Red Heat, Empty Fields: Beijing’s Crisis of Control

China Truths
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Across China’s agricultural heartland, the despair is mounting. In Gansu, a province known more for arid resilience than desperation, one agricultural blogger recently described the current season as the worst drought in two decades. “It hasn’t rained in three months,” she said. “If this continues, everything we planted will die.” Her losses from last year’s hailstorm were already devastating—this year’s drought may finish what the climate started. #china #chinatruths #chinanews
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When the Cotinopsis palosula plants had just sprouted a little,
they were all attacked by hail and died.
Last year I lost a lot of money.
It was all natural disasters and man-made disasters.
I don't blame anyone.
I just hoped that next year would be better.
But this year is the complete opposite.
I really didn't expect it.
Do you know?
Across China's agricultural heartland, the despair is mounting.
In Gansu, a province known more for arid resilience than desperation,
one agricultural blogger recently described the current season
as the worst drought in two decades.
It hasn't rained in three months, she said.
If this continues, everything we've planted will die.
Her losses from last year's hailstorm were already devastating.
This year's drought may finish what the climate started.
In Henan, a 70-year-old farmer stood in a scorched wheat field shaking his head.
The harvest is just weeks away, he said.
But there's nothing to collect.
Only empty husks.
There's no such drought disaster as this year.
It means that this crop of crops is the same as the wheat I planted.
There is no water on the mountain.
All of them will die.
These aren't isolated complaints.
They are distress signals from China's so-called breadbasket,
a region now boiling under record heat,
wilting under policy failures,
and unraveling under the weight of systemic environmental neglect.
In mid-May 2025,
record-breaking heat is engulfing much of northern and central China.
On May 19, the National Meteorological Center reported that temperatures in Zhengzhou,
the capital of Henan province,
soared to a staggering 109.2 degrees Fahrenheit,
breaking the city's historical high for the month of May.
The same day, parts of Hebei and Shandong provinces recorded similarly extreme readings,
with Henan occupying five of the top ten hottest cities in China.
In other videos at Gansu province,
the drought conditions have reached critical levels.
Fields lie cracked and barren,
with crops facing near-total failure.
Footage circulating on Chinese social media
shows farmers kneeling in desiccated soil,
arms lifted in silent appeals for rain.
In one instance,
villagers erected a makeshift altar and conducted traditional rituals,
a sign of both desperation and cultural defiance
against decades of state-promoted atheism.
With no meaningful rainfall for months,
local residents are bracing for a catastrophic harvest shortfall
and deepening rural hardship.
Local media captured the crisis through viral videos.
China National Radio reported that surface temperatures in Zhengzhou
reached 145.6 degrees Fahrenheit.
Footage from social media showed the seat of an electric bicycle
parked on the street was so hot to 163.4 degrees Fahrenheit
that it burned the buttocks of pedestrians.
A puppy was shaking its legs on the street,
and the soles of pedestrian's sandals were melted by the heat
and delivery workers collapsing from heat exhaustion.
It felt like standing inside an oven,
one resident told Jimu News on May 20.
Beyond the immediate human suffering,
the heat is accelerating a hydrological collapse
across China's most vital river systems.
The Han River, which supplies central China,
and the Wei River, a key tributary of the Yellow River,
have shrunk dramatically.
In March and April 2025,
aerial images showed riverbeds cracking open
across Gansu, Shanxi, and Henan,
regions critical to China's wheat output.
By early May, residents were filmed walking across sections
of the Yellow River that had once flowed with immense volume.
As one farmer in Luoyang remarked,
this used to be our lifeline. Now it's a ditch.
According to unofficial reports
suggest from a hydrology institute in Shanxi,
satellite imaging from the past six months
shows a 30-40% drop in surface water coverage
across key river basins.
Yet Beijing has not released
any updated official hydrology reports since 2022.
Infrastructure projects like the South-to-North Water Diversion Scheme,
once hailed as a miracle of engineering,
have exacerbated regional disparities,
draining southern reservoirs to keep water flowing
toward the party's political core in Beijing.
The Chinese Communist regime's decades-long obsession
with growth at all costs
has neglected the country's most essential infrastructure,
its natural water systems.
Dams have rerouted rivers without ecological planning.
Agricultural policies have promoted high-output,
water-intensive crops like wheat and rice,
even in arid provinces.
Urban sprawl continues to pave over groundwater recharge zones,
and in the face of all this,
climate reality is overwhelming the Communist Party's propaganda.
Beijing's narrative remains focused on
scientific development and modernization.
Yet the regime's failure to prepare for,
or even honestly report,
this environmental collapse is now putting lives,
food security, and energy systems at risk.
As heat waves grow more severe and water sources evaporate,
China's leadership seems more focused on optics than outcomes.
China's climate crisis isn't just a slow burn.
It's a whiplash.
In the span of mere weeks,
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
swung from an extreme drought to deadly flooding,
laying bare the instability of Beijing's environmental management.
According to official figures
from the Guangxi Flood Control and Drought Relief Headquarters,
as of April 17, 2025,
97.5% of Guangxi was classified as experiencing meteorological drought.
68.7% of the region was under extreme drought,
with some counties seeing virtually no rain since November 2024.
The southern provinces of Guilin, Luzhou, Hechi, Nanning, and Wuzhou,
major centers of sugarcane and rice cultivation,
were parched.
Forest fire risks soared.
Urban water supplies began running low.
The local government issued a Level 3 emergency alert for drought prevention.
Yet by May 18, less than four weeks later,
the same regions were underwater.
In Shijiai Town, Kangwu County,
rainfall exceeded 5.5 inches in just two hours.
Videos verified by Jimmu News
showed torrents of brown water cascading through residential streets.
Vehicles swept away like driftwood
and panicked residents attempting to anchor their cars with ropes.
Ten bridges collapsed.
Sixty homes were damaged.
And over 330 residents were displaced.
The following day, in Miaoming, Guangdong,
a landslide in Hehua Town buried homes in mud,
killing three people and leaving one still missing.
Local media confirmed that the mudslide
dumped over 6,000 cubic meters of debris onto residential property,
obliterating structures and displacing families.
The mudflow originated just 20 meters behind a self-built housing cluster
that had no protective zoning.
The death toll may be higher,
but local authorities are notoriously opaque in disaster reporting.
On May 18, heavy rain struck Yangshuo County in Guilin, Guangxi,
bringing thunder, lightning and strong winds.
The Yulong River's water levels surged rapidly.
By May 19, video footage showed an unfinished bridge in Xingping Town
collapsing under the force of the floodwaters.
No casualties have been reported.
This is not random weather. It is systemic failure.
Chinese authorities continue to treat these events
as isolated, natural disasters,
rather than symptoms of chronic environmental collapse
exacerbated by the regime's own policies.
The Communist Party's engineering obsession,
the so-called South-to-North Water Diversion Project,
has drained southern provinces like Guangxi and Jiangxi
to funnel water into northern megacities like Beijing.
The result? Southern reservoirs dry out in winter,
then collapse under pressure when seasonal rains finally arrive.
Even more revealing is the growing urban-rural divide in China's water access.
In Beijing and other major northern cities,
water shortages have been largely mitigated
through the South-to-North Water Diversion Project,
which has rerouted over 70 billion cubic meters of water
since 2014 from provinces such as Hubei, Jiangxi and Anhui.
Government officials have lauded the project
as a success in securing urban water security.
Move at least 330,000 people were displaced over the past few years
to make way for the expanded reservoir and canal
from the Yangtze River to Beijing,
but many weren't impressed by their new yet.
In the same southern regions that feed this pipeline,
rural communities are facing acute shortages.
In Guangxi and Jiangxi, villagers report dry wells,
cracked reservoirs and reliance on trucked-in water for basic needs.
While elite government compounds in Beijing enjoy steady supplies,
farmers in the south are praying for rain,
a stark reminder of who the system truly serves.
Even China's top weather agency had to issue a Level 4 emergency
for rainstorms on May 18,
while the Ministry of Natural Resources warned of landslides
across several provinces.
In any functioning democracy, this level of instability
But in Beijing, it's business as usual.
In contrast to countries like the U.S. or Japan,
where flood control relies on real-time data,
local decision-making, zoning laws and transparent communication,
China's disaster response remains secretive, centralized and reactive.
Meanwhile, censorship silences the truth.
Videos of floods and landslides briefly surfaced online
before being deleted.
State media downplayed the crisis,
focusing on rescue stories while avoiding any mention of root causes.
3. Food Security Crisis
Failing Harvests and Grain Unrest
As record heat scorches China's major wheat-growing regions,
the country is now facing a looming food security crisis.
In Henan Province, traditionally referred to as China's granary,
wheat yields have collapsed.
Farmers are reporting less than 110 pounds per one-sixteenth acre,
a fraction of the break-even point.
According to footage verified by multiple independent Chinese bloggers,
entire wheat fields have been harvested weeks early,
not because they were ready, but because they were dying.
One clip filmed near Yong Village, Huai County in May 2025
shows a farmer holding two ears of wheat,
one with nothing inside and the other with barely a dozen kernels.
This year, the drought hit everything.
We planted over six acres.
All we got was about 220 pounds of wheat.
That's barely enough to pay for one family meal, he says.
Irrigation costs have skyrocketed.
In Luoyang, a region in western Henan,
farmers report spending over 1,000 yuan, roughly $140,
to water just 1.5 acres of land,
while grain prices remain low, hovering near 1 yuan per pound.
One villager told Jimu News,
we spent more on diesel, fertilizer and electricity
than we'll earn back selling the wheat.
What's worse, many farmers are now giving up on planting corn.
In Guigang, Guangxi, a rare drought has hit hard.
By mid-April, 431 counties faced severe drought.
Villagers line up for water at dawn,
fish ponds are dry and fields crack open.
Despite pumps running non-stop, irrigation remains difficult.
A 91-year-old man said,
I've never seen anything like this.
Rainfall has dropped by half,
and extreme heat is worsening the crisis.
This goes beyond weather.
It's a systemic failure.
While Beijing insists grain production is stable,
local officials are quietly raising alarms.
On May 12, officials in Luoyang and western Henan
confirmed the wheat harvest was forced early
due to heat and water stress.
Yields were revised down,
but Beijing has yet to publicly acknowledge the losses.
The historical parallels are no longer abstract.
Even state meteorologists have begun drawing comparisons to 1961,
the final year of the so-called three years of natural disasters.
However, historians widely agree
those disasters were largely man-made,
driven by Mao's disastrous agricultural collectivization
and grain requisitioning policies.
Today, the causes are different,
but the Party's behavior is not.
Censorship, statistical manipulation, and empty slogans
have once again replaced transparency and reform.
Fertilizer hoarding and black market sales are rising,
with some provinces seeing nitrate-based fertilizer
sold at 30 to 50 percent above market rates.
Many farmers can't afford it,
resorting to skipping fertilizer or using untreated groundwater,
putting both yield and food safety at risk.
In a healthy market economy,
this would prompt swift policy action and financial support.
But in China, the focus is on image control.
In April 2025, Beijing announced a ten-year plan
for agricultural reform,
claiming food security is guaranteed,
even as crops wither nationwide.
This crisis isn't just environmental.
It's political.
The regime's propaganda about a bumper harvest
echoes Mao-era denialism,
ignoring the suffering on the ground
while doubling down on central control.
And just like six decades ago,
it's the rural poor who will pay the price first.
Over 1,250 bank branches in China shut down,
marking a 30 percent increase from last year.
On June 7,
the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
announced that, during the first five months of this year,
a total of 1,257 bank branches exited the market,
marking a 30.41 percent increase
from the same period last year.
Shanghai's state-run media outlet, The Paper,
reported that out of the total closures,
527 were rural commercial banks,
which accounted for 41.93 percent.
Additionally, 266 closures involved
rural credit cooperatives and their branches,
which made up 21.16 percent of the total.
Together, these rural financial institutions
comprised 63.09 percent of all the shutdowns.
It's worth noting that some rural commercial banks
closed multiple branches simultaneously.
Other types of banks also saw branch closures—
227 from major state-owned banks,
94 from joint-stock banks,
82 from city commercial banks,
and 34 from rural and township banks.
These figures represent 18.06 percent,
7.48 percent, 6.52 percent,
and 2.7 percent of the total closures, respectively.
Furthermore, the market saw the exit
of 16 foreign bank branches
and six policy bank branches.
Additionally, the rate at which
new banking institutions are being established
has slowed down.
According to China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission data,
only 894 new bank branches
were established across the country
in the first five months of 2024.
Liu Feiping from the China Postal Savings
Bank Research Institute explained
that the current low net interest margins
in the banking sector are reducing profitability
and increasing the need for more capital,
prompting some branches to close
to minimize operational costs.
Echoing this, a specialist from a think tank
stated that banks are earning less profit
than before, leading them to shut down
some branches to reduce expenses.
CCP strictly controls senior officials' travel abroad,
expert analyzes three reasons.
On June 6, the South China Morning Post
reported that the Chinese Communist Party
has been tightening travel restrictions
for public officials and now also targets
high-ranking individuals in state-owned enterprises,
banks, universities, and hospitals.
These groups must hand over their passports
and apply for permission to travel abroad.
Furthermore, within the CCP's framework,
officials of bureau chief status or higher,
including retirees,
are subjected to lifelong travel bans.
Mr. Li Yuanhua, an Australian-based historian,
outlined three reasons for the CCP's actions.
Firstly, no official is immune to corruption.
If they've embezzled money and moved it abroad,
then fleeing becomes difficult
because a red notice could be issued.
So, while it appears to curb corruption,
it's fundamentally rooted in fear.
The issue of corrupt CCP officials
and state enterprise executives
absconding with funds is longstanding.
In May, mainland economist Liu Qiyuan estimated
that capital flight from China
exceeds US$3 trillion.
Mr. Li explained,
many have seen the CCP's decline
and sense its impending doom.
Some, having profited,
wish to abandon this sinking ship
and enjoy retirement in the free world.
The CCP, however,
wants everyone to sink with it.
Secondly, the CCP fears that officials
exposed to free societies
will see through its propaganda,
rendering brainwashing ineffective,
which causes panic within the CCP.
Thus, they restrict travel to control minds.
Thirdly, due to insufficient foreign exchange reserves,
depleted by the greedy and corrupt,
if ordinary people travel and spend,
nothing remains.
Another possibility is the depletion
of the national treasury,
making the CCP averse to overseas spending.
For years, the CCP has tightened restrictions
on anti-communist groups.
Mainland democracy activist
Geng Hongjun, despite having a visa,
couldn't leave.
Geng recounted that he tried to leave twice
but was stopped by customs.
Eventually, he reached the US
through irregular channels,
by traveling from Yunnan to Laos and then on.
Mainland anchor Liu Ziyao's husband,
suppressed for pro-democracy activities,
also fled to the US using a similar strategy.
Liu explained that a friend,
detained briefly for a minor issue,
was blocked at the border upon their return.
They succeeded because they traveled
without any documents,
making them untraceable.
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