René Descartes - Meditation #6 - Proof of the Physical World & Distinction Between Mind and Body
He has to sort of thread a needle in a very narrow hole, or I don't know how this threading needle analogy works.
This video is about the sixth and final of Descartes' meditations.
There are two major things that happen in this meditation.
The first is that Descartes finally gets around to proving that the external physical world,
the world of tables and chairs and mountains and molecules, all that stuff outside of his own mind,
he proves that that exists. And then the other thing he does is he offers two arguments for
the distinctness of the mind and the body. Descartes is what we will call a dualist.
Dualism is specifically, as we're using the term here, a theory about the nature of the human mind.
The idea is that there's two, there's two things, dual. There's the mind and the body, this is what
Descartes thinks, and there are two separate kinds of stuff. There's the physical stuff and the mental
stuff and they're different. So we get two arguments for Descartes' version of dualism
in meditation six. So before we get to all that, let's just really, really quickly recap what
happened in the first five meditations. In meditation one, Descartes wipes away all of his
beliefs. He doubts everything. In meditation two, he proves that he necessarily exists and that he's
a thinking thing. In meditation three, he proves the existence of God. That was the weird proof
with like formal reality and objective reality. In meditation four, he runs into a problem,
a problem of error. That's a problem for the conclusion from meditation three, the conclusion
that God exists. He solves that problem, or at least thinks he does, in meditation four. Then
in meditation five, he offers another proof for the existence of God. That was the ontological
proof. So now, here we are at the beginning of meditation six. Descartes knows for certain that
he exists, that he's a thinking thing, that he has all of these thoughts, and that God exists.
But he doesn't yet know that there's a physical world. Any physical world that includes his own
body with his hands, and his eyes, and his ears, and his feet. He doesn't, he hasn't proved that
that exists, or that there are any mountains, or buildings, or rooms, or anything like that.
Here's what he says to prove that those things exist. This happens on page 8079.
For God has given me no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for these ideas.
He means a source other than the physical world for all of his ideas of objects in the physical
world. On the contrary, he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by
corporeal things. Corporeal just means having a corpse or a body, so physical ordinary material
objects like stones, and mountains, and hands, and feet, and tables, and chairs. So I do not
see how God could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from
a source other than corporeal things. It follows that corporeal things exist. They may not all
exist in a way that exactly corresponds with my sensory grasp of them. For in many cases,
the grasp of the senses is very obscure and confused. Okay, in that short passage, Descartes
proves that the physical world exists. Here's what's going on. He has to sort of thread a needle
in a very narrow hole, or I don't know how this threading needle analogy works, but the point is
that on the one hand, he needs to say that God is not a deceiver, but on the other hand, he needs to
accommodate the fact that he makes mistakes, and he needs to prove that the physical world exists,
but he knows that he can't prove that everything that he thinks about the physical world is
accurate, because there's lots of things that he thinks about the physical world that definitely
aren't accurate. Like, he often has mistaken beliefs about, you know, objects around him,
and then it turns out he was wrong. Things weren't the way that they seemed from afar.
So he's got all of these balls that he's trying to juggle, and he solves this problem, or he juggles
all of these considerations with the idea of double-checking. So there are some things that
you might be inclined to believe, but then you can double-check to see if you really should believe
those things. Let's say that I seem to see a cat over there. Seems like there's a cat, but is there
really a cat, right? I can double-check. There's all sorts of ways. So it seems like I'm seeing a
cat, but I can check by asking another person who's next to me, hey, do you see a cat over there?
I want to know if I'm hallucinating, if there's really a cat or not, right? Or maybe the light
is playing tricks on me or something like that, so I ask another person. I double-check that there's
a cat. Or I walk over to the cat, and I reach out with my hand, because if I'm having a visual
hallucination, then when I reach out with my hand, I won't feel anything, because there isn't
actually a cat there. So I double-check by using another one of my sense modalities, right? I'm
checking my vision by using the sense of touch. Or even I could triple-check by then also smelling
to see if there's a cat there. Even, you notice, when I originally put forward the suggestion that
I was like, you know, seeing a cat or whatever, I did this thing with my head, you know? I was like,
I was like this. I was like, hey, is there a cat there? What am I doing with my head there? Remember
that? We do this all the time when we see something unusual. What we're doing is we're getting another
perspective on the object, right? I have one angle on this supposed cat that I'm supposedly seeing,
and then I move my head. And now I'm at another angle. And so if it was the angle that was
misleading me, I've now double-checked by moving my head a little bit. This is something that we
do automatically all the time. We double-check what we're inclined to believe. So Descartes
thinks that it's compatible with God's existence that sometimes he has mistaken inclinations as
long as he can double-check, right? If he's inclined to believe that there's a cat there,
and he doesn't bother double-checking, and then he falsely believes that there's a cat when there
really isn't, right? Because he's having a hallucination, or because the light is playing
tricks on him, or something like that. Well, in that case, he didn't double-check, so it's his
fault. It doesn't make God a deceiver. But then there are other things that he's inclined to
believe. Like the phrase that he uses is that he has a great propensity to believe those things.
There are some things that he very naturally wants to believe. He's inclined to believe them,
but that there's absolutely no way of him double-checking. Like the general claim that
there's a physical world at all. The natural thing to think that all human beings think,
right, automatically by default, is that there is a physical reality. That the ideas that one has
in one's mind of, you know, a hand, come into your mind because of an actual physical corporeal hand
in the world. There's the physical hand, and the idea gets into your mind from the hand
itself. That's what we're naturally inclined to believe. How could we double-check that? We have
no way of double-checking the general claim that the physical world exists at all. We can't just
get another angle on it. There's no way to double-check. So, if that inclination, the inclination
to believe in the physical corporeal world, if that inclination were misleading, if there wasn't
a physical world, we would just sort of be trapped into that belief with no way to check. And if we
were trapped into a false belief with no way of double-checking, well then God definitely would
be a deceiver. So, Descartes concludes, because he thinks he knows that God exists and God isn't
a deceiver, it has to be the case that the physical world exists. Because otherwise, if the physical
world didn't exist, then his inclination to believe in the physical world would be a deceptive one,
and God would be a deceiver, but God isn't, so the physical world must be there. That's the proof
for the existence of the physical world. I'm going to reread the passage that I just read before so
you can see that I'm not just making this up, that that's what's in the text. For God has given me
no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for these ideas. On the contrary,
he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by corporeal things.
That is, he has an inclination to believe that the ideas in his mind of physical things
actually come from physical things. That's what he's inclined to believe. He has this great
propensity, and he has no way of double-checking. So, I do not see how God could be understood to
be anything but a deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal
things. So, if these ideas in my mind of physical things didn't come from physical things, then God
would be a deceiver. It follows that corporeal things exist. Therefore, corporeal things exist,
because otherwise God would be a deceiver, and God isn't a deceiver. That's the proof for the
existence of physical objects in the world. What about dualism? The second thing that happens in
Meditation 6 is that we get two arguments for the claim that the mind and the body are different
things. One of them is the conceivability argument. That argument happens mostly on page 8078,
and then there's the divisibility argument. The divisibility argument happens mostly on page 8086.
You'll notice, actually, that because the conceivability argument happens at this point,
it actually comes before the proof for the existence of the physical world. Anyway, this is
an introduction to philosophy course, so we're not going to talk about the conceivability argument
because it's a little bit more complicated. When I get around to teaching an upper-level course
focused more directly on the meditations, we'll go through the conceivability argument. But for now,
the divisibility argument, this one, is enough to occupy us. Before we get started, though,
let's just say something about how this argument might fail. Descartes, at this point in the
meditations, before the divisibility argument, but after the proof for the existence of the physical
world, Descartes has proven that he has a mind. That was back in Meditation 2. And now, in Meditation
6, he's proven that he has a body. His body might not be exactly the way he always thinks it is,
but there's a physical world and he has some sort of body, he thinks.
It could turn out, of course, that these two things are just one thing, right? It sometimes
happens that we think there's two things and they just turn out to be one. Like, for example,
you've got Clark Kent and Superman. Clark Kent is a reporter at the Daily Planet newspaper,
or whatever. Superman is an alien from Krypton. I know that. And he can fly and shoot lasers out
of his eyes and he's really strong and so on. Oh, and he has x-ray vision. That too, I think.
Wait, so he can shoot lasers out of his eyes and he has x-ray vision? Okay. Anyway, it turns out
that these two dudes are the same dude. There's just one dude. You might think that you might
associate some characteristics with Clark, like being nerdy and working as a newspaper reporter,
and he is nerdy and he does work at a newspaper reporter. And then the qualities of being able
to fly, that's the qualities of Superman, but there's really just one guy. He's a nerdy guy
who can fly. One dude. It could turn out that the mind and the body are really just one thing.
Descartes associates the mind with thought. He thinks that thought is the essential characteristic
of the mind, and he thinks that the essential characteristic of the body is what he calls
extension. Extension was a standard philosophical term in the 17th and 18th centuries in Europe,
when Descartes was writing. Extension just means the characteristic of being stretched out
in space. You're extended, extended, stretched out. You're extended in space if you take up space. You
have height and depth and width, right? You have all the three dimensions. That's extension. There
are two things, and they each have a characteristic property, right? But it could turn out, right,
that they were just the same thing, that there's really just one thing, just like there's really
one guy, Clark Kent, Superman, just one dude. Now, because Descartes is a dualist, Descartes thinks,
no, there's not just one thing. The mind and the body are two different kinds of stuff,
and the divisibility argument is the argument that seems to show that. We're going to read
the argument right now. The first observation I make at this point is that there is a great
difference between the mind and the body, inasmuch as the body is, by its very nature,
always divisible, while the mind is utterly indivisible. Okay, that's the start of the proof.
There's a difference between these two things. The mind is indivisible,
cannot be divided, cannot be separated out into parts, and the body is divisible,
always divisible, like you can always chop body up into smaller parts. The way that this proof
is going to work is that, you know, you prove that there's two incompatible properties.
One thing can't be both indivisible and always divisible. It would be like,
let's say you knew that Clark Kent was, you know, five foot six inches tall, and you knew that
Superman was 6'2". They can't be the same dude if they're different heights, because you can't be
5'6 and 6'2". You're only one. You're either this height or this height, or some height in between,
or some height greater, but you can't be at two mutually incompatible heights, right?
So if it turned out, if you were trying to figure out, you were like,
huh, are Superman and Clark Kent the same dude? You'd be like, I've never seen them at the same
place. They both have dark hair. One of them wears glasses, the other one doesn't, but then you'd be
like, no, you could just take off glasses, but you can't take off height. So if you found out
that Clark Kent was 5'6 and that Superman was 6'2", then you'd know, oh, it turns out they're
not the same. That's what Descartes is trying to do with the divisibility argument when it comes
to the mind and the body. He's saying, oh, look, this thing is indivisible, and this thing is
divisible, so they can't be the same thing. For when I consider the mind, or myself, insofar as
I am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself. I understand
myself to be something quite single and complete. This is backing up the claim that the mind is
indivisible. It doesn't have parts. It's just one simple thing. Simple means not made up of parts.
Although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, I recognize that if a foot or arm or
any other part of the body is cut off, nothing has thereby been taken away from the mind.
In that sense, Descartes considers a possible objection. The thought is, well, no, look,
the mind is sort of spread out over the whole body, and so the mind has parts. The mind has
its foot part, just like the body has its foot part. No, Descartes says, because if you chop
off someone's foot, then you've taken away some of their body. But you haven't taken away any of
their mind, right? It's not like part of their mind goes away. So it seems like when you divide
some of the body, you don't divide the mind. The mind isn't spread out over the body. Although it
seems that way, that's just not true, Descartes says. As for the faculties of willing, of
understanding, of sensory perception, and so on, these cannot be termed parts of the mind,
since it is one and the same mind that wills and understands and has sensory perceptions.
Okay, in this sense, Descartes is considering another possible objection, right? You might
object to the claim that the mind is indivisible by saying, what do you mean the mind is indivisible?
It has different faculties. It has, you know, the part of the mind that senses things in the world,
and then it has the part of the mind that understands, and the part of the mind that
wills, or whatever. And Descartes is saying, no, no, no, strictly speaking, those aren't parts of
mind. Those are just things that the mind does. It understands things, or it senses things. It's
just still one singular indivisible mind, and it just does different things at different times.
By contrast, there is no corporeal or extended thing that I can think of which, in my thought,
I cannot easily divide into parts. And this very fact makes me understand that it is divisible.
Okay, so in that sentence, he moves on to the claim that body is divisible. Descartes thinks
that you can always take some bit of physical matter and chop it up into smaller pieces.
Descartes, writing in the 17th century, was what was called a corpuscularian.
The corpuscularians were a group of scientists at the time. Famously, it included Hobbes and Locke
and Newton and Boyle. That's Isaac Newton. These were folks that were rejecting Aristotle's four
elements that make up the universe, earth, wind, fire, and water. They instead thought that physical
matter was made up of corpuscles, little particles. And corpuscularianism was different from another
theory that was circulating at the time called atomism. Atomism was the idea that, well,
things were made up of particles, sure, but those particles were indivisible little particles. The
corpuscularians thought that, no, you can get into those little basic particles that make up
everything and you can change features of them and stuff like that. And so it was the corpuscularians,
like Newton, who were alchemists. They were trying to change other metals, like iron or whatever,
into gold. Sort of as a side note, there were different kinds of corpuscularians. There were
the ones that thought that all of the particles that make up the universe, you know, were sort
of bopping around and bouncing into one another and all that sort of thing, but there was empty
space sometimes in between them. Maybe modern physics is this kind of corpuscularian. But
Descartes was the kind that thought that all the corpuscles, all the particles, were packed in
maximally tight, up against one another, and there was no such thing as a vacuum. There was
no empty space whatsoever. So if one of the particles sort of moved out of the way, then
another one immediately squeezed in to replace what would otherwise be empty space left by the
first particle moving. This is in stark contrast to the view that we have today, given to us by
modern physics, whereby almost everything in the universe is empty space. You know this, right,
that according to physics, everything, or basically everything, is empty space. Like,
everything is made up of atoms, right, and atoms have a nucleus, and then in the nucleus, that's
where the protons and the neutrons are, and then there's the electrons. And the atoms, of course,
you know, they'll sometimes get really close and they'll bond, and that's when they share electrons,
but the electrons are still orbiting around the nucleus or whatever, but the atom is almost all
empty space. Like, take a hydrogen atom, for example, right. Say that you, a hydrogen atom,
you know, is the simplest atom. It's just got one proton in the middle, and then it's got one
electron going around it, right. Say you took a hydrogen atom and you blew up the nucleus so that
it was this big. There, that's the proton, that's the nucleus of the hydrogen atom. Okay, where should
I draw the electron? Like, how far away do I have to go before I draw the electron? The answer is two
miles. If the nucleus is this big, then the electron goes two miles away. For every, you know, let's say
foot of nucleus, you have a two-mile gap, and then you have an electron. Atoms are almost entirely
empty space, and so that means everything, according to modern physics, is almost entirely
empty space. This marker is empty space, basically, and every table, every solid surface,
all this stuff is empty space. That's not the way it looks, but according to physics,
that's the way it is. Anyway, Descartes was the kind of corpuscularian who thought that
there were no vacuums, everything was packed in maximally tight, there was no empty space at all,
and the important part for us is that Descartes thinks that you could always separate out
physical matter into parts. You could always divide it, right? Even if you got down to a corpuscle,
you know, a particle that you couldn't physically rip apart, you could still, you know, mentally
divide it into, like, the left half and the right half, and those are parts, and you're still
dividing in a certain sense of dividing. This one argument would be enough to show me that the
mind is completely different from the body, even if I did not already know as much from other
considerations. Okay, that sentence is just the sentence where he says, okay, I'm done, I've
concluded that dualism is true, that the mind is distinct from the body, and, you know, this
argument works all on its own, the divisibility argument, even if I hadn't already given this
other argument for the same conclusion, you know, several pages earlier. Why does it matter that the
mind and the body are distinct? Like, why do we care? Well, here's the big reason to care, and then
because of this, we're going to spend the entire rest of the semester focusing on whether dualism
is true or whether the alternative view, physicalism, that the mind is part of the body,
whether that view is true. It matters because this is the only way that human beings can survive
their bodily death. We don't typically think about it like this, but most people on the planet
think that they themselves and that everyone around them is immortal, right? Immortal means that you
can't die. So, if you are an adherent to one of the major monotheistic religions, you think that
you have, like, a soul that goes somewhere when your body dies, right? So your heart stops beating,
and all the electrical signals in your brain cease, and then what happens is your soul, that
is, your mind, your consciousness, your memories, all that sort of stuff, they're not physical
stuff. They go off to heaven or to hell or whatever, right? They go to meet judgment or something like
that. Most people on the planet think that something like this happens. If that is true, then we don't
really die, not in the interesting sense. You lose your, like, your vessel, you know, the machine
that you're moving around in. But you yourself, your thoughts, your consciousness, your mind, that goes
somewhere else, and it never dies. It goes to live somewhere for eternity. So, in the interesting,
important, fundamental sense, you are immortal, if all of those people are right. Anyway, that view is
only really possible if you think that the mind is not itself some physical stuff. The mind has to be
a separate, different thing from the body in order to live on forever after your body dies.
Okay, there's one last thing that we need to take out of meditation six before we can be done with
the meditations and move on with the rest of the course, and that's this. Descartes is not just any
old dualist. He's what's called an interactionist dualist. The idea is that the mind and the body
are distinct, that's the dual part of dualism, but that they interact causally. Stuff happening in
the mind can cause stuff to happen in the body, and stuff happening in the body can cause stuff
to happen in the mind. That's Descartes' view. He's an interactionist dualist, the kind of dualist
that thinks that the body and mind interact with one another. Here's where he makes this claim.
It happens on AT86. My next observation is that the mind is not immediately affected by all parts
of the body, but only by the brain, or perhaps just by one small part of the brain, namely the
which is said to contain the common sense. He definitely thinks that they causally interact,
but he doesn't think that the mind directly interacts with your hand, for example. When
your mind has a sensation of touch from your hand, it's not like the mind is right up there with the
hand. Rather, what happens, Descartes thinks, and if dualism is right, then it seems like Descartes
is right, that there's a signal sent from your hand, up your arm, to your spine, and then into
your brain, and then there's a part of your brain, the part that contains the common sense part of
your brain. In another work, he points out that he thinks that this is the pineal gland. That's a
gland. That's a part of your brain. He thinks that's where the mind, or the soul, gets the
signal from the hand, and that's also where it sends a signal back to the hand to do things like
move around. Every time this part of the brain is in a given state, it presents the same signals
to the mind, even though the other parts of the body may be in a different condition at the time.
The idea there is just that, you know, let's say I have the sensation of like touching this glass,
right? One way for that to happen, I get that, how does that sensation get into my mind? Well,
one way, Descartes thinks, is for a signal to go from my hand, up my arm, into the spine,
into the pineal gland, and then from the pineal gland, it goes into my mind, wherever that is.
Not really anywhere in space. It's not extended, for sure. So that's one way, is that the signal
goes from my hand to the pineal gland, and then into the mind. But Descartes thinks that it's
also possible for that signal to originate more locally, that is closer to the pineal gland. Like,
let's say I don't touch the glass, but some wire in my brain gets tripped anyway,
and the signal gets into my pineal gland, even though I don't touch anything.
The signal didn't start in my hand, it started somewhere closer. But if the same signal gets
into the pineal gland, then that same signal gets sent to the mind, and then in the mind,
I have the feeling or the sensation of touching the glass, even if I don't. That's what he was
saying in that last sentence. Okay, that's it. We're done with the meditation.

