Rene Descartes, Meditation 2 | What Is Known Clearly and Distinctly | Philosophy Core Concepts
Hi, this is Dr. Gregory Sadler. I'm a professor of philosophy and the president and founder of an educational consulting company called Reason.io, where we put philosophy into practice.
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In the meditations, as well as in other works, you're going to see René Descartes making almost constant use of two terms that play an incredibly important role within his epistemology and his reconstruction of the possibility of knowledge.
Those two terms are clear and distinct, or clarity and distinction, and he sometimes uses synonyms for these as well.
If you're reading between the lines, so to speak, you'll see many more references and uses of these than simply those two terms.
In meditation two, we're going to see it already being used quite a bit and being invoked as an important way of making sense out of our thoughts.
And a little bit later in meditation three, Descartes will actually give us a rule that he's going to use throughout the rest of the meditations that anything that I conceive of clearly and distinctly, I can hold to be true.
He doesn't quite have that working explicitly in meditation two, but he's already making use of something like that.
And there's a lot of different ways in which this comes up.
We can have the general formula of conceiving ideas clearly and distinctly.
What is it that we're doing?
We're conceiving or thinking or understanding or perceiving.
All of these are modes of grasping something.
And then what are we grasping?
In general, these can be called ideas or notions, right?
They're things that are present to the mind.
And clarity and distinction then are certain qualities or attributes of those particular ideas or the way in which we are grasping those ideas.
So what is it then for things to be clear and distinct?
This is something that Descartes spends very little time actually explaining.
He never provides a formulation of precisely what it is for an idea to be clear in the meditations, nor as a matter of fact, in his discourse on method.
Instead, it's going to be in his principles of philosophy that we'll find this formulation of the idea being present and accessible to the mind when the mind is actually attending to it.
So, you know, the opposite of clear is obscure.
And a clear notion is something which impresses itself upon us.
It has a certain, you could say, self-evidence in how it is given to us so that we can say, ah, yes, I do in fact grasp what this thing is.
So putting that aside, saying that we do understand what clarity is because Descartes assumes that we really do have some sort of conception of this.
We can say what's clear and what's not clear.
What about distinction?
This is a little bit easier to say because Descartes is, I'm going to use a pun here, very clear about what it means to be distinct.
And for ideas to be distinct means that they're not confused with other ideas.
We're able to separate them out and see how they're different from each other.
So Descartes will use this language really throughout meditation too.
And we can see a number of different examples of this, some of which I want to focus on.
And one of the most interesting ones is his famous realization that if I am being deceived, if I am having any sort of thought whatsoever, then I must be able to say, I am, I exist.
And this is often framed in terms of what we call the cogito.
I think, therefore I exist.
This is something that Descartes takes to be completely clear.
And we could also say that it's distinct from other formulations, other realizations.
The fact of my own existence, my knowledge or notion of my existence is something different from my notion of other things existing.
And so this is something that qualifies as very clear and distinct.
But he talks about a lot of other things as well as having a certain kind of clarity and distinction.
For example, a little bit after that, when he is talking about the notion of body and he says that it has all of these different characteristics, these are things that I can distinguish apart from each other.
For example, being able to be in a space and exclude other things from the space, being able to be seen, heard, sensed in other ways, having a certain extension or figure, whatever we want to call it.
All of those are distinct from each other.
And those are also clear within the conception of a body or a corporeal thing or extended thing.
Let's come back to the I am, I exist, the thinking thing.
He says that if I think about what it means to be a thinking thing, a thing that thinks, what is that?
He says it's a thing that doubts, that conceives, that affirms, that denies, that wills, that wills against, that imagines also and which senses or perceives through senses.
And he says, all of these are distinct from each other.
All of these are modes of thought that we can distinguish.
And he knows clearly, or he has a clear conception of the fact that he is doing those sorts of things.
There's another passage a little bit later.
He says, it is of itself so evident, so clear, we might say, that it is me who doubts, who understands and who desires that there is no need of anything else to add in order to explain it.
So that's another great example of something that's a very clear set of ideas.
I know that I am the one who desires.
I am the one who senses.
I am the one who understands.
And he says, and it's also certainly the power of imagining, right?
That I imagine the things that I imagine are not true.
Nevertheless, this power of imagining does not leave or does not lack, you could say, any reality in me.
And it's part of my thought.
The things that I imagine, I can imagine, in some cases at least, quite clearly.
And I know clearly that I have a power of imagination.
So all of these are presenting themselves with a sort of self-evidence.
You could say all of the different modes of thought that are part of the Cartesian cogito.
That's something we can be quite clear about.
What about other things?
We can be clear about the general notion of what body includes, right?
The ideas of bodily, external things in general.
Although he says, you know, at some point,
sometimes general notions are kind of confused, right?
And that would be the opposite of being distinct.
But he says, well, if we take individual things,
and here you might think of the famous example of the piece of wax,
or of other things that he says could be equally applicable,
any other physical thing, including the people outside of my window,
who I think are people, even though they could just be machines or things like that.
Insofar as we're thinking about the thing in terms of its substance,
that turns out to be something that is quite clear.
And he also goes on, and he tells us that, you know,
when it comes to the sensations that we have of it,
those sorts of things are also clear and distinct ideas.
Not clear and distinct ideas in the sense that they automatically tell us
that the thing that they're attached to, or signifying,
or whatever we want to say they're representing, does actually exist.
Could be that no corporeal objects actually do exist at this point.
But the ideas that we have of them are at least clear and distinct, right?
He goes on and he says that if we carry out this process
of stripping away all these sensible qualities,
and we think about the piece of wax,
he says the notion and knowledge of the wax seems to be more clear,
more, in that case, net in French, and more distinct
after it has been discovered, not only by sight or touch,
but also by many other causes, with so much evidence,
such distinction and clearness that I myself,
you know, understanding myself, can be compared to that.
So our ideas, already in Meditation Two,
can indeed have this quality, qualities, of clarity and distinction.
It doesn't mean yet at this point in the game
that they automatically are true in the sense of referring
to the reality of the thing that they seem to signify,
if we're talking about external things.
If we're talking about things that pertain to my own self
and my own thinking, well then the clarity
and distinction that we have, which Descartes takes to come
in part from what he calls the natural light.
We attend to ideas and there's a sort of natural light
that illuminates them.
It means that we can't be wrong about those.
So this criterion of clear and distinct ideas
is going to play an absolutely central role
in the entire argument of the meditations,
and you can see it playing an important role already,
though less explicitly drawn out,
in the things that Descartes is particularly concerned with
in Meditation Two, which are the human mind
and its various types of thoughts, physical objects,
hopefully outside of the mind,
although we don't know that yet,
and the apprehension that we have of those objects,
both through how they present themselves to the senses
and even more importantly,
how the mind or understanding grasps them.

