德拉克講海軍歷史 美國海軍人物誌:海軍上將雷蒙德·斯普魯恩斯P.5
王者风范
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3 次觀看·2025年11月21日
Ladies and gentlemen, it's finally time to wrap up our series on Admiral Spruance.
So, there's been a fair few videos we've done in this series so far,
and this one will look at what he did after he left Okinawa up until his last few days.
So, although the Okinawa campaign was still ongoing
when Admiral Spruance transferred command of the main US Navy fleet in the Pacific to Admiral Halsey,
he had seen the landings off to a good start as he was able to,
given the near-constant rain of kamikazes.
After a few days at sea following this transfer,
the battleship USS New Mexico pulled into Guam on the 1st of June 1945.
Guam was now Nimitz's command post,
as at just about 1,500 miles from the new front line,
it was far enough away, if only just,
to not be bothered by Japanese air raids,
but considerably closer than the approximately 4,700 miles
from Okinawa to Pearl Harbor.
Although interestingly, it meant that Nimitz was now
almost exactly the same distance from the front lines
as he had been when he'd been in Pearl Harbor during the Battle of Midway.
But on Guam, Spruance at last found somewhere in the Pacific
where he actually enjoyed the climate.
Despite having spent almost the entire war on,
or near, the warm waters of the Central and Western Pacific,
Spruance had never actually been a big fan of the heat,
and at Guam, the senior officer's quarters
were at a considerable elevation above sea level on a mountainside.
As the second most senior officer in the ATTA,
this meant he enjoyed much cooler accommodation
than he would ever experience aboard a ship or back in Hawaii.
But this wasn't just some luxury retreat.
The next stage of operations had to be planned.
As we discussed in the previous video,
opinions on the way forward
had already differed substantially amongst the U.S. military.
Now Okinawa was on its way to being occupied,
the question of what to do next reared its head once again.
Spruance, of course, was, as we've seen,
entirely in favor of letting the Japanese
die in glorious combat for the Emperor
in whatever arbitrary numbers they so chose to do.
But he was much less enthusiastic
about sending in men under his own command
to facilitate this
when other, more remote methods
like widespread napalm bombing were available.
In this case, although many argued
for the invasion of the Japanese home islands
as the logical next step,
he was therefore in favor of expanding
the U.S. line of control
close to the Japanese coastline further west,
securing further bases up to and including
some proposed bases on the Chinese coastline.
Taking these would completely cut off
Japanese access to Korea and China,
and this would serve a dual purpose.
It would massively accelerate
the food and other material shortages in Japan,
and it would cut off
the Imperial Japanese Army forces in China
from almost all resupply,
and that in turn would make
the job of the various Chinese warlords
and any allied supporting units much easier,
as well as prevent any last-minute transfer
of vast numbers of troops back to the home islands
just in case invasion then became necessary.
His opinion, therefore,
was to slowly strangle
the Japanese economy and food supply
until the Japanese either surrendered or starved.
A classic approach that,
although it took time to see results,
was well proven by, ironically enough,
the navy whose entry into the final stages
of the Pacific War he had just coordinated,
the Royal Navy.
However, there were a few major factors
that weighed against taking this approach.
Although the U.S. public had not been demoralized
by the initial Japanese attacks
at the start of the Pacific campaign,
with the war in Europe
having just about wrapped up
and the viciously high casualties
each Pacific island seemed to impose
in a few short weeks of fighting,
many in the U.S. leadership
believed that the U.S. public
would not tolerate another two to three years
of wartime controls and restrictions
when the news that would emerge
would just be months and months and months
of blockades,
airstrikes with associated losses of pilots,
and kamikaze raids in return
with a gradually ticking number of casualties
and not a huge amount else to show
for the effort
until the very, very end.
Additionally,
it would put the U.S. armed forces
in something of a catch-22.
While there was an active war on,
the idea of massively demobilizing
the army and all the marines
seemed extremely silly.
But at the same time,
if the strategy was to blockade
the enemy into submission,
well, you needed a navy for that,
but what exactly would you do
with several million idle soldiers?
In the military itself,
the split in opinion
was largely based on service lines.
The U.S. navy's upper echelons
broadly favored the blockade strategy.
The U.S. army largely wanted
to land troops on Japanese beaches,
and the U.S. army air forces,
which were technically still part of the army
but becoming more independent by the day,
were just happy with whatever was going on
as long as there was something to bomb,
since Japanese cities
had proven agreeably flammable.
However,
in this particular case,
the new president, Truman,
since Roosevelt had died
a little over a month earlier,
had decided to move forward
with planning an invasion of Japan,
and so that was what Spruance
would be called on to make plans for,
at least for the moment.
However, by mid-July,
these plans had shifted somewhat.
Although the plans for the landings
were still ongoing,
parallel plans for a simple occupation
were being drawn up,
ostensibly just in case
Japan happened to surrender or collapse
without any further resistance
in the near future.
To many of the staff,
this seemed a highly optimistic
level of thinking,
until at least at the beginning of August,
Spruance assembled his staff
and outlined roughly
what an atomic bomb was
and what level of destruction
it was expected to cause.
This, he hoped,
would force Japan to surrender.
Days later,
and Hiroshima and Nagasaki
vanished in pillars of nuclear fire,
and suddenly a Japanese government
that had not two weeks earlier
rejected the Potsdam Declaration
that outlined Allied terms for surrender
was suddenly in contact
about ending the war.
This, of course,
did not mean the fighting was over.
For one thing,
a few days after Nagasaki was destroyed,
a Japanese torpedo bomber
very nearly sank
the Pearl Harbor veteran
USS Pennsylvania,
so it was clear
that even if peace was soon to be declared,
the war would be fought
right up until the very end.
As missives flew back and forth,
mainly discussing if Japan
would be able to keep
the emperor and the royal family or not,
the planning for invasion
was gradually wound down
and the occupation plans
were rapidly given finer details.
Partially as a result
of the speed of the switch
from landings to occupation,
and partly just because it made sense,
the US Navy forces
would be landing
roughly the same units
as they would have been
escorting in during an actual invasion,
only they'd be landing
over a slightly wider area
and they'd be able to use
port facilities instead of beaches.
Ideally, of course,
there would also be a lot less shooting.
The 15th of August
brought news of the formal acceptance
of surrender terms by the Japanese,
which meant that in theory
the war was now over
bar the signing ceremonies.
In reality, of course,
there would be a few small clashes,
mostly in the air,
between reconnaissance aircraft
monitoring Japanese compliance
and a few Japanese pilots
who thought that any enemy aircraft
in Japanese airspace
should be shot down
until the war was officially over,
and then there was the business
of communicating the news of the surrender
and then accepting
the local surrender from
various Japanese forces
across Southeast Asia
who'd either been bypassed
and cut off
or was still at that very moment
in combat with Allied troops
on the various front lines.
And, of course,
there would also be holdouts
in the occupied islands,
some of whom would take
quite a few years to convince
that the war was in fact actually over.
But all that was for the future.
In late August,
Spruance boarded the battleship
USS New Jersey
and headed for the Philippines,
where he allowed himself
to be drawn into a press conference,
only the second such conference
he'd been involved in it
during the entirety of the war.
This conference reflected
perhaps his inexperience
in dealing with the press,
but also his forthright nature.
Some parts of the interview,
such as his attitude
on the upcoming occupation of Japan,
went down fairly well.
He pointed out that
there was precious little point
in fighting the Japanese
over the issue of their
retaining the emperor,
stating that
if the Japanese wanted an emperor,
there was very little in
that the US could do
to actually stop them.
Even deposed,
he would still be venerated.
And the last thing anyone should want
was unnecessary oppression
by the occupation forces,
which might make them as unpopular
with the civilian population in Japan
as the Japanese occupations
had been in the various areas
that were now being liberated.
However,
he also expressed the opinion
that although strategically valuable,
permanent US bases on Formosa,
now Taiwan,
Okinawa,
and other such locations,
might not be politically wise,
as this might inflame future tensions
with China and Russia.
His reasoning being
that the US would
hardly tolerate
a heavily armed island
or island chain
off of its own coast,
as events in the
Cuban Missile Crisis
would later prove,
and thus it would be
somewhat hypocritical
to expect other nations
to feel any differently.
He also said that
with the war over,
the US Navy
should be reduced in size significantly,
since there was now no
potential major enemy fleet
left in the world to fight,
and thus the costs of the fleet
as it stood
were not justifiable.
Although there was logic
to both of these statements,
and their wisdom of course
can be endlessly debated,
a senior officer expressing
what were after all
rather political views
to the general public directly,
caused something of a firestorm
in both the US Navy's
upper echelons
and the US State Department,
both of whom made a point
to express their disapproval
of such views
being expressed out loud
by a serving officer
in no uncertain terms,
albeit the general public
seemed to think
his statements
were considerably wiser
than his ranking superiors thought.
Although invited
to the surrender ceremony
by MacArthur,
Spruance declined the invitation.
It seems that he was
far more eager
to just be getting on
with his next mission,
that of being
recovering prisoners of war
back into Allied hands,
and it also seems possible
that he and Nimitz
had arranged specifically
for Spruance to be away
with the New Jersey,
just in case
the Japanese launched
some final Kamikaze attack
and thus managed to wipe out
the rest of the US Navy's
senior officers aboard the Missouri
during the surrender ceremony,
as of course
this would mean Spruance
would be in a position
to take immediate command of the fleet,
as they wouldn't be able
to get him as well.
And thus,
while the surrender ceremony
took place in Tokyo Bay,
Spruance and the New Jersey
were neck-deep
in Operation REAMPS,
the recovery of said
prisoners of war.
A series of typhoons,
as well as drifting mines,
many ironically
in up-American ones
who'd been liberated
from their anchor points
by said typhoons,
obstructed the initial efforts,
but soon,
with the provision of escorts,
particularly minesweepers,
various hospital ships
and transports
were soon making their way
to various Japanese ports,
with the battleship itself
showing up on the 15th of September
at Wakayama,
just south of Kobe and Osaka,
to supervise the release there
of about 1,300 prisoners of war
onto a small rescue convoy.
This visit, however,
had both light and dark sides to it.
On the one hand,
Spruance was glad
to be able to tour
the hospital ship sanctuary,
and the prisoners of war
were glad to be going home.
But on the other hand,
along with their freedom
came reports of
what exactly the hell it was
to be a Japanese prisoner,
and these prisoners
were of course the ones
who had survived that experience.
Spruance rapidly instigated
investigations into
any reported incidents,
and in these,
he was both decisive
but also remarkably even-handed.
On the one hand,
he dismissed most claims
that were made
where a prisoner in question
had disobeyed a clear
and, in his view,
reasonable rule
in a prisoner of war camp
and had then suffered
the listed punishment
for breaking said rules.
And he also viewed
reductions in food rations,
at least if they had been
implemented in recent months,
as an undesirable
but understandable effect
of the general food shortages
in Japan that were being caused
by the Allied blockade.
On the other hand,
if he found that the treatment
had meted out to prisoners
had gone over the line in any way,
he was quick to advocate
for maximum punishment,
primarily in the form
of speedy executions.
Both to send a message,
and, as he saw it,
to do the rest of Japan a favour
by excising the worst
of the population very speedily,
before they could sink back
into society
and potentially spread
their attitudes.
Theoretically,
Admirals Halsey and Fletcher
were also to be involved
in this repatriation effort.
But before September was out,
it was clear that Spruance
would be assuming the title
of Commander Naval Forces Japan,
and so it seemed sensible
to expand his purview
to encompass all of Japan
and its former empire.
Halsey and Nimitz
were preparing to head home
for the U.S.,
which afforded an opportunity
for Vice-Admiral Rawlings
to invite the U.S. Navy
Senior Command Cadre
aboard his flagship,
the battleship King George V,
where all involved
were delighted to be reminded
that, of course,
his Majesty's ships
were in no way, shape or form
mandated to be free
from a stock of good drink.
Spruance seemed to view
the division of work as equitable.
He rather liked being able
to arrange the return
of prisoners of war
and then latterly U.S. troops,
and it meant he got to stay at sea,
while he found the prospect
of parades, naval reviews
and the supervising
of the inevitable demobilization
of the Navy
with extreme distaste.
So if Halsey and Nimitz
wanted to head home
and take on those tasks,
he was quite happy
to let them get on with it.
Part of his efforts ashore in Japan
involved some interesting solutions.
As the stress of being at actual war
gradually lifted,
it became more and more evident
that much of the U.S. Navy's
current manpower,
as well as that of the Army
and the Marines for that matter,
were essentially civilians
brought into service for the conflict,
not career soldiers and sailors.
Now they wanted to go home as well,
while Spruance was generally
favoring longer-serving men
who'd perhaps not seen home
for half a decade or more
on the first ships
that were heading to the U.S. west coast.
This, in turn, led to a rise
in various sorts of crime ashore,
for which the fleet's
chief medical officer proposed
the opening of an official naval brothel
under supervised medical control,
where men could let off steam
in a controlled environment.
Spruance agreed,
ordered the establishment set up
and was gratified to see
reports of crime
against the local populace
drop off almost immediately.
However, someone in the fleet
wrote home complaining
about the Navy-sanctioned brothel
and Spruance was ordered
to shut it down,
and depending on your point of view,
fortunately or unfortunately,
this was done,
and the crime and STI rates
duly climbed once again.
As the various systems
that needed setting up
to facilitate the occupation
and get the rest of the
Allied personnel home
settled into a routine,
Spruance could now think
about his future.
Ideally, he wanted to
remain in a position
where he could stay at sea
as long as possible,
as he loathed the idea
of ever being based
in Washington DC again.
He hoped that he could
replace Nimitz as
Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Forces,
when the latter eventually
would be promoted,
and after that,
he hoped to become
President of the Naval War College.
In November 1945,
though, he had to hand over
command of 5th Fleet
to Admiral Towers
and head back to Hawaii,
where he and Nimitz
would have to await further news
on their future in the Navy.
At this stage, however,
Spruance got his wish,
but in something
of a speed-run form.
At the end of the month,
Nimitz was summoned home
for promotion,
and Spruance indeed
took over as Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Naval Forces,
but he would only have
control over the Pacific
for 2 months and 2 weeks,
just enough time
to get settled in,
celebrate Christmas,
and then start drawing up
plans for what he actually
wanted to do,
before Towers showed up again
like a bad penny,
taking over Interna's
sink pack in February 1946.
Spruance had just received
orders to return to the US,
and fortunately,
they were ones he liked.
He was to be the President
of the Naval War College.
And so he arrived home
to little fanfare,
with he and his wife
promptly setting out
from California in his old car
for the rather epic road trip
to Newport Road Island,
where he took over
at the start of March.
Nimitz was now
Chief Naval Officer,
and he ordered Spruance
to get the Naval War College
back up to speed,
and rework it to be able
to respond rapidly
to the future needs of the Navy.
This was going to be
challenging on two fronts.
Washington D.C. seemed
almost rabid in its determination
to repeat its performance
in the aftermath of
the War of Independence,
the War of 1812,
the Civil War,
and various other conflicts,
and cut the US Navy
not so much down to the bone
as right down to the marrow,
before sucking that out as well,
as fast as humanly possible.
And so his budget
would be extremely limited.
There was the additional question
of what exactly
should be taught there.
Before the war,
battleships with some carrier support,
as the decisive arm of action,
was the order of the day.
Everybody was taught
that is how things
were going to be fought.
Now, however,
carriers were in the ascendancy.
But on top of that,
there were a whole bunch
of new things.
There was a new generation
of heavy carriers
in the midways,
coming off the slipways.
Jet aircraft
and early guided weapons
were just clearing
their first generation
of implementation.
Rafts of information
on new submarine technologies
were being acquired
from Germany and Japan,
as well as from allies
and at home.
Thoughts were percolating
on the US Navy
having its own
sea-based strategic bomber force.
And of course,
the British were off
chasing their own tail
on potentially taking
the battleship to its next level
with a six-digit displacement
and enough armor
to build several divisions of tanks.
So what exactly
was the future
they were supposed to be teaching?
Having grown to like
the idea of an admiral's staff,
Spruance decided
that the best way
to get things done
was to form a new staff
around himself
made up of highly-driven men,
give them his guidance,
and then set them loose,
which would allow him
some much-needed breathing room
after half a decade at war.
He decided that
instead of trying to ram
a particular school
of present-day warfare
down his students' throats,
he would concentrate
on setting them
as many extremely challenging
mental exercises as possible.
As he judged that
an officer of good intellect
with sound reasoning
and good judgment
would be able to adapt
to whatever situation
the next stage
of naval warfare
turned out to be.
In this vein,
he aimed to determine
which type of mind
each student had,
from a list of three
which he had developed.
The first type
was a mind capable
of quickly and efficiently
carrying out orders,
but patently unable
to display all that much
imagination
in a situation
where the solution
wasn't already obvious
or prescribed.
These types,
he held,
would be excellent bridge officers,
but under no circumstances
should they be placed
in independent commands
where a modicum of initiative
was needed.
But they would do well
in charge of support ships
and perhaps as subordinate captains
in squadrons of ships
where the squadron
had a decisive leader.
Second was a mind
capable of quickly understanding
and processing new ideas
and thinking
that someone else
might have come up with,
but were not in and of themselves
especially inventive.
These might make
fine technical
and systems specialists
and would perhaps be suited
for more general command positions,
but like the first type,
they would not make
good squadron or fleet leaders.
The third type
he held as the rarest
and the most valuable.
These were men
who could both think
of new ways
to respond to a situation
and implement them,
although he acknowledged
that without the correct training
they might hesitate
when under fire,
unable to decide
which of the many options
that were running through their heads
should be the best implemented.
These men
would make the best
commanding officers,
commodores and admirals,
and would need support
at the higher levels
from staffs
that were made up of
all three types of minds.
Like-minded but lower-ranking
officers of the third type
would make excellent sound boards
to bounce ideas from and to.
The second type
would be able to translate
their intentions into orders,
and the first type
would be able to conduct
those orders speedily
and without hesitation.
In order to do this,
instead of concentrating
on teaching how warfare
might be fought that year
using ships and systems
that the officers being taught
hopefully already understood,
students would learn
about the cutting edge
in tactics and technology
that was coming down the pipeline
and how those might be
implemented in the future,
since that was almost certainly
where the Navy's next prospect
of real action lay.
This included lessons
in world affairs and politics
to ensure that the officers
had a basic understanding
of who they might be likely to fight
and why.
He also tried to get
army and air force personnel
to attend in order to get
all three services familiar
with each other,
as he saw cooperation
as vital to any future war effort.
Having already seen
where partisanship could get you,
in the past few years,
he summarized his views thus in 1948.
During the war,
I was always impressed
with the necessity
of keeping an open mind
and of being receptive
to the ideas of others.
We study military history
for the lessons it has to teach us,
but we must not expect necessarily
to obtain from history
the correct answers
to all future problems.
Situations rarely repeat themselves
and preconceived solutions
which result in fitting
the situation to the solution
and not the solution
to the situation
are apt to be dangerous or costly.
No one of us
can be highly competent in all fields.
It behooves us
to recognize this fact
and to take advantage
of the superior knowledge
and capabilities of others
in their respective fields.
Don't insist upon making
a lot of the decisions yourself
which your subordinates
can make better than you.
The larger the organization
over which you are placed,
the less proportionately
becomes the share
which your own output
as an individual
can contribute to it,
and the more important
becomes your power to guide
and to direct,
to encourage,
and to use the ideas
of your subordinates.
There are some persons
who seem to feel that
to recognize and use
the ideas of others
is an admission
of their own inferiority.
Persons of this mentality
do not fit very well
far up in an organization.
In using the ideas of others,
a generous recognition
of their origin
is always in order.
The Navy has a saying
that to have
loyalty up,
there must be loyalty down.
A selfish,
self-centered individual
who uses his subordinates
for his own personal advancement
and fails to appreciate
their contributions
and look out for their interests
is not apt to have
a very high degree of loyalty
among his subordinates.
We can either drive men
through fear of punishment,
as we see being done
in large portions
of the world today,
or else we can lead them
by obtaining their friendship
and loyalty,
and encouraging them
to exercise
their individual initiative.
Punishment of recalcitrant
individuals
is required occasionally,
but with intelligent people,
the other way
is much the best.
While Spruance was in the process
of overhauling
the Naval War College,
some officers
sought to enhance
their own post-war reputations
by refighting
various specific battles
in newspaper articles.
Generally speaking,
Spruance held himself
above such things,
even when those articles
were directly critical of him.
He thought it simply better
to ignore attacks
on his conduct in the war
and let these small fires
that the articles generated
burn themselves out
for lack of fuel.
The only times
he would come out
and make some kind of statement
was when he felt
that the Navy as a whole
might suffer damage
should an incorrect article
or assertion go unchecked.
Thus was Spruance occupied
for the last two years
of his active naval career.
He retired on the 1st of July 1948,
having reached
mandatory retirement age.
There was no great ceremony arranged,
as there had been
for some of his contemporaries.
It seemed to many
like he was being
officially ignored.
But a man like Spruance
does not leave naval service
entirely without notice.
As he and his wife
drove away from the Naval War College
for the last time,
they were ambushed
by the entire college staff,
a full marine guard
and a naval band
that somebody had acquired
from somewhere,
who saw him out the gates
with all due ceremony.
He also retired
as a four-star admiral,
having just lost out to Halsey
for a fifth star,
but in compensation
he would receive full pay
as a four-star upon retirement
for the rest of his life,
something that not even
the five stars could boast of.
With a long naval career behind him,
Spruance retired
to Pebble Beach, California,
where he settled into
a more gentle life
for the next four years.
That lasted until 1952,
when he was appointed
ambassador to the Philippines,
which was in the middle
of an active rebellion
by communist insurgents
against a deeply unpopular government.
But since his activities there
are well into the realm of politics,
I'll leave it for someone
who's far better versed
in Philippine political history
than I am
to describe his career there.
Except to note
that he would end up
utilizing his full range of skills
that he developed during wartime
to try and prevent the country
descending into anarchy
during the upcoming elections
of the early 1950s.
In 1955,
he retired from this
ambassadorial position
and headed back home again.
He was now aged 69,
but the toll of his long service
in the war
was beginning to come due.
His eyesight was beginning to fail,
and one by one
his old comrades-in-arms
were passing away.
Some, like Lee,
had died either before
the war was actually even over,
or shortly thereafter.
Kelly Turner,
who'd become a nearby neighbor
in California,
died in 1961,
and Nimitz himself died in 1966.
By that point,
failing eyesight,
influenza,
hernias,
and atherosclerosis
were competing
to all have a go at him.
And, as was his way,
Spruance regarded them all
with detached curiosity.
Cataract surgery,
he noted in a letter later on,
was especially appealing,
as although it didn't fully
restore his sight
to what it had been before,
it did allow him
to more fully appreciate
the colors of his garden in spring.
Spruance himself
would go to rest
on December 13, 1969.
He'd been born in an era
where a single Brazilian ironclad
had sparked a panic
along the whole U.S. East Coast,
and the U.S. Navy
had been globally viewed
as something of a standing joke.
He died the same year
that a naval aviator
became the first man
to walk on the moon,
while the U.S. Navy
was now the most powerful
navy on the planet,
and the vast form
of the nuclear-powered
USS Enterprise CVN-65
prowled the seas.
It was a change in fortune
that he'd had no small part
in seeing come to pass.
Today he is buried
alongside his wartime
comrades Turner, Lockwood
and Nimitz near San Francisco.
The following year in 1970,
USS Spruance DD-963
would be named in his honor,
the lead ship
in a large class of destroyers
that would serve
through the rest of the Cold War
and beyond.
And today,
USS Spruance DDG-111
continues his legacy.
