5 Dấu Hiệu Cỗ Máy Chiến Tranh Của Nga Sắp Phá Sản

KHUNG TRỜI MỚI - NEWSKY TV
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Nội dung chính:
0:33 LỚP HÀO NHOÁNG TUYÊN TRUYỀN BỊ XÉ RÁCH
2:37 CUỘC CÁCH MẠNG DRONE TRONG CHIẾN TRANH HIỆN ĐẠI
4:43 TỪ HỎA TIỄN DẪN ĐƯỜNG CHÍNH XÁC ĐẾN VŨ KHÍ LỖI THỜI
7:37 NGA CẠN KIỆT THUỐC NỔ, ĐỐI MẶT NGUY CƠ TÊ LIỆT HỎA LỰC
9:36 NGA CẠN KIỆT SĨ QUAN CHỈ HUY TUYẾN ĐẦU
11:29 NGA “ĐÀO MỘ” KHÍ TÀI LIÊN XÔ
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After more than three and a half years of war, from the peak of the Soviet-era weaponry,
Russia entered the war with the belief that it had the second most powerful army in the world.
But now, the defense budget is 40% of the federal budget,
while the oil and gas resources are depleted, the defense industry is weak,
and the army is forced to rely on strategic resources.
Russia is having to use the T-55 tank from the 50th anniversary,
shoot anti-aircraft anti-aircraft missiles S-300s at ground targets,
and attach commercial GPFs to combat aircraft carriers.
It is a sign of a war system crisis that Moscow has never seen before.
Russian propaganda channels often play battle music and super-weapon performances
every time there is positive news from Ukraine, even when it only takes down a small village.
But behind that performance is a completely different reality about the war machine of the Kremlin,
a brutal picture, contrary to the powerful image that the Moscow government is trying to portray.
After more than three and a half years since President Vladimir Putin launched a campaign
that never promised to be quick, Russia has not only failed to achieve its goal,
but has also fallen into a stalemate in all areas necessary to wage war.
Sufficient statistics make any defense minister sweat.
From the front-line reconnaissance drone to basic things like the Lukashu,
Russia's defense industry system is falling into a serious outage.
In fact, the Russian military is draining its resources in a dangerous way.
To understand the scale of this collapse,
we need to look at each loss not only as a tactical issue,
but also as a sign of the disintegration of the military system that has been built over many decades.
And the starting point for this crisis lies in an element that almost did not exist before the year 2020,
the unmanned aircraft, especially the first-class-controlled drone.
Even President Putin must admit to the public that the Russian army is seriously lacking this equipment,
a rare recognition from the Russian leadership.
Recently, he ordered factories in the country to increase the production of FPVs.
In response, he said,
I know, and many people attending today's meeting also know clearly that these combat vehicles are still not enough.
The number he mentioned is really shocking.
According to this source, Russia has purchased more than 1.5 million drones
and supplies about 4,000 FPVs to the frontline every day,
but still believes that that number has not met the requirements.
And in fact, the battlefield seems to have proven Putin this time not to say too much.
At the end of 2022, Russia will control about 18% of the territory of Ukraine.
After two and a half years, that ratio only increased by 20%, a number that caused controversy.
It means that Russia has to spend 1.5 million drones and other weapons
just to expand about 2% of the territory of Ukraine.
To see clearly the importance of the issue, it is necessary to understand that the war is going through a big turning point.
FPV drones are commercial drones,
commonly used for sports or photography, but are equipped with explosives or other combat equipment.
They are small, cheap, and the delivery price is from $ 500 to $ 3,000,
much cheaper than the traditional military weapons systems costing millions of dollars.
This is a similar revolution to the First World War,
where drones from reconnaissance tools became indispensable weapons on the battlefield in just four years.
Both Russia and Ukraine are continuously creating new FPV variants
When the war broke out in 2022, both sides mainly used drones for reconnaissance,
following the traditional military theory.
But by 2024, Ukraine had deployed thousands of FPV drones every day to attack the enemy,
turning electronic devices into weapons of mass destruction.
In Russia, however, military theory is still rejected in the ancient military doctrine of Soviet times.
The importance of power concentration is large,
such as super-long-range anti-aircraft guns or large-range anti-aircraft guns.
But the modern war requires the ability to attack and disperse,
precisely what a small drone can bring.
President Putin's order to increase the production of drones
is in fact a failure of the Russian defense industrial system.
The war is not expected to last long,
the damage is too great and the need to mobilize the economy to overcome all initial calculations.
The problem is deeper in the production model.
Ukraine has rapidly switched from electronic devices to military drones,
using ready-to-use components such as smart phone cameras, game controllers.
Although Russia has a larger industrial base,
it faces difficulties in its defense industry, which is designed to produce heavy equipment.
According to the centralized, secret and unsuitable mechanism to transfer to small equipment manufacturing,
low costs, like asking a factory to shut down a locomotive to transfer it to a bicycle.
Without enough FPV drones, Russian groups are almost like moths on the battlefield,
forced to rely on time-travel reconnaissance methods.
Meanwhile, Ukraine's drones approach, cut and destroy the target with the armed reconnaissance team.
From guided missiles to time-travel weapons
One of the most obvious changes on the Ukrainian battlefield
is the serious reduction in the use of the Russian word for guided missiles.
The Kalib-Bombardier or Iskander cruise missiles
were once advertised by Moscow in military campaigns, now appear gradually.
Instead, defense analysts found that Russia had switched to using the S-300 anti-aircraft missile
from the Soviet Union to attack ground targets.
This is a significant change, which is worth noting,
which is the high point of modern warfare.
Each Kalib costs about $1 million,
but can destroy a target that, if used with a normal gun, will have to fire dozens of rounds.
Their range is over 100 kilometers,
and the GPS system and the self-locating radar allow you to hit within a few meters.
This is Russia's direct response to the US' smart weapons technology.
But now, the S-300 missile, designed in 1970 to shoot down NATO aircraft at high altitudes,
shoots down ground targets, showing that Russia has run out of special attack missiles.
The S-300 was not designed to shoot ground targets,
The reason began to be revealed.
In mid-2023, Russian defense industry only produced about 60 guided missiles per month,
which is too low to maintain pressure on the country.
Therefore, Russia's long-range offensive strategy switched to guided-missile bombs,
mainly FAP-500 bombs,
which improved with a simple guided-missile and radar system.
Russia also uses larger variants such as FAP-10, FAP-30,
Although these bombs have a great impact and pressure on the country's defense,
the low accuracy causes thousands of missiles to fall into empty boxes instead of important targets.
According to January 2025 data, Russia fired about 3,000 FAP-500s per month,
but the actual effect is not equivalent to the number.
Worryingly, both guided-missile and smart bombs need electromagnetic fields,
which Russia is missing.
Since 2022, the West has imposed strict sanctions on chip and electronic components.
Until March 2025, an important semiconductor company in Stavropol
was forced to close due to insufficient operability
due to the government's price cut to lower production costs.
While the defense budget of 2025 accounts for up to 40% of the country's total spending,
the fact that even the military headquarters are short of capital shows
that Russia is slowing down its financial capabilities.
The long-term dependence on imported components originates from the economic crisis.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, it has now become a deadly weakness
that cannot reach the global market.
Russia can only buy low-quality components from black markets
or from allies such as China and Iran,
which seriously reduces the quality of equipment.
One example is that in May 2022,
a Russian Su-34 combat aircraft was discovered
with GPS equipment made of tape right in the cockpit
because the domestic guidance system was broken.
Russia is fighting a deadly threat of nuclear weapons.
If the lack of drones or nuclear weapons is a serious problem,
then the fact that Russia is short of nuclear weapons
is a warning bell for the rest of its life.
Official documents and satellite images show that
Moscow is rapidly completing a new RDX-producing plant in Siberia,
a sign that their nuclear arsenal is in danger.
RDX and TNT are the core components of most modern weapons,
from artillery, nuclear warheads, bombers,
from drones to anti-aircraft guns.
Without a stable source of supply,
the army could have all the means of transport in the world,
but it could not cause real damage.
What is more worrying is that the source of the explosives
that Russia imports from North Korea
is considered to be of poor quality,
to the extent that it is almost useless in warfare.
In fact, Russia still has the ability to produce
about 3 million rounds a year,
which exceeds the total number of NATO.
This is also the reason why Russia
can still keep some progress on the battlefield.
Although slow and large losses,
this advantage is being quickly wiped out.
Ukraine has used long-range attack drones
to destroy ammunition depots and production facilities,
especially in the western part of Moscow,
where many factories and warehouses have been concentrated since the Soviet Union,
when Ukraine was once a large production center of the Soviet Union.
This strategy turns large ammunition depots
into boxes of explosives.
As long as a drone can bring explosives,
the whole depot can be set on fire,
destroying thousands of ammunition in the blink of an eye.
Even the new factory in Siberia,
which is located deep in the interior,
is not considered to be completely safe.
Ukraine has proven its ability to conduct
attacks at distances of more than 2,500 kilometers,
such as the famous cyber-warfare.
This means that there is almost no place
on the Russian territory that is out of the opponent's reach.
In addition, the introduction of deep-dive production facilities in Siberia
follows a huge logistics cost
to still transmit ammunition to the front lines.
This creates a stronger distance to protect production resources.
Russia is more and more difficult in ensuring
the economy for the battlefield,
making the effective cost reduction more and more unfavorable.
Russia has reduced the number of officers in command of the front line.
Below, the requirements for supplies
are an even more dangerous hole.
Russia is gradually reducing the number
of low-ranking officers with capabilities.
Among the Western armies,
the Central Committee and the Grand Committee
are the main links between strategic determination
and tactical execution.
They usually undergo 4-8 years of training
and practical training.
They have both technical expertise
and command capability
through special training programs.
Russia's military education system
inherits the model of the Soviet Union,
which used to operate a vast network of academies.
The training of officers has a deep technical foundation
and systematic thinking,
but this type of training requires time
and huge resources,
which cannot be replaced immediately
during a fierce battle.
In addition, a lack of discipline,
overestimation of the quality of training
and a lack of discipline
of Russia's long history of war.
If the losses of supplies
and personnel have created
serious deficits,
Russia's financial situation
shows that the entire war machine
is sliding into a self-destructing loop.
Revenue from state funds'
main sources of living
has decreased by 34%
since June 2025
compared to the same period last year.
Meanwhile, the country's defense spending has plummeted by 40% and the Kremlin has had to sacrifice a number of civilian sectors, such as education, infrastructure, health and economic development.
This is the result of more than two decades of dependence on energy exports.
In the early 2000s, Russia modernized its military, sponsored social programs, and expanded its geopolitical influence, especially with the European Union.
But when the EU cut back on Russian energy imports, the money-making machine began to weaken.
The reduction in revenue in the context of the large-scale war budget has forced Moscow to publicly plan to cut spending right from 2026, a statement that it cannot maintain its current ambitions.
In the absence of Russia's return to the island, Soviet-era equipment, the long-line tanks T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks have been abandoned to show their desolation.
From the T-90Ms, which are now retreating to the T-72s, and the T-55s, which were born in the 1950s, they have returned to the battlefield.
Russia no longer has a new production capacity with a significant number, and the re-equipment is only intended to provide a target for drones and anti-aircraft missiles in the battle for pride.
What is certain is that even the newest tank types, such as the T-90M, also have disadvantages of the T-64 generation.
The self-loading system, which can only be loaded with a thin layer of armor, is a weak point that can detonate the entire ammunition storage inside, causing the vehicle and driver to be completely destroyed.
In that context, the use of T-55s, which are simpler and longer, has become an economic choice in a cruel manner of the Russian war.
And if the lack of drones, anti-aircraft missiles, explosives, or tanks is alarming, then the crisis of the tank is the proof of the failure.
The Western sanctions not only block the source of the complete load, but also cut off the source of chemical and high-speed production equipment.
The consequence is that many Russian military vehicles are running with a load to the extent that they are at risk of being caught in the middle of the road.
With an army that belongs to mobility, especially when the winter season turns the surrounding land into mud.
This is not only a disadvantage for logistics, but also a strategic threat.
Looking at the whole picture, the eight crisis points, from drones, artillery, explosives, explosives, officers, budget, tanks, to tanks, are creating what military theorists call a system depletion.
When a lot of land is broken in the supply chain, it reduces the overall force to a much lower level than the total impact of each individual element.
Russia is entering the war with confidence.
Three and a half years later, the Putin regime is spending money that they do not have to create weapons that they do not have enough raw materials for a war that they cannot maintain.
That war machine is not just running out, it is eating itself to survive.
