This One REALLY Upset Me…| Gulf Air flight 072

Warship And Aircraft
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Why? Why would he have done something like this?
A couple of very bad decisions from the pilots isn't sometimes all it takes to cause an aircraft
disaster. At least this is the way that the media portrays aircraft accidents. But is that really
true? The story I will tell you today looks from the onset like exactly such a scenario,
with almost unbelievable carelessness shown. But was it really that simple? Stay tuned.
The flight crew, who would later find themselves in a true nightmare scenario,
started that day at a hotel in Cairo, Egypt. The captain and first officer, who flew for the
Middle Eastern carrier Gulf Air, had spent the previous night hanging out with other crew
members and – in the captain's case – also gambling at a local casino. And while the captain
had therefore stayed up until 3 am, their next flight wasn't due until the following afternoon,
so he got plenty of sleep and reportedly woke up feeling well-rested.
The date was the 23rd of August the year 2000, and their assigned trip on that day
was Gulf Air's regular flight 072 from Cairo over to the small island nation of Bahrain,
located east of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf. The aircraft that they were going to use was a
nearly six-year-old Airbus A320, which was in a great technical condition with no significant
faults recorded on it. The weather was also reported as great along the route with warm
temperatures and not a cloud in the sky, so the pilots would have been expecting a relatively
straightforward flight as they were going through their pre-flight briefing.
The commander of the flight was a 37-year-old captain of Bahraini nationality who had
accumulated 4,416 total hours over his six-year career as a pilot with Gulf Air.
He had originally joined the company as a flight engineer cadet at the age of just 17 back in 1979,
and he then spent several years as a flight engineer on the Lockheed L-1011 before being
promoted to first officer in 1994. After that he was then transferred over to the Boeing 767 later
that same year and then further on to the Airbus A320 in 1998, back to the 767 in 1999 and then
again back to the Airbus A320 in January of the year 2000. He was then promoted to captain on the
Airbus A320 on June the 17th that same year, but he subsequently took three weeks of vacation between
July the 30th and August the 19th, so as a result he had only accumulated 86 hours as a pilot in
command by the time of this flight. Most pilots who had flown with the captain described him
favourably, but he had only narrowly passed his upgrade check right back in April after receiving
some poor grades on two different emergency manoeuvres. Some pilots also said that he had
a tendency towards overconfidence and occasionally reacted poorly to suggestions from his first
officers. Speaking of which, working as his first officer on this day was a 25-year-old Omani
national who had only been flying the Airbus A320 for Gulf Air since April that same year,
which meant that he had only accumulated a total of 608 hours. His training record was quite spotty
and in fact he had initially failed his Airbus A320 proficiency check back in October of 1999
after receiving D grades on seven different items, including VOR DME approaches,
normal landings and automation technology. Captains who had flown with the first officer
described him as timid, meek and slightly reserved, albeit keen to learn. They also
mentioned that he had shown some difficulty with handling unfamiliar situations, that he didn't
ask clarifying questions and might hesitate to challenge the captain. One instructor had
deliberately tested the first officer on that point by exceeding the taxi speed limits on purpose
during a simulator session just to see if the first officer would say something, but he didn't.
It should also be mentioned that despite being very new to the job, the first officer already
had a previous incident on his record. In January of 2000, while the first officer was undergoing
line training under supervision, the aircraft he was flying had struck debris during take-off
from Abu Dhabi and was subsequently unable to pressurize. An internal Gulf Air investigation
found that the flight crew displayed poor airmanship and awareness during the emergency,
and the first officer ended up being sent for two days of remedial training.
I want to really emphasize here that this is how an airline should react if knowledge deficiencies
are found out. Providing extra training and then possibly following up with some extra line checks
is standard procedures when a pilot has committed errors that weren't done on purpose.
That really just forms part of a just culture where people shouldn't be punished if they've
done something but they didn't mean to. Anyway, despite the first officer's record,
he had now been placed with a very new captain with little command experience and
that would not happen at most major airlines today. Gulf Air did have a probationary period
for new captains, during which time they couldn't fly with inexperienced first officers,
but this period originally lasted only 40 flights and in 1999 the company had then cut that down
even further to just 20 flights. So at the time of this flight there were no restrictions on who
this captain could fly with. Now, if it seems strange to you that Gulf Air would roll back
a safety measure, you wouldn't be alone in thinking so. And to explain what was really
going on here, we need to look a little bit closer at this airline, which I will soon do.
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us create these videos. Now let's get back to Gulf Air and their safety culture.
Gulf Air was originally a subsidiary of the British Overseas Airways Corporation,
the forbearer to British Airways, until in 1973 when a majority stake was purchased jointly by
the governments of Bahrain, Qatar, Amman and the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, which later became part of
the UAE. The airline then acted as a joint flag carrier for all of those countries,
with routes stretching from New York to Australia. Officially, the airline was registered in Oman,
placing it under the authority of the Oman Directorate General of Civil Aviation and
Meteorology, or DGCAM, while its chairmanship was rotated yearly between nationals of its
stakeholder countries. During the 1990s, Gulf Air then started to encounter some financial
difficulties and that's where things started to take an unfortunate turn. Records from the Oman
DGCA show that during this period regulators sent numerous letters to Gulf Air concerning
violations by the airline, many of which received no reply or were just inadequately corrected.
Gulf Air was subsequently sanctioned repeatedly for violations in areas ranging from flight
operations, duty time limit exceedances, flight training and record keeping, among many other
things. These sanctions included restrictions of its extended twin-engine operations,
ETOPS authorization, revocation of its right to carry out three-engine ferry flights on its
four-engine Airbus A340s, as well as suspension of several flight crew licenses.
DGCA inspectors assigned to Gulf Air noted that the airline had no crew resource management
training program, no quality management program, no safety awareness program and were also lacking
several other critical items required under the Oman Civil Aviation regulations.
Not only was communication with Gulf Air on these issues drawn out and difficult,
a later audit also found that the company expressed opposition to the existence of
many of these regulations in the first place. In fact, during this time, instead of trying to
comply, the company was actively reducing the number of safety programs that they had in place.
For example, back in 1992, Gulf Air had started an in-house CRM training program in order to
improve teamwork in the cockpit, but that was then discontinued in 1996 and replaced with nothing.
The airline's human factors manager tried to organize a new CRM training program,
but was totally unable to make any progress, so he just resigned, only for his replacement
to come across the very same problem. What all of this shows us is that Gulf Air's
management seemed to have a really problematic attitude towards flight safety. And it looks like
Gulf Air executives might have been viewing safety as a cost to be minimized instead of
recognizing that safety programs like these tend to save money in the long term. As the saying goes,
if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident.
In 1999, Oman then introduced a requirement for all airlines in the country to have
CRM training programs, at which point Gulf Air basically just complied and contracted a third
party to implement one by May of 2000. But then a contractual dispute delayed its development and
by the time of this flight, the training still hadn't started yet. That meant that since both
pilots of flight 072 were trained ab initio in-house by Gulf Air, neither had ever received
any real CRM training, which is a fact that is going to become super important to this story.
But that wasn't the only crucial training that they had missed.
Gulf Air also didn't include normal go-arounds in its recurrent simulator training program, nor
did it provide pilots with continuous simulator training on how to respond to ground proximity
warnings, and that's also worth remembering here. So overall, I would say that the quality of
training that these pilots had received was probably a bit below the standard that should
have been expected, and soon we will see the consequences of that. Back in Cairo, while the
pilots were preparing their aircraft for departure, the 6th cabin crew oversaw the boarding of the
passengers, eventually leading to a total of 143 souls on board. The flight was originally
scheduled to depart at 16h00 local time, but the pilots only arrived to the aircraft shortly before
that. The crew of the previous flight reported that the captain had seemed angry when they arrived,
and that he had told them that they were late because some company ground personnel had told
them to go to the wrong gate. As a result, the flight eventually departed 52 minutes late,
pushing its expected arrival time to well past 19h00, by which time it would be fully dark in
Bahrain. Anyway, the pilots proceeded with setting up the aircraft and after a completely normal
departure, the flight soon continued its climb up to its cruising altitude, and then proceeded
uneventfully towards its destination, crossing over the Arabian Peninsula with the sun setting
behind them. The captain was acting as the pilot flying and the first officer as pilot monitoring
for the whole flight, and there are no indications that anything out of the ordinary happened during
the cruise phase of the flight. Eventually though, flight 072 started getting closer to the destination
and they began their descent while within the Damam air traffic control sector in Saudi Arabia,
and this is where we will pick up the sequence of events at time 19h21 as the aircraft descended
through 14 000 feet. Damam approach control soon cleared flight 072 to proceed on its own discretion
directly towards the initial approach fix for runway 12 at Bahrain international airport,
and the controller also told them to descend to 3 500 feet and to contact Bahrain approach.
The first officer immediately read this back and then called up Bahrain approach to report their
position. When the new controller heard this, he asked the flight to confirm that they had been
cleared down to 3 500 feet, which was standard for the aircraft transitioning over from Damam,
but the captain had apparently misheard that previous clearance and told the first officer
to report that they were only cleared to 7 000 feet, and the first officer did this without any
type of protest. In response, the Bahrain controller simply again told them to continue their descent
down to 3 500 feet, but somewhere around here, and possibly even before, flight 072 had started
to acquire some quite excessive indicated airspeed, well above 300 knots, which is something
that would soon come to have a profound effect on what's about to happen. The final report isn't
super clear about why this excessive speed was allowed to develop, but one possible contributing
factor is that the captain misunderstood that previous clearance, which might have caused him
to descend too slowly at first, only to then pitch down and allow the speed to build up in order to
catch up with their intended descent profile. It is also possible that the Direct 2 clearance that
they had received earlier towards the final approach fix had cut down their available track
miles and therefore led them to be high. In any case, there were no operational or ATC related
reasons why such a high speed would be necessary, since there was no other traffic in the area and
plenty of space available to descend. No, instead, it seems likely that the captain might have
deliberately used a higher than normal speed here in a misguided attempt to make up for being late
and or to impress his brand new first officer. In fact, during the descent, the captain had tried
to show off his ability to quickly set up the navigational system for the approach without the
first officer even noticing, which he then bragged about. Anyway, this excessive speed was then
maintained as the aircraft descended down below 10,000 feet, where a speed limit of 250 knots
would normally be enforced in most parts of the world, but Bahrain didn't have any official speed
limit at low altitudes. And whilst most airlines enforced its 250 knot limit internally anyway,
even in countries that doesn't really formally require it, Gulf Air had no such policy.
Technically, the pilots were supposed to check with their traffic control before flying faster
than 250 knots anyway, but that didn't happen. Instead, the flight was now cleared down to 1,500
feet and at time 19.25 the captain started maneuvering to intercept the final approach
fix for the non-precision VOR-DME approach to Bahrain's runway 12. A VOR-DME approach uses a
very high frequency omnidirectional range radio beacon to define the approach course which the
use track with their instruments to align precisely for the runway. The VOR doesn't
provide vertical guidance like an instrument landing system does, so instead the pilots will
track their distance from the airport's distance measuring equipment or DME and then start their
descent at predetermined distances according to the approach charts. In bad weather, a VOR-DME
is less precise than an ILS and can therefore be a bit trickier to fly especially in bad weather,
but on this day the weather wasn't an issue at all since the visibility was almost unlimited.
According to the approach chart for this particular approach, flight 072 would need
to use the VOR to align with the runway at a minimum distance of 9 nautical miles from the DME
station and at a platform height of 1,500 feet. In this case, the DME station was situated 2 nautical
miles beyond the far end of the airport, so if you want to compare DME distances to the remaining
track miles to the runway, you have to subtract 2. Now that's not super important for this story,
but just something that I wanted to mention in order to avoid some confusion as we continue.
Now, after aligning with the VOR at 9 DME, the chart called for level flight at 1,500 feet until
reaching 7 DME, at which point the pilots could initiate a steady descent down towards the runway.
According to Gulf Air's standard operating procedures, when flying a non-precision approach
like this, the pilots had to configure the aircraft fully for landing before reaching
the final approach fix, which in this case was at 7 DME. Since non-precision approaches are
generally more complicated to fly and require more focus, most airlines at the time had this SOP to
enable the pilots to fully focus on the navigation once the descent was initiated.
For the Airbus A320, that meant that the flaps needed to be set to full, the landing gear needed
to be down, and in this case they also needed to maintain an altitude of 1,500 feet prior to the
fix. On top of that, the indicated speed could not be more than 5 knots below or 10 knots above
the calculated approach speed, which for flight 072 was set at 136 knots. If these parameters were
met, then the approach would have been allowed to continue, at least down until something that
we refer to as the approach gate. Under the stabilized approach concept, an approach is
considered stabilized if, upon reaching the approach gate, the aircraft is in the landing
configuration, the thrust levers are set correctly, the speed, course and altitudes are correct,
and only minor control inputs would be needed in order to land in the touchdown zone.
At Gulf Air, that approach gate for a VOR DME approach was at 1,000 feet above the runway,
which would normally be reached at just above 5 DME on this particular approach, meaning about
3 miles from the runway. Now, the correct thing to do is to go around if the company's stabilized
approach criteria can't be met by the approach gate, but Gulf Air's manuals just said that the
pilots should consider going around in that scenario, which seems to imply, improperly of
course, that the pilots had a choice to continue instead. Anyway, we don't know exactly how much
that particular issue had any influence here, but what we do know is that it should have been
obvious from a very early stage that this particular approach would not be stabilized
by 1,000 feet. During the descent, the captain extended the speed brakes a couple of times in
order to try and slow the aircraft down, but he didn't use them to their fullest extent.
By the time the pilots had intercepted the landing course at 9 DME, they were still at 1,873 feet
instead of the required 1,500 feet, and their airspeed was still at an absolutely insane 313
knots. At that point, the correct thing to do would have been to request a nice big 360-degree
orbit, or a holding pattern, or maybe even some radar vectors, and then they would have been able
to use those extra track miles to properly slow down and descend to the correct altitude. If that
would have been done, that might have added another five minutes or so to the flight, but that would
have been it. But the captain didn't want to do that. In fact, these pilots never even discussed
that possibility. Instead, the captain simply extended the speed brakes again and continued
barrelling onwards towards the final approach fix without saying anything about how he was going to
deal with the situation. One of the consequences of flying at such high speeds is that the timeline
where you need to act and do things during the approach becomes really compressed, and that
can make it really easy to fall behind the aircraft and therefore make the situation even
more complicated. The first officer's job here since he was pilot monitoring should have been
to point out that the approach was unlikely to succeed and suggest an alternative course of
action, or at least express that he was uncomfortable with what he was seeing.
But this poor first officer, who remember had no CRM training to teach him strategies for speaking
up, just remained silent. In fact, at no point during this flight did the first officer do
anything except respond to instructions from the captain and read checklist items. He never
provided any original input and the captain never really asked for any either. That left the captain
basically flying solo, which is not what you want in the type of high workload situation that can
develop when you're too fast on approach, as we will soon see. Anyway, as flight 072 approached
the final approach fix at 7 DME, the captain now instructed the first officer to report that they
were established on the VOR DME approach. And when he did, the Bahrain approach controller
responded by handing him over to the tower controller, who immediately cleared the aircraft
to land. The first officer read this back and flight 072 now passed the final approach fix
at 7 DME, which meant that the captain could start descending down towards the runway.
At this point, the plane was not in the approach configuration at all. The landing gear had just
been extended, but the captain was only calling for flaps 1 and their airspeed was at 224 knots
and their altitude at 1678 feet, so still almost 200 feet too high. Now the Airbus A320 has
five flap settings, starting with 0, meaning retracted, 1, 2, 3 and full, where flaps full
was normally used for landing in Gulf air. But each flap stage must be selected below a certain
indicated speed, because at higher speeds the aerodynamic pressure on the flaps could otherwise
be too great. That's why the crew had been unable to extend the flaps to the landing position before
reaching the final approach fix. And they were now in a position where it was impossible to
configure fully for landing before reaching the approach gate, since there just wasn't enough
time left to slow down. Instead, as the flight approached 1000 feet, the captain announced that
he was now visual with the airfield and therefore in his mind he had switched from an instrument
approach to a visual approach. When flying visually with the runway in sight, the approach
gate can be brought down to 500 feet instead of 1000 feet, so he likely tried to just buy himself
some extra time here by using that rule. But at this point, their airspeed was still at 207 knots,
over 70 knots too high, and the flaps were still only in position 1. The captain announced that
they had to be stabilized by 500 feet, and he then ordered the first officer to select flaps 2,
but within the next 15 seconds he finally started to realize the inevitable, and at time 1927 he
declared, we're not going to make it. Of course, this was a very unsurprising conclusion, something
that he could have very easily avoided by slowing down further out or asking for more track miles,
but his overconfidence had now led him to this crossroad. And to be perfectly honest here,
most pilots have been in similar situations at some time during their career. I definitely know
that I have. Standard procedure at this point would have been to just execute the normal go-around,
which for this approach was as simple as just to climb straight ahead following the runway heading
to 2,500 feet and then return to the start of the approach for another attempt. But instead of
doing that, the captain just allowed this descent to continue for a short period while he decided on
a proper course of action. And then he disconnected the autopilot, turned off the flight directors,
and told the first officer to request a 360 degree left orbit. Now it has to be emphasized here that
once you have passed the final approach fix, the only permitted maneuver are to either continue
for landing, go around, or possibly circle to land on the reciprocal runway if that has been
pre-briefed. An orbit on final approach is not standard practice and should not be attempted
since visual maneuvers outside of the ones that I just mentioned must be conducted above the
minimum safe altitude, which in this case was 1,500 feet. And in most cases airlines have even
more stringent rules about 360s than that. Now the reason for this is that it's just plain risky
to do something like this since it normally just destabilizes the approaches even further,
and most transport aircraft aren't really designed to perform complex maneuvers in
full landing configuration either. So all around this was a pretty bad idea.
Now the first officer should have spoken up here and said something like
hey I think we should just go around and if he would have done that it is likely that the
captain would have listened to him. You see we captains can sometimes get very deep into the
getteritis and we actually appreciate when the pilot monitoring speaks up and offers a voice of
reason. But instead this first officer just continued to say nothing and the captain therefore
started to execute a fully manual 360 degree orbit on final approach on a moonless night
partially over water at less than 600 feet above the ground. Now I want to stop here and ask a
really important question. Why do you think a pilot would choose to do something like this?
Why would he disregard rules, regulations and plain common sense? Well the answer it turns out
is that there are several factors that can lead to intentional non-compliance with SOPs and rules and
all of them were in play here. Now of course the captain's history of overconfidence and
penchant for showing off may have predisposed him to take risks. After all he was new to his role
and he may have felt a bit embarrassed about his failure to stabilize the approach under these
nearly perfect weather and visibility conditions. In such situations a go-around can feel like
admitting to failure which can be difficult to do for some people. But studies have also shown
that pilots can intentionally deviate from SOPs if everybody does it or if the SOP is not perceived
as realistic. In other words it's part of the company culture or they might also do it in an
attempt to optimize things like time, fuel consumption or workload. Now violation for
any of these reasons become more likely under four main conditions. First the expectation that
the rule will have to be bent in order to get the job done. Secondly high confidence in one's own
ability to accomplish the task. Third the presence of opportunities to do things more efficiently
than the procedure allows. And fourth inadequate planning forcing problem solving on the fly.
And as it turns out all of these risk factors were present here. First of all according to
air traffic controllers some gulf air flights had occasionally done orbits on final approach
in the past so the captain was probably aware that there were informal precedents for doing this.
Secondly an orbit instead of doing a go-around would obviously save both time and fuel. And third
the crew had not recently discussed the go-around procedure or what criteria they would need in
order to go around. So in other words insufficient planning. There was no trace on the cockpit voice
recorder of a proper briefing but of course the recording was only 30 minutes long so it could
have happened earlier. Anyway what I think is by far the most important external factor here was
the company culture. You see while gulf air insisted that no pilots were ever to be punished
for going around from an unstable approach they still required pilots to submit a report
about the reason for the go-around if they did one. Now not only was this extra paperwork probably
pretty annoying to do but it also led to the perception among some gulf air pilots that the
airline viewed go-arounds unfavorably. And that right there is absolutely unacceptable. Anytime
pilots develop that impression even if they're wrong the airline needs to take clear and
unambiguous action to dispel those type of worries. Because when pilots feel pressure
not to go around they will start taking risks to avoid them. So if you imagine yourself in the
captain's shoes here you've just messed up this approach by flying too fast for no real reason
and you're now unstabilized. But if you go around you'll have to submit paperwork explaining to your
why you couldn't land on a nice long runway with unlimited visibility, minimal wind and
no other traffic and a perfectly functioning aircraft. So why subject yourself to all of that
when you could just do an orbit instead to get back on track and just land? Does it make a little
bit more sense to you now? Yeah. Anyway one way that the airlines can prevent this kind of thing
is by monitoring flight data over their fleet for unusual signals or exceedances of certain
parameters. This is called a flight data monitoring program and it can be super useful to detect when
pilots are routinely violating SOPs in situations that wouldn't otherwise be reported. Now those
kind of programs allows airlines to identify the root causes of violations and change their
policies in order to incentivize the correct actions. But Gulf Air's flight data monitoring
program only existed on paper. The airline had even purchased its planes with quick access data
recorders installed to facilitate this kind of monitoring, but they had never been turned on.
So this is basically a great example of how airline policies and culture can play a huge
role in pilot decision making and explain why certain seemingly inexplicable decisions are
taken. Anyway in the Bahrain control tower a trainee controller was operating the tower
position under supervision when flight 072 called up to request that orbit. At this point flight
072 had not reported that they were visual so as far as the controller knew they were still flying
the VOR approach where such a maneuver was definitely not allowed. So strictly speaking
the controller should have denied this request and just ordered their flights to execute a go
around instead, but both the trainee controller and his supervisor didn't really recognize the
problem and instead just approved the request for that 360 turn. So the captain now finally
started turning left to begin the orbit while positioned just 0.9 nautical miles short of the
runway threshold which is just insane. At this point their altitude was still 584 feet with an
airspeed of 177 knots meaning that they were still over 100 feet too high and 40 knots too
fast. As the captain held the plane in the turn he told the first officer to first select flaps
two then flaps three and then finally flaps full and after having done that the first officer
called out that the landing checklist was now complete. The captain was now flying the plane
manually in full high drag landing configuration which was quite difficult because even the fly
by wire Airbus A320 doesn't handle very well with full flaps in level flight and in a turn.
And to make matters even worse Bahrain airport is located on a small island in the Persian Gulf
so as the left turn progressed the airplane soon passed over the airport and out of the water
which was pitch black since the sun had set and the moon hadn't yet risen. Since the captain had
turned off the autopilot and the flight directors he was now flying visually and he soon found
himself forced to glance back and forth between his instruments and out the window in search for
a reference point. The flight data shows that he was having difficulty controlling the plane in both
roll and pitch and he might have started to become disoriented already at this point. During the
altitude fluctuated wildly from as low as 332 feet to as high as 965 feet and they repeatedly
exceeded the normal 25 degree maximum bank angle reaching a maximum of 36 degrees of left bank.
In the tower the controllers were somewhat concerned by flight 072's erratic flight path
but as the flight neared the runway centerline the tower reissued the landing clearance anyway.
At that moment the first officer declared runway in sight as the airport lights became visible
again off to their left and when catching sight of the lights the captain instinctively leveled
the wings in order to regain his bearings and determine his position relative to the runway
but he did so way too early. The airplane was now flying almost 90 degrees off the approach course
soon passing a beamed runway threshold which was near their 10 o'clock position.
The captain started cursing and announced we overshot it at which point he resumed the left
turn and also started pushing the thrust up. Clicking his tongue in frustration he then told
the first officer to call the tower up and announce that they were now finally going around.
At the time the go-around was initiated the captain was probably already somewhat disoriented
and definitely quite stressed not only by the difficulty of the maneuver but likely also by
his failure to achieve the intended goal. So far everything the captain had tried only seemed
to make the situation worse and now that he had finally decided to bail out he found himself doing
so from a highly abnormal position. When we humans are under a lot of stress the likelihood of making
errors increases significantly and sometimes those errors compound making the situation more
stressful which makes errors even more likely until things start to spiral completely out of
control. And that is exactly what now happened over the coming 55 seconds. Now during a go-around
the pilot should apply go-around thrust pitch up to about 15 degrees retract the flaps to position
3 verify positive climb and then retract the landing gear. These are memory items so the
needs to know them by heart but in this case not only did Gulf Air pilots not practice normal
go-arounds in recurrent simulator training the high stress and their unusual position relative
to the runway would likely have made it more difficult for the pilots to recall those memory
items while still trying to maneuver the aircraft. Initially the captain started pulling back on his
side stick reaching a pitch up of almost 14 degrees but instead of holding it there he then started
likely instinctively pitching the nose back down again below 10 degrees as he continued the left
hand turn. Meanwhile he also called for go-around flaps and at the same time in response to the
first officer's go-around call the tower asked if they would like radar vectors back for another
approach. The captain answered yes and the first officer replied as such whilst also moving the
flap lever back to position 3 like the captain had asked for. The captain then also called for
the gear to be retracted and the first officer complied but the aircraft still continued turning
left past the runway centerline instead of following the published go-around procedure
which was to follow the runway heading straight ahead. Now we don't know why that happened but
it might have been in anticipation of the imminent radar vectors back onto the approach or the captain
was now getting so task saturated that he was missing that the aircraft was still turning.
At the same time he kept applying subtle probably subconscious forward pressure on his side stick
causing the nose to slowly drop towards 6 degrees way below the go-around pitch attitude of 15
degrees. It's worth noting here that during a go-around with the flight director engaged the
flight director overlay on the primary flight display would have indicated the target pitch
angle of 15 degrees but because he had turned the flight directors off during the orbit there was
now no target pitch shown. Most likely the captain was not even aware that he was making these nose
down inputs because he would have been focused on turning the plane and calling for the go-around
configuration. And what happens when an aircraft starts pitching down with go-around thrust set?
Yes, it starts accelerating. Now in a disoriented state an increase in forward acceleration can feel
very similar to an increase in pitch and that's because both forces pushes you in the same
direction relative to your seat basically back into it and the vestibular system in our inner
ears cannot determine the difference between those two feelings. The only way that our brains have in
order to separate these two feelings is by outside visual references like a horizon or the attitude
indicator. This type of sensory confusion is called a somatogravic illusion and it has caused
several accidents over the years involving pitch down inputs during a go-around. So in this case
as the captain became more stressed and task saturated by this complex series of manoeuvres
he also started to become more susceptible to the effects of somatogravic illusion.
As the engine spooled up to toga thrust the low pitch angle resulted in more and more acceleration
which would have also added to that illusion with each passing second. The first officer now made
the standard positive climb and gear up call outs and at the exact same moment he did so
the controller instructed them to fly on heading 300 degrees and also to climb to 2500 feet.
The first officer correctly read this back and the captain asked him to repeat the heading which he
also did. The first officer then asked whether they should turn right or left to the captain but
the captain just did not respond. In fact he had now started to level the plane off on heading of
040 degrees instead of the cleared 300 degrees. Just two seconds later before anyone could clarify
the situation a continuous repetitive chime suddenly started blaring warning the pilots
that the plane was now exceeding the maximum speed of 185 knots for flaps in position three.
The first officer exclaimed that they were over the speed limit and as he did that the tower
instructed them to now contact Bahrain approach again. The first officer read this back but the
captain just let out a swear word he was likely now far down the stress cone. As all of this was
happening the aircraft proceeded out beyond the limits of Bahrain airport and towards the pitch
black persian gulf and that suddenly meant that the captain would now only see a complete
blackness outside of his windows. Within two seconds after this loss of visual references he
now started pushing forward even more on his side stick causing the nose to rapidly drop below the
horizon until it reached a terrifying minus 15 degrees the maximum pitch down allowed by the
Airbus A320's flight envelope protections. The timing here was not coincidental as the loss of
visual references greatly increases the effects of somatogravic illusion. Now he still had his
instruments working in front of him but he doesn't seem to have looked much of those.
As this was occurring the first officer called out speed checks flaps three and the captain
replied by ordering flaps up so he was still there somewhat even though he obviously weren't
handling the aircraft correctly. But then the stress rose even further when the ground proximity
warning system the GPWS suddenly realized the aircraft's ground closure rate and started calling
out sink rate followed by several pull up. Now the only correct way to respond to this particular
warning is to immediately pull the nose up as far as the flight envelope protections would allow
make sure that the thrust is set fully forward and that the speed brakes are retracted. But here
none of the pilots reacted to it at all. So what was going on? Well the final report actually used
a great analogy to help us understand that. You see you have to think of the human brain as a
one-channel processor. It can only handle so many things at a time before it reaches capacity and
then nothing new can get through. In situations of extreme stress where many different stimuli
are coming at us in a short period of time the brain can engage in what's known as load shedding
in which it simply stops processing certain stimuli according to an instinctive hierarchy
of importance. In many cases audio processing hearing is one of the first things to go which
is why sounds can feel muffled or dull in moments of extreme panic fear or confusion. So most likely
as more and more stress factors piled onto the captain he actually lost his ability to perceive
new auditory stimuli which physically prevented him from hearing the ground proximity warnings.
This type of situation can be prevented by rigorously drilling in the response to GPWS
warnings, the terrain escape maneuver, in a simulator since doing that retrains the
subconscious brain to give those warnings a higher priority. But of course Gulf Air
hadn't provided a sufficient amount of that type of training for these pilots.
Now the first officer's workload was much lower here since he wasn't responsible for
hand flying the airplane so it's hard to believe that he was so overloaded that he
couldn't hear those warnings. But because Gulf Air didn't provide ongoing training on either GPWS
response or flap over speed situations it's possible that the first officer didn't really
know which of these warnings presented a greater threat. Overspeeding the flaps isn't really a
direct safety threat but if he thought that it was, well then he would have faced a tough choice
on deciding which warning to address first. That choice was made for him though because the captain
remained focused on the overspeed warning and in fact as the first officer called out gears up and
started to mention the flaps the captain now called flaps all the way still with the GPWS
blaring in the background. When the confused and unassertive first officer saw the captain address
the flap issue first it's likely that he didn't even question whether this was the highest priority.
He again just accepted it. Now he probably didn't believe that his captain could fly the aircraft
straight down into the water but in fact that's exactly what was now happening. And by failing to
intervene and prompt the captain or possibly even to take over the controls the fate of this
aircraft was now sealed. In the final seconds the captain started pitching up slightly but this was
most likely a reaction to the captain's own disorientation rather than to the GPWS warnings.
The last word on the cockpit voice recorder was the first officer announcing that
flaps zero had been set and then it was all over. Two seconds later with nose down pitch of six
degrees and an airspeed of 282 knots flight 072 slammed into the Persian Gulf completely
destroying the airplane and all 143 souls on board were instantly lost. In the aftermath of this
accident it would have been easy for the investigators to write it off as yet another
case of crew spatial disorientation during a go-around. There have since been several tragic
accidents of this type where a pilot becomes disoriented and makes nose down inputs during
a go-around including but not limited to flight Dubai flight 981 in 2016, Tatarstan Airways flight
363 from 2013 and Armavia flight 967 back in 2006 which I have previously shown on this channel.
But to the investigators credit this investigation examined not only all of the factors that led to
the flight crews loss of situational and spatial awareness but also the reasons behind the bad
decisions that got them there in the first place. Intentional deviations from SOPs can seem in the
moment like a good idea but it's normally very hard to accurately assess the risks associated
with leaving the safety net that those procedures provide. Especially in situations where the margins
are already thin like during a landing or a go-around. Once we stop operating inside of those
defined procedures we risk getting ourselves into very complex and unanticipated situations
that might exceed our ability no matter how skilled we believe ourselves to be.
But what this investigation clearly showed was that this was much more complex than just
pilots disregarding rules. Nobody violates this many SOPs in a vacuum.
It was found that Gulf Air had contributed to this accident by ignoring and even eliminating
training programs that would have helped the first officer to speak up, encourage the pilots
to maintain a more sensible airspeed, eased the captain's go-around decision and improved
the pilots' response to the flapoverspeed and GPWS warnings. The airline also failed
to implement policies that could have avoided the pairing of two weak and inexperienced pilots
together as well as programs that could have monitored their own flight operations to find
any worrying trends. In the aftermath of the accident several key personnel at Gulf Air and
the Oman DGCA resigned and contractors were brought in to help overhaul the airline's
safety culture. Gulf Air temporarily suspended its instructor appointment and its Abenitio
training program in order to make major improvements to both processes. The airline
also introduced CRM training, more training on go-arounds, new procedures related to speed
management and a stabilised approach concept as well as visual manoeuvring. They also moved to
ensure that pilots would no longer perceive pressure to avoid go-arounds and they installed
an Airbus-approved modification that causes the flight director to automatically re-engage when
go-around mode is activated. The anti-safety mindset that once played Gulf Air's top management
was purged during several periods of leadership turnover which involved a major scaling back of
the company's operations as all countries except Bahrain rescinded their joint ownership.
Gulf Air still exists today as the flag carrier of Bahrain but since the tragedy of flight 072
it hasn't had any more serious accidents. Now if you like this story then you should definitely
watch this video next and make sure that you also follow us on Spotify and join us on Patreon. I
would love to see you in my next hangout. My name is Petter Hörnfeldt and you're watching
MentorPilot. Have an absolutely fantastic day and I'll see you next time. Bye-bye.
