Lộ Danh Tính 12 Nhân Vật Thay Tập Cận Bình “Cai Trị” Trung Quốc

More surprisingly, the person in charge is not Xi Jinping. A series of revelations about Zhang Huixian, a senior figure who used to defend Xi Jinping's right to control the army, shows that he can become Xi Jinping's leader when the army is no longer standing still, everything can happen. During the chaos in the South China Sea, Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a slip of the tongue between Europe, revealing the true nature of Beijing in the unforgettable war, and inadvertently revealing the strategic face of Russia's West. At the same time, Chinese society continues to crumble due to a record-breaking decline in numbers and people's frustrations. The return of senior officials Xi Jinping, Li Keng, Ding Tiet-Tuong, Chiu La-Teh, Chen Kat-Ning, Chuong O-Hiep, Ho Xuan-Hua, 7 people are holding positions in the Central Committee for Discussion and Statutory Coordination. A total of 12 people, not including Ma Hung-Thuy, who was appointed to avoid the office of this agency, increased the total number of officials with authority to 13. The most noteworthy thing is that the position of member of this agency does not belong to Xi Jinping, but to Hu Qiongdao, the former secretary-general of the Communist Party of China. And Xi Jinping, who currently holds the highest power on the list, only holds the role of deputy member of the agency. Ma Hung-Thuy, who was once considered useless, has now returned to Beijing and is being used to avoid the office of the committee, a position that has the right to directly coordinate and operate all the auxiliary machines of these agencies. This shows that the situation is changing, and the political foundation of the Central Committee is no longer as monotonous as before. The establishment of this committee, in conjunction with the recent implementation of the Communist Party of China, the coordination of the Committee for Discussion and Statutory Coordination and the Central Committee, shows a transformative change in the power structure. The re-emergence of the political center of political power and absolute power of Xi Jinping began to face anti-progressive regimes. In other words, China is entering a political period of co-sisterhood, that is, a single leader who shares power with the retired senior officials. This arrangement, on the one hand, brings hope to those who want the country to return to the path of reform and opening up. On the other hand, it also signals a deep risk of internal conflicts that are gradually turning into public political conflicts. All these developments, along with the two major events to come, the North China Sea Summit at the end of July and the Sino-U.S. Quad-20 Summit at the end of August, will play a decisive role in determining the political future of China, or opening the door to reform, or continuing to sink into the abyss of struggle and power crisis. According to the content of the working convention of the Committee for Discussion and Statutory Coordination and the Central Committee, which the Communist Party of China has just implemented, this committee is designated as the highest coordinating body under the direct leadership of the Central Committee, with the task of defining the overall strategy, determining major policies and assigning key personnel to the entire Chinese political system. An additional point in the convention is that the committee is authorized to provide advice on proposals proposed by the Central Political Department. This means that if the committee, where the officials' presence is present, does not become a political process, the political department is forced to return. This committee, for the first time in many years, has officially given to the leaders who have retired, a role of institutionalization of Xi Jinping's power. The re-emergence of the old, especially Hu Jintao, On Xiaobao and Tang Khanhong, is no longer symbolic as before, but has become a political entity with official power. This breaks the absolute order of power of Xi Jinping, which has been strengthened for more than a decade. In terms of the form of this institutionalization process, it seems to be a response from the South China Sea to the existential crises from the inside out, from economic degradation, social instability, to international pressure. But in essence, it can also be a living reflection of the layers of the old cherry blossoms in the pond. Those who are afraid that Xi Jinping's extremist, pessimistic and increasingly personal path will push the entire system into a dead end, the old, which used to be the architect of the era of the reform and opening up, now returns with the hope of balancing the political path and China's direction towards a more practical path. In the context of a serious economic downturn and an isolated international relationship, letting people like Hu Jintao or On Xiaobao participate in the political process may be an effort to regain confidence from both the domestic market and the international community. However, as with all co-existence models in the history of the Communist Party of China, the division of power between the single and old generations always limits the great risks. New political structures can easily fall into a state of division, where major decisions are delayed due to ideological conflicts or group interests. And if not handled skillfully, conflicts between parties can completely erupt into an internal crisis, both in terms of institutionalization and practicality. From the current indicators, it can be seen that the Committee for Discussion on Work and the Central Committee is not only an advisory agency, but also a power center in line with the Politburo, and even has the right to approve or direct the Supreme Committees. This also means that Xi Jinping is no longer the only one who intends to get everything done in the South China Sea, and his days of absolute power may be gradually coming to an end. The reappearance of the old in the power center with an authoritarian system and the ability to undermine the political system raises a key question. Is the Communist Party of China entering a phase of institutionalization, where internal strife is no longer silent, but has been put into force? According to Article 8 of the Convention of the Communist Party of China, this agency has the right to discuss and discuss major strategic issues such as economy, diplomacy and defense. This means that any important policy, from the direction of macroeconomic, foreign trade with the United States and Europe, to military policy related to the Taiwan Strait, must pass consensus or at least not be denied by the authorities. The sharing of power in this sense is to get collective opinions, in fact, to hide the high risk of disintegration, when members of the Committee are represented by conflicting ideas and different interests, even opponents. Hu Jintao and Wang Jiabao represented the reform generation, which once emphasized the market, soft diplomacy and social stability. On the contrary, Xi Jinping followed the path of absolute power, comprehensive control and the direction of ideological struggle. These conflicts are not only theoretical, but also deeply ingrained in the management, reform or change of will, opening or self-independence, market or nation. Article 13 of the Convention stipulates that the content of meetings must be kept absolutely secret, while Article 16 emphasizes that any unauthorized behavior or violation of the Constitution will be held accountable. These provisions seem to reflect the state of internal uncontrol and the fear of a coup from within the party. However, for those who are too familiar with the power game, such as the increase of Hong or Zhang, the old-fashioned hands of the H-100 era, can a table of conditions be able to contain the coups behind the scenes? The biggest risk right now is the conflict between the old and the current leadership. It is no longer a side issue, but has entered into an authoritarian system, that is, it is put into a system, but lacks a judicial or legislative system to balance it. Without a clear distinction between power and administrative boundaries, the cohesion between the reform generation and the ruling generation not only does not create a balance, but can also cause the leadership to fall into a state of stagnation, even deterioration. Especially worrisome is that in this new structure, Xi Jinping maintains the role of deputy convener under the leadership of Hu Jintao, a symbol of profound significance, showing that the senior ministers no longer place their trust in the current leadership. With a full relationship between these two characters, especially after Xi's order to force Hu to leave the 20th General Assembly, which is widely seen around the world, it raises the question of whether the current arrangement is an effort to resolve or the beginning of a coup with a deterrent nature. CHUONG U HIEP, THE BIGGEST THREAT TO XI JINPING In the current power struggle, CHUONG U HIEP stands out as a key figure, not only because of his position as deputy convener of the Central Committee, but also because of his special relationship with Xi Jinping, formed from a period of extremism just 10 years ago. According to internal sources, at the beginning of March 2015, when he was holding a meeting of the Central Committee and the Minister of General Equipment, CHUONG U HIEP led a unit of the 38th Military Group, now the 82nd Military Group of the Central Committee, to enter the South China Sea in conjunction with the Communist Party of China. At that time, he was in charge of the Central Office, carrying out a thorough reform of the Central Guard. In fact, it was a soft coup, in which the guard forces, when CHUONG U HIEP announced the implementation of the direct order of Xi Jinping, immediately changed the personnel structure of the guard. The entire Tao-Thanh Military District, a province of the Capital Lake, was cut off right there, forced to leave the South China Sea, and transferred back to the military base in Beijing. In just a few hours, the garrison took over the entire central security system. Since then, it was the first time that Xi Jinping really held a sword in his hand, completed the final step to strengthen his personal power. The leader of that group, no one else, was CHUONG U HIEP. However, after the 20th General Assembly, the relationship between the two has completely collapsed. It was revealed that before the 20th General Assembly, CHUONG U HIEP had pledged to the so-called reform party, that the army would be neutral. But then everything changed. When CHUONG U HIEP was seduced by money and political interests, he was said to have received 200 billion yuan for his family, and himself was forced to resign, even though he was too old. Even in meetings with former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, CHUONG U HIEP has repeatedly stood on the side of the party, saying that the party was about to fall, what should we do? Intentionally creating an alliance to weaken the defense from the reform side. But when he entered the 20th General Assembly, CHUONG U HIEP suddenly appeared. At the meeting of the chairman's group, he publicly announced his support for Xi Jinping's re-election. He even threatened to use force to suppress any force that opposed Xi Jinping, causing the atmosphere of the meeting hall to shake, forcing all personnel and staff to turn in the direction of favoring Xi Jinping. It was thanks to this betrayal and footjob that Xi Jinping won the general election at the 20th General Assembly, and the reform party was swept out of the central machine. Xi Jinping, after securing the 3rd term, has begun to abandon the people who have worked so hard and are at risk of turning the tables. Overthrowing Lee Tung-Fuk, CHUONG's right-hand man in the army, is considered the first move in CHUONG U HIEP's planning chain. However, CHUONG did not accept to be brought to the front in a quiet way. In return, he made a strong counterattack, even issued orders to arrest the most intimate limbs of the party in the army, including Miu Hoa and Ha Viet-Dong, two loyal generals to Xi Jinping. Currently, the Chinese military is in a tense atmosphere. Many senior officials are being investigated, the atmosphere is turbulent across the battlefields. Some long-time generals are said to have publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with Xi, saying that he used anti-corruption as an internal suppression tool. In an institution where the government was born from the gun, the military has always been the highest determinant factor, and if CHUONG U HIEP is to be brought to the front he will be the one to be arrested. However, the Chinese military has always been the most determinant factor. was born from the gun, the military has always been the highest was born from the gun, determinant factor. In a meeting with the top representative in charge of EU foreign policy and security, George S. Porrell said that Beijing cannot accept Russia's failure in Ukraine, because if that happens, all US attention will immediately be turned to China. This statement, although revealed in a close-up, has shocked all Brussels diplomats, because it not only confirms Beijing's deep stance behind Russia, but also frames Russia's strategy of lending a hand in the face of pressure from the US and the West. Immediately, social media in Europe circulated comments. Wang Yi accidentally told the truth. I say that this uncommon, if heard by Russian President Vladimir Putin, can make him angry to the point of anger, because the establishment of a secret debate behind Wang Yi's words when Russia is just a tool in Beijing's geopolitics, is a lifeline for the Chinese Communist Party to have more time to prepare to deal with the West. According to the article of the South China Morning Post, the four-hour meeting between Wang Yi and Porrell is described as a political and commercial marathon debate, in which Wang Yi continues to show Beijing's logic that the longer the US intervenes in the war in Ukraine, the longer the war will benefit China. In other words, Beijing hopes that Russia will continue to prolong the conflict to consume the energy and resources of the West, from which it continues to exert pressure on China. Although Wang Yi's air display is said to be respectful and constructive, according to some European officials attending the meeting, At the same time, according to AFP, EU representative Joseph Porrell did not hesitate to speak out, publicly criticizing Beijing for wanting to stand on both sides, as well as supporting the war in Ukraine and hoping to increase trade relations and dialogue with Europe. Porrell also affirmed that Beijing could not give up its support for Russia's invasion, and asked to be welcomed as a strategic partner in Europe. The situation is getting worse as the Chinese government has asked to shorten the EU-EU summit, which is expected to take place at the end of July, from two days to one day, from Beijing to the city of Hefei, where the economic summit was also canceled. This has led many people to believe that Wang Yi has broken his promise and ruined the plan to improve relations between Beijing and Russia for further bilateral trade talks. Currently, under pressure from the EU, Beijing is forced to give a final answer. If China really wants to cooperate with Europe, it must end all support for the war, from the transfer of critical components, support for technology to the avoidance of sanctions on the third way. So, in a few honest words, Wang Yi has accidentally undermined the entire foreign strategy of the South China Sea.