The Battle of the Philippine Sea was a turning point in the Pacific Theatre of the Second World War as the Imperial Japanese Navy was never able to recover from the losses inflicted upon them. The aerial battle was so one sided it became known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.
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In June 1944, American forces began a decisive phase of their advance across the Central Pacific
towards the Japanese homeland. Invasion of the Mariana Islands was considered critical
for success. There, as elsewhere in the vast Pacific Ocean, aircraft carriers would be the
the Marianas and the First Battle of the Philippine Sea. That was the most intense.
That was an active part of the war. Fortunately, we had the opportunity to be there at that time.
A lot of shoot-downs, a lot of changing of the tide of relative strengths between the enemy and
ourselves. The Marianas were a 425-mile-long chain of 15 islands stretching from Farallon
de Pairos in the north to Guam in the south. Just over 300 miles to the north lay Japanese
bases on Iwo Jima and 250 miles south in the Caroline Islands. Apart from Guam,
nearby Saipan and Tinian had operational airfields with emergency landing strips as well.
All three would be prime targets. Capture of the Marshall Islands 1,000 miles east of the
Marianas in February and March 1944 provided anchorages from which to mount the assault.
Including beach landing craft, 535 warships and auxiliary vessels would take part in the operation,
codenamed Forager, which involved transporting 127,571 troops,
was scheduled for the 15th of June. Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific,
would exercise overall command, but direct control of all Operation Forager forces devolved on
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, Commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet. Under Spruance, Vice Admiral Mark A.
Mitchell led the 1st Carrier Task Force 58, which provided air cover for the Joint Expeditionary
Force of Marine and Army units destined to carry out the invasion. Mitchell's Task Force 58
comprised four independent carrier task groups, known as Task Groups 58, 1, 2, 3 and 4,
protected by escorting cruisers and destroyers. In all, the 14 aircraft carriers would deploy 896
bombers and fighters. By the 8th of June, the Joint Expeditionary Force had concentrated in
the marshals with its own close escort of warships. The troops bound for Saipan left on the 9th of
June, those for Guam on the 12th. As the final plans were drawn up, critical aerial reconnaissance
was carried out by long-range aircraft based in American-occupied New Guinea, the Marshall,
Admiralty and Solomon Islands. On the 18th of April, as naval liberators photographed Saipan
and Guam, escorting B-24 bombers attacked military targets. From the 26th of April until the eve of
the operation, regular photographic reconnaissance flights were mounted from the marshals.
The B-24 bomber, the Liberator, is best known for its cooperation with the B-17 Flying Fortress
in the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. But in the Pacific,
stripped of all its armament and its bombing capability and given extra fuel, it became a
photoreconnaissance aircraft with a range of 2,000 miles, which was further than any other aircraft
in the Pacific at that time. It had a speed of 300 miles per hour and capable of a ceiling of
30,000 feet. It therefore was invaluable when it was operating from territory that had been
captured from the Japanese, like the Solomon Islands and the Marianas, who could cover a vast
distance and it was invaluable to Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet. History Hit is a streaming
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at checkout. For some time, the Japanese had anticipated an attack on their defensive
perimeter in the Western Pacific, which arched 2,000 miles northwest from New Guinea. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Soemu Toyoda, decided on a risky strategy
of offense. Operation AGO would lure the American fleet into a decisive battle with full strength,
where the Japanese could use their shore-based aircraft to full advantage. On the 3rd of May,
he designated the Palau Islands and Western Carolines, Yap and Wale, as the decisive battle
areas. Toyoda planned that a decoy force would entice the Americans into the trap, which would
be sprung by the 1st Mobile Fleet under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Osawa from Tauitaui in the Sulu
Archipelago. On receiving the executive order, Osawa would proceed immediately to the area east
of the Philippines without leaving a trace. Complete success is anticipated, Toyoda declared.
On the 16th of May, Osawa's fleet converged on Tauitaui at the southern tip of the Sulu
Archipelago. Five days later, Toyoda signaled, prepare for AGO. The basic fear of the Japanese
was the American aircraft carriers, and the basis of Operation AGO was to lure the Americans into a
where their aircraft carriers could be attacked and neutralized. That meant that to make the
maximum use of land-based aircraft, they had to be lured to the southwest of the Philippine Islands.
There was an additional problem, as far as the Japanese were concerned, was they were short of
fuel. So what they aimed to do was to lure the fleet into this area and to attack both the
aircraft carriers and also the task force landing force. Having got rid of the aircraft carriers,
it was then the possibility, indeed what they sought, was a fleet battle.
Land-based naval aircraft of the Japanese based air force would play a pivotal role in Operation
AGO. Even after a formidable force was detached to New Guinea in early June, 172 aircraft were
stationed on Saipan, Tinian and Guam, another 268 in easy reach of the islands. A further 500 were
capable of being quickly flown in from Japan and the occupied territories. AGO required the base
air force to destroy at least one-third of the enemy task force carrier units prior to the
decisive battle, as well as putting up regular reconnaissance flights before and during it.
Although he was aware of American activity in the Central Pacific,
Osawa still had to get the American carriers within range.
When General MacArthur's troops attacked Bayak Island off the New Guinea coast,
he spotted an opportunity. On the 9th of June, he suggested to Toyota that Japanese naval
reinforcements might draw the American fleet into the anticipated zone of decisive battle
and enable them to launch AGO. The following day, Vice Admiral Matoni Ogaki was detached from
Osawa with two battleships, a light cruiser and six destroyers towards Bayak. Within two days,
he was recalled to implement AGO. The build-up to Operation Forager had been gradual. In the last
week of May, American carriers attacked Marcus and Wake Islands to the north of the Marianas
and from the 3rd of June, land-based Army Air Force aircraft
bombed the Caroline and Palo Islands in the south. Then, on the 11th of June, Task Force 58 began to
bomb and strafe the Mariana Islands. At 1 p.m., 208 fighters and eight torpedo bombers attacked
Saipan, Tinian and Guam. We make our sweep on Guam, expecting to catch all the planes on the
ground and everybody having a brunch or at the swimming pool. And it ain't so. The airplanes
aren't on the ground. They're all up in the air. Fighters are way up above us. They came down on
our backs right as we got into our runs and started down. The anti-aircraft fire was exceptionally
heavy. We lost three pilots to what we believe were a five-inch size weapon. It blew them right
out of the sky. One survived. And we ran into this terrific ground fire. And then the Zeros
jumped us. Then we got in. Everything breaks down one-on-one. Essentially, you're a wingman if he
can stay with you. And I ended up with getting two of them and we chased a third. But that was
a good scrap. We made many strikes on Guam. The four carrier task groups continued to pound the
three islands during the 12th of June. The following day, as two of them sailed north
to attack Chichijima and Iwo Jima, from which Japanese reinforcements might be flown south,
the other two continued to engage Saipan and Tinian. Proceeded by heavy naval bombardments
on the 14th of June. At dawn on the 15th of June, covered by an air umbrella and the fire
from warships offshore, two marine divisions landed on the west coast of Saipan. American
activity prior to the landings had persuaded Ozawa to recall Ugaki's force. The mobile fleet left
Tauitaui on the 13th of June and two days later was fueling his ships at the Guimara Strait in
the Philippines, where Toyota signalled Ozawa to attack the enemy in the Marianas area and
annihilate the invasion force, activating AGO operation for the decisive battle. The following
day, at 4.50pm, Ozawa and Ugaki rendezvoused east of the Philippines. Ozawa now had nine carriers,
five fleet and four light, with five battleships, 13 cruisers and 28 destroyers. He had 430 carrier
aircraft and 43 seaplanes for reconnaissance and gunnery observation duties on his battleships and
cruisers. A considerable armada, but inferior to the Americans. Nor had it concentrated without
trace, as Toyota hoped. The submarine Seahorse reported Ugaki moving north. Another submarine,
Flying Fish, spotted Ozawa on the move. The standard American submarine was the T-class
submarine, which had a speed of nine knots underwater and on the surface 21 knots. That
meant therefore it's much more effective on the surface, stalking and picking off individual ships.
They had 21-inch torpedoes and a crew of 85. They were used not only for stalking ships but
also for observation and blockading purposes and this became very important when they were spotting
the movement of the first cruiser fleet at the Mariana Turkey chute. Because of the submarine
reports, Spruance now knew that two Japanese naval forces were at sea, Ozawa and Ugaki,
and therefore postponed the invasion of Guam. During the morning of the 16th of June under Vice
Admiral Willis A. Lee, Spruance created a separate force of seven battleships, four heavy cruisers
and 13 destroyers with air cover provided by task group 58-4 to form a screen in front of
the American main force. Radar-equipped seaplanes were flown from the marshals
to operate from roadsteads off the west of Saipan once that area had been secured on the 17th of
June. Spruance had no intention of being passive. Our air will first knock out enemy carriers,
then we'll attack enemy battleships and cruisers to slow down or disable them.
American warships would follow up these aerial attacks to force a fleet action
and, with the help of the carrier's aircraft, pursue any survivors. Without firm information
about the enemy, Spruance reasoned he could not afford to sail west during the night of the 17th
18th of June in case the Japanese slipped by to put the invasion at risk. At 3 45 a.m on the 18th
of June, a signal from the submarine Cavala revealed that the previous evening a large
Japanese force had been sighted 780 miles west of Saipan, steering east. Spruance calculated
that it could not be in a position to threaten him until the 19th of June. Ozawa had refueled
his force on the 17th of June and resumed his eastward course that evening when Cavala saw him.
He had organized his ships into three forces. A force comprised three fleet carriers,
Taiho, in which Ozawa flew his flag, Zuikaku and Shokaku, with 207 aircraft. B force,
under Rear Admiral T. Yoshima, had the two fleet carriers, Yunho and Hiyo, with the light carrier
Ryoho together containing 135 aircraft. These two groups, 15 miles apart, were escorted by
one battleship, four cruisers and 16 destroyers. The bait, Force C, 125 miles ahead under Vice
Admiral Kurita, consisted of three light carriers with 88 aircraft escorted by four battleships,
five cruisers and eight destroyers. The Japanese carriers tended to be smaller than the American.
Their fleet carriers were 20,000 tons and they carried about 60 aircraft. Their light carriers
were about 10,000 tons and they carried something like 40 to 45 aircraft, so they were considerably
smaller than the Americans. As dawn broke on the 18th of June, neither commander knew the precise
location of the other. Cavala's information was over six hours old. Ozawa had two slight
advantages. His carrier-based Ziki fighters and Jill torpedo bombers could attack the Americans
at extended range and fly on to refuel at Japanese-held Guam and Rota Islands. On his
battleships and cruisers, the reconnaissance seaplanes had a greater range than any of the
U.S. aircraft and could therefore give Ozawa early warning of his enemy's position. The Americans
gave codenames to all the Japanese aircraft. They referred to the Zik aircraft, which is in fact a
Zero. That's a Mitsubishi Naval Type 0 aircraft, Mark 1, and that was the type of aircraft that was
used at the time of Pearl Harbor. It had two 20mm cannon and two 7.7mm cannon. It had a speed
of around 350 miles per hour. The Jill was an Akajima torpedo bomber which carried a single
torpedo at a speed of 260 miles per hour. Air searches mounted from Mitchell's carriers at
dawn on the 18th of June proved fruitless. But in the afternoon, the Japanese made their longer range
tell. At 3.14 p.m., one search aircraft reported several carriers, two battleships, an unknown
number of other ships. Another at 4.00 p.m., unknown number of carriers, 10 plus other ships
further south. Task Force 58 had been located beyond the battleship shield. Rear Admiral
Obayashi, the carrier group commander in Force C, prepared to launch 67 aircraft against the
Americans at 4.37. Ozawa was more cautious, countermanded the order, and altered course
to keep outside the range of the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. The following morning, the 19th of June,
he intended to contact and destroy the enemy. Spruance, due to his fear of being caught too
far west of Saipan, had turned back as night fell on the 18th of June. Then Pacific Fleet
headquarters at Pearl Harbor reported that at 8.23 p.m., its direction finding stations had used
intercepted enemy wireless signals to locate Ozawa, 350 miles west-southwest of Task Force 58.
Mitcher sought permission to change course so that he could be in a position to attack with
his aircraft at dawn. Still concerned that a sizable Japanese force might sneak past him,
Spruance denied his request. Apart from not trusting the direction finder's information,
he was worried that a garbled message from the submarine Stingray might mean the enemy was closer
than thought. Meanwhile, a U.S. naval seaplane had picked up on its radar two large groups of
ships in the Philippine Sea, almost certainly Ozawa's A and B forces. Such are the fortunes of
war that, due to bad communications, Spruance did not receive this information until 9 a.m.
on the 19th of June. Other aerial sweeps sent out during the night and at dawn from Task Force 58
failed to pinpoint the Japanese. Ozawa was better served. At 4.45 a.m. on the 19th of June,
4C catapulted 16 seaplanes from its escort ships to search for the Americans. At 7.30,
one sighted Task Group 58 won. Sent off at 5.15 a.m., 13 torpedo bombers from 4C
reached the picket destroyers of Lee's battleship screen,
but lost seven of their number to marauding Hellcats without causing damage.
The Kate was a Nakajima naval torpedo bomber, which was the standard Japanese torpedo bomber
at this time in the Pacific. It carried one torpedo of 764 pound, but it could also be
used as a level bomber. The Jake was a seaplane. It was the standard naval torpedo bomber in the
Pacific. It could carry a one 250 kilogram bomb with equivalent rate in depth charges.
It had a range of 1,200 miles and a cruising speed of 203 miles per hour.
One of its great assets was that it had air-to-surface radar.
Ozawa now had enemy carriers in his sights, though he was unaware that the Japanese naval
code had been broken, which gave Mitchell time to organize a war welcome. Disaster,
though, had already begun to hamper the Japanese operation. Even as Ozawa's flagship Taiho was
launching her aircraft, a torpedo from the submarine Albacore struck. Although the carrier
continued to function, unknown to those on board, she had sustained a mortal blow. Since dawn on the
19th of June, Hellcats of Task Force 58 had been flying protective patrols over the fleet.
Two duty dive bombers from Guam were intercepted at 5.30 a.m. 20 minutes later,
six bomb-carrying Zikis were driven off. At 6.30 a.m., radar reported aerial activity over the
island 100 miles away. Hellcats arriving at 7.20 found Japanese aircraft taking off from Orochi
Field and summoned help. Shortly after 8 a.m., a large force of enemy aircraft was reported heading
towards Guam from the southwest, reinforcements from Truk and Yap Islands. Mitchell, reviewing the
situation, concluded that we were probably due for a working over by both land-based and carrier-based
planes. He ordered his three southern task groups each to send 12 Hellcats to take over the Guam
patrols, and together they accounted for 30 Zikis, or hams, and five bombs. Meanwhile, the first of
four major raids that day had been launched from the Japanese carriers. At 8.30 a.m., 16 Ziki fighters,
45 bomb-carrying Zikis, and eight Jill torpedo bombers were dispatched by Force C.
An hour and a half later, they were picked up by radar in Admiral Lee's battleship screen
at a range of 150 miles. Mitchell immediately recalled the Hellcats from Guam, leaving only a
small standing patrol there, and warned Task Force 58 to be ready for a maximum fighter effort.
At 10.19, he gave the executive order, and four minutes later the first American fighters took off
to counter what became known as Raid 1. The Grumman Hellcat fighter was the standard
naval fighter in the Pacific in 1944. It had 6.5 machine guns and a speed of 376 miles per hour,
a range of just over a thousand miles. It could be used as a fighter-bomber, in which case it could
carry a maximum of 2,000 pounds of bombs. One of the Admirals described it as truly a war-winning aircraft.
The enemy aircraft were now 72 miles away, orbiting at 20,000 feet prior to hitting the
American carriers, which gave the defenders time to stack between 17 and 23,000 feet
for a coordinated response. At 10.36, Mitchell signaled all his carriers to keep fighters
available to repel these attacks, landing planes as necessary. At that very moment, a formation of
24 Japanese bombers and 16 fighters came under attack from Essex's Hellcats, which dispersed
the formation and shot down six. We were going into Guam to try to catch everything there,
but we only got in about halfway, and we got a hey-roob, which means turn around and come back,
and we need help. And we started back, and we were almost looking down. I remember on the right side
about, oh, two o'clock, I guess, and you could see Japanese K8s and VAL dive, the typical carrier
makeup, heading in for the force. And so what we did, we caught them going in, and we went on down,
and again, I got caught up in the fighters before I got into the main attack group, but we had others
that were in and shooting down the dive bombers and the torpedo planes. And we had a good mix up
there. I think I got a couple down that time. The fighters, the minute they detect you, they break
right back into you and leave their support. It gets down there to one-on-one again, and it's a
dogfight. Some of the attacking aircraft managed to evade the forward Hellcats and continued towards
their targets, only to run into a second defensive line. Three or four got beyond the destroyer
pickets to attack the battleships, where at 10.49 a bomb struck South Dakota, causing minor damage.
None reached the carriers, and this raid was officially broken up at 10.57.
The Japanese lost 42 from the 69 which set out.
Raid 2, launched from Ozawa's Force A at 8.56, comprised 53 Judy dive bombers, 27 Jill torpedo
bombers, and 48 Ziki fighters. Shortly after takeoff, one pilot crash-dived a torpedo heading
for his own ship, and eight other aircraft turned back with engine trouble. Flying over Force C,
two more were shot down by trigger-happy friendly gunners, and eight others so badly damaged that
they went back. At 11.07, the remaining 109 were identified by radar at a range of 115 miles,
and intercepted 60 miles out by urgently scrambled Hellcats.
Attacking at 11.39, the American fighters accounted for about 70,
but the survivors kept going to be met by the concentrated anti-aircraft fire of Lee's Scream
and 42 more Hellcats. At noon, six Judys attacked Task Group 58-2, where an overhead burst caused
casualties on Wasp, and near-misses did some damage to Bunker Hill. Four of the dive bombers
were shot down, one escaped to Rota, another to Guam. Simultaneously, a small group of Jills
attacked Task Group 58-3. None survived, and no damage was done, bringing Raid 2 to an ignominious
conclusion. Of the 129 aircraft launched, the Japanese had lost 98. They were not, however,
finished. Raid 3, comprising 15 Ziki fighters, 25 Ziki fighter bombers, and seven Jill dive bombers,
took off from Force B between 10 and 10.15. Due to false information, they were initially sent too
far north, and 27 returned having seen nothing. The remainder did pick up amended instructions
that were detected 100 miles from the battleships at 12.55. 40 Hellcats intercepted them and accounted
for seven. A few did attack Task Group 58-4 on the flank of Admiral Lee's screen,
did no damage, but escaped. From the 47 launched on Raid 3, 40 therefore survived.
The Japanese Zero was a very lightweight, very agile aircraft with a good power loading,
absolutely zero pilot protection, no armor for the pilot or the oil tank or anything like that.
It was really a time bomb in a way, just waiting to be set off. I think I only had one encounter
where I was higher, we were higher than the Zeros when we got into combat. They were always
way above us, up in the center where we couldn't see them. We got jumped several times there in
that cruise, never saw them until the bullets started flying. And you didn't stay in dogfight
with Zero. It could turn tighter, it could outmaneuver you and all of that. That was a
cardinal error to try. You may make a turn or two, but then you had to get out of there,
he'd be right on your tail. You couldn't, if he was an experienced pilot. So most of the work
against it was a slash attack, maybe one quick turn or wing over and back into it again, but then
you either had another enemy or you cleared out some way because you just weren't going to do it.
Raid 4, the final attempt launched between 11 and 11.30am involved 30 Zikis, 9 Judy and 27
Val dive bombers, 10 Ziki fighter bombers and 6 Jill torpedo bombers from 3 Force B carriers
and 1 Force A carrier. Aircraft of this raid were sent too far south and found nothing.
Some made for Rotor were picked up by radar 45 miles from Task Group 58-2 and 5 were shot down.
Elsewhere, Hellcats attacked other raiders, claiming 9 successes. A group of 49 aircraft
from Raid 4 made for Guam, jettisoning their bombs en route. As they did so, at 14.49 they
were picked up on Task Force 58 radars and 12 Hellcats went off in pursuit.
On reaching Guam, they found the enemy machines circling a rotary field waiting to land.
At this point, 15 more Hellcats arrived and the Americans shot down 30 of the 49 enemy.
One feature of the action during the 19th of June was lack of interference from the
Japanese islands, particularly Guam, which were attacked at intervals by American formations.
In order to clear their decks for fighters to engage the incoming Japanese attacks,
Task Force 58 carriers had sent off their bombers to orbit. Many did not circle idly.
At 10.40, 24 from Hornet hit Guam. At 13.00, dive bombers from Lexington attacked 30 parked
aircraft there. Protected during the afternoon by fighters, other bombers carried out more raids.
And until 18.45, Hellcats kept up patrols over the island.
In talking to the Japanese subsequent to the war, the thing they feared most
were the Hellcats strafing the troops on the ground. You can imagine, you put yourself in a
slit trench or on your belly and palm trees out there and have a flight of four fighters coming
down and you've got 12 .50 calibers going. Absolutely devastating. The Guam operations
were not without cost. Six Hellcats and one bomber were lost, four of them to anti-aircraft fire.
During the four enemy raids, minor damage was suffered by the carriers Wasp and Bunker Hill,
the battleships Indiana and South Dakota, and 31 men killed.
By noon on the 19th of June though, the danger to the American fleet was over.
Commander Paul D. Buey described the carnage achieved by the Hellcats
as easy as shooting turkeys. And the legend of the Great Mariana's turkey shoot was born.
Ozawa's airstrikes had failed spectacularly. 243 out of the 373 aircraft launched by his three
naval forces failed to return. Another 50 to 60 shore-based machines or reconnaissance seaplanes
had also been destroyed. American losses were 29 aircraft, 27 airmen after those rescued were
counted. During the afternoon of the 19th of June, Ozawa suffered more grievous setbacks.
At 12.20 p.m. the carrier Shokaku was torpedoed by the U.S. submarine Kavala,
finally sinking after a massive magazine explosion shortly after 3 p.m.
At 3.32 the damage suffered in its own earlier torpedo attack
caused a similar explosion on Taiho, which sank at 5.15 p.m.
Ozawa had already transferred his flag first to the destroyer Wakatsuki,
then at 5.06 p.m. the cruiser Hagoro. He had survived, but two of his nine carriers had not.
By the time of the Mariana Turkey shoot in June 1944, the Japanese had already lost a number
of carriers, so to lose two fleet carriers on that day, the 19th of June, for them was a major blow.
Taiho and Shokaku were both fleet carriers carrying 60 plus aircraft. According to the
American naval historian Samuel Morrison, this was a decisive action after which the Japanese
could never compete on the same level with the Americans. Ozawa was misled by reports from
returning pilots of vast numbers of Hellcat losses and claims of up to six carriers in flames.
Tokyo Radio declared that 11 U.S. carriers and many other ships had been sunk.
Unaware that so many of his own aircraft had failed to reach the safety of friendly airfields,
on the 20th of June, Ozawa planned to refuel his ships and recover the aircraft that he believed
had flown on to Guam and Rota. With Lee's battleship screen 25 miles in front of them,
at 8 p.m. on the 19th of June, three of Mitch's task groups turned west,
steaming at 23 knots to preserve fuel in pursuit of Ozawa. They left behind Task Group 58-4
to cover the Japanese-held Mariana Islands. During the night, its aircraft strafed Tinian
and Rota and again bombed Guam. Mitchell was aware of Spruance's stern warning to ensure
adequate protection of Saipan, but also the 5th Fleet commander's desire to attack the enemy
the next day if they knew his position with sufficient accuracy. Locating Ozawa would not,
as it turned out, be easy. In theory, Task Force 58 should have closed on the Japanese during the
night of the 19th-20th of June, because the mobile fleet was then steaming at only 18 knots.
But two hours before the Americans set off in pursuit, Ozawa altered course. He therefore
eluded long-range reconnaissance liberators from the Emerald Islands, seaplanes operating
from the shelter of American-held Saipan and patrolling American submarines.
Maintaining radio silence on the 20th of June, the Japanese commander had effectively vanished.
From 5.30 a.m., Ozawa sent up relays of seaplanes from 4C to look for his enemy.
At 7.13 a.m., one reported two American search aircraft, but no warships. He decided to continue
refueling his fleet. But poor communications on his present flagship, Haguro, meant that the
exercise was highly disorganized and did not get underway until noon. At 1.00 p.m., Ozawa transferred
his flag yet again to the carrier, Sukaiko. There he learned the full extent of his losses the previous
day. However, he clung to the belief that heavy damage had been inflicted on the Americans during
the 19th of June, and was determined to seek battle again on the 21st of June. Messages from
Tinian led him wrongly to conclude that air reinforcements had arrived from Iwo Jima and
Truk, and Toyota had not discouraged him from renewing action. Suddenly, his confidence was
shattered. At 4.15, the cruiser Otago intercepted an American transmission. The Japanese had been
Within half an hour, Ozawa had stopped all refueling,
changed course, and set off at 24 knots in an attempt to outrun his pursuers.
Throughout the morning and early afternoon, the Americans had mounted increasingly desperate
searches. At 3.38 p.m., an Avenger aircraft had last spotted Ozawa's ships, approximately 275
miles northwest of Task Force 58, but its message was incomplete. Not until 4.05 was the exact
location of the three enemy groups received by Task Force 58. This was the transmission picked
up by Otago. It was late in the day, and the Japanese were at extreme range for the American
carrier-based aircraft, but Mitcher immediately prepared to launch his squadrons. Commander 5th
Fleet was informed that the carriers were firing their bolt, in Mitcher's words, a single-shot
venture. At 4.21 p.m., Task Force 58 turned into the wind, and within 10 minutes its six fleet
carriers had launched 77 dive bombers, 54 torpedo bombers, and 85 fighter escorts, all the Hellcats
and Helldivers carrying extra belly tanks. 30 minutes into their flight, the American pilots
were given an amended location for the enemy. Ozawa was 60 miles further away than originally
thought. This made Mitcher abandon an intended second strike, and gave those already in the air
grave doubts about their ability to safely regain their carriers. Fuel would be at a premium.
We knew we weren't going to get back. Surprises that you don't necessarily like. As we came up
what we call the fly one position, this is where the signalman is to launch a deck launch,
and the talker who was holding a blackboard, and he's got his earphones on, and he's got a
blackboard, and he's holding it against the wind over the deck. New enemy position.
The bearing was a little bit different, but distance 305 miles, and right at that time,
there's no way we're not going to get back. The fighters would be the best off,
torpedo planes the worst off, and the dive bombers in between. So you got this on your
mind as you're going out. With the sun low on the horizon, at 6 40 pm, the Japanese were sighted.
Six tankers and six destroyers were trailing the three main groups, which were virtually in line,
and each tightly concentrated to allow maximum anti-aircraft fire,
in the absence of formidable air cover. Aircraft from Hornet, Yorktown, and Bataan,
made for Ozawa's Force A. Ozawa's new flagship Zuikaku was so severely damaged,
that it seemed in danger of sinking, but did manage to lift back to port. Squadrons from
Bunker Hill, Monterey, and Cabot concentrated on Force C, where the carrier Chiyoda, battleship
Aruna, and heavy cruiser Maya, suffered badly. In the meantime, aircraft from Wasp set about the
tankers, causing two to be scuttled after heavy damage. You got your head tucked between your
shoulders because AA fire was horrendous. One thing that I remember vividly is the color.
There was purple bursts, lavender, greenish blue, as well as white and black. It was like 4th of July.
In Force B, all the carriers were hit. A single bomb struck Ryoho, which escaped severe damage.
Junyo similarly remained in action, despite being hit amid ships by two bombs.
Ryoho, however, was first struck by two torpedoes from Bellow Woods Avengers,
then hit by dive bombers from Enterprise. It sank two hours later, leaving behind a
devastated enemy. Shortly after 7pm, the American pilots faced a hazardous return journey in darkness,
with dangerously low fuel. We started home, and it's dark. And about a third of the way back,
we started hearing the torpedo planes call out. You know, it was not just our ship, there were
other carriers and ships involved, running out of gas, preparing to ditch, and call after call
after call. From there on out, it was chaos. The first pilots reached the carriers at 8.45pm.
In an effort to guide them in, Mitscher ordered all carrier lights to be switched on.
A perilous tactic had Japanese submarines been near. Star shells were sent up, and destroyers
played their searchlights over the waves to pick out men and rafts in the water.
Despite the various efforts to help, several aircraft piled up on flight decks.
On Lexington, five aircraft were involved in a multiple crash.
There was hysteria, and I'll just call it hysteria. Pandemonium had developed. Nobody
knew where their ships were. They were running out of fuel. We had four of our pilots ran out
of fuel right there by the ship. Two of them ditched right alongside the ship, and two others
went down in the landing pattern. And then we had people making landing approaches on cruisers,
destroyers, anything that had a light in, on it. And so that command, turn on the lights,
from Mark Mitscher, was a lifesaver. Those lights came on just while I was in my approach.
We had pilots that were down in the water. We had them on other carriers. We had
pilots from other carriers in our carrier. We had a lot of strange people in the ready room.
And we had to start sorting it all out. Well, we started getting reports that we had Carmichael
and so-and-so and so-and-so aboard New York Town and so-and-so aboard one of the other carriers.
And we were reporting who we had back to their home carriers. And that was quite a night.
The last aircraft landed safely at 1052. In addition to 20 aircraft lost over the Japanese
fleet, 17 Hellcats, 35 Helldivers, and 28 Avengers had been lost on the way back.
A massive rescue operation meant that in the end, only 16 pilots and 33 crewmen were lost during
this phase of the operation, together with six men killed on the carriers during deck crashes.
At 7.12 p.m. on the 20th of June, at virtually the same time that his aircraft were leaving
Ozawa's fleet, Mitscher proposed that these battleships be sent in immediate pursuit of
the Japanese. Spruance insisted that Task Force 58 be kept together, and at dawn,
make the best practical speed as a concentrated force towards Ozawa.
After the American aircraft had been recovered on the evening of the 20th of June following their
attack upon the Japanese, there was a proposal that Admiral Deeds' battleships should immediately
set off to try and slow down the Japanese. It was later known that they were approximately 570
miles from Okinawa at this time. Admiral Spruance vetoed the idea, on the grounds that he wanted to
keep the whole of the task force tactically concentrated during the night. His fear was
that if Admiral Lee had set off with these battleships, they had no air cover. And even
if they caught up with the Japanese, it was doubtful whether they could have done enough
damage to slow them down before the Task Force 58 had caught them up. So he was therefore cautious,
and rightly so. Had Admiral Deeds' battleships got within range of the Japanese, it is likely
that they would have been devastated by the remaining Japanese aircraft. Spruance was not to
know that the Japanese had lost those two aircraft carriers, but they still did have aircraft which
could have attacked. Spruance was encouraged by the report of a reconnaissance seaplane at 1.30
a.m. on the 21st of June that some of Ozawa's ships were trailing oil. American search aircraft
continued to shadow the Japanese, but by 7.43 the enemy were 360 miles away. The main enemy fleet
might now be out of range, but Spruance pinned his hopes on catching damaged ships which had fallen
behind. Throughout the 21st of June, Task Force 58 pressed northwards as search aircraft continued
to scour the area without finding any enemy warships. At 8.30 p.m., Spruance pulled off the hunt.
Effectively though, the Battle of the Philippine Sea ended on the evening of the 20th of June,
its outcome decided by the turkey shoot of the previous day.
The result for the Japanese was critical. The American landings in the Marianas had not been
halted, and very soon Japan itself would feel the weight of a sustained offensive by B-29 bombers
from captured Mariana airbases. During the evening of the 21st of June, Ozawa offered his resignation,
which Toyota refused. So he remained in command of the mobile fleet which reached Okinawa on the
22nd of June. In the two-day battle, the Japanese neither sank nor seriously damaged a single
American warship. At the end, Ozawa had only 35 operational carrier aircraft.
Over 100 Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the Marianas and other Japanese territory in
associated attacks. Including those which ditched or crashed after successfully completing their
missions on the 20th of June, the Americans lost 130 aircraft. The great Marianas turkey
shoot opened the way for ultimate success in the war against Japan. It was a decisive victory
for the Americans.