
unintended consequences? And what
insights might it offer for our
investment decisions?
In this video, we'll explore the policy
signals behind these moves.
Monetary policy typically falls into two
categories, expansionary or
contractionary. In the years following
the pandemic, most countries have
adopted contractionary policies. But
China has leaned toward expansion.
However, this expansion isn't absolute.
It's a blend of a targeted easing and a
tightening measures.
Consider the current performances of the
UN's exchange rate and the stock market.
It's difficult to describe this as fully
expansionary. The central bank is
leaning more toward the restraint. How
do they strengthen the yen by selling
dollars and buying y? Notably, the
central bank's balance sheet has been
contracting this year. Meanwhile, on the
fiscal side, China's economic slowdown
means funds are needed across the board,
requiring the central bank to ease
monetary policy to provide the
liquidity. Thus, the central bank's
current approach is one of selective
easing, balancing multiple objectives.
For instance, in early September during
a meeting with the Ministry of Finance,
the central bank signaled it might
resume Treasury bond trading. This tool
can serve a dual purpose. Buying bonds
signals easing while selling them
indicates tightening. The central bank
can also adjust the yield curve
structurally as we've seen in recent
years. They've purchased the short-term
bonds to lower their yields while
selling long-term bonds to raise theirs,
resulting in a steeper yield curve. For
the central bank, Treasury bond trading
isn't primarily about easing or
tightening. It's about regulating
interest rates. By influencing Treasury
bonds rates, they guide market interest
rates, a far more effective tool than
the current loan prime rate or LPR. The
central bank has long sought to emulate
the US Federal Reserve using open market
operations to adjust Treasury bond rates
as a benchmark for marketing borrowing
costs. The LPR by contrast is less
efficient quoted monthly through banks
to guide private borrowing costs which
can lead to mispricing or delays.
Treasury bond trading however occurs
daily with the market rates reflecting
realtime responses avoiding lag or
errors. To illustrate, the LPR is akin
to a a heavily administrative guideline
price reminiscent of fixed prices in a
planned planned economy. The authorities
set a figure, but the actual market
price often diverges. For example, if
the guideline price for rice is 1 per
kilogram, the market price might already
be 2 y. As this gap widens, people
naturally trust the market signals like
treasury bond rates or interbank lending
rates over the LPR. Consequently, the
LPR's relevance is waning and the
central bank is increasingly focused on
directly influencing market rates.
China's current challenge isn't a
shortage of funds, but insufficient
demand for credit. The central bank
cannot address systemic issues such as
the persistent bias against the private
enterprises in the financial system
while stateowned enterprises in the
local governments enjoy preferential
access to financing. These issues lie
beyond the monetary policies reach. In
this context, the central bank's role is
to reduce borrowing costs technically
and adjusting treasury bond rates
remains one of the few effective tools
to stabilize credit demand and prevent
further economic decline. Additionally,
the Ministry of Finance has directed the
commercial and policy banks to lend 1
trillion yen to local governments to
settle debt owed to private companies.
This effectively pressures the central
bank. These loans are essentially
lowquality assets, low interest, high
risk, long-term and often unsecured. For
banks, such lending is not only
unprofitable, but could lead to
significant losses. This raises the
spectre of systemic financial risks,
forcing the central bank to step in as a
backs stop. One approach is providing
targeted liquidity to ensure banks have
funds to lend while also assisting with
managing bad debts. How is this managed?
Through tools like reending, matching
loans one on one. For every yen a bank
lends to local governments, the central
bank provides an equivalent amount of
funds, allowing banks to lend without
using their own capital, effectively
transferring bad data risk to the
central bank. Should bad debts
accumulate, the central bank either
absorbs the losses or prints money to
offset them. However, such measures can
only be used sparingly. The central
bank's asset composition is transparent
and filling its balance sheet with
lowquality assets would severely degrade
its asset quality, triggering a cascade
of consequences. First, the central
bank's ability to inject liquidity could
be compromised. Issuing currency relies
on the quality of its assets as
collateral. If those assets are
predominantly low quality, the central
bank credibility weakens, undermining
confidence in the UN and driving down
its exchange rate. Second, monetary
policy could lose effectiveness. With a
balance sheet burdened by fiscal
liabilities, the central bank's policy
options are constrained. Raising
interest rates or shrinking the balance
sheet becomes risky as higher rates
would further devalue lowquality assets
harming the central bank first. This
creates a fiscally dominated central
bank entirely subordinate to fiscal
policy. Third, in desperation, the
central bank might print money to cover
deficits potentially leading to severe
inflation. Over the past two years, the
central bank's autonomy has steadily
eroded with its balance sheet
increasingly filled with the fiscal
liabilities.
Last September, a new policy allowed the
non-bank institutions to use stocks as
collateral to borrow directly from the
central bank, marking a shift from
holding only highquality assets like a
foreign exchange or treasury bonds to
including riskier ones like a stocks. I
believe the September 24th policy last
year was a pivotal moment, signaling
that the central bank began prioritizing
economic stability over its own asset
quality, subordinating monetary policy
to fiscal needs.
This year, the Ministry of Finance has
intensified this trend, pushing another
1 trillion yen in lowquality government
debt onto the central bank's balance
sheet. However, consider this. Chinua
University econ economic professor Lee
Taquay estimated that the local
governments owe private companies at
least 10 trillion yen. This 1 trillion
yen is merely the beginning. Another 9
trillion yen awaits and even that may
not suffice given the scale of local
government debt which runs into the
hundreds of trillions. The more you
address it, the larger the problem grows
and is effectively unpayable.
Given these signals, can anyone doubt
the risk of severe inflation in China's
future? The central bank has lost much
of its decision-making independence
increasingly exploited by fiscal demand.
While the Ministry of Finance burdens
the central bank's balance sheet with
lowquality assets, the central bank must
expand its highest quality foreign
exchange reserves to prop up the UN's
exchange rate. Doesn't this accelerate
the path to financial strain or the
central for the central bank? China is
often labeled a currency manipulator and
aid the ongoing trade war with the US.
US Treasury Secretary Bent and the
Chinese Vice Premier Hurung held the
trade talks in Madrid, Spain in
midepptember. Leading up to this, the
UN's exchange rate rose steadily to
around 7.1.
This appreciation aligns with the
objectives of the current Trump
administration, which seeks to reduce
the US trade deficit. For China,
however, a stronger UN is not
necessarily beneficial. Now without
exchange rate advantage, export
companies must rely on increased fiscal
subsidies to maintain orders or risk
supply chains relocating abroad. More
subsidies increase the fiscal deficit.
Historically, when exports faced the
challenges, China's government typically
chosen yan depreciation over fiscal
subsidies. This time they've opted for
appreciation relying on fiscal support
to sustain export orders. Does this
suggest external pressure or a trade war
compromise? Could China be using yan
appreciation to reduce the US trade
deficit in exchange for concessions such
as access to US semiconductors?
I believe only the tech industry's need
for chips could prompt Xiinping to
temporarily prioritize this over
exportdriven dollar earnings.
Regardless, the central bank's asset
quality will continue to deteriorate as
foreign exchange reserves must be
depleted to sustain the y's value until
depreciation is permitted. Recently,
Reuters reported that central bank
insiders indicated China would not
closely follow US rate cuts to mitigate
the stock market risks. With the central
bank's asset quality declining, doesn't
it seem unlikely they cut rates?
Lowering rates would reduce market
interest rates, devaluing the lowquality
assets in their portfolio. Moreover,
maintaining the UN's exchange rate
requires continuously expanding dollar
reserves. Is there a way to preserve the
central bank's asset quality? Indeed,
there is. Consider what the central bank
has been doing, purchasing gold monthly.
Gold prices have surged this year with
the major investment banks predicting a
rise to at least $3,800 by year end.
From this perspective, would the central
bank allow gold prices to plummet? They
hold over 2300 tons of gold reserves and
continue to buy more each month. A sharp
drop in gold prices would further impair
their asset quality, potentially
hastening severe inflation.
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