Is Russia's shadow fleet secretly destroying underwater cables?

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Aug 6, 2025
Russia is earning billions of euros from its so-called shadow fleet of aging oil tankers
with questionable insurance and registration. They transport oil in a way that can evade
international sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine. These ships have also been accused of
purposely dragging their anchors over valuable underwater cables connecting NATO countries.
Now, as Terry Schultz reports from Norway, the alliance is deploying technology to listen
underwater for signs of interference. This doesn't look like a battleship,
but it is one of NATO's best defenses against hybrid war tactics at sea.
The special agents on the NRV alliance research vessel aren't watching for potential attacks.
They're scientists from NATO's Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation, or CMRE,
and they're listening for threats to critical undersea pipelines and cables.
For the first time, we've been able to detect an anchor dropping on the sea bottom.
That's important because dragging rusty old anchors along the ocean floor has become an
effective tactic for saboteurs targeting critical undersea infrastructure in NATO waters.
It's the core of asymmetrical warfare. It's extremely low tech,
even some embarrassingly low tech, but can do a lot of damage. And so you have to think
how to adapt to this kind of new threats. Knowing immediately from sound sensors if
an anchor has dropped, information transmitted simultaneously to command centers on land
can give NATO a time advantage it hasn't had before. A suspicious ship can be intercepted
before it does damage. Now that NATO can detect an anchor
hitting the ocean floor, I wanted to know what that sounds like. But the scientists on board the
ship say they can't share that with me. It's classified. It's just another reminder of how
critical the threat level is in these northern waters. The team said any adversary who heard
the anchor drop could also distinguish the research ship's signature sound and possibly
track it. However, CMRE decided this summer not to keep the NRV alliance quite so anonymous.
For the first time in the ship's 37 years, it has NATO painted on its side.
It's an act of deterrence. Our very presence in the Baltic Sea is there to not only reassure our
allies, but it's also to keep our adversaries at bay. We go down to almost 2,000 meters.
But even if enemies do stay far away, increasingly NATO's got an ear on them.
Well, for more on this, let's bring in Elizabeth Braw here. She's a senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She joins us from the Taiwanese
capital, Taipei. Elizabeth, talk to us about the impact of undersea cables being severed.
What sort of damage, disruption is caused by that?
Well, the first damage or the first harm to bear in mind is that when a cable is damaged,
or cut for that matter, which has happened several times, it can't transport traffic.
And that traffic then has to be transported with other cables. In most cases, so far,
other cables have been available to transport that traffic. But here in Taiwan, a couple of
years ago, two cables connecting the Matsu Islands with Taiwan proper were cut by Chinese merchant
vessels, which meant that there was nothing available to connect the Matsu Islands with the
world. They were completely cut off. The second harm is financial. It is expensive to repair
undersea cables. There is an arrangement, an insurance agreement, ambulance service agreement,
that undersea cable operators have. But still, at about one million pounds or dollars each per
repair, or up to two million, that is not pocket change if it happens repeatedly.
So our report there focused on the vulnerability of underwater infrastructure in NATO regions,
specifically around Norway. But this, as you point out, is a global issue affecting Asia
and the rest of the world, isn't it? It is a global issue. And the Pandora's box has been
opened, as it were, for decades. There has been agreement around the world that it's in everybody's
interest, every country's interest, every company's interest, to leave undersea infrastructure alone.
It hasn't been protected. It has just been an agreement that we all depend on these cables
for modern life. So let's make sure we don't deliberately harm them. And now there have been
several mysterious cases of cables being cut or damaged. And that raises the question,
now that has happened in the Baltic Sea, off the coast of Taiwan several times, which country will
be next? And it's not just the case that if it's off the coast of one country, that country is
capable to, by definition, connect several countries, at least two countries. So it is
a problem not just for the countries in whose waters that damage or cut may occur.
So NATO now has this detection technology that should give it more time to react to a ship
that may intend to damage undersea infrastructure. How much of a difference do you think this
technology could make? It is good to have the technology. It's always better to know than not
to know. And there are a number of technology companies that have developed solutions, sensors
and so forth, that they say will make a big difference as well. And they are trying to sell
to undersea cable operators and indeed to NATO. But the question it boils down to is,
what do we do with this information? So if a cable operator or NATO patrols discover that a ship
seems to be about to cut a cable in NATO waters, or indeed anywhere else,
what does that country then do? Does it send out the Navy to chase away that vessel? What happens
if that vessel doesn't leave? And this is the dilemma really facing NATO and every country
that may be affected by sabotage of its cables. What are you going to do, even if you get the
information ahead of the cable guy? What are you going to do? Because if you send out your Navy to
chase the potential saboteur away, whoever is behind that potential saboteur may decide to
escalate back. Elizabeth, thank you very much. That was Elizabeth Bross,
senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
