64 Reponsibility invoked by a State other than the injured State

As we have seen, the injured state is entitled to invoke the responsibility of a state if the conditions set out in article 42 are met. The injured state can then claim, from the responsible state, cessation of the ongoing internationally wrongful act, reparation for the injury resulting from the breach and, if circumstances so require, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. Furthermore, as we shall see later in this lesson, the injured state will be entitled to take countermeasures against the responsible state in order to put pressure on that state and obtain from it that it meets its new secondary obligations arising from international responsibility. However, the responsibility of a state may also be invoked by any state other than the injured state when a collective interest is at stake, and this is envisaged under article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility. Again, the key element is to determine to whom the obligation breached is owed. Article 48 envisages two different possibilities. Each time, the invocation of responsibility by non-injured states is possible because a collective interest is at stake. Non-injured states will be entitled to come to the rescue of that collective interest by invoking the responsibility of the state concerned. The two possibilities envisaged under article 48 paragraph 1 are as follows. a. The obligation breached is owed to a group of states, including that state, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of that group. or b. The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. The obligations envisaged under article 48 paragraph 1a must be owed to a group of states and must, moreover, be established for the protection of a collective interest of that group. Those obligations are usually established under multilateral treaties, but they may also exist under customary international law. Those obligations are obligations erga omnes partes. Examples of such obligations can be found in the case between Belgium and Senegal, about the obligation to prosecute or extradite Hissenabré, the former head of state of Chad, present in Senegal. In that case, the ICJ found that such obligation under the 1984 Convention against Torture was an erga omnes partes obligation. The obligations envisaged under article 48 paragraph 1b must be owed to the international community as a whole, and are of a customary nature. They are called obligations erga omnes, and as recalled in the video relating to the invocation of responsibility by the injured state, the concept of obligation erga omnes was introduced by the ICJ in the Barcelona Attraction case. In that case, the court said that, I quote again, all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection, and I quote, because, again, of the importance of the rights involved. The court gave examples of such obligations, and it referred to, I quote, the outlawing of acts of aggression and of genocide, as also the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including, said the court, protection from slavery and racial discrimination, end of quote. As we have seen in week two, the court has since then added the right of self-determination of peoples to this list of erga omnes obligations, and you may remember the Istimor case or the Royal Opinion of the court. Erga omnes obligations are thus obligations that are owed by all states to every other state, to the international community as a whole. When such erga omnes partes or erga omnes obligations are breached, any of the states to which the obligation is owed is entitled to invoke the responsibility of the state for the breach of such obligation, because, again, of the collective interest it protects. However, and as stated under article 48 paragraph 2, the states other than the injured state are entitled to invoke this responsibility for specific purposes. Indeed, those other states may claim from the responsible state, I quote, a cessation of the internationally wrongful act and eventually assurances and guarantees of non-repetition and b performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured state or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. So the invocation of responsibility by the other states than the injured state serves a double purpose which is never selfish nor purely in the interest of the non-injured state invoking such responsibility. The return to legality through cessation of the ongoing wrongful act and eventually assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, this is in the interest of the group of states or of the international community as a whole and the reparation of the injury resulting from the wrongful act, but this is in the interest of the injured state or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached, which could be individuals. It's not in the interest of the other state than the injured state. Lastly, article 48 paragraph 3 limits the possibility to invoke the responsibility of a state by non-injured states by declaring that the requirements that we have seen before under article 43, notice of the claim, article 44, admissibility and article 45, loss of the right to invoke responsibility, that those requirements also apply to the invocation of responsibility by non-injured states.