Deciding The War - Every battle is both a victory and a defeat – it depends which flag you fly. Across every theatre of the Second World War battles were decided not only by strategy but by armies in their element, capitalising on the terrain and with better access to supplies or by forces stretched beyond their limits, facing unforeseen conditions and targets underestimated.
These battles won and lost would determine possession of territory, of resources, and of the strength to go on fighting. For some of the battles it was the victory that most influenced the future course of the war. For others, it was the defeat.
From sweeping offensives to special operations, this is the story of the battles won and battles lost that shaped the outcome of the greatest conflict in history.
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Every battle is both a victory and a defeat.
It depends which flag you fly.
In every theater of the Second World War,
battles won and lost determine possession of territory,
of resources, and of the strength to go on fighting.
For some of the battles, it was the victory that most influenced the future course of the war.
For others, it was the defeat.
This is the story of the battles won and lost
that decided the outcome of the greatest conflict in history.
A war that reached every continent and touched every sort of terrain demanded every sort of
strategy. In this episode, we examine battles fought at sea and in the jungle, in city streets,
in invasions from the air, and retreats from the land.
Spring in Paris, over the Eiffel Tower, over the cities and towns of Europe,
hangs a pall of fear and death. The German invasion of France could hardly have gone better
for the Germans. The German blitzkrieg against Western Europe opens on the 10th of May 1940,
and within a fortnight, the British and French and Belgian armies are defeated.
It looks as if the Second World War in the West will be over literally within weeks.
The Wehrmacht advance was remorseless. Army Group A, in the center of the offensive,
wheeled towards the coast, pushing the French First Army and the British Expeditionary Force
towards the sea with the finesse of a sheepdog.
Pressing from the north, Von Bock's Army Group B further penned the Allied force.
And soon, three German armies, von Kluge's 4th, von Küchler's 18th, and von Reichenau's 6th,
were moving in for what must have been the coup de grace. On the 4th of June, German troops entered
the port of Dunkirk, but they did not defeat and imprison the hundreds of thousands of troops that
they had penned there. And though there are solid reasons why they did not, what happened between
May 23rd and June 4th must, albeit with hindsight, be classed as a German mistake,
with quite significant consequences. By the 23rd of May, the Belgian army had been isolated,
and the British and First French forced against the sea. Von Rundstedt, commanding Army Group A,
issued what has famously become known as the Stop Order.
The Germans have been fighting for three weeks invading Western Europe. Their forces are exhausted.
So the German generals, and not as many people think, Hitler, order them to stop on the perimeter
of the Dunkirk beaches. So in effect, the Germans hand Western Allies a few days grace.
So why did von Rundstedt and Hitler halt their smashing offensive? The panzer divisions had
been reduced by 30 percent in the blitzkrieg that had brought them to the channel. And the
bulk of the French military machine lay undefeated, as indeed did the greater part of France.
The Germans were concerned about the potential for an Allied counterattack.
And they're fighting an army which basically won the First World War. So the Germans are concerned
that their enemy is giving in too easily. So yeah, there was a very, very sensible prudence on the
part of the German commanders, who also knew that their own troops were disorganized by success.
When Hitler visited von Rundstedt, his acceptance of the Stop Order was made easier by the assurances
of Reichsmarshal Hermann Göring, who agitated for and guaranteed the success of
leaving it to his Luftwaffe to finish off the trapped Allied troops.
The country around Dunkirk is not suitable for armored warfare. It's flat, but it's cut up by
canals and drainage ditches. In fact, it's very similar to the fighting in the First World War
in Flanders, which the senior commanders on both sides, including Hitler, remembered from 20 years
before. On the day that Hitler and Göring made their plans, the British commander, Lord Gort,
took a unilateral decision. He would not risk losing his entire command by participating in
General Wagen's proposed and wildly optimistic offensive, which imagined a breakout to link up
with forces further south. Gort decided instead to withdraw the British expeditionary force on
Dunkirk, from which they could be evacuated, to fight another day. That evacuation, Operation
Dynamo, would begin on May 26th. Gort's was not the only unilateral decision of the unravelling
alliance. On May 27th, without consulting his allies, King Leopold of Belgium offered his
surrender to the Germans. Admiral Bertram Ramsey, who had been alerted as early as May 20th of the
possible need for an evacuation, had brought together a large and decidedly motley collection
of vessels, with which to carry off the troops assembling at Dunkirk. British ships, cruisers,
destroyers, yachts, paddle boats, anything that could float, for the British were determined to
save their men. The shortest route had to be abandoned when Calais fell, and ships would
have been within range of the Calais shore batteries. The second, Route X, was vulnerable
to unswept mines. And so, the longest passage, north to the Quinte Bois, west to the Goodwin
Sands lightship, and south to Dover, a journey of 160 kilometres, was chosen of necessity.
As it became clear what was happening, the Luftwaffe's action against the evacuation
intensified, which spread the panic to the civilian population.
There were men, women and children with bags, dragging little trucks. The children weren't
talking or playing, all with vacant expressions, just looking straight ahead.
The pullback on Dunkirk was not a route. Beginning on the 26th, the forces conducted
an orderly phased withdrawal to a 25 kilometre perimeter, defining a pocket 10 to 12 kilometres
deep. The BEF disabled its equipment, spiked and abandoned its guns, and fell back.
Had it not been for this discipline, had there been panic, what happened at Dunkirk would not
have been possible. There, the efficient evacuation was underway. 25,000 men had been taken off by the
end of the second day of the operation. By May 31st, the day of the largest total taken off,
the figure had risen to 68,014. The harbour was full of sunken ships and at the quayside,
I could see somebody running in front of me. I could see him running and he was running and I
thought, oh, that ship's got smoke coming out of the furnace. Well, I ran like mad as well
and was just pulling away from the quayside and I managed to get aboard. I just jumped aboard.
Thank God. The effectiveness of the Luftwaffe was restricted. The bombers could not operate at night.
Visibility was limited by frequent mists, although calm seas favoured the evacuation fleet
and the Royal Air Force could sufficiently harass German aircraft to restrict their effect.
By the end of Operation Dynamo, the RAF had lost 177 aircraft, the Germans 240.
Had the Germans not halted on the 23rd, it is unlikely that such an evacuation could have been
conducted. The evacuation of Dunkirk means several things. I mean, in sheer practical terms,
it means that the British have literally hundreds of thousands of men to continue the fight.
Secondly, they've got not just British troops, but French troops especially.
So there's a free French army created in Britain because of the evacuation of Dunkirk.
Though the British troops had lost their equipment, they had boosted morale and the
will to resist. Anyway, the BEF has come back and whatever the disasters that have led to their
return, we at home are mighty glad to have them here. And when, on their return, Churchill made
his defiant, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall never surrender speech. He spoke for the
It's an enormous psychological boost. And we still talk about the Dunkirk spirit,
because although it was a massive defeat, it was a psychological victory,
which the British drew on for the rest of the war.
In 1937, Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China. It did not go to plan.
Progress was slow, resistance more stubborn than had been anticipated.
In 1939, Japanese colonial ambitions suffered a further check on the Mongolian border,
where Soviet troops inflicted a decisive defeat. It all strengthened the hand of that
faction in the military, which argued that Japan's expansion should be south. To Japan,
it was the southern resources area. And dressed up as the greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere,
it would give Japan all of the living space and raw material that she needed.
What we need to remember here is that this is an age largely before synthetic products,
that Japan had been fighting a very costly war in China. The way that it saw finishing that war was
it needed more resources. The Japanese leadership saw that they had no choice but to seize the
resources of the Netherlands East Indies. Not only are the Dutch East Indies of great
strategic value, but also they contain great material wealth, oil for instance.
Their aims were to do it quickly, so they could release the troops needed to send them back to
fight the war in China, so that they could grab those resources in the Netherlands East Indies
and start shipping them back to Japan before the United States started to gear up for war.
December 7th, 1941. As Japanese aircraft were approaching Pearl Harbour,
Japanese forces under General Tomoyuki Yamashita were already going ashore on the Malay Peninsula
at Kotobaru. Some of their early successes were all about simultaneous operations across
the broad swathe of Asia and the Pacific. So the British and American forces in the Asia Pacific,
they were spread out trying to react to the Japanese. A lot of these places were very
weakly garrisoned as well, so the Japanese were very quickly seizing them and then moving on,
because part of their battle plans were that troops required for one operation would then
move relatively quickly on to the next. So they didn't have time to do that.
At the end of 1941, hardly more than three weeks after the code words
Tora! Tora! Tora! had sent in the raid on Pearl Harbour, the Japanese were now poised for a
full-scale invasion of Burma, the conquest of the Philippines, the assault on Singapore,
and the defeat of the Dutch in the resource-rich Dutch East Indies. As Churchill said of the fall
of France, how could it have happened so quickly? The reasons for victory can be seen in the
campaign in Malaya. They were repeated through the co-prosperity sphere and were fundamental
to Japan's early success. When Japanese transports, more than 20 of them, brought
Yamashita's army group ashore at seven sites on December 8th, they were virtually unopposed.
British forces were in their habitual deployment, particularly in strength around the Butterworth
base, and had not been moved despite the growing threat of Japanese militarism
and the presence of the Japanese force across the Gulf of Siam.
The 5th Infantry Division quickly secured the air bases at Patani and Singora.
Taking Singora, where the peninsula narrows, made possible the movement of Japanese forces
across to the west coast. And that meant that Yamashita could advance on two fronts,
dividing the defenders. The Japanese maintained flexibility in action. The east coast,
thinly defended, was little more than a march southwards. The west coast required different
tactics, and they got them. Hook actions either left strong defensive positions impotent in the
of troops that had bypassed them, or, more usually, encircled and smashed them.
In places, these hooks meant moving through jungle that the British had deemed impossible,
an echo of the French mistake that was exposed by the advance through the Ardennes.
The terrain is exploited by the Japanese in a way that it's not by the British. They never
quite managed to work out how to prevent the Japanese outflanking, both using the forested
areas, but also what the Japanese do in Malaya as well, is make use of small craft
to outflank British positions on the land by outflanking movements using the sea.
All the earlier reports from Malaya spoke of heavy and confused fighting,
with the Japanese gaining ground. This is typical Malayan country,
almost the only place in which troops can deploy being the plantation.
The Japanese had been specifically trained in jungle warfare. The British and Commonwealth
forces had not. Their strategy had suffered from traditional textbook planning, planning which had,
in a way, suffered from imperial hubris. There's a lot of racial prejudice underlies
the Allies' initial reading of what the Japanese military is capable of,
and so it underestimates its ability to maneuver, it underestimates its ability to fight,
it underestimates its willingness to utilize the terrain to its advantages,
it underestimates the capabilities of its aircraft, and thus the Japanese are able to
wrest control of the skies in areas that they're fighting very quickly.
Speed was fundamental to Japanese military thinking,
so it was engineered into every aspect of the operation. Troops, not only in the Malay campaign,
but everywhere and throughout the war, traveled with very little in the way of support.
When, by the 21st of December, British formations received the order
to concentrate on a line behind the Parak River, it was too late.
Japan would continue to record victories, pushing and pushing faster than their opponents
so that Singapore, the Philippines, and the East Indies would all fall.
If there was a true blitzkrieg in the Second World War, it was this one.
In a matter of weeks, Japan had gained for itself one-sixth of the surface of the planet.
It seems for a while you have this superhuman enemy, this soldier who can keep going and going,
who fights like the devil, who doesn't fight the way that Western forces expect to fight.
It also means that there's a vast amount of territory that, if the Allies are going to
win the war, that they have to recapture from the Japanese. But after six months,
the seeming invincibility of Japan was stopped in a great naval battle in a place called Midway.
The United Kingdom's position as a great power, which she possessed at the start of the Second
World War, was not a consequence of the wealth, or weather, or natural resources of the British
Isles. It rested on her empire, a vast maritime empire, the greatest the world had known.
And the integrity of that empire rested not on a large standing army, it depended on the Royal
Navy. The Royal Navy, facing only Germany before the fall of France, was a dominant force and
continued to have the strategic advantage of effectively sitting astride Germany's exits to
the globe. It had eight major groups located in the Atlantic at the time that the Germans could
barely deploy two battle cruisers and a number of submarines. Before the war began, the German
pocket battleship, Admiral Graf Spee, sailed for the South Atlantic. And there she waited.
Chief interest, of course, attaches to the famous pocket battleships, which are only 10,000 tons,
but mount six 11-inch guns and have a speed of 26 knots. Once war had started, the Graf Spee began
her operations. Between the end of September and the end of October, she sank six vessels in an
area that straddled a major sea lane for ships, travelling around the Cape of Good Hope.
Well, the Graf Spee was in the South Atlantic as part of a deliberate campaign to interrupt, to
destroy the global shipping movements, to slow and interrupt the movement of resources to and
from the United Kingdom. By November, the Royal Navy had formed six task forces to find and sink
the battleship. In early December, Graf Spee claimed two more victims. But they did not go
down without sending radio signals that influenced Commodore Harwood, commanding Force G,
to concentrate his forces on the Falkland Islands. Captain Langsdorff, commanding Graf Spee,
made two blunders. The first was that spotting the smoke of four of Harwood's cruisers
and mistaking them for destroyers on escort duty, he closed to the attack.
What followed, history knows, as the Battle of the River Plate.
Captain Langsdorff of Graf Spee, it was his duty not to engage British warships. It was his duty
to preserve that ship undamaged. As soon as he detected British ships, he should have tried to
go in the opposite direction. Langsdorff engaged Exeter and Ajax Royal Navy and Achilles Royal
Navy New Zealand division. As soon as he realized his mistake, he sped towards the enemy to prevent
them from outpacing him. Graf Spee had diesel engines, the British vessels steam, which could
not accelerate rapidly. Graf Spee engaged Exeter at 17,000 meters at 0618. She had turned northwest
against the Germans approach. Harwood actually split the cruisers, so they came at Langsdorff
from two directions, which unnerved him a bit. Ajax and Achilles, turning together northeast,
forced Langsdorff to spread his fire. After two minutes, Exeter was returning fire,
but Graf Spee had far superior weaponry. In fact, it inflicted quite significant damage on the three
British cruisers, which were undergunned compared to the 11-inch guns that he had. I had eight and
six-inch guns. By 0630, Ajax and Achilles had closed to 12,000 meters, forcing the German gunners
to divide their main armament. After nearly an hour, Admiral Graf Spee was finished. Far from
out of the fight, still sailing and seaworthy, but done for, because a shell from Exeter,
herself badly damaged and soon to retire from the battle, had damaged the battleship's fuel
plant. Graf Spee now had fuel for only 16 hours sailing, which meant she could not get home.
Neither could the damage be repaired at sea. Langsdorff consulted the charts. He would head
for the nearest neutral port, and that was Montevideo at the mouth of the river Plate.
There she is, the Admiral Graf Spee in Montevideo harbour, where she took refuge after the hammering
she received from her small adversary. In Montevideo, Langsdorff released the 61 British
merchant seamen he had taken on board as survivors of vessels he had sunk, and sought permission to
remain in port long enough to make repairs. The British had only one further vessel close
enough to blockade Graf Spee, but that's not what they broadcast. False intelligence painted a
picture of Force H, a large British force including the aircraft carrier Ark Royal,
assembling to finish the German the moment she sailed from port. Langsdorff committed his second
blunder. He believed the false intelligence. He did have an idea that there were stronger
forces waiting for him than were in fact the case, but it is true given the damage he'd already had
in the first action that the Graf Spee immediately leaving Montevideo would have been forced into
another action and would have received further damage, which would have left her in my view
absolutely open to being hunted down and destroyed by the much more powerful forces
that were concentrating on the river plate at that time. On December 17th, facing limited choices,
he sailed his ship into the estuary and ordered it scuttled. Tremendous explosions aft have wrecked
the vessel and there she lies abandoned to the flames by captain and crew, not to be sunk in
open fight by the enemy, not to go down with her colors flying like the Royal Pindi, but to be
blown up, abandoned, scuttled in an act of defeatism which has rightly earned the contempt of all decent
people. Two days later, Hans Langsdorff shot himself. Even as an army marches to certain
victory, a wrong step can lead to a setback, a defeat. The allies had been grinding on from
their Normandy beachhead, moving north and east, pushing the Germans back and approaching slowly
against resistance towards the Rhine and the moment when they would set foot on German soil.
Market Garden is a bizarre battle because it arises from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's
desire to bolt into Germany. Field Marshal Montgomery, the British commander, and Dwight
Eisenhower, the American supreme commander, had a very uneasy relationship. They had fundamentally
different ways of commanding, of projecting themselves, and they disagreed about the
strategy for the allied advance into Germany, which they had to do in order to defeat the Third
Reich. Eisenhower, I think sensibly, wanted to advance on a broad front. Montgomery had a bizarre
idea to punch a hole in the German defenses, to break into the North German plain. Montgomery
hoped his plan might also answer those critics of his conduct following D-Day, when some had
thought him overly cautious. Operation Market Garden was not a cautious plan, and following
Eisenhower's approval, he received the troops and resources that he needed. The new move was
shaping up, and everybody knew it would be another of those combined operations,
and it was going to be that knockout punch we'd all been sweating out.
Market Garden's basically two operations. Market is the airborne operation, where they drop airborne
troops beyond the bridges. Garden is the land advance to join up with those airborne forces.
And it sounds like a sensible idea, except, as the phrase goes, it was a bridge too far.
For Montgomery's plan to work, it was essential that every phase of the operation was a success.
Every bridge secured. Douglas C-47 aircraft, Dakotas to the British,
were the workhorses of the operation. They carried the first allied airborne army,
and they towed the gliders. About 2,000 aircraft of various types were involved.
Troops dropped in by glider or chute were to grasp and secure the bridges.
Following them would be the British 30th Corps under General Brian Horrocks.
If Horrocks could bring his men up in time, if the airborne divisions could take and hold the
bridges until 30th Corps got through, the German flank would be turned on the Rhine. If.
On September 17th, the operation was launched. Then we were over the DZ, and it was red on,
stand up, hook up, green on, go, and out we went. Feet together, head down, shoulders round,
feet together, watch the ground, boom, that's it. 101st Airborne quickly secured the canal bridges.
82nd took Grave, but was forced back from Nijmegen by a strong counter-attack.
But on the 18th, 30th Corps linked with the 101st,
and the next day supporting the 82nd renewed pressure on the bridge at Nijmegen.
The bridge fell to them, and Operation Market had succeeded. The British 1st Airborne had
achieved its initial objective on the first day, the 17th. Both paratroop and glider units
were well grouped, and after a hard fight, the bridge over the Rhine was secured.
Three battalions made north, center, and southerly advances, but only 2nd Battalion in the south had
reached its final objective on the northern approaches of the bridge. And there it stuck.
The bridge was a long way ahead of 30th Corps. A bridge too far, in fact, unless German resistance
was moderate. It wasn't. By this stage of the war, the Western Allies have got almost total
command of the German secret intelligence. They're reading German messages virtually as soon as they're
sent. What they did know, but what wasn't passed on to the troops who were responsible for actually
carrying out this operation, was that in exactly the place where the paratroops were to be dropped,
there was a German panzer division resting and re-equipping. So they literally dropped
the 1st Allied Airborne Army onto the top of a German SS panzer division.
And that's where things started to unravel, for they were strong units.
They were the 9th and 10th SS panzer divisions, and they pressed on the British bridgehead with
superior numbers and weaponry. On the 21st, the Polish brigade was dropped south of the Rhine.
They had been delayed in joining the battle by bad weather, and poor intelligence dropped them
into strong German positions, where instead of being able to force a way through to reinforce
1st Airborne, they were cut to pieces. Airborne troops are comparatively speaking only lightly
armed, and landing behind the enemy's lines they faced the prospect of engaging fully equipped
heavily armed forces, thus all the hazards of an isolated operation. Further compounding 1st
Airborne's situation was the loss of their drop zones. Malfunctioning radios made it almost impossible
to advise the RAF of this, and consequently vital resupply fell into the wrong hands.
Of 390 tons of supplies dropped, only 31 tons were received by the British division.
We went in there on Sunday, and fought from there until Wednesday afternoon.
And there weren't many of us left then, and ammunition was pretty well non-existent.
General Urquhart, commanding 1st Airborne, made the decision to pull his men to a defensible
position to await relief by the overdue 30th Corps. This meant abandoning 2nd Battalion,
which had reached the northern end of the bridge. German troops, meanwhile, cut across the British
line of advance south of Uden, further slowing the relieving column. On the 26th, nine days after the
drop, 30th finally linked up with 1st Airborne, but it was too late to affect a battle that had
been lost. Market Garden is an absurd Allied defeat at the very moment where the Allies are
gloriously advancing through France and Belgium, liberating the country as they go. It should never
have happened. The Allies are massively well equipped, they've got more weapons, more equipment,
more intelligence than the Germans, but they fail to use it. Of 10,000 who had landed at Arnhem,
2,000 marched out with 30th Corps. Most of the rest saw out the remainder of the war
as prisoners of the Germans. Market Garden certainly doesn't do Montgomery's reputation
any good. Eisenhower already knows that he's a hard man to work with, and Market Garden puts the
cap on it. It has another effect, of course, and that is that the Allies are not going to get to
the Maas and certainly not get across the Rhine in 1944. And of course it means that Eisenhower's
actually right, that you can't simply drive your column into North Germany and expect to win.
You've got to advance on a broad front, and that's exactly what the Allies do
in 1945, and that's what gets the Germans defeated in the West.
The overwhelming size of significant actions, like the landings at Normandy or Japan's epic
sweep through the Asia-Pacific region, dominate our view of war, distracting us from campaigns
unfairly referred to as sideshows. But some sideshows have real strategic significance,
and all of them involve real fighting, real destruction, real death. In the wash-up from
the First World War, Britain and France, then the possessors of the world's two great maritime
empires, had divided the Middle East between them. With the fall of France, the collaborationist
government was allowed to retain control of French colonies. So it was that opposing forces
faced each other across the desert frontier. French standards, symbolic of the nation's honour,
sailed for safekeeping in French African territory. France had carved out Lebanon and Syria,
both guarding the eastern Mediterranean and Syrian astride routes into Iran, then Persia,
a major source of vital oil, and neighbouring the British sphere of influence in Iraq,
where rebellion against the British had only been curbed in May. On June 8th, a joint British,
Commonwealth and Free French force moved into Lebanon and Syria, with the expectation that
45,000 strong Vichy French garrison would surrender and march over to the Allied cause.
But it did not, and six weeks of fierce fighting ensued before the Vichy French lost the battle,
and 6,000 were counted as casualties. The Vichy French resisted skillfully along all three of
the Allied routes of advance. On the coastal sector, fierce fighting occurred at the Litani
River on the 9th of June, and on the 12th of June, it was decided to transfer the bulk of the
forces to the coastal advance, where good progress was being made by the 10th Indian Division and
Free French forces. Much of the Vichy force comprised French colonial troops. The Vichy
troops dug themselves in well at all points, often holding fire to point-blank range, but this only
made our fellows all the more determined to finish off the job. When Australian James Heather Gordon
charged a machine gun emplacement during the Battle of Jazeem, an action for which he was
awarded the Victoria Cross, he found that he had been fighting not Frenchmen, but Senegalese.
The Allied advance stalled on Jebel Abu Atris, where a flanking move by Free French tanks was
stopped by heavy shelling from Vichy artillery, and troops holding Kanetra on the other main road
to Damascus reported the approach of a strong Vichy force from the north. Two companies of
Free French troops were sent to reinforce defensive positions across the road. By 0900
on the 15th of June, Indian troops were pushing forward into the hills, and within an hour
had captured Tal Kisue. By 1130, Free French marines had secured the village of Montkalbe.
In the second phase of the attack, Free French were fighting Vichy French.
The very tragedy that General de Gaulle had wanted to avoid at Dakar.
What a comment on the so-called honor of the Vichy leaders, that they should have ordered their men
to fight not only their former British allies, but even the Free French, their own countrymen.
During the night of the 15th of June, Indian troops took R2s on the Kanetra to Damascus road,
cutting the communications of the Vichy force advancing on Kanetra, but their approach was too
slow. On the afternoon of the 16th of June, the Allies at Kanetra outnumbered three to one,
and facing tanks against which they had no effective counter, surrendered. But by the 18th
of June, the situation had been restored. Allied focus switched to Damascus, which fell on the 21st
of June. On that day, a mixed force of British troops, including those of the Arab Legion,
entered Syria from Iraq and advanced on Palmyra, which was attacked on the 25th of June.
The Vichy forces held out for nine days before surrendering.
Finally, the entry into Damascus. You could hardly say the population looked gloomy about
our arrival, could you? After the capture of Damascus, the drive on Beirut,
chiefly the Australian 7th Division, became the main Allied focus. On the 10th of July,
the Australians were within 10 kilometers of Beirut. The British 4th Cavalry Brigade
was closing on Homs, and the 10th Indian Division was advancing into northern Syria.
Of course, the importance of our occupation of Syria hardly needs stressing.
Success in Syria justifies us in choking one more mark against Hitler.
The Vichy French commander, General Henry Dentz, sought an armistice. He had lost the battle,
and his command of 38,000 surviving troops was given the option to be returned to Vichy France
or to join the Free French forces. Less than 6,000 elected to join the Free French.
That mattered less than the control that Britain now had in the Middle East.
The Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, and the Arab oil fields were all more defensible
because of the sideshow in Syria. On the 25th of April 1945, American and Soviet troops made
contact. The link up between the Americans and the Russians of the river Elba near Togau marked
the climax of the two great advances into the heart of Germany from west and east. It was
colossal news. On the same day, the Red Army completed its encirclement of Berlin.
Berlin, at the same time, became a fortress city. That was the special concept, meaning that the
city was to be defended at all costs, to the last cartridge, to the last bullet, to the last man.
Defensive preparations were made in depth, but resources were far from elite.
The numbers in Berlin, well, there are no concrete numbers. It mostly was a mishmash
of units, so police units, Hitler Youth units, and Volkssturm units, just people's militia
made of those who were not able to serve in the regular army because they were either too young
or too old or had some sicknesses, health issues, pretty much everything they could get.
The 12th Army, west of the city, comprised 12 divisions that were a grab bag of raw recruits.
Von Manteuffel's Third Panzer Army, north of the city, comprised nine divisions,
none of which was panzer. The total deployed in defense of the capital was some 50 in different
divisions. Coming towards them were almost 200 divisions of the Red Army, and as they came,
they scorched the earth. The Soviet offensive was designed to ensure the fall of Berlin no later
than May Day, May the 1st. Soviet forces began to move on April the 12th. Air raids continued
to pummel the city. The Berliners, they built tram barricades, piles of rubble to block the
streets, but how could that help really? Because seven Soviet armies were advancing exactly on
Berlin, and the Berlin garrison had less than a hundred thousand men. This is less than a corps
against seven Soviet full able-bodied armies. So their situation was dire, to say the least.
Zhukov's first Belarusian front in the center, Konev's first Ukrainian front to his south.
Rokossovsky's second Belarusian to his north would race each other for the prize.
On April 16th, Zhukov's offensive began when three red flares shot skywards, and 140 search
lights were turned on in the eyes of the enemy. Then three green flares signaled the start of a
ground-shattering bombardment, literally so shocking that entire villages collapsed and
whole forests exploded as 8,983 Soviet guns opened up. The bombardment lasted for 35 minutes,
then abruptly, neatly, it stopped. And the Red Army moved forward, more than six million men and
women with one thing in mind. Zhukov, advancing from his bridgehead on the Oder, was aiming for
the heart of the city. The Germans, mostly the SS units, they were tough in battle, but nothing
could save them. This is obvious, because the Soviet soldiers, they were so close to the victory
that they were waiting for, fighting for, hoping for, for four years. Now there is a moment of
revenge, especially for those who lost their loved ones or who went through the occupied
territories in the Soviet Union, saw the horrible massacres and all the outcomes of the genocidal
policy that the German state was executing in the occupied eastern territories. So now
they were fighting with even more rage, more anger. Retribution is incidental in the course
of military operations, but certainly here in Berlin there was all the evidence of it.
Retribution for the havoc caused by Hitler's Huns in Leningrad and Warsaw,
London, Coventry, Rotterdam and all the devastated cities of the Allies.
On the 26th, the city centre was ringed and Soviet forces, advancing house to house,
room to room, moved in. Their objective was the Reichstag.
Berlin was hell, pretty much. This was hell. A number of those who fought,
they remember that it was hard to tell if it was night or day, because thick black smoke
was covering the sunlight. The smoke that was lit by the fires of knocked out tanks and
buildings, screams in the air, screams of those wounded, because Berlin was full of
civilians that, of course, were dying during the course of the battle. And dust from the
destroyed buildings was always in the air. It was hard to breathe all the time,
cracked on the teeth of those who fought. On April 30th, after first successfully
testing the poison on his beloved dog Blondie, Hitler and his new bride bit down on cyanide
capsules, at which point Hitler, to be certain, shot himself in the temple.
The Red Army was 200 metres away. The next day, the Reichstag fell,
and the red flag was famously hoisted on its roof. General Helmut Weidling,
commanding the military garrison, surrendered the city.
Berlin as a capital, as a city even, was dead. This was what remained of the Reichstag,
the building which gained worldwide notoriety when the Nazis seized power.
The battle for the capital had cost more than 300,000 Soviet casualties,
perhaps a similar number of German casualties, and, in addition, 480,000 German prisoners,
who had failed in their attempt to break out west to surrender to the American,
British and French forces, from whom they expected kinder treatment.
The capital has fallen, but the resistance still was going in the north. Some troops were still
fighting for the Third Empire that did not exist, that lasted for only 12 years.
The last of the last they just decided to give themselves in late May 1945.
This was the end of the Reich.