In September 1944, the Allies dropped over 40 thousand troops into the Nazi occupied Netherlands. Their objective was to capture strategic points including 9 bridges to create an invasion route into Germany. This hugely ambitious operation was a disaster and led to enormous Allied casualties and prisoners.
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On the 26th of September 1944, a British-led force of 2,000 paratroops succeeded in making
a crossing of a fast-flowing river in central Holland.
The journey across the Lower Rhine marked the completion of an operation codenamed
Berlin, and the soldiers who reached the other side could be proud of their achievement.
They were also relieved.
For the British paratroops, a terrible battle was finally at an end.
These 2,000 men were all that were left of an original force of over 10,000 that had
arrived in Holland just nine days before.
The success of Operation Berlin also signalled the ultimate failure of a far bigger Allied
enterprise.
Its codename was Operation Market Garden.
The men who crossed the Lower Rhine had been deployed as the spearhead of one of the most
ambitious Allied efforts of the Second World War.
At the time, Operation Market Garden was the biggest combined air and ground offensive
ever seen in the history of warfare.
The idea was for British-led troops to strike against Germany itself by making a huge advance
through Holland to bypass the fortifications of the Sea Creed Line.
The potential prize on offer was enormous.
In early September 1944, Allied commanders still hoped to bring the war to an end by
the close of the year, and Germany could fall to the Western Allies before the Russians
arrived from the east.
Operation Market Garden was one of the most radical ideas of the whole war.
The Allied commander who conceived it was not normally associated with such imaginative
thinking, but as events turned out, the vast Allied offensive that took place in September
1944 proved to be too ambitious.
For it to have worked, British paratroops would have needed to capture one strategic
road bridge that stretched across the Lower Rhine.
By 26th September, it was clear that the objective had not been achieved.
As a result, the war in the west would drag on well into 1945.
But the story of the Allied failure remains one of the most compelling episodes of the
Second World War.
The British troops fought with exceptional bravery, as did their colleagues from America
and Poland.
But in the end, their courage was not enough to overcome an enemy who still possessed a
remarkable stomach for the fight.
The plan itself may have been fatally flawed from the start, and many Allied commanders
expressed concerns about the objective given to the British paratroops.
For the Allies, the month of August 1944 proved to be one of the most satisfying periods of
the Second World War.
On the Western Front, the weeks of high summer had proved to be a hard slog, as the Germans
prevented an Allied breakout from Normandy in the aftermath of the D-Day landings.
But in the early days of August, the men of George Patton's American Third Army were finally
sweeping eastwards away from Normandy, as British and Canadian armies pushed forwards
towards the town of Falaise, which fell on the 16th.
Just hours before, the Allies had opened up an entirely new front with the arrival of
the American-led Sixth Army Group in the south of France.
This force of seven divisions quickly began to advance north as terrible fighting continued
in the region that became known as the Falaise Pocket.
The Allies were now in the ascendant, and when the Falaise Pocket was eventually closed
on the 21st of August, the once-mighty German force in the west was in full retreat after
having taken huge casualties.
Good news continued to reach the Allied leadership.
On the 25th of August, the French capital of Paris was finally liberated from German
occupation.
When the American general Dwight Eisenhower took charge of the new supreme headquarters
of the Allied Expeditionary Force a week later, he could be satisfied with the progress of
events.
In the early days of September, three vast Allied army groups moved forward through France
and Belgium, and their final destination was obvious.
Germany itself was almost within reach.
Some Allied units advanced at speeds of up to 25 miles a day, and many Allied commanders
began to think of a life beyond the Second World War.
But Eisenhower knew that his armies still had work to do.
The sheer speed of Allied progress began to cause problems with overstretched supply lines.
Winter was now on the horizon, and the enemy was still a force in the field, despite its
losses in Normandy.
On the 4th of September, the legendary Gerd von Rundstedt was brought out of retirement
to once again take charge of German forces in the West.
Von Rundstedt knew that the Normandy fighting had cost Germany some 40 divisions out of
50 deployed, and many of those that had survived were in poor fighting shape.
But the German high command was able to bring in a remarkable number of hastily trained
reinforcements.
Von Rundstedt also knew that he still had a number of fanatically loyal SS units whose
abilities on the battlefield were well known to Germans and Allies alike.
But in September 1944, the biggest problem facing von Rundstedt's opponent, Eisenhower,
concerned the business of attacking the German Reich itself.
The German border was defended by the mighty Siegfried Line, a line of defences that stretched
all the way from the Swiss border to the industrial heartland of the Ruhr.
Even if the Allies could break through this West Wall, there was still the difficulty
of crossing the Rhine before Germany could finally be brought to surrender.
Both enterprises were likely to be expensive in terms of time and Allied lives.
So in early September 1944, some Allied commanders began to question the wisdom of a direct assault
against the Nazi state.
Maybe there was another way to attack the fatherland.
Instead of trying to breach the Siegfried Line, why not go around it?
One famous Allied field marshal grew convinced that there was a real chance to achieve a
strategic surprise by launching a lightning thrust through Holland before sweeping east
into Germany itself.
To carry it out would require a vast operation, combining an advance on the ground with an
invasion from the air.
It was one of the boldest ideas of the whole war.
For the commander who conceived it, the proposal was little short of revolutionary.
World War II was the first great human conflict to involve the deployment of airborne troops
in battle.
The German capture of Crete proved that paratroops could be used decisively to carry out offensive
operations.
The Allies also used parachute landings in pursuit of war aims in Sicily, and especially
Normandy where airborne forces had a key role to play in the early hours of the D-Day landings.
But as the British 6th Airborne Division went about their duties on the 6th of June 1944,
their colleagues in the 1st Airborne Division remained in reserve at their base in England.
Three months later, the three brigades that made up 1st Airborne had still not seen action,
and Divisional Commander Roy Urquhart was well aware that his men were desperate to
join the fight against the enemy.
Their opportunity would soon arrive.
By early September, 1st Airborne was part of a newly formed 1st Allied Airborne Army
alongside three other divisions, one British and two American, as well as an independent
Polish parachute brigade.
In August, the new Airborne Army was placed under the overall command of the British-led
21st Army Group, then in action in northern France, and it was the commander of 21st Army
Group that decided to use his airborne forces as part of a major new Allied offensive.
His name was Bernard Montgomery.
By early September 1944, Montgomery was already a legend, and his promotion to Field Marshal
only served to confirm the stature of one of Britain's finest ever soldiers.
Monty was known as a cautious commander, but he was also a great showman whose thirst for
glory could cause rivalries with men of a similar character, such as the American General
George Patton.
Now Montgomery revealed a plan that could bring him yet more glory as the man who brought
the war to a final end in the West.
Montgomery argued that his own 21st Army Group should be deployed in a bold offensive to
strike at Germany itself.
The idea was for the 1st Canadian Army to continue its advance along the coast of the
English Channel, while the British Second Army thrust forward from the Belgian border
into Holland, before turning east into the heartland of the enemy.
To achieve this, the Allies would have to secure a number of strategic bridges along
the road that ran from the Dutch border towards the Zuiderzee.
Two of these structures were located in the region around Eindhoven.
Two more were situated further north, near the towns of Grave and Nijmegen.
Finally there was a fifth essential crossing that the Allies had to secure.
This was the road bridge at the city of Arnhem.
The need to capture the bridges on the road to Arnhem meant that the 1st British Airborne
Division would at last get their chance to go into battle, along with the rest of the
new 1st Allied Airborne Army.
Montgomery's plan was to deploy his airborne troops at the three key locations along the
road through Holland, while his ground troops launched a simultaneous advance from the south.
In all, Montgomery sought to carry out the biggest combined land and air operation ever
seen.
For a supposedly cautious commander, the proposal was little short of breathtaking.
It was all too much for some.
The commander of the American Third Army was dismissive of the idea.
General George Patton argued that priority be given to his own direct advance towards
the German homeland.
Patton's superior, Omar Bradley, was also unsure about Montgomery's plan, though he
accepted that the potential prize on offer was considerable.
In the end, it was the Supreme Allied Commander who made the decision to support the bold
new operation.
Eisenhower accepted that the chance to finish the war in 1944 was simply too good to turn
down, and on the 12th of September the formal orders for the new Allied offensive were issued.
The airborne element was given the codename Market.
On the ground, Montgomery's men were to pursue Operation Garden.
The whole combined operation was known as Market Garden, and there was little time to
waste.
On the 12th of September, the Allies began frenzied preparations for an enterprise that
would begin just five days later.
Montgomery had won his argument, and the British Field Marshal was convinced that he had the
forces needed to bring off a spectacular and decisive victory.
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On the 10th of September, 1944, an advanced unit of British Guards succeeded in capturing
a bridge over the Meuse-Esco Canal, near the border between Holland and Belgium.
Known as Joe's Bridge, this striking landmark was determined as the starting point for the
Allied ground advance to begin on the 17th of September.
The task was allocated to the men of the British 30th Corps, with the tanks of the Guards Armoured
Division as the spearhead.
On either side of 30th Corps, the men of 8th and 12th Corps were given the job of securing
a supporting flanking advance through the Dutch countryside.
But it was the progress of 30th Corps along the main road to Arnhem that would be essential
if Operation Garden was to succeed.
To assist them, the 1st Allied Airborne Army was given the objective of capturing the strategic
bridges located along the route.
The region around Eindhoven was allocated to the American 101st Airborne Division.
Their fellow countrymen of the 82nd Airborne Division were given the job of securing the
bridges around Grave and Nijmegen.
Furthest north of all, the battle-hungry 1st British Airborne Division were ordered to
secure the crossing of the Lower Rhine at Arnhem, with men of the Polish Independent
Parachute Brigade in support.
The British and Polish elements formed part of the 1st British Airborne Corps, which was
placed in effective command of the whole airborne operation.
As 17th September approached, the Corps commanders prepared their men for the battle that lay
ahead.
They knew that victory was far from certain.
Despite the ingenious nature of Montgomery's strategic plan, many Allied officers suspected
that a fierce fight lay ahead across the Channel in Holland.
Their suspicions would be justified.
Germany had suffered a terrible defeat in France, and her regional forces had taken
catastrophic losses, but the Wehrmacht was still not finished as a fighting force in
the West.
In late August 1944, a once mighty military machine found itself in full retreat.
By early September, the German armies that made up the command of OB West had lost 40
out of 50 divisions since battle was joined in France on D-Day.
When the elderly Gerd von Rundstedt was recalled to take charge of OB West on September 4th,
he could suspect with good reason that the men under his command were now a defeated force.
But all was not yet lost for Germany on the Western Front.
New divisions were formed using former pilots and seamen in a new role on the ground.
Hitler's concern for events in the West led him to transfer precious resources from other
theatres of operations, and units based in Germany itself could be brought quickly into
battle in the event of an Allied offensive in Holland.
There was also no shortage of good German commanders, who retained a quiet confidence
in the men under their command.
At the town of Oosterbeek, to the west of Arnhem, Field Marshal Walter Mödl established
the headquarters of German Army Group B, a force whose main elements were the 1st Parachute
Army, based to the south at Wut, and the 15th Army, located to the west.
Mödl also knew that he had a number of battalions in the region of Arnhem itself, including
two SS training battalions, but the German Field Marshal was aware that his real military
muscle was located just to the north and east of his Oosterbeek headquarters.
This was the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.
These elite armoured units formed the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, having succeeded in withdrawing
from the fighting in France, and it was the power of these two divisions that would cause
the greatest concerns to Allied commanders once battle was joined at Arnhem.
In September 1944, Montgomery was 57 years of age, and a hero to his nation.
His great victories over Rommel in Egypt and Tunisia had caught the imagination of the
British public, and turned the war in North Africa.
When the Germans and Italians were eventually ejected from Africa, Monty played a key role
in the conquest of Sicily, before moving on to Italy itself.
As Eisenhower's deputy, the British general was also heavily involved in the successful
Normandy landings on D-Day.
On September 1st, 1944, he was appointed Field Marshal, commanding all British and Canadian
forces in the Western theatre.
Throughout this brilliant career, Monty was always regarded as a cautious leader in battle.
He said himself that his own experiences of the slaughter of World War I led him to avoid
excessive risks to the lives of his men.
But Monty was also a showman, with a keen eye for publicity.
In Sicily, he became involved in a rivalry with the American general, George Patton,
with the two men almost bitterly engaged in a race to see whose army would be first to
the port of Messina.
It was a race won by Patton, but in September 1944, Montgomery was back in the ascendant,
and the British Field Marshal knew that if his bold plans for Operation Market Garden
succeeded, then his fame would be sealed forever.
To secure his objectives on the ground, Montgomery chose to rely on an old protégé to command
the advance of XXX Corps, on which so much depended.
Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks first came to attention during the fighting in Egypt
in late 1942, when he took command of the British XIII Corps in the fight against Rommel.
Universally known as Jorrocks, this popular commander was given command of XXX Corps in
August 1944, having already been heavily involved with events in Normandy.
But Horrocks was injured in the course of the summer fighting, and his health was still
suspect in the days before the launch of Operation Market Garden.
The overall commander of the Airborne Army was Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton, but
as Operation Market Garden got underway, effective command would be in the hands of Brereton's
deputy, the commander of 1st British Airborne Corps.
This was Lieutenant General Frederick Boy Browning, a commander who'd gained a reputation
as a powerful advocate of air power.
September 1944 gave Browning the chance to put his beliefs into action.
Operation Market Garden was the only Allied deployment of airborne troops in a strategic
role during the fighting on the Western Front.
Browning's subordinates included the American Major General Maxwell Taylor, commander of
the 101st Airborne Division, and his compatriot, Brigadier General James Gavin, in charge of
the 82nd Airborne.
These two commanders would be responsible for securing the key objectives along the
road to Arnhem once their men had landed safely on the ground.
But it was at Arnhem itself that the toughest task lay ahead, and the capture of the Arnhem
Bridge was the responsibility of Browning's 1st British Airborne Corps.
Browning's command was not confined to British units.
1st Airborne Corps also included the Polish Independent Brigade of Major General Stanislaw
Sosabowski, a soldier who typified his nation's burning desire to get to grips with the Germans.
But Sosabowski had grave concerns about the planning for Operation Market Garden.
A shortage of aircraft meant that his brigade would only arrive at Arnhem on day three of
the operation.
Sosabowski was quick to point out that changing weather conditions could delay their arrival
even longer, with potentially disastrous results.
Sosabowski was also prepared to argue that the staggered drop at Arnhem meant that the
first troops to arrive would be put under an enormous burden as they pursued their objective
of Arnhem Bridge.
These were the men of the British 1st Parachute Division, under the command of Robert Roy
Urquhart, a 47-year-old Major General whose reputation soared during the bitter fighting
on the Italian peninsula.
But in mid-September 1944, Roy Urquhart found himself in England, waiting to lead his Airborne
Division as part of the Allied Air Armada.
But Urquhart was another Allied commander with concerns about what lay ahead, and not
because September 17th 1944 would be the date of his first ever parachute jump.
The divisional commander was gravely concerned at the eight-mile gap between his men's landing
zones and the objective of Arnhem Bridge.
He was also aware that his division's landings were also staggered, with three battalions
arriving on day two to join the first six battalions already on the ground.
These included the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, a body of men whose bravery at Arnhem
would become the stuff of legend, as would the leadership of their commander, Lieutenant
Colonel John Frost.
In contrast to Roy Urquhart, John Frost was a paratrooper of massive experience, having
joined the Parachute Regiment as soon as it was formed in 1941.
The following year, as a Major, Frost led the daring raid on the German radar installation
at Bruneval in northern France.
He was also involved in airborne operations in Sicily, and by September 1944, Lieutenant
Colonel Frost was a well-known figure in the British Army, and an ideal choice for command
during Operation Market Garden.
But as Frost and his colleagues must have suspected, it wasn't only the Allies who could
call on excellent command in the battle that lay ahead.
As the dramatic events of World War Two unfolded, and the tide began to turn against Germany,
the Wehrmacht's Supreme Commander took an increasingly hands-on approach to command
decisions within his armed forces.
Time and again, Hitler intervened in his army's command chain, much to the annoyance of his
generals.
In December 1944, the massive scale of the German offensive in the Ardennes was Hitler's
personal order, overruling his nominal commander in the Western Theater, the legendary Field
Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.
At the time of Operation Market Garden, three months before the Ardennes campaign, von Rundstedt
was already 69 years old.
His formal retirement from the German armed forces took place as far back as 1938, before
the Second World War began, but his experience was far too valuable for Hitler to ignore.
In the years that followed, von Rundstedt enjoyed senior command positions in Poland,
France and then Russia as German forces swept across Europe.
By the summer of 1944, Gerd von Rundstedt was back in retirement after his dismissal
as Commander-in-Chief of the Western Theater.
Hitler was unimpressed with the old Field Marshal's apparent defeatism during the Normandy
campaign, but it was a brief withdrawal from command.
On September the 4th, he was once again recalled to duty, and von Rundstedt remained Commander-in-Chief
West almost until the end of the war.
But the extent of his authority was limited, as the German forces fought an increasingly
desperate battle in the West.
When it came to resisting the Allied Operation Market Garden, the real German commander in
the region was not the Commander-in-Chief West, but the commander of Army Group B, Field
Marshal Walter Model.
At the beginning of World War II, Walter Model was virtually unknown, even within the German
armed forces.
By 1944, he was a 53-year-old Field Marshal with a substantial reputation at home and
abroad.
During the fighting on the Eastern Front, Model became known as the Fuhrer's fireman,
because of his ability to take charge of a difficult situation and turn it around quickly.
Unusually for a German commander, Model was prepared to challenge Hitler directly if he
disagreed with the Fuhrer's thinking, and by September 1944, Hitler had to rely on Model's
skills once more when the Market Garden offensive began in Holland.
But Walter Model knew that he was not the only skilled commander available to resist
any Allied assault.
His command included a newly formed 1st German Parachute Army based at Wundt, halfway along
the corridor that the Allies hoped to secure.
Though the Parachute Army was essentially a ground-based force, its commander was one
of the pioneering figures of airborne warfare.
General Kurt Student's flying experience began as a pilot during World War I.
By 1940, he was an experienced Luftwaffe officer in charge of airborne operations in France
and Holland.
The following year, Student led the airborne invasion of Crete, an enterprise that can
now be seen as one of the most impressive achievements of the war.
Unfortunately for Student, Hitler was unconvinced of the merits of using airborne troops in
a strategic role.
In the years after Crete, Student was denied the chance to repeat his success.
But in September 1944, this gifted commander was back at centre stage, applying his skills
to thwart the Allies' own attempt at strategic airborne warfare.
In addition to Student's 1st Parachute Army, Field Marshal Mödl also knew that he could
call on a force more readily associated with German operations of the Second World War.
Just to the north and east of Mödl's Oosterbeek headquarters, the armour of the 2nd SS Panzer
Corps lay waiting for any call to action.
Corps commander Willi Bietrich knew that the two divisions under his command could be a
devastating weapon against an unarmoured airborne offensive, and that's exactly what faced
Bietrich at Arnhem when the British arrived on 17th September.
But an armoured provision was also part of the overall Allied planning for the combined
ground and air offensive, and the tank was just one of many weapons required for a successful
push to Arnhem.
One of the most compelling features of the Arnhem campaign is the combined nature of
the operation, with ground and air elements pursuing simultaneous objectives.
But for many people it's the sheer size of the airborne landings that remains the most
memorable episode of the battle.
It's hard not to be impressed with the idea of dropping three divisions of troops over
enemy held territory.
In all, over 2,000 aircraft were required for the drop on 17th September 1944, and there
was only one transport plane that the Allies were ever going to use to carry the bulk of
the 1st Airborne Army on its journey to Holland.
This was the American Douglas C-47 Skytrain, known to the British as the Dakota.
The Dakota was a military transport plane with origins in the world of commercial aviation.
The C-47 design was inspired by the early passenger aircraft the DC-2 and DC-3, but
by the end of World War II the C-47 was the most famous transport aircraft anywhere.
With a range of over 2,000 miles and a top speed of 230 miles an hour, it was an ideal
workhorse aircraft for operations like Market Garden.
Twenty fully equipped paratroopers could be accommodated in a C-47, and many Dakota Skytrains
were filled with airborne soldiers on the morning of 17th September 1944.
But the C-47 was also used to carry material to the landing sites in Holland.
Jeeps and light artillery were just two types of hardware that could be accommodated by
the Dakota's 6,000-pound payload, and the C-47 was also employed extensively as a glider
tower for air landing battalions during Operation Market Garden.
The Allied gliders were also able to carry both men and material, and of all the hardware
landed on 17th September 1944, perhaps the best-known weapon of them all was the American-designed
75mm Pak Howitzer, the M1A1.
Introduced into service between the wars, the M1A1 became the standard infantry support
weapon in British as well as American arsenals as World War II unfolded.
British gun crews knew that the M1A1's 13-pound shells could make a devastating impact in
the event of close-quarter street fighting.
The plans for Market Garden called for the Howitzers to arrive both in gliders and under
parachutes, with the weapon broken up into nine pieces for the purpose.
When reassembled, the M1A1 could provide invaluable support for isolated infantry units.
It's typical of the nature of warfare that Montgomery's great plan for Operation Market
Garden called for fast movement of resources over a substantial area of land, but when
fighting got underway, many Allied units found themselves bogged down in localised exchanges.
For many American soldiers, this meant relying on one of the best-known weapons of World
War II, the M1 automatic rifle.
Known as the Garand rifle after its inventor John Garand, the M1 was a gas-operated weapon
that was the first automatic rifle to be issued as standard to infantrymen during World War
II.
With a weight of 9½ pounds, the M1 may have been heavier than the typical bolt-operated
rifle, but American forces appreciated its sturdiness in combat situations, as the production
figures confirm.
By the end of the war, over 5½ million Garand rifles had been manufactured, and this was
the gun that persuaded the world's armed forces that automatic weapons were the way forward
for infantry rifle provision.
Famous mass-produced American designs were also available to British forces during Operation
Market Garden, and British armoured units were pleased to have the American M4 tank
at their disposal for their land offensive through Holland.
Ever since the Battle of El Alamein, British tank crews appreciated the protection and
firepower of the American tank known to them as the Sherman.
In Africa, the typical Sherman design boasted up to 76mm of armour protection, and a 75mm
main gun.
But by 1944, the British had evolved their own variant on the classic M4.
This was known as the Sherman Firefly, a vehicle that packed a hefty punch.
Over 600 Fireflies were made, with the thumping 17lb anti-tank gun mounted in the turret.
The 17lb gun had already proved itself a vast improvement on the traditional British 6lb.
When allied to the Sherman's speed and manoeuvrability, the result was a devastating weapon of war,
capable of taking on the best of the enemy designs.
But when it came to sheer speed, there was one British tank that could hold its own with
any produced during the war.
The Mark VIII Cromwell had a top speed of some 40mph.
First used in the Normandy campaign, the Cromwell's armament and armour were not world-beating
in the late summer of 1944, but its speed did much to make up for its relative lack
of strength, and the use of a standard 75mm main gun meant that it could use American
ammunition when in action.
With speed being one of the key elements of Operation Market Garden, the potential advantages
of a 40mph tank were obvious to Allied commanders.
But there remained the question of whether the local landscape would allow the British
Cromwell crews to exploit their advantage.
What could be assumed was that the Allies had no monopoly on quality weapons in September
1944.
When Montgomery and his senior commanders made their preparations for the Market Garden
offensive, the opinions of the troop carrier commanders were taken especially seriously.
The danger of the Luftwaffe meant that the air armada would travel with strong fighter
support, and Allied bombers were also involved with the task of hitting German anti-aircraft
defences on the ground.
But there was still real concern about the potentially disastrous impact of German flak,
and no anti-aircraft weapon was feared more than the 88mm gun.
The Allies knew all about the 88 by the time of Market Garden.
Its 20-pound shells could hit aircraft as high as 26,000 feet.
Over 10,000 of these mighty weapons were produced, and the firepower of the 88 was not only used
against aircraft.
Early on in the war, the Germans recognised that the gun could be adapted for anti-tank
use, and many lightly armoured Allied tanks had no chance against a direct hit from the
88 during the fighting in North Africa.
But by late 1944, it was the 88's original role that concerned the Allies most, and fear
of the weapon led directly to a cautious choice of drop zone for the British paratroops at
Arnhem.
Roy Urquhart's men would have to advance 8 miles to reach their objective at the bridge.
But once on the ground, there was still the danger that the British paratroops would come
up against the 88mm weapon, as part of the firepower of the most famous of all the great
German tank designs, the Type 6 Panzer, the Tiger.
With a weight of some 56 tons, the Tiger looked and felt like a mighty weapon of war.
Though it was too slow for divisional use, the 1,350 Tigers produced between 1942 and
1944 were still able to make an impressive impact on many battlefields, especially during
the fighting for Normandy.
On the 13th of June 1944, the German tank ace, Michael Wittmann, sealed the reputation
of the Tiger forever.
That day, Wittmann led an attack by four Type 6 Panzers against Allied armoured units at
Vierre Bocage in Normandy.
The Allied tanks included Shermans and Cromwells, but there was nothing they could do against
the Tiger's 88mm gun, which could penetrate 110mm of armour at a range of 1,000 metres.
Twenty-seven vehicles fell victim to the Tigers in a matter of minutes, and it was this kind
of firepower the Allies hoped to avoid during Operation Market Garden.
The British and Americans also knew that the enemy was likely to be well-equipped for close-quarter
street fighting.
In theatres of operation such as Italy, the Allies were forced to deal with the considerable
skills of German mortar crews.
The fighting for Arnhem again revealed the value of the most famous German mortar design.
The 8cm weapon fired an 8lb bomb, and a well-trained crew could deliver an enviable rate of fire
up to a range of half a mile, more than enough to make an impact in street fighting.
To this day, Allied veterans of the Arnhem battle recall the unsettling effect of facing
German mortar fire, without any certainty as to where the enemy crew was situated.
A similar effect was achieved by German machine gunners during the Battle of Arnhem, with
one gun design again well-remembered today.
Like many other great weapons, the MG42 began to establish its reputation on the battlefields
of North Africa and the Soviet Union.
German machine gunners were quick to appreciate the smooth feed of the .50 cartridge belt.
They could also take advantage of a remarkable rate of fire.
Some 1,550 revolutions a minute could be delivered by the MG42, and it's not surprising that
the gun remains in service in many armies of the present day.
The MG42 was just one excellent weapon that the Allies were likely to face during September
1944.
The hope was that the brilliance of the strategic plan could keep casualties to a minimum.
When Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery unveiled his plans for Operation Market Garden, there
were many amongst his colleagues who were taken aback by the bold nature of his proposal.
The words of the American General Omar Bradley have survived to give some indication of the
reaction.
I could not have been more astonished than I was by the daring adventure he proposed.
For in contrast to the normally conservative tactics Montgomery ordinarily chose, the Arnhem
attack was to be made over a 60-mile carpet of airborne troops.
Bradley believed that Monty's plan was ambitious.
Too ambitious.
But he also accepted that if it worked, the prize would be well worth winning.
In simple terms, the British 21st Army Group commander proposed to use his own forces in
a dramatic thrust through enemy-held Holland.
This involved British 2nd Army moving forward from the Belgian border at Joesbridge, along
the main road to Arnhem parallel to the Siegfried line of fortifications that blocked the way
into Germany itself.
Having advanced past this line, 2nd Army could turn east and attack Germany's industrial
heartland in the Ruhr Valley.
The suspicion was that this might be enough for Germany to accept that the war was lost.
The Armoured Guards Division was given the task of leading 2nd Army's 30th Corps on their
advance north, with flanking advances through the Dutch countryside by 8th Corps and 12th
Corps.
But this was not the full extent of the Allied thrust forward.
At the same time as 30th Corps began its advance, the 1st Allied Airborne Army would also arrive
in Holland to secure strategic bridges along the road to Arnhem.
Five major crossings were identified as essential to the success of the operation.
In the south, there were bridges over the Wilhelmina and Zuid-Wilhelmsvaart canals.
Their capture would be the responsibility of the American 101st Airborne Division.
Further north, Montgomery knew that three major river crossings also had to be secured.
One of them was the road bridge over the Maas near Grave.
This was to be taken by the paratroops and airlanders of the American 82nd Airborne Division,
along with the mighty road bridge over the Waal at Nijmegen.
Furthest north of all, there was the bridge that has come to be most closely associated
with the whole Market Garden operation, the road bridge over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem.
To secure this final crossing, Montgomery allocated his 1st British Airborne Corps,
with its 1st Airborne Division and independent Polish Parachute Brigade.
This was the toughest objective of all, and success was essential to the Allied cause.
If the Arnhem bridge could not be captured, the whole operation would fail, as Montgomery
was well aware.
In the days prior to the launch of the operation, the Airborne Corps Commander General Browning
met with Monty to discuss the imminent engagement.
According to one of the most famous stories of the war, Montgomery argued that the British
paratroopers would only have to hold the bridge for two days before the ground troops arrived
from the south.
Browning said that he could hold it for four.
But the British General could not conceal his doubts about the whole operation.
He suggested to Montgomery that the crossing at Arnhem might prove to be a bridge too far.
Browning knew that Market Garden was an operation that involved a substantial degree of risk,
and he was not the only Allied commander to recognise the potential pitfalls of Montgomery's
grand proposal.
With the benefit of hindsight, it's easy to see the risks that lay ahead for the Allies
during Operation Market Garden.
There can be no doubt that a large number of assumptions were built into the thinking
behind an offensive which was prepared in a matter of days.
Commanders like General Sosabowski made their concerns clear at the time, but there were
compelling reasons for going ahead with the operation.
The Allies were on the march.
German defeat was surely only a matter of time, and the amazing plan of the legendary
Montgomery meant that it could all be over by Christmas.
Again, with hindsight, we might consider that the glitter of the potential prize blinded
the Allied command to the risks of Operation Market Garden.
To begin with, there was the uncertain nature of Allied intelligence coming through from
the ground in Holland.
In particular, no one could be certain of the scale of anti-aircraft defences that lay
in wait for the airborne landings on day one.
At the city of Arnhem, it was believed the German flank defences were substantial, and
so the idea of a direct landing there was ruled out as a consequence.
The landscape to the north of Arnhem was also considered unsuitable for an airborne landing,
which meant that Browning's 1st Airborne Corps were forced to accept a landing zone some
eight miles to the west of their objective.
Before the British could get to Arnhem, they would have to advance through the town of
Oosterbeek, where some German resistance would be inevitable.
What the Allies could not be sure about was the scale of the resistance.
Intelligence reports failed to give a full picture of German strength in the Arnhem area,
but one Dutch communication made the alarming suggestion that the Germans were still a force
to be reckoned with around Arnhem.
It suggested that a strong German armoured presence was resting and refitting in the
area, having succeeded in withdrawing from France.
The report was ignored.
The men of the British Airborne Corps did not know what was waiting for them.
What they did know is that their arrival to the west of Arnhem would not take place in
one lift.
A shortage of aircraft and the decision to give priority to the American landings meant
that three days were allocated for the deployment of Browning's force, with the Poles scheduled
to arrive on day three.
This staggered deployment had two serious consequences for the Allies.
The first airborne troops to land would be faced with a massive burden.
With the need to secure the zones for day two and three, the British would only be able
to send three battalions of paratroops into action on day one.
Against a light defence this might be enough.
A more substantial resistance, perhaps involving armoured units, would make the capture of
Arnhem Bridge a fiendish objective on day one.
There was also the question of the follow-up landings.
Sosabowski and others knew only too well that bad weather back in England could cause the
second and third landings to be delayed or postponed.
But once again the Allied command judged that it was worth taking a chance with the weather.
In Holland itself, the local landscape was also a factor that could present problems
for the Allies.
The advance of XXX Corps would be made along a double-track road known as the Club Route.
The key to XXX Corps' success would be the speed of advance, but the single road meant
that slow-moving traffic was likely to arise if vehicles broke down or were taken out by
enemy fire.
By the end of the operation, the Club Route would be known by a far more grim nickname.
Either side of the road, the flat, marshy polder land, made speedy progress all but
impossible, and in the region to the south of Arnhem the exposed nature of the landscape
made any kind of open warfare a dangerous enterprise.
But of all the potential difficulties for the Allies in September 1944, it was the uncertainty
concerning the strength of the enemy that presented the biggest danger to the success
of Operation Market Garden.
But by the evening of 16th September, there was no more time for worrying, and no turning
back.
At airbases across the south-east of England, British and American airborne troops prepared
to board their transports.
Across the channel on the Dutch border, the Guards Armoured Division prepared to lead
the advance along the Club Route towards Arnhem.
All that was certain was that one of the most ambitious operations of the whole war was
about to begin.
Late in the evening of Saturday, September 16th 1944, 200 British Lancaster bombers took
off on raids designed to soften up the German defences in Holland.
The following morning, some 800 American flying fortresses joined the attack.
It was not the first or the last time that German units on the ground felt the power
of these famous Allied bombers, but on this occasion, their deadly cargo was not released
as part of the strategic bombing offensive.
This was a tactical move in support of Operation Market Garden.
As the bomber crews went about their work, back in England, Allied fighter pilots also
prepared to go into action over north-west Europe.
But their job was one of protection, not destruction.
371 British Spitfires, Tempests and Mosquitoes, and 548 American Thunderbolts, Lightnings
and Mustangs were allocated to protect the huge armada of the air that began to take
to the English skies at 0930 hours on the morning of Sunday, September 17th.
In a matter of minutes, two vast columns of aircraft began to form into position, some
2,000 planes and gliders en route for Holland.
On board were 20,000 men and material of an airborne army.
The hope was that the mission that lay ahead could secure an early end to the Second World
War on the Western Front.
But no one knew for sure what would happen, especially the men of the British battalions,
as they took off for the city of Arnhem.