Elon Musk Revealed Shocking Secret about What Happened To Boeing Starliner!

The thruster failure during the Boeing Starliner crew test flight is the most obvious example of Boeing's technical weakness. Of course, Boeing's technical weakness is not just about poor workmanship, but it also reflects a wider culture problem at the company. To get the real story, we need to dive deep into the inner workings of Boeing and its relationship with its contractors, such as Aerojet Rocketdyne, and even its buyer, NASA. Find out everything in today's TechMap episode. But before we begin, let's subscribe to the channel to stay up to date with the latest space news. The return of Boeing's Starliner Calypso to Earth without its crew was perhaps the hollowest victory in Boeing's history of space exploration. Rather than focusing on the spacecraft's safe landing, what has captured the public's attention most is Calypso's failure to fulfill its role in the crew flight test mission. It carried astronauts to the ISS but was not allowed to take them home due to safety concerns, leaving the new kid on the block, Boeing's rival SpaceX, to help. Furthermore, Boeing's longtime ally, NASA, which has covered up Boeing's mistakes time and again, has ended up embarrassing them even more. The U.S. Space Agency has totally no regrets about the decision to return without astronauts on board. The crack between Boeing and NASA has started since NASA consent to allow both astronauts Butch and Suni to stay on the ISS until February 2025 and return on a SpaceX Dragon. In response, Boeing representatives were later absent in the August 24 press conference, where NASA announced that final decision. Two Boeing officials didn't also show up at a news conference after the flight without reason. Of course, this is just Boeing's childish tantrum because they knew full well that their credibility in the eyes of NASA and the public at large was gone. They also realize well that one of the is a severing of communication between those at the top of the company and the people actually doing the work. It's people at the top not understanding what was going on and having no interest in understanding, said Richard Aboulafia, an aviation industry analyst at Aerodynamic Advisory. The idea of taking an engineering company and having non-engineers running it with a complete ignorance of technical challenges is a recipe for trouble. It's safe to say that who killed Boeing is the company itself, not someone else. In 1997, Boeing made a history merger with McDonnell Douglas, valued at approximately $14 billion, which allowed Boeing to consolidate its position in the aerospace industry. While the firm had a great aerospace tradition in building airliners, starting with the iconic DC-3, McDonnell Douglas found it increasingly difficult to compete with first Boeing and then Airbus. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the company's military business had fallen on hard times and it had to be very sensitive to costs. Lacking the resources to embark on new product development, merging with Boeing was McDonnell Douglas's way to exit the industry. However, while the firm's name was retired, the McDonnell Douglas management team did not leave quietly. In fact, the tougher, leaner managers of the weaker company elbowed out the more gentlemanly leaders of the bigger company. The result was that Boeing's idealistic engineers ended up being run by McDonnell Douglas's hard-bitten veterans. These were accountants, financial controllers, and other managers obsessed with cost savings and used to running things on a shoestring budget. They were also very sensitive to shareholder wealth. One money-hungry CEO described those who cared too much about safety and quality rather than the company's stock price as, quote, phenomenally talented assholes. To appease Wall Street and Boeing has engaged in substantial stock buybacks, spending billions to enhance shareholder value. This approach has been criticized as it diverts funds that could otherwise be invested in safety improvements and technological innovation. It doled out hundreds of millions of dollars on campaign contributions and lobbying to lower safety standards, rake in massive government contracts, and boost its bottom line. In 2018 alone, the company spent over $15 million on lobbying efforts, making it one of the top players in Washington's lobbying landscape. This spending is aimed at influencing legislation and regulations that affect the aerospace industry, often focusing on lowering safety standards and securing lucrative government contracts. To cut costs, the new management approach encouraged extensive outsourcing and a modular design strategy where a significant portion of design and manufacturing was delegated to external partners. This strategy aimed to reduce costs and development time but often resulted in coordination issues and quality control problems, as seen in the troubled development of Boeing's Starliner spacecraft. Take the case of its propulsion system, for example, which has failed several times in both the 2022 uncrewed test flight and the first crewed test flight. While SpaceX developed its Draco and Super Draco thrusters internally for Dragon, Boeing took a more traditional path, turning to industry leader Aerojet Rocketdyne for Starliner's various thrusters. In turn, Rocketdyne had its own myriad subcontractors. One of the big differences between new space companies like SpaceX and traditional space companies is vertical integration. If it works well, developing and building one's own technology is faster, cheaper, and much more efficient. Everyone is also on the same team and pulling in the same direction. By contrast, partnerships between two large aerospace corporations are often cumbersome. The need to coordinate across multiple teams, obtain approvals, and navigate different corporate cultures and processes can make even simple tasks like designing a widget an arduous undertaking. Even if a problem does occur, it becomes much more complicated to resolve because this involves a dozen different people in different departments at different companies have touched the part. As a result, it adds time and cost, and no one feels ownership of the process. At a new space company, the process can be much simpler. An engineer designs a part and writes a purchase order for the shop to build it. As an engineer, you're supposed to solve hard problems, but the structural inefficiency was a huge deal, said one person familiar with this process at Rocketdyne and Boeing. Additionally, can't help but mention a poor working relationship between Rocketdyne and Boeing. That relationship was severely strained in June 2018 when the Starliner spacecraft experienced an anomaly during a hot-fire test of its launch abort system. Boeing and Rocketdyne more or less hated one another, according to sources. Everyone was in super defensive mode even before this happened. It had been classified as a risk, but the two sides weren't talking openly and honestly about it. In addition to hiring outsourcing, another strategy that Boeing used to increase its revenue is through a cost-plus contract. Cost-plus contracts leave the buyer, such as NASA, who has little to no control or understanding of the likely or possible overruns. It leaves the buyer open to fraud. A typical example is in the SLS Block 1B project primarily made by Boeing. According to NASA's Office of Inspector General, SLS Block 1B costs will reach approximately $5.7 billion before the system is scheduled to launch in 2028. This is $700 million more than NASA's 2023 agency baseline commitment. However, this approach of Boeing has become counterproductive for the fixed-price contracts, for instance, the contract under NASA's Commercial Crew Program. Fixed-price contracts leave the risk with the seller, for sure, but should also ensure that they carefully assess the program, what it'll take to complete it, and factor in some probable overruns in their costs. The sloppy workmanship and cutting-corner habit of Boeing resulted in bad consequences, as you can see the troubled Starliner has faced numerous issues and delays in its test flight program, with none of the three flights so far being problem-free. Obviously, all the costs of dealing with those problems were paid by Boeing, as required under the fixed-price contract. Boeing has taken about $1.6 billion in charges on Starliner throughout the program, mostly since a flawed initial uncrewed test flight in late 2019. The company took a $288 million loss on Starliner in 2023, including $257 million in the second quarter of last year, after the company delayed the CFT mission to 2024. The first crew flight test in June had a minimum mission duration of eight days. Starliner's return to Earth was delayed to allow time to perform further testing of propulsion system anomalies. As a result of the CFT delays during the three months that ended June 30, 2024, Boeing increased the reach forward loss on the program by $125 million. In the post-flight to being certified for the first operational mission, Starliner's glitches involving helium leak and thruster need to be handled, and Boeing has to pay for the bill. NASA has not ruled out the possibility of another crew flight test, which could cost its contractor $400 million. Due to financial pressures and the inefficiency of the Starliner program, analysts believe that Boeing is likely to cancel the program in the future. And that just about wraps it up for today's episode. Thank you, and we look forward to seeing you next time.