Worse Than Evergrande! 2.6 Billion Clears 147 Billion Debt, Leaving Unfinished Buildings for Chinese

Global Finance News
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I bought this apartment in Jinkou Jiuyuan for my son's wedding.
The plan was to receive the property on August 30th,
but now it's clear that the developer has defaulted.
Jinkou, the developer, has breached the contract.
So many properties here can't be delivered now.
I came to check again today.
This was supposed to be my son's wedding house.
There was supposed to be a living room, a kitchen,
a bathroom that wasn't finished.
The second bedroom was meant to be the child study room and sleeping area.
The master bedroom and its bathroom were planned here.
I originally bought a fully furnished apartment,
but now it's in this condition.
The developer has defaulted,
and now we are planning to gather thousands of people at the city government
at the end of this month to demand answers.
I spent 1 or 2 million yuan on this apartment,
and the developer took all the money,
but the property hasn't been delivered to me.
What should we do now?
I bought it here because it was supposed to be the last development in Yixing,
which is why we chose to buy it.
Now it's like this, and the government isn't doing anything.
You've cheated us, the common people.
I just walked around, and I only saw one security guard working.
Jinkou City, what can I do to save you?
From the once popular Wushang South development to today,
where the weeds are taller than the people,
My friend, in early 2022, rushed into buying this building.
It was almost all the same height back then,
and it still isn't finished.
So don't trust the developer's empty promises.
It's better to buy second-hand or completed properties.
Since there's supposed to be financial oversight,
where did the money go?
I don't know, and I don't dare to say.
The buildings aren't finished,
the project hasn't been delayed,
and the sales office is now empty.
The property owners have struggled to defend their rights in recent years.
From the once popular Wushang South project
to what many now call an unfinished development,
how did Jinkou end up like this?
Was it bad management, or did they misappropriate the funds?
I hope the relevant authorities will investigate.
While over 10,000 homebuyers struggle to defend their rights
and anxiously await delivery of their unfinished homes,
Chinese developers Jinkou Property Group
has quietly pulled off what some people are calling
a miracle in the capital market,
a complete debt wipeout.
Recently, Jinkou's announcement
that it has successfully cleared its debts
has drawn widespread attention
and become a bombshell in the real estate sector.
In stark contrast, Evergrande,
another major developer that plunged into a similar debt crisis,
remains mired in public scrutiny,
criminal investigations, and liquidation proceedings.
However, Jinkou, through a series of capital maneuvers
and court-led restructuring,
has managed to make what appears to be a dramatic comeback.
Founded in western China,
Jinkou was once among the top 10 property developers nationwide,
with business-spanning residential projects,
urban renewal, and commercial operations.
Like Evergrande, Jinkou relied heavily on leverage growth.
When the real estate market began to decline in 2021,
the high-debt strategy quickly turned into a major liquidity crisis.
In simple terms,
high leverage means companies were borrowing huge sums of money
to fund expansion instead of using their capital.
This model worked when the market was booming.
Companies like Evergrande and Jinkou
kept borrowing more to pay off older loans,
keeping up appearances.
But by 2021, China's economy took a sharp downturn
and the government introduced the Three Red Lines policy
to limit excessive borrowing in the real estate sector.
Banks became reluctant to lend
and companies could no longer sustain their operations by refinancing.
The cash dried up and defaults followed.
By September 30, 2023,
Jinkou's total debt had ballooned to 227 billion yuan.
Of that, 35 billion yuan was due within one year.
In February 2024,
Jinkou formally applied for bankruptcy restructuring.
Before the court accepted the case,
its listed subsidiary, Jinkou Holdings,
had already declared 75.5 billion yuan in general claims.
Of these, 54 billion yuan were confirmed
with another 14.3 billion yuan pending.
Meanwhile, Chongqing Jinkou had 44 billion yuan in confirmed claims
with 6 billion yuan pending
and nearly 30 billion yuan in unreported but potentially protected debt.
The restructuring plan covered a massive 147 billion yuan in total debt
and involved more than 8,400 creditors.
Yet surprisingly,
this mountain of debt was reportedly cleared
through an injection of just 2.6 billion yuan
from new investors,
a move some on social media jokingly described as
a miracle in the history of global finance.
As one person put it,
it's like using 100 million yuan to pay off 10 billion in debt.
And the creditor, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
actually agreed to it.
The mastermind behind this must be a world-class negotiator.
So how exactly did Jinkou pull off this feat,
clearing hundreds of billions in debt with just 2.6 billion yuan?
The answer may lie with the man behind Jinkou, Huang Hongyun.
Huang's story is often cited as a classic Chinese rags-to-riches tale.
In 1998, he founded Jinkou Real Estate
and quickly expanded across southwest China
with projects like the Jinkou Garden series,
earning him the nickname King of the Southwest.
In 2006, Jinkou went public by merging with a listed company.
Huang soon appeared on China's rich list
with a net worth of 15 billion yuan.
The real turning point came in 2014,
seeking to cash out at the peak of his company's value.
Huang teamed up with China's private equity king,
Xu Xiang,
to inflate Jinkou's stock price
under the banner of investing in new energy.
The stock rose from 2 yuan to nearly 10 yuan per share.
In just one week, he cashed out 2.8 billion yuan,
and over 2014 and 2015,
he withdrew more than 6 billion yuan in total.
Jinkou then quietly canceled its province performance targets,
signaling that the capital extraction was complete.
That money fueled Jinkou's rapid rise.
By 2020, its sales exceeded 200 billion yuan,
its total assets reached 400 billion,
and the company secured a spot on China's top 500 enterprises list.
But problems soon followed.
Authorities investigated Huang for manipulating the stock price.
In 2017, he reportedly divorced his wife,
possibly to transfer shares and avoid risks.
Then came the market crash.
As the government tightened real estate regulations in 2021,
Jinkou's sales plunged to just 55 billion yuan.
Huang borrowed against his shares to keep operations afloat,
with a pledged share ratio as high as 72.8%.
The stock price collapsed,
the company posted years of losses,
and CITIC Securities sold off pledged shares,
triggering further controversy.
The final blow came from within the family.
In 2023, Huang's ex-wife, Hong Xia Dao,
publicly accused him of stock ownership dispute,
sending the market into a panic.
Share prices plummeted,
and the once-mighty property tycoon fell from grace.
At its peak, Jinkou operated nearly 300 real estate projects
across more than 60 cities in China.
But since 2021,
many of these projects have been abandoned mid-construction.
Tens of thousands of buyers
were left with homes they couldn't live in.
At least 60,000 households have been affected,
with many still fighting to stop mortgage payments
and defend their rights.
Meanwhile, Jinkou carried out large-scale layoffs and pay cuts.
Many employees in sales, design, and engineering were forced out.
Reports of unpaid wages appeared frequently in the news.
Today, many of Jinkou's construction sites
are plastered with court-issued red seals,
indicating asset seizures.
By 2022, Jinkou's finances were nearly paralyzed.
Debt payments came due,
and creditors swarmed the company demanding payment.
Huang could no longer fill that massive financial hole.
In 2023, Jinkou officially filed for court-supervised restructuring.
But this process dragged down countless stakeholders—
banks, suppliers, homebuyers, and investors.
One investor who held Jinkou bonds vented his frustration.
This is blatant exploitation.
They call it restructuring,
but it's just bankruptcy with a different name.
Behind Jinkou's miraculous comeback lies another key player—
the consortium led by Shanghai Pingqi Management Consulting
and Beijing Tianjiao Lu Yuan Real Estate Development.
This group includes influential names
such as former China Merchants Bank president Ma Weihua,
who now serves as honorary chairman,
and real estate mogul Feng Lun, who is chairman.
Another major figure is Feng Biao,
the man who led the restructuring of Huludao Zinc Industry,
a major zinc company.
Each of these players bring deep financial
and political connections to the table,
and none of them are ordinary figures.
Ma Weihua, the former president of China Merchants Bank,
is now the honorary chairman of Jinkou's restructuring.
With a background in the financial industry,
he advocates for market-based reforms
and financial innovation,
and is regarded as a moderate figure.
Feng Lun, one of the six gentlemen at Wanton,
has had a distinguished career in both government and business.
In the early 1990s,
he transitioned to the private sector
and became a prominent businessman.
Now serving as the chairman of Jinkou's restructuring,
Feng maintains close ties with top officials
and is known as a red-circle entrepreneur
for his ability to navigate
between government policies and capital.
Feng Biao, a low-profile figure
known as a shadow capital operator,
previously led the restructuring of a major zinc company.
Though he lacks a high-level political background,
Feng understands local government business dynamics
and maintains strong connections
within the government-business alliance.
These three figures executed the following strategy.
First step, stabilize with minimal funds.
The restructuring group injected 2.6 billion yuan.
On the surface, this was to save the company,
but in reality it served as a stabilizing force,
paying salaries,
ensuring unfinished homes are delivered,
and initiating court procedures.
It acted like a lubricant
rather than addressing the debt directly.
Second step, turn creditors into shareholders.
Creditors who originally came to collect debts
were forced to accept a debt-for-equity swap
and trust repayment plan.
For example, if a creditor lent 100 yuan,
they might only receive a few yuan worth of stock
and some future installments,
effectively a discounted forced-equity deal.
Third step, avoid bankruptcy while preserving the shell.
After significantly reducing its debt,
Zhenke appeared to be the lender
and ready for a fresh start.
However, control shifted to the new investors.
It's like a driver was swapped out
and the original creditors were kicked out of the car.
Ultimately, the real beneficiaries of this market rescue
were Feng Biao, Feng Lun, Ma Weihua,
and other capital giants behind the scenes.
For just 2.6 billion yuan,
they acquired over half of Zhenke's shares
at a bargain price.
Some institutional creditors were prioritized for repayment
due to their connections,
and local governments also used this
to ease pressure on delivering homes.
In the end, this wasn't a rescue.
It was a wealth redistribution,
with the real losers being the small creditors,
suppliers, homebuyers, and retail investors.
In comparison to Evergrande's dramatic collapse,
Zhenke's handling of its debt crisis
seemed far more elegant yet much colder.
Evergrande's default became a public spectacle
with founder Xu Jiayin facing jail time
as authorities cracked down hard.
The entire process was harsh and public.
In contrast, Zhenke, with just 2.6 billion yuan,
managed to restructure 147 billion yuan in debt.
They used legal frameworks and other tactics
to dilute and clean out creditors,
eventually emerging from the process
with what they call a rebirth.
Evergrande's debt was outright default,
while Zhenke's debt clearance
was a more systemic, legalized looting.
Xu Jiayin fought to the bitter end
but ultimately faced liquidation,
while Zhenke's real controller, Huang Hongyun,
cashed out billions before stepping back,
exiting the scene with grace.
A deeper difference lies in the path they took.
Evergrande expanded aggressively
using traditional high-turnover leapfrog methods,
while Zhenke brought in financial capital
to lead its expansion.
By shifting assets, diluting shares, and packaging debt,
Zhenke calculated a way out.
Evergrande's collapse became a nationwide lesson,
while Zhenke's restructuring was presented
as a successful model of market clearing
with media and government approval.
The real sharp difference is this.
Evergrande lost to reality,
while Zhenke succeeded through strategy.
One collapsed dramatically,
the other made a quiet exit.
Zhenke's restructuring has been packaged as a success story
and received government support
because it offers a replicable turnaround template
for other high-debt developers.
This method, which masks responsibility
under the guise of rules,
has been seen by the Chinese Communist Party
as an emergency solution to stabilize the housing market
and rescue China's troubled real estate industry.
Currently, due to the sharp decline
in China's economy and housing market,
many real estate companies are on the brink of bankruptcy.
Among them is Vanke,
another leading developer aside from Evergrande.
On July 14th, leading real estate developer China Vanke
announced its performance forecast for the first half of 2025,
projecting losses of 10 to 12 billion yuan,
a significant increase from the previous year.
Vanke reported sales revenue of 69.1 billion yuan,
delivering over 45,000 units
with a payment collection rate exceeding 100%.
However, after excluding non-recurring income,
the actual loss was 9.5 to 11.5 billion yuan.
The company cited declining settlement volumes,
low gross margins, asset impairments,
and failed large-scale transactions
as key reasons for ongoing operational challenges.
Vanke relies heavily on its major shareholder,
Shenzhen Metro Group,
for repeated financial support to maintain cash flow.
Since early 2025,
Shenzhen Metro has provided over 21.8 billion yuan in loans,
using its subsidiary Wanwu Cloud shares as collateral.
Despite no foreign debt maturing until 2027,
Vanke's financial strain persists
with efforts to self-rescue
through a focused strategy and operational revival.
Industry consensus holds that Vanke's massive losses
underscore systemic risks in the real estate sector.
If even top firms struggle,
smaller, already defaulted developers face dire prospects.
Amid market imbalances and collapsing confidence,
Vanke's self-rescue appears more like a desperate struggle.
Vanke is not alone.
Several state-owned developers also announced expected losses,
highlighting the industry's severe crisis.
China Overseas Land and Investment, under SASAC,
anticipates losses of 2.3 to 2.9 billion yuan,
more than double last year's.
Beijing's Shoukai Real Estate
expects losses of 1.6 to 2.1 billion yuan.
Tianjin's Jintou Urban Development
forecasts 500 to 600 million yuan.
And Shanghai state-backed Greenland Holdings
projects losses of 3 to 3.5 billion yuan.
Private developers fare no better.
Sinda Real Estate anticipates losses
of 3.5 to 3.9 billion yuan.
Rongchen Real Estate Development
expects 2.2 to 3.3 billion yuan.
Zhenko's successful restructuring
has set an escape script for debt-laden firms
like Sunac, Tahoe Group, and China Fortune Land Development,
avoiding liquidation, bankruptcy, or accountability
through restructuring.
Yet ordinary creditors and homebuyers bear the losses.
The Chinese government permitted Zhenko's exit
not out of leniency, but for stability-first priorities.
Though not a national leader,
Zhenko's extensive projects and complex debt
in southwestern China risk widespread unfinished buildings,
local debt defaults, and social unrest if liquidated.
Authorities opted for a graceful exit
Operationally, Zhenko's restructuring
is a classic cage swap, using debt-for-equity swaps
and new capital to transfer control.
This fulfills local governments'
insure-home-delivery mandates
while creating space for state-linked capital to expand.
For the CCP, delivering homes and containing financial risks
takes precedence over creditors' recovery.
This reflects the CCP's logic,
sacrificing fairness for order
More critically, such restructurings
expose massive risks in banks, trusts, and bond institutions,
revealing the financial system's heavy reliance
on real estate and its fragility.
Regulators will likely reassess real estate loan models
and collateral valuations, further tightening financing.
Moreover, Zhenko's restructuring is not a true market clearing,
but a government-orchestrated soft landing,
leaving homebuyers without recourse,
creditors with total losses,
and local financial systems unstable.
As such, limited support becomes the norm,
institutional credibility erodes,
and social risks accumulate silently,
potentially triggering irreversible chain reactions.
Ultimately, unresolved individual losses
will burden society as a whole.
Chinese issues expert Wang He argues
that the Chinese government's attempts
to rescue the economy and housing market
through policies have already failed.
Official data shows that in the first half of 2025,
national real estate development investment
dropped 11.2%,
new home sale areas fell 3.5%,
and sales revenue declined 5.5%.
Compared to 2021,
both sales volume and value have nearly halved.
In June 2025, housing prices continued to fall,
with new home prices in first-tier cities
down 1.4% year-on-year.
Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen saw declines,
while only Shanghai rose.
Second- and third-tier cities faced steeper drops,
and the second-hand housing market's decline is widening.
Wang He believes that this clearly demonstrates
that the central government's 2024
Stop the Decline and Stabilize goal
has largely failed.
The so-called new real estate model
seems nearly impossible to implement
as it requires disrupting entrenched interests,
which the government lacks the capacity to achieve.
Wang He explained,
in 2022, a widespread mortgage strike
by owners of unfinished buildings
forced the government to launch
the Ensure Home Delivery campaign
with a dedicated task force.
However, with too many failing projects
and massive funding gaps,
banks, local governments, and developers
shifted blame, yielding poor results.
By 2024, 297 cities established
real estate financing coordination mechanisms
to push bank loans for whitelist projects.
By the end of 2024,
over 5 trillion yuan in loans were approved,
with another 570 billion yuan added
in the first 22 days of 2025,
totaling over 5.6 trillion yuan.
The government claimed that the delivery goal was met,
but the data tells a different story.
Despite massive spending,
residential completion areas plummeted,
down 27.4% in 2024
and 15.5% in the first half of 2025.
So much money spent,
yet homes aren't being built.
Does this make sense?
Ultimately, Ensure Home Delivery
tackles mostly unviable projects
that don't meet banks' compliance
and profitability criteria.
Banks are reluctant to invest,
and everyone is stalling
or going through the motions.
Policies abound,
but their impact is negligible.
Wang He continued,
During the real estate bubble,
people rushed to take out loans,
with mortgages accounting for 40% of household debt.
By the first half of 2025,
this fell to 9%,
reflecting a complete loss of confidence
in home buying.
In 2021,
while developer funds grew by only 4%,
personal mortgage loans surged by 8%.
After the bubble burst,
personal loans crashed even more sharply
than developer financing,
showing that ordinary people
are the real victims.
Wang He stressed,
In recent years,
the government rolled out policies
to save the housing market,
like lifting purchasing and sales restrictions,
lowering down payments and interest rates,
and promoting urban village renovations.
They even held the first
Central Urban Work Conference in a decade.
But these policies are either too weak
or hard to implement.
The real issue is their misguided directions.
For decades,
the CCP fueled a massive housing bubble
through speculation.
Now that it's burst,
the market should naturally clear out bad projects
and restore true supply and demand.
Instead, the government refuses
to let the market adjust,
clinging to policies to prop up prices.
Isn't this just wishful thinking?
